Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

1. Resolved, That one month's pay ought to be allowed, in addition to the common allowance, to the officers, (according to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers and privates of the regulars, volunteers, and militia, and to the legal representatives of those who were killed or have since died of their wounds, composing the army under the command of Gov. Harrison, in the late campaign on the Wabash.

2. Resolved, That five years' half-pay ought to be allowed to the legal representatives of the officers, (according to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers, and privates, of the volunteers and militia who were killed in the battle of the 7th November, 1811, or who have since died of their wounds.

3. Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law to place on the pension list the officers, (according to the rank which they held,) the non-commissioned officers, and soldiers, of the volunteers and militia who served in the late campaign on the Wabash, under the command of Governor Harrison, and who have been wounded or disabled in the said campaign.

4. Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law to pay for the horses and other property of individuals lost in, or in consequence of, the said battle.

5. Resolved, That the further time of – years ought to be allowed to the officers and soldiers who were wounded, and to the legal representatives of those who were killed, in the said battle, to complete the payments due or which may fall due to the United States on any purchases of the public lands made by them before the said battle.

Thursday, January 9

Ursuline Nuns at New Orleans

The petition which the Speaker laid before the House yesterday, from the Ursuline nuns at New Orleans, was enclosed to him and recommended by Governor Claiborne. It prayed for an exchange of the military hospital for some lots which they hold in that city better calculated for a hospital. After the petition was read,

Mr. Dawson observed that he had received a letter from Governor Claiborne relative to that petition, and in confirmation of the facts therein stated. This community of nuns is a most respectable and useful member of society, the whole of their temporal cares being directed to the education of female youth. They are that community which some years ago presented a most elegant address to the then President of the United States, and received from him an equally elegant answer.

I am well assured that the lots which they wish to exchange are more valuable, and better suited for the erection of a hospital than those on which the hospital now stands. I therefore move that the petition and accompanying papers be referred to a select committee, who will no doubt converse with the Secretary of War on the subject.

This was agreed to, and Mr. Dawson, Mr. Lowndes, and Mr. Macon, were appointed the committee.

Friday, January 17

Quartermaster's Department

The bill from the Senate "for the establishment of a Quartermaster's Department" came up on its third reading.

Mr. Alston said, if the House would pay attention to the duty of the Purveyor of Public Supplies, and examine the powers given to the Quartermaster General in this bill, it would appear evident that there was no necessity for both offices, and it certainly was not the wish of the House to erect two great departments to perform the same duties. He could perceive no way in which one officer was to be a check upon the other. He liked the bill as it came from the Senate better than as amended, as he saw no necessity for retaining the office of Purveyor.

Mr. Tallmadge observed, that the great object of this bill, and the only one which made it necessary, was to provide for a Quartermaster General's Department, instead of military agents, as employed at present. There never was such an officer in the staff department in the Revolutionary war. The late Secretary of War, as well as the present, were in favor of this change. The military agents, without much responsibility, had nearly controlled the whole War Department. An attempt was made two years ago to effect this change, but it then failed. The office of Purveyor of Public Supplies was instituted long before that of Military Agent. The duties of the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different. The former is a highly respectable and confidential officer; he is next in consequence to the Commander-in-chief, with whom he has frequent communication. Every movement of the Army is first communicated to him. He ought to be a military character. It is his duty to receive and deliver out the necessary supplies for the Army, and to attend to its movements. The duties of the Purveyor is to purchase, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, arms, clothing, hospital stores, and every other article necessary for the Army. So that there is not the least similarity between the two officers; one being the purchasing, the other the distributing officer. If the office of Purveyor were to be done away, the Quartermaster General would have to employ a deputy or agent to make these purchases, which would be putting too much in the power of a subordinate officer, and would do away that check which will exist if the Purveyor be continued, as the purchaser and distributor of the supplies would be in the same person. The Purveyor is also the purchaser of goods for the Indian department.

Mr. Williams rose to prevent any person from falling into the mistake which the gentleman from North Carolina appeared to have done, by making remarks applicable to the printed bill (a part of which had been struck out and other parts amended) instead of the bill read from the Chair. He deemed it unnecessary to add any thing in reply to what had been so well said by the gentleman from Connecticut.

Mr. Alston said he had attended to the bill as read, and not to the printed bill; and insisted that, from the provisions of the bill, the Secretary of War might direct the Purveyor and Quartermaster to purchase the same articles. If the bill was what the gentleman from Connecticut had stated it to be, he should not have objected to it; but it was not.

Mr. Quincy had doubts whether both these officers were necessary. There was no such officer as Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war. If it were found hereafter that another besides the Quartermaster General was necessary, he could be appointed. There ought certainly to be a responsibility attached to the purchase of supplies, and this might be placed in the Head of the War Department or Quartermaster General. He had not sufficient light on the subject, to say that both these officers are necessary. He was in favor of the bill as it came from the Senate.

Mr. Blount said, that though there was not a Purveyor of Public Supplies during the Revolutionary war, there was a Clothier, who did much the same business. If we are going to war, said Mr. B., he did not see how we could do without a Quartermaster General; and it would be improper for him to become the purchaser of supplies, which it is the duty of the Purveyor to purchase, because, as had already been stated, there would be no check in the business. There must be propriety in keeping the offices distinct.

Mr. Macon observed, it was impossible to go to war without a Quartermaster General; for there is no man has so much to do about an army as this officer. There was always more difficulty in settling the Quartermaster General's accounts than any other. The only instance in which a Quartermaster General has to purchase supplies, is when, by some miscarriage or accident, the supplies from the Commissary or Purveyor do not arrive in season. It is necessary that such a power should be vested in this officer, to be used on such extraordinary occasions. As had been stated by his colleague, though there was no Purveyor during the Revolution, there were clothiers or agents employed in different situations, which answered the purpose. The qualifications necessary for the Quartermaster General and Purveyor are very different; the one ought to be a soldier, the other a merchant.

The bill passed by a large majority.

Naval Establishment

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill concerning the Naval Establishment.

Mr. Cheves, the Chairman of the Navy Committee, moved to fill the blank in the first section of the bill with "four hundred and eighty thousand dollars," and said he believed it to be his duty at this time, to disclose to the Committee of the Whole the views and motives of the select committee in reporting the bill. Mr. C. said, I consider this subject as one of the most important that can be brought before this House; as a great question, involving, to a considerable extent, the fate of a species of national defence the most essential and necessary to the interests of this country. I know, said Mr. C., how many and how strong are the prejudices, how numerous and how deeply laid are the errors which I have to encounter in the discussion of this question; errors and prejudices the more formidable, as they come recommended by the virtues, and shielded by the estimable motives of those who indulged them. I have been told that this subject is unpopular, and it has been not indistinctly hinted, that those who become the zealous advocates of the bill will not advance by their exertions the personal estimation in which they may be held by their political associates. I will not do my political friends the injustice to believe that these exertions will diminish their confidence; but, could I think otherwise, I hope I shall never be diverted from a faithful discharge of my duty by considerations of this kind. I wish to lead no man, and I am determined not to be blindly led by any man. In acting with a party, I do so, because I adopt their leading principles and politics as the best, and because I believe, from the nature of free Government, it is necessary so to act to give efficiency to the exertions of any individual; but I do not feel myself, therefore, bound to renounce my deliberate opinions on all the great interests of the nation, or to take no independent part in the exertions of the party to which I belong. I sincerely believe that, if this infant Naval Establishment be either abandoned or put down, the party who now form the majority in this House, and in the country, may run great risk of becoming the minority, not only within these walls, but in the nation.

It has been said, by a strong and lively figure of rhetoric, that this country is a great land animal, which should not venture into the water. But if you look at its broad high back, the Alleghanies, and its great sides swelling to the east and to the west, where do you find its immense limbs terminate? Not on some great plain which has been formed for their reception, but in two great oceans, the Pacific on the one side, and the Atlantic on the other. The figure explains the true interests of the country, in the inseparable union and necessary dependence of agriculture and commerce. The God of Nature did not give to the United States a coast of two thousand miles in extent, not to be used. No; it was intended by this bounty to make us a great commercial people; and shall we ungratefully reject the enjoyment of his unexampled beneficence? No, it has not and will not be neglected. A great portion of our people exist but upon the ocean and its fruits. It has been eloquently, and not less truly than eloquently, said, that "the ocean is their farm," and it must and will be protected. But how is this protection to be afforded? I will endeavor to prove that it can be done, and done most cheaply and effectually by a naval force; and if I succeed in this, I shall hope for the concurrence of the committee. No proposition appears to me more true or more obvious, than that it is only by a naval force that our commerce and our neutral rights on the ocean can be protected. We are now going to war for the protection of these rights; but in what way, and under what circumstances? The mode is altogether accidental, and not founded on the permanent relations or means of the country. It is not my intention to condemn the course which has been taken. It has had my hearty concurrence, and my zealous, though feeble, support. I hope it may be altogether effectual; and I believe it will inflict a wound which will be felt with poignancy. But it is, notwithstanding, partial and accidental; for, if Great Britain had not the Canadas on our borders, how could we attack or resist her, armed as we are? If we possess ourselves of the Canadas, and this we shall certainly do in the event of war, how and where shall we then continue the war without a naval force? We shall suffer the evils of war, without inflicting any of them on the enemy. We cannot send our regulars or our volunteers on the ocean. Does it not then result, inevitably, as the dictate of common prudence, that we should, as soon as possible, commence our naval preparations? The Naval Establishment of the United States has been heretofore so much neglected, that it is at present in a state of lamentable depression; and the question now is, whether we will suffer it to go down entirely, or attempt to raise it up to some degree of respectability. Some gentlemen say, "if you had asked for no more than the reparation of the frigates in ordinary, we might have granted your request." But, for myself, I would not thank any gentleman for this concession. The select committee conceived it to be their duty to bring the question fully before the House in the shape in which they have exposed it. Not to ask merely what it would do to assist by naval co-operation, in the first efforts of the contemplated struggle, but principally what it would do towards establishing and perpetuating a respectable naval force for the protection of those important rights of the people, which are, and must continue, exposed upon the ocean. Their determination was plainly, candidly, and boldly to speak to the House, and through it to the nation, on this great question, and leave its fate to the wisdom of the one and the good sense of the other.

That a respectable Naval Establishment affords the only effectual means of causing our commercial rights to be respected, will, as a general proposition, be denied by few persons, if any. But its adoption by us is deemed improper by those who oppose it, on the grounds of the enormous expense which, it is said, the establishment will necessitate, and the inability of the nation, by any force which it can provide, to resist, with effect, the immense naval power of Great Britain. Is it not surprising that so much prejudice should exist against this establishment on account of its expensiveness, when it is ascertained that, during the whole eighteen years of its existence, from 1794 to 1811, inclusive, it has cost the Government only $27,175,695? I am afraid I shall be tedious, because the only way in which I hope to bring conviction home to the minds of the House, is by entering, with minuteness and precision, into a dry detail of figures and statements; but the necessity of the case must be my apology for the course which I shall take. If the House shall have full confidence in my statements, much will be gained to the argument; for it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the hearer to follow me through an examination of these details, as the argument proceeds. For this confidence, therefore, I will venture to hope. I believe the statements on which I rely to be accurate, as far as accuracy is material to the discussion. I will state them with candor, and, when I have concluded, I will put them into the hands of gentlemen who may wish to examine them for their own satisfaction, or to refute them. The average annual expense of this establishment, so much censured for its wasteful and improvident management, has but little exceeded $1,500,000, which is not much more than twice the amount of the usual annual appropriation for our economical Civil List. It has been generally supposed that it has been much more expensive than the Military Establishment, but I will show that this is not really the case. The expense of the Military Establishment, from 1791 to 1811, inclusive, has been $37,541,669, giving an annual average of $1,700,000, or $200,000 per annum more than that of the Navy. It thus appears that, in the gross amount, as well as in the annual expenditure, the Army has been more expensive than the Navy. Compare, too, the services of the Army with those of the Navy, and it will be found that those of the latter have been most useful and most honorable to the nation. I know of no service of this character which the Army has performed, except the defeat of the Indians by General Wayne, and the late gallant affair on the Wabash. The Navy, in the contest with France in 1798, were victorious wherever it encountered an enemy, and probably laid the foundation of the subsequent accommodation with that nation. In the Mediterranean, its exploits gave a name to the country throughout Europe; humbled, in an unexampled manner, the piratical and barbarous foe, and crowned itself with a reputation for intrepidity and heroism, which had not been exceeded by the exploits of any nation, and which must go down to a distant posterity. I mean not, by this comparison, to say any thing injurious to the Army, but only to declare that preference to which I think the naval services of the country are entitled. Admitting, if it be desired, that the Navy has heretofore occasioned an expense not warranted by its force or its services; and I cannot deny but that, from a variety of causes, the expense may have been unnecessarily great; an argument cannot thence be fairly drawn against its future use – the contrary is the fair conclusion. Past errors lay the foundation of future improvement. It was thus the greatest orator, and one of the greatest statesmen of antiquity, reasoned. The great Athenian orator, when rousing his countrymen, by his impetuous eloquence, to resist the ambition of Philip, declared that it was on their past misconduct that he built his highest hopes; for, said he, "were we thus distressed, in spite of every vigorous effort which the honor of our State demanded, there were then no hope of recovery." So may we reason in this case; for had these extraordinary expenses been the result of good economy, then, indeed, would their diminution be hopeless; but, as they have proceeded from a wasteful or unskilful expenditure, the remedy will be found in a reform of the abuse; to effect this reform, is the duty of Congress. But it has not only been less expensive than the Army, but it may be proved, as the committee have declared in their report, that "a naval force within due limits and under proper regulations, will constitute the cheapest defence of the nation." This will be partly proved by a comparison between the expense of the permanent fortifications of our maritime frontier and that of an adequate naval defence. The experience of modern naval warfare has proved that no fortifications can prevent the passage of ships of war. The present fortifications of our maritime frontier, though they are more numerous and better than they have been at any other period in our history, cannot prevent an inconsiderable naval force from laying many of our towns in ashes. Indeed, it is believed that no fortifications which can be erected will afford a complete protection against such attacks, while their expense would be oppressive to the nation. The city of New York alone, if completely fortified, would require a further expenditure of three millions of dollars, and a garrison of ten thousand men, and then might be laid in ashes by four or five seventy-fours. But we have a coast of two thousand miles to protect, the expense of which could not be borne by the nation. A better defence would be furnished by such a naval force as would give you a mastery in the American seas, and at home much less expense.

The superior cheapness of naval defence seems to me to be satisfactorily established, and I am next to prove that the force proposed – I mean twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates – are sufficient to protect us in our own seas, and defend our ports and harbors against the naval power of Great Britain. The first evidence that is offered in support of this proposition, is the opinion of naval men; and if the representations of any man may be relied upon with confidence, so far, at least, as that they are not founded in deception, I believe those of a sailor may be. By naval men, I have been assured that this force is adequate to the object proposed. It is impossible for me to state with accuracy, or in a manner calculated to give a due impression of them, all the reasons which they offer in support of their opinion, but among them are those detailed in the report of the select committee. Indeed, they advance the opinion, and support it with reasons, the error of which, if they be erroneous, I am unable to discover, that it will require the enemy to employ a triple force to put himself on a footing of equality with that of the United States. Their reasons are, as nearly as I can state them, these: there must be stationed on our coast, at any given time, an equal force; this force cannot be fitted out, unless with great disadvantage to the service in point of expense, and in respect to the health of the crew, for much more than three months' service. An equal force must be put in requisition and kept in readiness to relieve that on the station. But, as all the equipments of the enemy must be made in Europe, the force destined to relieve the first must be despatched by the time the first may be supposed to have arrived on our coast, because it will be necessary, at a period as early as the arrival of the second, for the first to return; but the first could not proceed to Europe, be equipped, and return to relieve the second in time; and therefore a third equivalent force is necessary, and thus three times the force of the United States must be employed by the enemy to place himself on a footing of equality with it. History may be resorted to, with confidence, to prove that neither Great Britain, nor any other nation, has ever been able to station, for any length of time, in distant seas, a force equal to that which, in the opinion of naval men, is sufficient to accomplish the objects proposed by the committee – the dominion of the American seas, and the defence of our ports and harbors. There is one fact which, above all others, shows the inability of Great Britain to keep a large fleet on our coast. From the frozen regions of the North to the Isthmus of Darien, she has not a port fit for naval equipment or repair, except Halifax; and if, as the opponents of the Navy seem to think certain, and I hope their opinions may be realized, we shall, in the event of war, deprive her of that, she will be without the means of repairing a disabled vessel in our seas. Under such circumstances, any thing but temporary service would be utterly impracticable.

But, said Mr. C., on the subject of the British naval force, there is great misconception. The high-sounding number of a thousand ships appals the mind, and an examination of its actual force, and the numerous requisitions which are made upon it, is usually rejected as an idle labor. Let this examination be made, and at least some part of the terror which it excites will vanish. Of the eight hundred and thirty-three ships which Great Britain had in commission in 1801, and she never had more, it is believed there were only three hundred and eighty-three that exceeded the size and capacity of the large privateers that will probably be fitted out by the citizens of the United States, in the event of war. Of this last number, there were one hundred and forty-two of sixty-four guns, and above; twenty-two between fifty and sixty guns; one hundred and fifty-six between thirty-two and forty-four; and sixty-three between twenty and thirty guns. The remainder of the vessels in commission consisted of one hundred and seventy-four sloops, one hundred and forty-one gun-vessels, and one hundred and thirty hired vessels. These hired vessels are small vessels, of from four to ten guns, which, it is believed, are only employed for revenue purposes. This review and enumeration, I have no doubt, proves the actual force of the navy of Great Britain, however great it really is, to be much inferior to the impression almost universally received, from the high-sounding boast of her thousand ships. Nor has the actual force of the British navy been more misconceived than the application of it. The common impression is, that the Government can direct to any given point almost an unlimited number of ships. But if this delusive impression be removed, it will be found that, notwithstanding the greatness of the force, the points to which it must be destined are so numerous and dispersed as to put it all in requisition. This I will prove by reference to the distribution of her fleets in 1801. [Here Mr. C. read a statement of the force and distribution of the British fleet at that time.] From which of these stations, said Mr. C., could she have spared, with safety and prudence, a portion of the force employed? Could she, from all, have stationed and continued in our seas a force which would have been equal, under the disadvantages which have been pointed out, to twelve seventy-fours and twenty frigates? How much less would she have been able to have furnished a force which would be superior to a naval armament whose expense should equal that of the military preparations of the present year? But it may be said, that the ships which Great Britain has in ordinary would be more than equal to any increase which any circumstances would require. This might be true, were her seamen unlimited in numbers, and her pecuniary resources inexhaustible; but both are limited, and so must be her naval armament. To fit out vessels which she has in ordinary, would require, within a few thousand, all the seamen in her merchant service, and such an addition to her annual expenditure, as the nation neither would nor could bear. The true object of inquiry to ascertain her efficient power is, what number of vessels is she practically able to keep in commission, and the answer may be received in a shape the most unfavorable to my argument, yet confirmatory of it, in the example of 1801, the year which I have selected for illustration, when it is confidently believed her equipment was greater, combining force and numbers, than at any other period of her history.