Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

It is said that the corporation, which it is proposed to recharter, independent of the facility it affords to Government in the collection of the revenue, has also particular advantages given to it; that it is a monopoly; and what right, it is asked, has Congress to grant a monopoly? I will ask, in return, when an officer is appointed to collect the customs, has he not a salary and emoluments? Is not every office in law called a franchise or a particular privilege? If the officer who has these emoluments, privileges, or franchises, (call them what you will) receives these in consideration for his services, have you not the power to hold out inducements to associated bodies of men to form an institution from which the public may derive benefit, not with a view exclusively to their monopoly and benefit but on account of the advantages to be derived from it by the public?

The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay,) with his usual ingenuity, spoke of the enormous evil and the danger to our liberties that is to be anticipated from giving the power to erect corporations, which he says is an original power, and has given being to institutions which have swelled to an enormous magnitude. The example of the East India Company and the South Sea Company were spoken of in an alarming, impressive, and ingenious manner. But, I ask, sir, if the State Governments do not possess this gigantic power? I see nothing to restrain them more than the General Government. I see that the only supervisors as to the State Governments are the people themselves, who are also the supervisors of Congress, who have also the invidious jealous eyes of the State Governments constantly upon them, as is illustrated in the conduct of some of the States on this very question, and who combined would guard this power from abuse by the General Government much more than the people alone will guard against abuses by the States. It is a visionary mode of reasoning to argue against the possession of power from the abuse of it. The gentleman may as well tell us that we may raise armies to so monstrous an extent as to crush our liberties; and, therefore, we ought not on any emergency to raise an army. He may as well say the creation of a military school, which is as much and no more a resulting power than the one in question, is giving to Congress a great substantive independent power to create a vast engine, under the name of a military school, which may swell to such an immense importance as to make it an instrument to swallow all the liberties of the country. So as respects sites for forts and armories, and ore banks, powers exercised by implication, the gentleman, from the unlimited indulgence he gives to a gloomy and foreboding imagination, may say, you may purchase the territorial rights of the States until you destroy their sovereignty. There is no end to the extent of such reasoning. We must rely in some degree on ourselves, on the vigilance of the State Governments, and on the discretion of the people. When the whole body politic is so corrupt that there are no eyes on our rulers to see when they transcend the powers of the constitution, all is lost, and no paper reservations can save us.

Mr. President, I am ready to admit that where a measure obtains, that inflicts a violation on our constitution that is unquestionable, palpable, and notorious, however frequently and however solemnly this measure had been sanctioned, however long it had been submitted to and endured, would not be considerations with me of any importance or create one moment of doubt. Error, however repeated and submitted to, is error still, and every occasion should be sought to get rid of it; but on an occasion in the origin of which the constitutional question was doubtful, when men of the purest integrity and most illumined intelligence might pause and differ and doubt, I should imagine that such case once acted on should never again be touched, unless considerations of irresistible importance lead to such a measure; and I imagine that every man of candor and intelligence who weighs with due deliberation the question under consideration, will at least admit, if the measure is not certainly constitutional, it is at least of that description of character I have last mentioned. In such an instance as this, will it be said that after this measure has been sanctioned by Congress on full deliberation and debate; after the bill establishing this bank had received the approbation of the President, who reserved his signature to it till the last moment permitted by the constitution, and after he had viewed the question with all its bearings in every attitude it could be presented, after full consultation with his Cabinet Ministers and others of high intellectual character; after the law thus sanctioned by the Legislature and the President has been acquiesced in and practised on for the space of twenty years, when it has been considered inviolable, and corroborating laws passed during the administration and legislation of different dominant political parties; when those laws have been sanctioned by the solemn adjudication of all our judges, both of the General and State Governments; to suppose that all these considerations are to have no influence as to putting to rest a constitutional question which was doubtful in its origin, is to be skeptical and scrupulous beyond all reasonable bound. If Congress had no right to incorporate a bank, was it not an act of usurpation in the President and Congress to pass laws punishing individuals for the forgery of its paper? Nay, more, Mr. President, when we inflict death for the support of institutions Congress had no right to create, and for the violation of laws the constitution prohibits that body from enacting – (and under the denomination of each of the political sects into which this country is divided, agreeable to the principles now contended for by gentlemen, such laws have been passed) – are not the Executive which sanctions, the Congress which passed, and the whole body of our Judiciary, both of the General and State Governments, which enforces such unconstitutional measures, and under their surreptitious authority inflicts death upon our citizens, worse than usurpers? Are they not murderers? Yes, Mr. President, I reiterate, are they not murderers? And are we prepared to pronounce so heavy a denunciation on our predecessors, on ourselves, and the other great Departments of our Government? Are we ready to inform the American people that this body and all their constituted authorities have sported with the lives and illegally shed the blood of our citizens? My colleague was foreman of the jury that pronounced sentence, or that found a verdict, on the famous or rather infamous Logwood, for forgery of the paper of the Bank of the United States. This verdict was confirmed by the judge of the court, and the criminal punished agreeably to the judgment. Is a measure of such weighty and awful import, so solemnly and deliberately acted on and decided, and multifarious other decisions of the same description, to have no influence on the decision we are about to give respecting the constitutionality of establishing a National Bank? If they are not, then gentlemen view the subject through a very different medium than that through which it is presented to my vision. Then, in my judgment, Mr. President, our situation is alarming indeed.

To recapitulate: I derive the power to create a National Bank, when this constitution came into existence, from the situation of society, and our legal institutions at that time, and the difficulty, as things existed, that the revenue could be collected with advantage in any other way than by the agency of a bank. If this reasoning be deemed erroneous, I insist that the constitutional power of Congress to create a bank was in the first instance doubtful, and the principle having been recognized, and having received every sanction the Government could give, and practised on for more than twenty years, is not now to be called in question. Admitting that on both these points my views are erroneous; say that the establishment of the bank, at its commencement, was improper, still, if it be demonstrated that the existence or re-chartering of the bank is indispensable, or highly expedient at present, to the due exercise of enumerated rights of Congress, that which was improper or even perhaps unconstitutional at first, because it was not necessary, becomes constitutional and proper, because now expedient or essential. Congress is clothed by the constitution with a variety of delegated rights. Now, admitting that the establishment of a bank in the first instance was not necessary for the due exercise of the legislative rights bestowed in any one of these enumerated powers, if our predecessors in office, by the creation of a bank, which at best was an improper institution, because not necessary, have placed our fiscal concerns in such a situation that it cannot be put down without great injury to the revenue, which Congress is bound to levy; and collect, without injuring our commerce, without impairing our public credit, without lessening the public welfare, all of which Congress is bound to provide for and protect; if this can be demonstrated to be the probable result of pulling down the bank at this period, I would ask whether that institution, which was improper at first, because not necessary, does not become proper, because almost indispensable at present?

In construing the Constitution of the United States, when legislating on the enumerated powers of Congress, I lay down this rule of construction: that the only limitation to the power of Congress is either some positive or implied prohibition in the constitution itself, or the exercise of an honest and sober discretion. If, therefore, there is any reason to believe, at the present period and existing state of things, that by putting down the bank your revenue will be greatly impaired, your commerce will be injured, the public credit lessened, all of which Congress is to protect; does not such a state of things make it proper that the bank, which ought not to have been created, because not necessary, now ought to be continued because indispensable? It may here be said, that I am varying the constitution if I say that a thing is proper to-day which was not proper five and twenty years ago; that this vibration will always keep the constitution in an uncertain state. I say, no. My doctrine is subject to no such accusation; the principles of the constitution are uniform and unalterable. It is an uniform and unalterable principle, that Congress have the power to lay and collect taxes; they have the same positive, unchangeable right to exercise all the enumerated powers, the only rule of construction relating to them being that the means you use have a necessary relation to the power on which you legislate. If the means be not enumerated, you exercise discretion as to the means, having a regard to the existing state of things when you legislate concerning them. The same means may be necessary and proper now, which would not have been twenty years ago. You change the means to attain the end, but the end itself, the enumerated power in the constitution, remains unchanged. As long as the constitution exists, you must select the means most proper for executing the enumerated rights at the precise moment at which you legislate respecting them. If this be the true construction of the constitution respecting the recharter of the bank, the question merely resolves itself into an inquiry how far such a measure is at present expedient. To determine at this moment whether or not it be constitutional, or in other words expedient, to incorporate the Bank of the United States, I am to say whether, under existing circumstances, in the present state of society, situation of trade and revenue, the preservation and continuance of this institution is essentially necessary. If it be essentially necessary, we have a right to recharter the bank. I have been precise in stating this view of the subject, because it has not before been taken by any other gentleman.

Tuesday, February 19

The credentials of John Condit, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of New Jersey, for the term of six years, commencing on the fourth day of March next; and of William B. Giles, appointed a Senator by the Legislature of the State of Virginia, for the term of six years, commencing on the fourth day of March next, were severally read, and ordered to lie on file.

Bank of the United States

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States," passed on the 25th day of February, 1791.

Mr. Taylor. – Mr. President: Although much time has been consumed in the discussion of the subject before us, and the ground completely occupied by those who have gone before me, yet the importance of the subject, the immense magnitude of the unhappy consequences likely to result to the nation from the rejection of the bill on your table, compel me to offer to it all the support in my power. Indeed, sir, to this sense of duty to the nation is superadded a very sacred, and to me indispensable duty – my duty to the State which I have the honor in part to represent, as well as another duty, which from the course the debate has taken, is not to be disregarded; I mean, sir, the duty which I owe to myself.

I cannot, as other gentlemen have boasted they can, put my hand into my drawer and pull out the instructions by which I am to be directed on this important subject.

The State of South Carolina is a very large stockholder in some of her State banks, and if a selfish policy, contracted to the narrow sphere of the unique advantage in dollars and cents of the Government of that State – in contradiction and disregard of the great body of her own citizens, and the citizens of the rest of the States in the Union – could have weighed a moment with her Legislature, I too might have been instructed. Let me not be understood, Mr. President, as drawing any comparison between the conduct of the State of South Carolina and the conduct of the great and leading States who have acted otherwise; but I must and will tell of the things that I do know. I rejoice, sir, that the State which I come from has, in this instance, been actuated by that magnanimity and patriotism which on all former occasions has distinguished her conduct; that neither selfishness, nor party rage, nor a spirit of intolerance, has induced her to counteract or embarrass the National Legislature in its pursuit of the great object of its institution, the good of the whole.

I hope it will not be considered as savoring of egotism when I say that my appointment to the very honorable station I now hold was unsolicited by me. That my sentiments on the subject now under consideration had been by me unequivocally expressed at the last session of Congress, and were well known to those who appointed me. Nay, further, after my venerable and respected predecessor had resigned his seat here, and had declined, also, his appointment for the ensuing six years, pending the election of a successor to him, and when my name was held in nomination, a resolution was offered, similar to those which we have heard so much talk about, proposing to instruct the Senators of that State to oppose the renewal of the charter of the Bank of the United States. This resolution, as I am informed, lay on the Speaker's table when the election was gone into. I was elected, and the proposers of the resolution had not power nor influence enough to raise it from the table on which it lay, and it died stillborn at the end of the session; and if I were to make an inference at all on these transactions, I should suppose I was tacitly instructed to vote for the renewal of the bank charter. But I seek not the avoidance of responsibility. It is here, sir, in my own bosom, I have instructions paramount to all others. My beloved country has rested the matter here, and my gratitude is superadded to all other moral obligations operating on me to perform this trust, and to execute this duty with faithfulness. I find the authority of Congress to grant this charter in the same sections of the constitution which the gentlemen who have gone before me have pointed out to you. In section seven, clause first, power is given to Congress "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties shall be uniform throughout the United States."

Clause second gives power "to borrow money on the credit of the United States." And, in the last clause of said section, power is also given to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the Government of the United States, or any department or officer thereof.

Let us understand the meaning of the words necessary and proper, to the last-quoted clause, for upon a correct knowledge of these depends, in my opinion, the correctness of our conclusions on this subject. The word necessary, in its technical and legal sense, in the meaning affixed to it in common parlance, established by usage, custom, reason, and the common law of the land, is different and distinct from the signification of the same adjective derived from the substantive necessity, as used by Hobbes, Hutchinson, Hume, and the other metaphysicians of the last century. It is well known that they used the substantive necessity as synonymous with the word fate, and which necessity, according to the opinions of one party, controlled omnipotence itself. This necessity was supposed by them co-existent with the Deity itself, not prospective nor discretionary, bending in one way, and in one way only, all substance, all matter, and all spirit. This meaning of the word is only to be found with these metaphysicians and philosophers; but in our law books, in the daily and hourly use of the word in common conversation, it has no such meaning. When the old Congress passed the conditional charter – which I admit they had not a delegated power to grant, but which is fully in point, both as to the signification of the word, and, also, of their opinion of the necessity, and even indispensableness of a bank for the administering the fiscal concerns of the nation – in the conclusion of the preamble they say that the exigencies of the United States render it indispensably necessary to pass the act, &c.; and in the laws passed during that period, when this Government was in the habit of following the English custom of beginning the laws by a preamble, you find the word necessary used as synonymous to expediency– practical expediency, (see Laws of the United States, vol. 1, page 247; idem, page 276,) in fact, among frail mortals with fallible judgments like ours. With any beings endued with less than omniscience, the word necessary must be only applicable to the honest judgment we can make up concerning the subject to which we apply it; in other words, it is resolvable into that sound discretion with which, as moral agents, we are in the first instance intrusted by our Maker, and in the instance now before us, we are intrusted with by the constitution and by the citizens who have sent us here to transact their business. But the rigid necessity which our opponents wish to enforce on us, this metaphysical necessity, must, from its very nature, be immutable; it must be unique, and could not exist in a greater or less degree; and, therefore, the word joined to it in the constitution (proper) could have no meaning at all. The laws, to be passed, must be necessary, is the only one way given under heaven by which you are to effect the end desired; in other words, the law must be imposed by Fate. It is perfect nonsense to say that there is a latitude left with us to judge whether such a law is proper or improper. I have, I think, brought the meaning of the word necessary to the level and within the comprehension of frail human intellect. The signification of the word proper I take to contain the description of the measure or law to which it is applied, in the following respects: whether the law is in conformity to the letter, the spirit, and the meaning of the constitution; whether it will produce the good end desired in the most ready, easy, and convenient mode, that we are acquainted with.

Great stress is laid on that amendment of the constitution which says, that all power not expressly granted shall be retained, &c. Either the general clause I have relied on gives power or it does not; if it did not give power, why was this amendment made? And if it did, and this power was offensive, why was it not stricken out when the amendment was made? But if it expressly gave power, which I contend, its being suffered to remain is proof that it was not the design of the amendment to take away the power given. Could not the Territory of Columbia have been governed without erecting a single corporation in it? I don't mean well governed. But was there that fatal necessity; that command from Jove,

"Ye fates fulfil it, and ye powers approve,"

to erect corporations? This legislation to erect corporations being, according to our opponents, sui generis, not of the ordinary kind, and only to be exercised where the express authority is given by the constitution, I ask gentlemen to show the clause in the constitution which expressly gives us the power to perform this sublimated act of legislation in this Territory any more than in any other part of the United States; and yet at this very session we have sent an armful of these high acts. The shelves of the office of the Secretary groan under the pile of charters we have granted.

I said it was easy to prove that the broad grant given to Congress to legislate for this Territory in all cases whatsoever, was restricted and paled in by the constitution. Congress cannot make the duties here on imports less or greater than elsewhere in the United States – imports and taxes must be equal, &c. – nor deprive the citizens thereof of the right to a trial by jury, nor grant them titles of nobility; and yet the incidents here alluded to would come under the description in the clause "of all cases whatsoever." In truth, sir, there is not a scintilla of the spirit, nor a single word or letter of the constitution, that loses its power and sanction upon our conduct in legislating in this particular. There is no more a power given us to legislate ad libitum on this Territory, nor to derive therefor powers by implication, than is given us in the laws we pass for the whole nation; and if this power, sui generis, of creating corporations, is properly defined by our opponents, they ought to go back to the works of yesterday, as well as to those of twenty years' standing, in order to introduce their new order of things. I might here draw a comparison of the tried scheme of using the United States' Bank, and the untried scheme of using State banks in aid of the operations of the National Treasury; but I should only be saying with less force what has been so fully and so conclusively said by the gentlemen who have preceded me. Suffice it to say, that for safe-keeping, for transmission and payment of the funds to any part of the nation, and for enforcing the punctual payment by the debtors to the customs, by addressing to those debtors the arguments to the sense of honor and shame, and also to their interest, to wit: by denying them credit in the bank on failure in punctuality – all these have been afforded to the Government without its incurring therefor one cent's expense. Are we sure the State banks can or will do this? I beg pardon of the Senate for detaining them on topics not new. As this is made a case of conscience, I deemed it necessary to be thus particular. I have no hesitation in saying, we have the right to act on this subject, inasmuch as I think the bank is both necessary and proper for the purposes above referred to.

To me it appears that this power is expressly granted; we derive it not by implication; but our opponents, in fact, are pressed to the necessity of using implication to come at the denial they set up against the exercise by Congress of this power.

I say, further, that this institution is necessary and proper for carrying into effect another general power, viz: The power to borrow money on the credit of the United States.

It is acknowledged on all hands that there is not specie enough in the nation, if applied solely to that purpose, to pay our annual impost. The operations of the Bank of Columbia in transferring the revenue derived from a part of Virginia (and of the land funds from the westward,) and of the Manhattan Bank in performing the same office in respect to the collections in Connecticut, have been dwelt upon by the honorable Senator from Maryland, (Mr. Smith.) His arguments drawn from the facts would have been more conclusive if he could have instanced the same facilities afforded to the Government between banks disconnected by the effect of that neighborhood circulation and of that course of trade very apparent in the instances he has produced. But it is not conclusive at any rate. There is a neighborhood medium of circulation, (the State bank paper,) and there is a national medium, (the United States paper.) The latter, under the present state of things, corrects the operations of distant banks and renders their transfers easy; but, deprived of this, would any of them, situated at four and five hundred miles, or at one thousand miles' distance, agree to make these transfers for the Government free of expense? Could they, for instance, transfer the solid bullion belonging to the United States from Orleans to Boston or Philadelphia, without our affording compensation for freight, insurance, &c.? I have witnessed the advantages of this national medium in the State I live in; and in the months of autumn, when strangers are fearful of venturing to Charleston, our western friends, rather than carry the hard dollars, are in the habit of giving two or three per cent. for bills of the Bank of the United States. Destroy this national medium, you insulate the State banks, which are so far asunder as not to be within the influence of the neighborhood medium of circulation. The stroke of our dreadful wand disconnects the ligament by which they are bound together in their distant operations.