Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

The gentleman from Maryland admits expressly that the transmission of your public money for the payment of the Army and Navy must be effected through the agency of banks, but contends that that object can be effected as well by the State banks as by a Bank of the United States. My friend from Kentucky (Mr. Pope) said, that the great characteristic difference between the present Government and that which existed under the old articles of confederation, is, that the present Government has within itself the means of executing its own measures, without relying upon the State governments; whereas the old Congress had to rely upon the States for the execution of the measures which it had previously devised and adopted.

The gentleman from Maryland, in speaking of the means which had been resorted to, to procure the renewal of the charter, says that we have not procured memorials to be presented to Congress praying that the charter might not be renewed – we have not procured pamphlets to be written, published, and laid upon the tables of members, proving the unconstitutionality and inutility of the bank – we have not imposed upon the credulity of honest mechanics and manufacturers, and by that means procured delegations to be sent to pray for the rejection of the bank memorial. Surely, sir, the gentleman did not by these declarations mean to insinuate that any one of those gentlemen who support the bill upon your table, have had any agency in procuring any application to be made in favor of the bank. I know that gentleman's respect for himself; his respect for the Senate; his respect for the individual members of this body, as well as his respect for the general rules of propriety, exclude the possibility of his making such an insinuation. [Mr. Smith explained, by saying, I exclude every idea of such an insinuation.] Sir, I will tell the honorable gentleman from Maryland, what has been done by those who are opposed to the renewal of the charter. I do not mean the members of the Senate who are opposed to it, but those who have attempted to inflame public opinion upon this question. Letters, sir, have been written from this place to induce the State Legislatures to instruct their members to oppose the renewal of the charter of the bank. I will ask the honorable gentleman from Maryland whether he does not know that letters have been written for that purpose?

The gentleman from Maryland has said, and I am extremely sorry that he has, that the Bank of the United States had their agents in this city for two sessions, intriguing with members of Congress to obtain a renewal of their charter. I can assure that gentleman that I have had as little to do with the agents of the bank as he has had. If, sir, I was disposed to retort upon those who are opposed to the renewal of the charter, I would ask, if they have not seen published in the democratic papers of Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, extracts of letters said to be written in the City of Washington, charging the members of Congress who are in favor of it with being bribed and corrupted, and with being disposed to sell the sovereignty of the nation to British capitalists? Have they not seen, in the same papers, conversations detailed with great minuteness, which it is pretended have passed between members of Congress, calculated to excite public odium and indignation against the friends of the bill now under consideration? Sir, I will not for a moment indulge an idea that these letters have been written or these conversations detailed by any member of this body. The idea that such has been the fact is too humiliating, too degrading, not only to this honorable body, but to human nature itself; to be entertained but for a moment. And yet, sir, the author of a charge, as base as it is false, against my honorable friend from Kentucky, (Mr. Pope,) has, day after day, occupied a seat in a gallery of the Senate, to which no person has a right of access, but by an introduction of one of the members of this body. Sir, the highway robber, when compared with the infamous fabricator of this base attempt to assassinate the reputation of this honorable member, becomes a virtuous and estimable character. Such, sir, has been the warfare which has been waged against the renewal of the charter. Denunciations and charges of political apostacy are the measures by which we have been assailed from without and from within. Sir, I have shown that the bank question was no party question in its origin – that it was a question upon which an honest difference of opinion always has existed, and does now exist. And, shall I be charged with deserting the standard of the people, while I am treading in the footsteps of the great Father of his Country?

The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) has said that he understood that a proposition was made in the Federal Convention to vest Congress with power to create corporations generally and without limitation. Had I been a member of that convention, I should most certainly have voted against the proposition, because it would have been unreasonable. Why should such a power have been delegated? Not certainly as necessary to execute the delegated powers, because they are very limited – a general power to create corporations would have enabled Congress to have created them ad libitum where there was no possible relation between them and any one of the delegated powers. The vote upon the incorporating the bank proves that if such a proposition had been submitted, it must have been rejected under a conviction that the power to create corporations is incident to such of the general powers as might require an act of incorporation completely to execute them, and fairly vested by the constitution in Congress; because ten of the members of that convention were in Congress, and voted for that bill – because General Washington signed that bill, because the only member of that convention now in Congress voted for the bill and is now in favor of renewing the charter; and because there were but eight members of that convention in Congress who voted against it.

Mr. President, I will now proceed to examine the objections which have been offered to the construction which I have given to several clauses of the constitution. In the observations which I made upon this part of the question when I was up before, I endeavored to prove that every construction that had been given to this instrument, upon the idea of its being perfect, was likely to be erroneous. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) and the gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Whiteside) still view it as a model of perfection. They are certainly at liberty still to entertain that opinion. Every man has a right to erect his idol in this land of liberty, and to fall down and worship it according to the dictates of his own conscience. I endeavored also to prove, that if we applied the same rule of construction to that clause of the constitution from which we endeavor to derive the right to create a bank, which has been applied to that from which the power to erect a light-house has been derived, the constitutional difficulty at once disappears. Until my friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) and my friend from Tennessee (Mr. Anderson) had otherwise declared, I had always understood the right to erect light-houses had been exercised as incidental to the power to regulate commerce. It seems, however, that I am mistaken, and that this right is incidental to that clause which gives Congress the right to exercise exclusive legislation in certain places. The clause reads in the following words:

"To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings," &c.

Now, says my friend from Tennessee, this clause gives the right to erect dockyards; and as dockyards must be on the seacoast, therefore Congress has the right to erect light-houses, because they must also be on the seacoast. This argument is extremely logical, nay, syllogistical, in form, but it is extremely illogical in substance. The conclusion drawn from the premises, is as necessary, as though I were to say, that because two and two makes four, therefore five and five makes twelve. The conclusion in the latter case is as necessary as in the former. But my honorable friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) derives it from the authority given in this clause, to erect other needful buildings. But the question recurs, needful for what? Why, certainly, for the purposes before specified. What are they? Forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards. If this clause gives any authority to erect forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, the other needful buildings spoken of must be needful for the specified purposes. I should suppose that no man, who spends only a few days in this city, can be at a loss to determine what is comprehended under the term "other needful buildings." Let him go to the dockyard, nicknamed a navy-yard in this city, and he will there find a little town of "other needful buildings" in the words of the constitution. But, sir, I deny that this clause of the constitution expressly gives any right, but that of exercising exclusive legislation in the places to be accepted or purchased for the purpose therein specified. The right to erect forts, magazines, and arsenals, is fairly incidental to the right of declaring war, and of raising armies; and the right to erect dockyards is fairly incidental to the right of providing and maintaining a navy. But if for the sake of argument I should admit that the right to erect forts, &c., is given in this clause, how can it be proved that the right to erect a light-house is also given? Forts, magazines, arsenals, and dockyards, are enumerated, and as the constitution says that all powers not expressly given are retained, if the right to erect forts, magazines, &c., is given in this clause, most clearly the right to erect light-houses is retained by the States, because it is not to be found in the enumeration contained in the clause. When I had the honor of addressing the Senate before I questioned the authority of the State governments to create banks; I then stated, and I again explicitly state, that it is with reluctance that I have felt it my duty to make any inquiry into the constitutional right of the State governments to incorporate banks. The State Legislatures ought to have recollected the Spanish proverb, which says that those who live in glass-houses ought not to throw stones. Before they undertook to question the constitutional authority of Congress, they ought to have thoroughly examined the foundation upon which their own right rested. The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Giles) says that the construction which I have given to that part of the constitution which prohibits the States from emitting bills of credit, would apply equally to promissory notes given by one individual to another under the laws of a State, as to a bank bill. Permit me to inquire of that gentleman whether he ever saw a law authorizing one man to give another his promissory note? He may search the pandects of Justinian; he may turn over the leaves of the musty volumes written upon the common law, from the days of Bracton and Fleta down to the present day, and his search will be in vain. For the right to make contracts, the right to give promissory notes, is antecedent to, and independent of all municipal law. The gentleman will find laws and decisions in abundance, regulating the effect of endorsements and other collateral circumstances, and prescribing the manner of enforcing the payment of promissory notes, but he will never find a law giving the right to execute the promissory note. But it is said that the bills of credit, which the States are prohibited from emitting, must be bills of credit emitted on the credit of the State. If this distinction should be well founded, many of the State banks are still subject to the charge of unconstitutionality, because in many of them the States are directly interested, and wherever that is the case, their bank bills are bills of credit emitted on the credit of the State. But the correctness of this distinction may well be denied, because the restriction is as general as it could possibly be made. But it is said that this restriction applies only to bills of credit which are made a legal tender in the payment of debts; that bills of credit, designated in the constitution, are ex vi termini a legal tender. For the correctness of this exposition, an appeal is made to the restriction which immediately follows it, which restrains the right of the States to make anything but gold and silver a legal tender in the payment of debts. It appears to me that the latter restriction excludes most emphatically the construction contended for. If the States are prohibited from emitting bills of credit, it would have been, to say the least of it, wholly nugatory to say they should not make them a legal tender. If the bills are not emitted, it is impossible that they can be made a legal tender. To suppose that the restriction upon the right of the States to make any thing but gold and silver legal tender has any connection with or influence upon the restriction to emit bills of credit, is as absurd as to suppose that the Decalogue, after having declared that "thou shalt do no murder," should have added, but, if you will murder, you shall not rob and strike the dead. The construction of the restraint upon the right to make any thing but gold or silver a tender, is that they shall not make specific articles, as tobacco or cotton, a tender, as was the case in some of the States.

But it is said that the history of the States will show that the bills of credit specified in the constitution were those only which were a legal tender in the payment of debts. Let us examine this point, according to the rule of construction applied to another clause in the constitution by a large majority of both Houses of Congress during the present session. Another clause in the constitution gives Congress the power to admit new States into the Union under two limitations: 1st. That no new State shall be formed within the limits of any State without the consent of the State; and, 2d. That no new State should be formed by the junction of two or more States without the consent of such States, and also of Congress. These limitations prove that the formation of new States, within the limits of the United States, was in view of the convention at the time that this clause was adopted; and the subsequent clause, which gives Congress the power to make rules for the government of its Territories, proves that these Territories were at that moment under consideration. In addition to these reasons for believing that the framers of the constitution had no idea of forming new States, beyond the limits of the United States, those who were opposed to the admission of Orleans as a State contended that the history of the United States proves that the power to erect new States and admit them into the Union was intended to be confined to new States within the limits of the United States at the formation of the constitution, and that a different construction would disparage the rights of the original States, and, of course, be a violation of the constitution. What reply did the majority of Congress give to this train of reasoning? They said that the right to admit new States cannot be subject to any other limitations or restrictions than those which are contained in the clause which gives the right, and as there is no restriction upon the right to erect new States without the then limits of the United States, Congress have an unlimited right to erect and admit them into the Union. Let us apply the same rule of construction to the restriction of the right of the States to emit bills of credit. The restriction is a general one; it has no exceptions; and every attempt to make exceptions ought to be repelled by the answer which was given to those who opposed the right of Congress to admit the Territory of Orleans into the Union as a State. The construction I have contended for gains additional weight when we consider the restriction which immediately precedes that under consideration. No State shall coin money, emit bills of credit, &c. Bills of credit are but the representatives of money. The constitution gives Congress the right to coin money, and to regulate its value. It takes from the States the right to coin money and to emit bills of credit. Why give to Congress the right to coin money and regulate its value? Because the interest of the nation requires that the current coin of the nation should be uniform both as to its species and value. If this is the true reason why the right of coining money and fixing its value was given to Congress, does not the right to issue that which is to be the representative of this coin; which, in fact, is to usurp its place; which is to be the real currency of the nation, necessarily belong to Congress? Does not the right to create a bank, which shall issue this representative of money, come within the same reason? I think it does.

To the fervid imagination of my friend from Kentucky, (Mr. Clay,) this power to create a bank appears to be more terrific than was the lever of Archimedes to the frightened imagination of the Romans, when they beheld their galleys suddenly lifted up and whirled about in the air, and in a moment plunged into the bosom of the ocean. Are these apprehensions founded in reason, or are they the chimeras of a fervid and perturbed imagination? What limitation does the constitution contain upon the power to lay and collect taxes, imposts, duties, and excises? None but that they shall be uniform; which is no limitation of the amount which they can lay and collect. What limitation does it contain upon the power to raise and support armies? None other than that appropriations shall not be made for a longer term than two years. What restriction is to be found in it upon the right to provide and maintain a navy? None. What upon the right to declare war and make peace? None, none. Thus the constitution gives to the Government of the United States unlimited power over your purses – unlimited power to raise armies and provide navies – unlimited power to make war and peace, and you are alarmed; you are terrified at the power to create a bank to aid it in the management of its fiscal operations. Sir, nothing short of my most profound respect for honorable gentlemen, who have frightened themselves with this bugbear, could induce me to treat the subject seriously. Gentlemen have said that they are alarmed at the exercise of this power, and I am bound to believe them. Sir, after giving Congress the right to make war and peace; the right to impose taxes, imposts, duties, and excises, ad libitum; the right to raise and support armies without restriction as to number or term of service; the right to provide and maintain a navy without a limitation, I cannot bring myself to tremble at the exercise of a power incidental to only one of these tremendous grants of power. The gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) contends that we have attempted to give a degree of weight and force to what we are pleased to call precedents, to which they would not be entitled in those tribunals from which we derive all our ideas of precedents. I am happy to find that my friend from Virginia (Mr. Giles) agrees with me in opinion upon this subject. Indeed the principal difference between that gentleman and myself is confined to the question of expedience. He thinks that the construction which has been given to the constitution ought to be considered as conclusive; and that great inconvenience will be produced by unsettling what ought to be considered as finally settled and adjudged.

Sir, I have closed the observations which I thought it my duty to make in reply to the comments which have been made upon the remarks which I had previously submitted to the consideration of this honorable body. If, sir, I preferred my political standing in the State which I have the honor to represent (and, sir, I do not profess to have any out of it) to the public welfare, I should rejoice at the success of the motion which has been made by the honorable gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Anderson.) But, sir, as I believe the public welfare infinitely more important than any fleeting popularity which an individual like myself can expect to enjoy, I shall most sincerely regret the success of that motion. Sir, I have said but little about the degree of distress which will flow from the dissolution of the bank, because I have not that kind of evidence which would enable me to judge of it with any degree of accuracy. The convulsed state of the European nations; the immense losses which our commerce has sustained by the operation of the decrees and orders of the tyrants of the land and the ocean, imperiously admonish us to beware of making untried and dangerous experiments. By supporting this institution, the tottering credit of the commercial class of your citizens may be upheld, until the storm shall have passed over. By overturning this great moneyed institution at the present crisis, you may draw down to undistinguished ruin thousands of your unfortunate and unoffending fellow-citizens.

The question was then taken on striking out the first section of the bill, (equivalent to a rejection,) when it appeared that there were for the motion 17, against it 17, as follows:

Yeas. – Messrs. Anderson, Campbell, Clay, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, German, Giles, Gregg, Lambert, Leib, Mathewson, Reed, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Whiteside, and Worthington.

Nays. – Messrs. Bayard, Bradley, Brent, Champlin, Condit, Crawford, Dana, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Lloyd, Pickering, Pope, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Turner.

The Senate being equally divided, it became the duty of the Vice President to decide the question by his vote; previously to which he made the following observations:

Gentlemen: As the subject on which I am called upon to decide has excited great sensibility, I must solicit the indulgence of the Senate while I briefly state the reasons which influence my judgment.

Permit me to observe, that the question to be decided does not depend simply upon the right of Congress to establish under any modification a bank, but upon their power to establish a National Bank, as contemplated by this bill. In other words, can they create a body politic and corporate, not constituting a part of the Government, nor otherwise responsible to it but by forfeiture of charter, and bestow on its members privileges, immunities, and exemptions not recognized by the laws of the States, nor enjoyed by the citizens generally? It cannot be doubted but that Congress may pass all necessary and proper laws for carrying into execution the powers specifically granted to the Government, or to any department or officer thereof; but, in doing so, the means must be suited and subordinate to the end. The power to create corporations is not expressly granted; it is a high attribute of sovereignty, and in its nature not accessorial or derivative by implication, but primary and independent.

I cannot believe that this interpretation of the constitution will, in any degree, defeat the purposes for which it was formed. On the contrary, it does appear to me, that the opposite exposition has an inevitable tendency to consolidation, and affords just and serious cause of alarm.

In the course of a long life I have found that Government is not to be strengthened by an assumption of doubtful powers, but by a wise and energetic execution of those which are incontestible; the former never fails to produce suspicion and distrust, while the latter inspires respect and confidence.

If, however, after a fair experiment, the powers vested in the Government shall be found incompetent to the attainment of the objects for which it was instituted, the constitution happily furnishes the means for remedying the evil by amendment, and I have no doubt that in such event on an appeal to the patriotism and good sense of the community it will be wisely applied.

I will not trespass upon the patience of the Senate any longer than to say, from the best examination I have been able to give the subject, I am constrained by a sense of duty to decide in the affirmative – that is, that the first section of the bill be stricken out.