Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

But, while it is contended by some that it will not be in the power of the nation to establish an effective naval force, there are others who are opposed to it, lest we become too great a naval power. They fear that our fleets will cover the ocean, and seeking victory on all the opposite shores of the Atlantic, involve the nation in oppressive expenses, and in wanton and habitual wars. Such objects are certainly not contemplated by the report of the committee; nor can such events possibly happen, as long as we remain a free people. The committee have recommended such a navy as will give to the United States an ascendency in the American seas, and protect their ports and harbors. The people will never bear the establishment of a greater force than these objects require. The reasons which forbid Great Britain, or any other European power, to station large fleets on our seas, will equally forbid us to cross the Atlantic, or go into distant seas, for the purpose of frequent or habitual wars.

But a navy is said to be anti-republican, because it was opposed by the Republicans in 1798. I apprehend, however, that it was then objected to, not because it was anti-republican in itself, but because the Republicans of that time believed it was to be employed for improper objects; because, while it was unnecessary at the time, it was of such a nature as only fitted it for the time, because it was part of a system which embraced unnecessary armies and unnecessary taxes and loans, to continue a war beyond the just objects of war – a war which, to use the language of the day, was to be waged by every man, woman, and child, in the nation, to which we are opposed.

We are told, also, that navies have ruined every nation that has employed them; and England, and Holland, and Venice, and other nations, have been mentioned as examples. The vast debt of Great Britain is declared to be among the pernicious fruits of her Naval Establishment. This I deny. Her debt has grown out of her profuse subsidies, and her absurd wars on the land. Though the ruin, which is supposed to threaten England, is attributed to her navy, it is obvious that her navy alone has saved and still saves her from ruin. Without it she must, long since, have yielded to the power of France her independence and her liberties. We are told that the same wealth which she has expended in supporting her navies would have been employed more profitably for the nation in the improvement of its agriculture and manufactures, and in the establishment of canals and roads, and other internal improvements. But experience is better than theory. Let us compare England with nations which have no navies, or comparatively inconsiderable navies. The nations of the Continent of Europe are without such overgrown and ruinous Naval Establishments, but do you there find the highest improvements in agriculture, the most flourishing manufactures, or the best roads and canals? No, it is in this nation, that has been ruined by her navy, that you find all these improvements most perfect and most extended. I mean not either to be the panegyrist of England; but these truths may be declared for our instruction, without suppressing the feelings excited by the wrongs she has done us. England has not, then, I conclude, been destroyed or impoverished, but preserved and enriched, by her navy. Was Holland ruined by her navy? No; surrounded by the great powers of the continent, with a population not exceeding 2,000,000 of souls, she protected and secured her independence for more than a century, against her powerful neighbors, by means of her commercial riches, which were cherished and defended by her naval power. Did Venice owe her decline, or fall, to her navy? While the neighboring Italian States were subdued, year after year changing their masters and their tyrants, she long continued to ride triumphantly amidst the storm, independent, and, in a great degree, free. It was her naval and commercial power which made her rich and great, and secured her existence as a State so long. Look even at the little Republic of Genoa, whose inhabitants, but for its commerce and its navy, would scarcely ever have possessed "a local habitation," or "a name!" But I must have exhausted the patience of the House, I will therefore conclude the observations which I proposed to make on the general merits of the question.

Saturday, January 18

Naval Establishment

The House then resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole, on the Navy bill; when Mr. Cheves finished his speech in favor of the bill, as given in full in preceding pages.

Mr. Seybert. – I rise under a pressure of more than ordinary embarrassment – prudence on one hand bids me shrink from the task which I am about to undertake; whilst on the other hand, a conscious duty impels me to engage in the consideration of the question now before the honorable committee. My friend from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) says this question is all important to this nation; in this I perfectly coincide with him, and therefore cannot rest satisfied with a mere vote on this occasion. Sir, it is not my intention to follow the gentleman from South Carolina through all the windings of the labyrinth into which he has ventured to penetrate. I will not pretend to chase reason on the wing.

I will not particularly follow the gentleman in his comparison of the Army and Naval Establishments of the United States. He has stated to us that the Army has cost this nation much more than the Navy; he concludes we ought to be equally liberal in our appropriations for both these purposes. Sir, I perceive no reason in this assertion. Some gentlemen on the other side of the House may say, that we have been lavish in our appropriations for an army; even admitting that in this respect we have been liberal to extravagance, it surely cannot be inferred that we should make ourselves doubly guilty of this charge. I will agree to make appropriations for the establishing a navy for the United States. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that when the war which we are about to wage, shall be over, our Army will leave us. Sir, I am happy to hear that on such an event the military will be readily disbanded – a dread of the contrary gave much uneasiness to many a few days since – this is just what we wish should take place. On the other hand, said he, "your proud Navy," will remain. It is for this, with many other reasons, why I am opposed to a navy. I wish he could have proved to us, that with the end of the war the Navy would also leave us; perhaps I should then agree with him in favor of its establishment: though the "proud Navy" will remain with us, he has neglected to tell us at what rate of expense.

Sir, the gentleman from South Carolina says many oppose a navy, because they deem it an anti-republican institution. On this head, I shall remark but little: I will only ask if it is to remain with us in times of peace with its numerous train of officers, may it not become a powerful engine in the hands of an ambitious Executive?

Sir, it was thought proper to make the foregoing remarks as preliminary to the subject. The question of a Naval Establishment for the United States more especially concerns those who inhabit commercial districts. As one of these I am much interested. Many persons maintain, that a naval system of defence is indispensably necessary to a nation, whose seaboard extends more than 1,500 miles, with a shipping interest amounting to 1,300,000 tons – in this respect, ranking the second of modern nations. The argument is as specious as it is plausible; it is liable to many, and in my opinion, to insuperable objections. The proposition before us will be considered as leading to a permanent Naval Establishment. This course is warranted by the report of the Secretary of the Navy as well as by the mode which was pursued by my friend from South Carolina. I shall not hesitate to declare my decided opposition to such an establishment, and will proceed to state the objections whereon my opinion is grounded. Sir, I deem it inexpedient to commence a permanent Naval Establishment at this time. We are quite unprepared for it – we are in want of all the necessary materials; though we have been told that our forests abound in all the necessary timber, it was said little of this material was to be found in our dockyards. The gentleman from South Carolina has told us, that a sufficiency of seasoned timber, to build four seventy-fours, was now on hand, and that the proper authority deemed it advisable to be used for frigates. Sir, this timber is a portion of that which was purchased some years since, for the purpose of building six seventy-fours. It now appears, that of this timber as much as was sufficient for two of these vessels, has been employed to build smaller vessels or gunboats, I presume. This is all a piece with our pretended economy. This mode of proceeding will not answer, sir. We are in the wrong from the commencement of our Navy. I do not wish it to be understood that I have decided a navy will never be a proper mode of defence for this nation – but whenever it shall be determined on, we should begin right; this can only be done by following those nations who have had most experience on the subject. Our first step should be to store away the proper timber. This should be done in times when we can best afford it – in times when our market is glutted – in times when labor can be commanded at fair prices – at a period when we enjoy peace, and surely not when we are about to engage in a war. We have heretofore paid the highest price for every article; we have given double wages for labor; and instances might be mentioned, when the workmen were transported in stage coaches, at an enormous expense, from our large seaport towns to the navy yard of this city. Contracts for timber were made in haste and at a very advanced price. As soon as it was obtained, it was put together, and in a few months we saw it floating in the form of a ship of war —rotten ships, I may say, sir, for I believe without exception in the frigates which were built by the United States, the more important parts decayed and were rotten in two, three, or four years. In many instances the expense for repairs was equal to the original cost. A single frigate, the Constitution, has cost for repairs, from October, 1802, to March, 1809, the enormous sum of $302,582 21, or upwards of $43,000 per annum for seven years in succession.

Let us view this subject in a more extended sense – I mean as regards our commerce generally – we shall still have cause to entertain the opinion which we first adopted. We cannot protect our commerce on the ocean. Our ships have vexed every sea – we trade to all parts of the world; of course, to protect our commerce, our ships of war must abandon our coasts and encounter all the force of the enemy or those of Europe. The ports we have in view are European. If your frigates, for convenience and safety, are to cruise only on your coasts, what will be the fate of the millions which are embarked beyond the Cape of Good Hope? By this management surely you cannot afford it protection. France, Spain, and Holland, when combined and backed by an armed neutrality in the north of Europe, could not secure their commerce. The fleets of Great Britain now sail triumphant over every wave of the deep. The Russians have a navy far superior to that which it is proposed we shall establish, and they cannot protect their trade in the confined limits of the Baltic. They count fifty or sixty sail-of-the-line, besides many frigates and smaller vessels.

Sir, the expenses which are incurred by a Naval Establishment, far exceed the profits which arise from the commerce which it is intended to protect. This proposition is warranted by the experience of Great Britain, the most commercial nation of modern times. In the year 1798, the total imports and exports of Great Britain amounted to £94,952,000. For the same year the expenditure for her navy amounted to £13,654,013, or about one-seventh of the total imports and exports, or fourteen per cent. on the total capital employed in commerce. What regular trade can yield such profits on the outward and inward cargoes? To me this is a secret. In the year 1799 Mr. Pitt computed the profits on the commerce of Great Britain at £12,000,000, or one and a half millions less than the expenses for her navy the preceding year!

Sir, the expenses which are necessarily connected with a Naval Establishment, constitute a very serious objection to it. At this time, the annual expenditures for the British navy amount to nearly £17,000,000, or $80,000,000. Every succeeding year brings with it an increase of expenditures. This has been the result year after year since the commencement of the institution. Our prospects will be the more evident when we take a view of the expenses which have been already incurred for the infantile establishment of our country; we shall be led to the same conclusions. The American navy was commenced in the year 1794, and by the end of the year 1811, the expenditures amounted to $27,456,979 – a sum much greater than the one-half of the public debt on the 1st of January, 1812. This would have been much better applied, had it been placed with the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund. I will ask the gentleman from South Carolina, what has the nation benefited for this enormous expenditure? What would have been the amount expended, had this engine been Herculean, with Admirals of the Red, White and Blue squadrons, with numerous dock and navy-yards, placemen, &c.? For we shall gradually advance to all this, if we do not stop short at this time. For the benefits of such appendages, I will refer you to a statement made to this House, the last session, concerning the navy-yards belonging to the United States; especially to the details of the expenditures of that connected with this city. The document I refer to, was laid before this House on the 25th February, 1811. It will inform you, sir, that the value of the work done from the 1st of January to the 31st of December, 1810, was $73,947 52. The commandant confesses, in his returns made to the Secretary, that this work, in many instances, is rated twenty per cent. above the prices paid in other places. The salaries in this same yard, for the same year, (1810,) amounted to $95,637 64¼. So that the pay for the salaries and the wages at this navy-yard, exceeded the value of the articles manufactured, even when rated far above the fair prices, in amount $21,790 12¼! This establishment is under the immediate eye of the Government; we might suppose every attention was paid to economy; if so, who will desire further proofs of the advantages of a navy!

Sir, I further object to a navy, because it will be the means of exciting many wars, which, without the establishment, may be honorably avoided. It is said, nations are involved in war, in proportion to the extent of their navies; and some assert (Brougham) that a perpetual war is one of the two modes which are necessary to support a powerful naval establishment. Sir, a naval establishment will create a new and a dangerous interest in our country. Nothing is more common than to be told, that such are the wishes of the naval interest of Great Britain, and that this or that war must be entered into to gratify them. For my part, sir, I shall be very sorry indeed, if ever the period arrives in the United States, when any particular interest or community shall direct the Government, whether it be naval, agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial – the general welfare should be the sole great ruling principle in the National Councils.

Sir, I am deterred, when I consider the fate of all those nations who at different periods have been famous for their navies. The naval strength of the Hanseatic League was such, two centuries past, as to excite terror on the part of England. These, sir, distant free cities, are now the appendages of mighty France, and have no political existence. Who has not heard of the once formidable fleets of Venice and Genoa? At one time England was indebted to the latter for officers to command her ships of war – alas! these republics are now consigned to oblivion. Denmark was at one time the mistress of the ocean; by means of her fleets she often invaded England, and held her in a state of subjection. The Danes heretofore burned London, Paris, and other great cities – they are now controlled by France, and they have had their Copenhagen defeat. Holland, with her Van Tromps, and De Ruyters, occupied the British Channel at pleasure; this power defeated the navies of England and France. Where is Holland now? Incorporated as a part of the French empire. Spain boasted her invincible armadas; Elizabeth of England, by nature haughty, proud, and ambitious, trembled at the very mention of them, until they were dispersed and destroyed by storms at sea; Spain is now the vassal of France. Not very long since the navy of France sailed triumphant along the British coast, looked into Portsmouth harbor, and taunted British spirit. I ask you, sir, where is the strength of which these nations formerly boasted? All are inoperative, and dread the gigantic power of the British navy – they are in part sick in dry docks, or are blockaded in their ports.

Mr. Chairman, Great Britain, though at this time triumphant in every sea, if she persists in her expensive naval establishment, with her present debt of £800,000,000, which was chiefly created for her navy – Great Britain, sir, I say, with all this, must sink under the heavy pressure. She will hereafter derive very little satisfaction from her brilliant victories on the 1st of June off Cape St. Vincent, Camperdown, Aboukir, and Trafalgar.

Shall I be pardoned, sir, when I fear our vessels will only tend to swell the present catalogue of the British navy? Of the 1,042 vessels which she possessed in July, 1811, one hundred and nine were captured from the French, forty-six from the Danes, twenty-five from the Spaniards, twenty-four from the Dutch, and three from the Italians; making a total of two hundred and seven captured ships, or one-fifth of her whole navy.

Small ships are proper for the service of the United States – by their agency we shall be able to annoy the convoys of an enemy. The privateers which were fitted out in every port during our Revolutionary war, destroyed much of the British commerce, even in the British and Irish Channels, whilst the frigates which were built by the Government did little or nothing – but two of them remained at the conclusion of the contest. The enemy will not watch your small vessels; they may enter all your small inlets, where heavy vessels cannot venture to approach them; and, at the conclusion of the war, they may be sold for the merchant service. I shall not follow the gentleman in his remarks on the bill before the committee; I shall vote against it, though it is my present intention to appropriate the sums requisite for the repairing and equipping our present ships of war. I will go no further. I tell you, sir, naval victories in the end would prove fatal to the United States; the consequences which have uniformly followed in other countries must take place here. If the United States shall determine to augment their navy, so as to rival those of Europe, the public debt will become permanent; direct taxes will be perpetual; the paupers of the country will be increased; the nation will be bankrupt; and, I fear, the tragedy will end in a revolution.

Mr. McKee rose, with deference, to perform a duty which he owed to his constituents, by delivering his sentiments on the very important subject before the committee, though he confessed himself very inadequate to do justice to it. He deemed the question of great magnitude; as he feared, if we were to proceed to build up a large naval establishment, it would affect the destinies of this nation to the latest posterity.

The gentleman from South Carolina has said, that he has great prejudices to encounter. Mr. McKee would have thought that the deliberate opinion of a majority of Congress, expressed upon more than one occasion, was entitled to a more respectful term than prejudices. Those decisions proceeded from the honest convictions of some of the best friends of the country.

Mr. McK. denied this doctrine, that "it is demonstrably clear that this nation is inevitably destined to be a naval power;" and he believed that, if the attempt were made to make it such, it would prove the destruction of our happy constitution. He would proceed to show on what ground he supported the opinion that the maintenance of a permanent naval establishment would prove ruinous to this country. For this purpose, he should be under the necessity of submitting some calculations to the House; for, though he had heard a course of this kind condemned, as fit only for the counting-house of the merchant, he considered it as the most conducive to correct legislation. It is certainly a matter of just calculation, when we are called upon to establish a permanent navy, to show that such an institution would cost more than any advantages to be derived from it would compensate.

[Here the Speaker went into detailed statements, taken from the authentic reports of the Navy Department, showing the enormous expense of building our ships, and the enormous expense of repairs; the great expense of manning and equipping them, and the pay of officers idle at home while the ship was rotting which cost so much, and which, at the time it was built, it was morally certain would have nothing to do until it rotted.]

Mr. McK. had said, this nation was not destined, under the present constitution, to be a great naval power; and he maintained that the statements which he had exhibited – and which he believed, for the purposes of argument, would be found substantially correct, when tested by experience – went conclusively to show that the expenses of the naval establishment of ten frigates and twelve seventy-four gun ships, now proposed to be built, could not be supported without permanent internal taxes, and a constant increase of the public debt and annual expenditure. And if the system was gone into, to the extent contemplated by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Cheves,) of building forty frigates and twenty-five seventy-four gunships, which he admitted would be necessary to relieve the naval establishment from comparative inefficiency, the annual expenses of the Government with such a system (as already shown) would be more than $25,000,000, which would rapidly increase the public burdens, and entail on this country that fatal system which has almost ruined the British Empire.

The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) takes it for granted that our commerce can be effectually protected by a navy; and assuming this fact, he proceeds to show that every portion of the American people are equally interested in the building a navy, because all are more or less interested in protecting commerce.

But, the fact is, that navies have never been considered as adequate to the complete protection of commerce. Look, said he, at the situation of the Old World, in times, to them, more prosperous than the present! What is the fact? Holland, with almost no navy, possessed an extensive and profitable commerce; and Spain, about the same period, with a large and powerful fleet, had no commerce.

But the situation of Europe is, in all respects, different from ours. The Governments of Europe are surrounded by rival powers, who are mostly engaged in war with each other, while we are happily far removed from them all, and have no neighbors to annoy us. Therefore, arguments drawn from the Old World are wholly inapplicable to this country, because their situation and form of Government are altogether unlike ours. And when we turn our eyes from foreign Governments to our own, we find that no people since Adam were ever more prosperous or more happy than the American people have been for the eight or ten years previous to the year 1808. Private fortunes have been accumulated with unequalled ease and rapidity; commerce has prospered beyond example; agriculture has flourished; and the revenue abundant, beyond the wants of the Government. And did this state of prosperity exist at a time when your commerce was protected by vessels of war? No; but at a time when your navy was out of use; and in proportion to the increase of your naval expenditure, in the same proportion has your commerce decreased. The protection of commerce is the only ostensible object for which navies are created, while power and conquest are the main objects. Show me, said Mr. McK., a nation possessed of a large navy, and I will show you a nation always at war. When has England been at peace with all the world, since she became a great naval power? Such instances in British history were so rare, and of such short duration, (if they existed at all,) that he could not answer the question; and he believed it would be difficult for the ingenuity of the gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Cheves) to answer it. It is true, that England, the greatest naval power in the world, is also the most commercial; and it was not to be doubted that her commerce received aid from her navy, though it owed its extent principally to the industry and consequent wealth of the nation. But England has other and far more important objects to effect by her navy than that of protecting commerce. Her insular situation renders it necessary for her protection, and she keeps it up for the purposes of war and dominion. England would destroy her navy to-morrow, if the protection of commerce was her only object; because it cannot be denied that the expense of keeping up her navy exceeds the profits of that commerce which it is said to protect. Navies, therefore, must be considered as instruments of power, rather than as the means of protecting commerce. They are the vile offspring of those nations where the power and grandeur of the Government is every thing, and the people are nothing but slaves!