Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

As I heard much said about absolute, indispensable necessity, I may be pardoned for giving what I consider the sound interpretation of the words "necessary and proper" in the constitution. This idea of absolute, indispensable, &c., must have originated in an excessive jealousy of power or a decided hostility to the Federal Union. This instrument was framed by and for the people of the United States, and, in the language used, was certainly intended to be understood in that sense in which it is used and understood by them generally. If you ask a plain man what are the necessaries of life, he will answer, something below luxury and extravagance, what is calculated to afford him reasonable comfort. Neither a house nor a bed is absolutely or indispensably necessary to a man's existence; he could live in a camp and sleep on boards, or on the ground, yet, the common sense of mankind would respond, they are necessary and proper. If a man had a journey to make, either to Richmond, in Virginia, or Lexington, in Kentucky, although every person would pronounce a coach and six superfluous and unnecessary, all reasonable men would say, he ought to have a horse or a hack, but it will not be pretended that either are indispensable, because he could perform it on foot. If a gentleman from Baltimore gives his agent instructions to provide every thing necessary for an East India voyage, what would he expect? Certainly that he should avoid unnecessary expense, but would consider him acting within the pale of his authority if he procured only what was reasonably necessary and proper, or, in other words, what was fairly suited to the master and crew, and well calculated to enable the vessel to reach her port of destination. That interpretation is correct which best accords with the common sense and understanding of mankind. It must, therefore, be evident that the only question as regards the constitutionality of the measure to be decided is a question of fact, and that is, whether a National Bank is reasonably necessary and proper, or fairly suited to, and calculated for, the collection of our revenue and the management of our money concerns. And this fact appears to be admitted by the gentlemen opposed to the bill, for their arguments are predicated upon the probability that the State banks will answer the national purposes. This is a complete surrender of the constitutional objection; for, if banks be necessary and proper, it follows that we have a constitutional power to create them, and it will be a mere question of expediency whether we will use State banks or a National Bank. My colleague (Mr. Clay) has asked for the congeniality between a bank and the collection of our revenue? The argument in favor of using State banks shows it, but let the use hitherto made of the bank answer the question. Is not a bank a proper place for the deposit and safe-keeping of money – more so than the custom-house? Is it not a convenient agent for paying and receiving money? Through the agency of this bank our revenue, or the greater part of it, has been collected, our financial transactions done, and public money transmitted to such places as the necessities of the Government required. The revenue collected at Boston, Baltimore, or any other port, is paid, if required, at New Orleans, Natchez, St. Louis, or any other place without risk or expense. The money in the bank and its branches is payable at such of them as the convenience of the Government may require, and, by this arrangement, we can command the whole of the public money in any quarter of the Union without risk or expense. The operations of this institution have been confined to the seaboard. The principal bank is at Philadelphia, with a branch at New York, Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Charleston, Savannah, and New Orleans. At all which places, the Government has considerable revenue to collect. No branches have been extended into the interior. It has been connected with our fiscal arrangements at all the places to which it has been extended, and may be fairly deemed a convenient, necessary, and appropriate auxiliary to the management of the national concerns. It is said that the revenue is collected at many ports where none of these branches are placed. This is true; the bank and branches are fixed only at the principal seaports, where a large amount of revenue is collected. Every one draws into its vaults, subject to the demands of Government, the revenue collected at the less important ports in the same quarter of the country. Boston being the commercial emporium of New England, the Government, by the agency of the branch bank there, is enabled to draw to that point most of the revenue received at the numerous ports in that quarter of the Union. The repeated sanctions this bank has received from the different Administrations, and especially from Mr. Jefferson and the Republican party, by authorizing the extension of a branch to New Orleans, and selling one million of the stock, the property of the United States, to British subjects, for four hundred thousand dollars more than the nominal amount, is indeed strangely accounted for; gentlemen say the Government were bound to fulfil their engagements, and that the charter, being in the nature of a contract, was sacred. I had thought the fashionable doctrine was, that an unconstitutional law was wholly null and void. It has been held by some of the States. However plausible the answer to the argument of acquiescence, it furnishes no apology for a positive confirmation. Permit me to assimilate a common case between individuals to the case before us: a man in Washington executes a joint power to five trustees in Kentucky to collect his debts, settle his land business, &c., and authorizes them to take all steps necessary and proper to effectuate the trust or power; in the progress of the business a measure is suggested as necessary, about which there is a diversity of opinion among the trustees. A majority, however, decide that it is within their authority; the principal is informed of it, does not complain or disavow, but positively and by the strongest implication assents to the construction given by his agents. In such a case there would be but one opinion. In 1791 a National Bank is proposed to Congress; they differ as to the constitutionality, a large majority decide in favor of it, the people and the States are informed of the measure, the States do not protest, nor do the people complain; many of the States pass laws to protect the institution, it receives the confirmation of three or four different Administrations, and particularly of the one composed of men originally opposed to it; it violates no positive provision of the constitution; no mischiefs have been produced, but great convenience and advantage have been experienced by the Government and community. I ask whether, under such circumstances, the question ought not to be considered settled? Is no respect due to the opinions of our predecessors? Is a question of construction never to be at rest? Why is a judge, sworn to support the laws and constitution of the country, bound by a train of decisions contrary to his own opinions? Because the good, the peace, the tranquillity of society require it. The conduct of a court, as well as every department of Government, must be regulated in its course in some measure by a regard for the public weal. It is worthy of remark that, notwithstanding all the fuss about implied and incidental powers – if you except the sedition law, which was supposed to violate a positive provision of the constitution – the same practical construction has been given to this instrument by every Administration of the Government. Indeed, the sphere of national legislation has been more enlarged under Mr. Jefferson's than any other Administration. All parties have found that the national vessel could not be navigated without sails, rigging, and every thing necessary and proper. Whence was derived a power to pass a law laying an embargo without limitation? There is nothing in the constitution about embargoes. Whence did we derive a power to purchase Louisiana, and incorporate it with the good old United States? There is no express delegation of power to purchase new territory. On these subjects the constitution is silent. I have approved both. No State can lay an embargo, or acquire new territory. Our power to perform these acts results from the nature of the national sovereignty created by this constitution. The Republican Administrations have no pretensions to the approbation of the people on the ground of having restrained any latitude or liberality of construction. Their claim to the public confidence is founded on very different considerations. They have repealed the internal taxes, paid a large part of the public debt, purchased Louisiana, and preserved to the nation the blessings of peace. For these acts, they have, I believe, the thanks of the nation. They have mine, most sincerely.

Great stress is placed on the twelfth article of the amendments to the constitution, which declares the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. I must confess that I cannot discover what influence this can have on the bill under consideration, or any other measure which may be proposed. It appears to me to have been adopted rather to quiet State jealousies and popular fears than with a view to produce any positive effect, for the inquiry must ever be, Is the power given? And if granted, it is not retained. The supporters of this bill do not pretend to usurp any power retained by the States or the people, but contend that the power to pass the bill is expressly delegated, if the facts assumed are true.

It is not pretended that our fiscal concerns can be managed with gold and silver. If our territory was of no greater extent than Rhode Island, Delaware, or the city of Philadelphia, gold and silver would answer the purposes of the Government, but it would require a number of pack horses and wagons to transport the public money in gold and silver, over this immense country, to the different places where it is wanting. Our extensive commerce, and the great extent of this empire, renders a paper medium necessary. Is the power to create this paper medium, or national currency, an attribute of State or national sovereignty? I put the question to the candor of gentlemen, and solicit a serious answer! The argument of my honorable friend from Georgia against the power of the States to authorize the emission of bank paper, founded on that part of the constitution which declares that "No State shall emit bills of credit," acquires great additional force, when these bills of credit are made to assume the character of money, for national purposes. In the same article the power to coin money is expressly prohibited to the States, and in the catalogue of cardinal powers granted to this Government, is that to coin money. It will, perhaps, be contended that this only applies to gold and silver, but if that be admitted to be the literal meaning of the words, still it is evident that what shall be the national currency, whether specie or paper, is a proper subject of national legislation. No gentleman will be so absurd as to insist that any State or States ought to coin the current money of the United States. That the power of the States to establish banks may be questioned with at least great plausibility, is perfectly clear, but as this banking power has been so long exercised, as the National and State banks have conducted their operations very harmoniously, as no serious evils call for national interference, I am not for disturbing the existing state of things; it is better, perhaps, that the banking power should be divided between the States and the United States. That bank paper, if good, is in fact money, although not made a legal tender, cannot be denied. The currency of this bank paper of the United States, although made by law receivable in payment of revenue, rests upon a much better foundation than an act of Congress. Its national character, the extended operations of this bank from Boston to New Orleans, have given it credit with the people of every part of the empire, more than the bank paper of any particular State can be expected to have; so that, by common consent, this money coined by the national bank has become the current money of the United States. I hope we shall never be driven to the necessity of compelling our citizens by law to receive our paper. We should so guard and regulate our banking operations as to make the national paper at least equal to gold and silver, in every quarter of the Union.

If this bank is removed, the Secretary of the Treasury must nationalize the bank paper of the great importing States; for, I presume, Congress will never decide what State paper shall be used by the officers of the General Government. Most of the public money is now collected and deposited in the Bank of the United States; if that is destroyed, the Secretary of the Treasury is to deposit in the State banks, and with him is the power of selection – a power and patronage greater than any ever exercised by any officer in this nation. The deposits of the public money are sought after with great avidity, by all the State institutions. He can deposit the whole in one, or divide it between two, or three, or all the banks in any one place. He can change them at pleasure. He may, with great apparent fairness and propriety, make it a condition with every bank where deposits are made that they shall appoint a certain portion of the directors of his nomination, and through them he can reach the credit of any man who may have accommodations in it. It is true we have now a man at the head of the Treasury who may not be disposed to abuse this power, but we may not always have such an officer. This immense power and influence may be exercised in an invisible manner, and, of course, without responsibility. Is this republican? It was not a few years ago. I have always understood that one of the strongest and most popular objections to the Federal Administration was their disposition to increase Executive patronage.

Although this subject has received much false coloring through the country, by charges of British influence, &c., I did not expect to hear it from an honorable senator of the United States – it has not indeed been positively asserted, but hinted in such a manner as to make an impression on the community. Some stale circumstances connected with the British treaty have been very unnecessarily lugged in to increase the prejudices against this bill. It has been insinuated, that British influence, operating through this institution, has prevented the Government from taking strong measures against Great Britain; but in what manner this has been effected, gentlemen have not been good enough to explain. Did it prevent Mr. Jefferson from taking a war course? For I believe it is generally understood that he was opposed to a war. Has it operated upon the present Executive? Such a suggestion will not be made. I have, during my service here, given a fair and faithful support to the Administration, and I have certainly voted for stronger measures than they were willing to accept. It is due to the 10th and 11th Congresses, who have been so much abused, to state that their course, as regards the question of peace or war, has been in perfect unison with the views of the late and present Presidents. Let it not be inferred that I am disposed to find fault; I believe when we consider the very extraordinary state of the foreign world, and retrospect the embarrassing circumstances which have surrounded us, the course pursued by them ought to be deemed substantially correct, certainly so as respects their leading object, which has been to avoid making this country a party in the present war. If I was disposed to censure, it would be for not making an effort to chastise some of the British armed vessels which lay in our waters after the affair of the Chesapeake, in open contempt of the President's proclamation; if a single vessel had been driven out or compelled to strike her colors, it would have healed the wound inflicted on the national pride and feeling, committed by the Leopard.

That this Government should have an influence with foreign Governments proportioned to the interest their subjects have in our funds, is probable, but how this interest gives them an influence here I am at a loss to perceive: foreigners cannot even vote in the appointment of directors. If there is any reality in this idea of foreign influence through this institution, why did gentlemen permit the present stockholders to be incorporated into the bill introduced last year? And why was not a provision inserted to prevent foreigners from purchasing additional stock?

Gentlemen say the embarrassments in Philadelphia could not have been occasioned by the Bank of the United States, because they continue to discount as usual. If I recollect the evidence – and I hope to be corrected if I mistake it – it was this: that the calling in of ten per cent. on their debts occasioned such a pressure, that they were prevailed upon to extend their discounts until the ultimate decision of Congress should be known. I have heard it seriously urged that the evils and inconveniences to be experienced from its dissolution, prove it to be a dangerous institution; the same argument would prove that the Government ought to be destroyed. Nothing, indeed, seems too absurd for the human mind to seize upon, when under the influence of passion or misguided zeal.

My honorable friend from Georgia has been reminded of the Macedonian phalanx. I trust, sir, we shall ever be found associated with a phalanx American, Republican, in heart and sentiment. I will not sacrifice the interest of my constituents for fear of being called hard names. The epithets of quidism, quadroonism, or any other ism which malice or policy may suggest, shall not drive me from the course called for by the public good. I am proud that I represent a people just, generous, and independent, not to be carried away by unmeaning clamor. Before they discard a public servant, they will view him both on a political theatre, and in the walks of private life. They know, too well, that those are not always the best Christians who sing hallelujahs on the house top, nor have they forgotten the celebrated Sempronius, who, on the approach of Cæsar, thundered war in the Roman Senate, and at the same time was secretly co-operating with the traitor to overthrow the liberties of the Roman people.

Deeply impressed, Mr. President, with the opinion, that the rejection of this bill will give at least a temporary check to the prosperity of the rising State from which I come, I shall give my negative to the motion to strike out the first section. Yes, sir, not only the interest, but importance of that State in the Union is about to be sacrificed. When I look beyond the mountains, and remember that Kentucky has nurtured me almost from my cradle, that she has bestowed on me her choicest honors, my bosom is filled with emotions of gratitude, which impel me to say on this, as on all other occasions, Kentucky I am only thine!

Saturday, February 16

Bank of the United States

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the bill to amend and continue in force an act, entitled "An act to incorporate the subscribers to the Bank of the United States, passed on the 25th day of April, 1791;" the motion to strike out the first section being under consideration.

Mr. Smith of Maryland said, that in seconding the motion to strike out the first section of the bill, he had pursued a course which, in his opinion, was the most correct. When I first took a seat in Congress (said he) the course of proceeding was to fix the principle by resolution, and, that once fixed, to send it to a committee to report a bill. By a motion to strike out the first section the principle will be tried, and the Senate, if the motion fails, will go into a discussion of the provisions of the bill. This I conceive a better course, than, for the Senate to go into discussion of the details of a subject which would probably be ultimately rejected on the general ground of principle.

The gentleman who introduced this subject spoke with great animation and with great feeling against the press or presses which have undertaken to give their opinions upon this great and important question. He spoke with much warmth, and said that whoever knew him would not believe that he would permit himself to be driven out of his opinion by any man or set of men. There is no man, sir, the least acquainted with the gentleman from Georgia (Mr. Crawford) but will believe his declaration. But another result may be apprehended, that those who feel so great an offence at the freedom the press has taken, may be driven into the opposite course by the irritation of their feelings. Certainly those feelings must have been extremely strong with the gentleman from Kentucky (Mr. Pope) to have induced him to terminate his speech with an oration hostile to the press. Are the gentlemen from Georgia and Kentucky the only Senators who have had their feelings wounded by the conduct of the press upon this subject? Sir, if the gentleman's opinions and sentiments have been censured by one description of presses, he may find consolation in having been greatly eulogized in others. For more than a year those on the same side of this question with myself have had their opinions tortured into every shape to destroy them in the estimation of the people, not only in this session but during the last. Sir, there are some presses in the Union which could not exist, whose papers would not be read, but for the discussion of individual character. Is any advantage to be derived from complaining of this? It results from the nature and temper of our Government, and the best way I have ever found to treat it is with silent contempt. He who does otherwise engages in the contest at a great disadvantage, and will seldom come out the victor. In the same presses of which those gentlemen complain, I have seen them both eulogized, and properly, for their conduct on the subject of the embargo and West Florida questions.

If the press be an evil in this respect, we must submit to it; those gentlemen who take a high and prominent stand must expect to be noticed. Sometimes gentlemen will be put down by the press, but their conduct being correct will more frequently be written up by its abuse.

It has been objected that this question is discussed on the ground of party; and the gentleman from Georgia, as I understood him, said, that this had been made a party question elsewhere, and might be so here. [Mr. Crawford said he had mentioned no place, but had said that this might be made a party question.] I understood the gentleman to say, said Mr. S., that this may again be made a party question. But for this observation of the gentleman the subject of party would probably not have been introduced at all; and we must indeed shut our eyes or we cannot avoid seeing that this is made a party question, at least on one side. Do you see one gentleman, one solitary gentleman of one party, discriminated generally as a Federal, who does not vote for this measure throughout? Do you see one public body in Philadelphia or New York which has a majority of Federal directors or agents, which has not come before you with memorials drawn up with the ingenuity of lawyers, to impose on your judgments? Have not the same party prepared memorials and got the subscription of every one of their caste, bringing forward nearly the same number of petitioners as they have of Federal voters? Have they not done so in Baltimore? Of that city I would say as little as may be, for being a manufacturing as well as a commercial city, it has stirred up an animosity in some gentlemen against it not easily accounted for. In Baltimore, on a warmly-contested election, the Federal party mustered eight hundred and fourteen votes, all they could parade with their every exertion. To the petition for the renewal of the charter of the bank, there are eight hundred and forty odd signatures! They have gained some few since the latest contest. Is this coincidence of members, this exclusively Federal petitioning, no mark of party? They have also got one public body in Baltimore to memorialize in favor of the bank; the rest were not to be intimidated by the threats of the Bank of the United States. What, sir, have the other party done? Have they disturbed the quiet of either House? Have they brought forward the mass of their voters as signers to petitions? No, sir, they have trusted the subject to their Representatives, confiding in their disposition and ability to speak their sentiments. The representation of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Norfolk, and Charleston, in the other House, have opposed the renewal of the charter. Every city high in estimation as a commercial city is opposed to the renewal of the charter, except Boston. This speaks with a strong voice what are the feelings of the people; stronger evidence cannot be presented to the human mind. Far be it from me, sir, to endeavor to work up the feelings of party spirit on this occasion; but the thing itself was one of the first causes which created the present parties, and separated man from man and brother from brother. This measure was originally brought forward and adopted when the representation in Congress was not bottomed on an actual supposed census of the United States. Sixty-five members composed Congress then, which was a representation taken by accident. If a proportionate representation had been given to the States according to their population, the law probably would not have passed. The States of North Carolina and South Carolina had each five Representatives, being thus placed on an exact equality. Now, North Carolina has twelve, South Carolina only eight. What was the vote then? Out of sixty-five members thirty-nine voted for the bill. It was not, as my friend from Kentucky said, a subject fully discussed, or carried by a tremendous majority.