Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

The value of commerce, then, has been strangely misunderstood by these gentlemen, who suppose that they have calculated it so very accurately. But whatever may be its value, you have already determined to defend it. Considerations of expense are not, indeed, to be neglected. We must employ, in the prosecution of the war, the cheapest and most efficacious instruments of hostility which we can obtain. But the arguments of the honorable gentlemen on the other side, are almost all of them directed against the war rather than the navy. It would be absurd, say they, to protect commerce by a navy, which should cost more than that commerce is worth. It must yet be more absurd, then, to protect it by an army which costs much more than the navy. In the comparison of the expenses and of the efficiency of an army and navy, instituted by my colleague, there is nothing invidious. The army is acknowledged to be necessary. It has had our votes. But, from the acknowledged propriety of raising the army, was fairly inferred the propriety of employing a navy, if it should be proved to be less expensive in proportion to its probable efficacy. War, and all its operations and all its instruments, must be expensive. It is difficult to determine upon the expediency of employing any of these instruments, except by comparing it with some other. To compute the result of this comparison, the honorable gentlemen on the other side must show, not that it is more expensive to maintain a navy than to be without one – not that it is more expensive to go to war than to remain at peace, (these propositions they, perhaps, have proved,) but that the objects proposed to be attained by the navy may be better or more cheaply attained in some other way. My honorable friend from Pennsylvania, then, in determining not to follow my colleague in the investigation of the comparative expense of different kinds of force, must have determined to avoid the best, and, indeed, the only method of examination from which a just conclusion could be deduced.

The honorable gentleman from Kentucky, however, who spoke yesterday, offered objections to a navy, which, if they were well founded, would supersede all further reasoning and calculation. He opposes a navy now – he will oppose it for ever. It would produce no possible good and all possible evil. It would infallibly destroy the constitution. Will the honorable gentleman tell us why? how? He sees the danger clearly? Will he explain it? An ambitious General might corrupt his army, and seize the Capitol – but will an Admiral reduce us to subjection by bringing his ships up the Potomac? The strongest recommendation of a navy in free Governments has hitherto been supposed to be that it was capable of defending but not of enslaving its country. The honorable gentleman has discovered that this is a vulgar error. A navy is really much more dangerous than an army to public liberty. He voted for the army and expressed no fears for the constitution. But a navy would infallibly terminate in aristocracy and monarchy. All this may be very true. But are we unreasonable in expecting, before we give up the old opinion, to hear some argument in favor of the new one? The honorable gentleman has asserted his propositions very distinctly. We complain only that he has not proved them.

Yet there is a view in which this question of a navy is, indeed, closely connected with the constitution. That constitution was formed by the union of independent States, that the strength of the whole might be employed for the protection of every part. The States were not ignorant of the value of those rights which they surrendered to the General Government, but they expected a compensation for their relinquishment in the increased power which would be employed for their defence. Suppose this expectation disappointed – suppose the harbor of New York blockaded by two seventy-fours? The commerce of that city, which exists only by commerce, destroyed? The protection of the General Government claimed? Your whole navy could not drive these English seventy-fours from their station. Would the brave and enterprising people of New York consent to see their capital emptied of its inhabitants, and their whole country beggared by so contemptible a force? Their own exertions would raise a fleet which would drive off the enemy and restore their city to its owners. But, when a single State shall find herself able to raise a greater fleet than the General Government can or will employ for her defence, can it be expected that she shall consider that Government as essential to her safety – as entitled to her obedience? I repeat that the Federal Constitution was instituted by the States, that the strength of the whole might be combined for the protection of any part which should be attacked. But what is the nature of the defence which one of our large States may be supposed interested to obtain from the General Government? Is it a land force? We can scarcely expect an attack on land, to repel which the militia of New York or Massachusetts would be unequal. Were either of these States attacked, the General Government would protect her by ordering out her own militia. To render the Union permanent, you must render it the interest of all the States, the large as well as the small, to maintain it; you must show them that it will provide, not an army which they can have without it, but what without it they cannot have – an adequate navy.

The honorable gentleman who anticipates the destruction of the constitution, unless we shall neglect one of the great interests which it was intended to protect, considers the English Orders in Council as leaving our institutions firm and untouched. Regulations, the effect of which is to give to a foreign power the complete disposition of the property of a large class of our people, are it seems in their political result innocent. Although every citizen who has property on the ocean become dependent on the English Ministry, become their subject, our liberty and independence are (we are told) unimpaired. But let a navy be raised – let the Government which expects obedience provide protection, and the constitution perishes!

But we have been referred particularly by my honorable friend from Pennsylvania to the experience of the world, as having already decided the question which we are now discussing. It seems that Venice and Genoa, and every other naval power which can be named, have all furnished abundant proof of the ruinous effects which such a force is calculated to produce. Sir, the assertion is new. I do not pretend to an intimate acquaintance with the histories of those nations, but I have hitherto believed that the first great shock which the power of Venice received, was given by the League of Cambray – a league formed to repress her ambition, not of maritime, but of territorial aggrandizement. But, whilst Venice has lost her independence, after maintaining it for five or six centuries, may I ask my honorable friend whether the States of Italy, which were never oppressed by fleets, had enjoyed a longer term of prosperity and freedom? As to Genoa – her naval power, her independence and glory, rose and sunk with the same man – Doria. But Holland, says the gentleman from Kentucky, affords an example of a nation, whose commerce flourished greatly before it had a navy, and decayed while her navy continued powerful. If there ever were a people, whose naval power has been employed to protect and almost to create their commerce, it is the Dutch. They fought their way at the same time to trade in the East Indies and America, and to national independence in Europe. The decay of their trade is to be attributed to the development of the resources of other nations; to the navigation act of England; and the similar measures adopted by other powers. As to France – the period of her greatest financial prosperity probably coincided with that of her greatest naval power; both were due to the administration of Colbert. But the evils of a navy (gentlemen tell us) have been concentrated in the case of England. With all her fleets she is destined soon to lose her independence. The expense of those fleets has crushed the industry of her subjects, and must soon reduce her to national bankruptcy. Let us suppose that these gentlemen, who have been so much mistaken in regard to the past, may be more accurate in their narrative of the future. Still England will have owed to her fleets her redemption from invasion for ages past. While every other considerable nation of Europe has been bankrupt over and over again, she is not yet bankrupt. While nearly every other Government of Europe has been overset, hers yet rides out the storm. Should England fall to-morrow, it should seem impossible to deny that her navy will have prolonged her independence for at least two centuries.

My honorable colleague has calculated the expense of building and maintaining a navy of 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates, and has explained the principles on which his calculations have been founded. The estimate of the gentleman from Pennsylvania can hardly be considered, after the error which has been remarked, as impugning those calculations. I have not myself attempted to estimate the probable expense of maintaining 12 ships-of-the-line and 20 frigates with any precision, but I cannot doubt the fairness of the rule which deduces it from the expense of such a force to England. This is the rule which I understood my colleague to have employed. It has not been disputed in debate; it has been in conversation. Many gentlemen have objected to an estimate of the expenses of a navy during war, in which (as they suppose) no allowance is made for the peculiar expenses which war involves. To have all our ships safe at the end of the contest is observed to be rather a sanguine expectation. But if the rate of expense in the estimate of my colleague were deduced from the rate of English expense during war, these objections must be altogether groundless. Now, it was deduced from the expense which is found sufficient to maintain the English Navy in a state of unimpaired strength during war. The English expense, from which it was inferred, included the charge of docks and navy-yards, of the repair of old ships and of the building of new ones. It included pensions to their officers, and even the support of the prisoners taken from their enemies. I have on my table a detailed account of the English naval expenditure for a year of the last war. The whole amount was about twelve millions and a half, and of this sum fully four millions and a half were applied to what may be considered the contingent expenses of the navy. Now, is there any reason to suppose that the contingent expenses of our navy would be greater in proportion to its force than this? And if not greater, has not an allowance been made for the capture of some of our ships, or, in other words, for the building of new ones? It is true, that from the superiority of English sailors to their present enemies, England loses little by capture, and, it may be supposed, that from the greater frequency and severity of our conflicts when we shall be engaged in war against her, our contingent expenses may be greater in proportion to the number of our ships then hers. But there are many expenses to which she is necessarily subject, from which we shall be exempt. I will instance that resulting from blockading squadrons, and that from repairs in colonial and foreign ports. These can appear inconsiderable to no man who has given his attention in any degree to the subject. Naval men I believe would not contradict me, if I were to state the expense of a ship employed in a strict blockade, and particularly during the winter months, as fully double that of a ship engaged in ordinary service. In fact, England finds the expense too great for her finances, and has been obliged, in some measure, to give up the practice. The other article of expenditure to which I have referred, I shall not attempt to estimate with any precision. It must, however, be obvious to every man, that the ships of war of England must frequently be repaired and refitted in distant countries. In these the most scrupulous fidelity and economy on the part of her officers cannot prevent the expense from being frequently extravagant. The most salutary regulations and most provident instructions on the part of the Administration at home cannot prevent her officers from being sometimes careless and fraudulent. I recollect an instance of the enormous expense involved in the distant services required from the British Navy, which I cannot pretend to state with accuracy, but in which I hope not to be substantially wrong. Sir Home Popham (a distinguished officer in the English Navy) had under his command in the last war two or three frigates in the East Indies. They had left England in good condition, and their repairs for two or three years, and the supply of the different articles of equipment which they occasionally required, exceeded, I believe, the prime cost of the vessels themselves. These two items of expenditure, blockading squadrons, and repairs in distant countries, (to neither of which an American Navy would be liable,) will be acknowledged, I think, to justify the conclusion, that the contingent expenses of the English Navy must be as great in proportion to its force as ours would be in war – and therefore that the rule employed in the calculations of my colleague was correct.

But our resources for the equipment of a navy appear to the honorable gentlemen on the other side, as deficient in respect to men and money. Sailors in this country cannot be obtained in sufficient numbers without impressment. It is not necessary, sir, to inquire whether for the defence of their peculiar rights the services of a marine militia may not be required. There is no reason to doubt our being able to procure the voluntary services of our seamen. If we shall at any time be engaged in a war (like that with France in 1798) which shall leave the greater part of our trade unaffected, the wages of sailors will, indeed, be high, but the number required will be small and the Government can afford high wages. In a war of a different character – against a nation powerful at sea – your sailors will be thrown out of employment and their wages will be necessarily low. But gentlemen object to this reasoning on the supposition that in such a case our sailors would all engage in privateers. The notion that in any war there will be a demand in this country for more than thirty thousand sailors for privateers is surely an extravagant one. But it has been shown by my colleague that in a war which should diminish our trade by one-half, (and a war requiring any great naval exertion would necessarily do this,) thirty or forty thousand seamen may be employed in privateers, and a sufficient number would remain for your public ships. But are not your privateers as much a part of the naval force of the nation as your ships of war? It has been said, indeed, that they are the more useful part. Now, if the Government should believe (what neither sober reflection nor the experience of other nations can permit it to doubt) that this part of your force cannot be in any great degree serviceable unless supported by a fleet – then surely a limitation to its extent, which would be necessary even to the interest of its owners, cannot fairly be objected to. The law just passed for raising twenty-five thousand men, provides, I think, for only one regiment of cavalry. Now, it is very possible that a much larger proportion of the twenty-five thousand men that can be accommodated in this regiment, may choose to go to Canada on horseback. They must be disappointed, and either not go into the army at all, or go into the service which they least desire. No man has hitherto denounced the act as on this account tyrannical and oppressive. Yet this case seems to me a true parallel to the other. In the naval, as in the military service, the interest of the country requires the employment of different sorts of force; and the object may be attained with equal fairness in both services by limiting the amount of the favorite force.

Mr. Law said: Being in favor of the bill now under consideration, I beg leave to express my sentiments, and state the reasons in support of my opinion; and the only pledge I shall offer to the House, for their attention, is, that I shall not occupy much of their time.

This bill, sir, embraces two objects – one relates to the repairs and equipment of the ships of the United States now out of service – the other contemplates the building of ten additional frigates, and laying the foundation of a new Naval Establishment. The view which I entertain of this subject, does not arise from its connection with that system which grows out of what is called the present crisis, or putting the nation in armor for war, as reported by the Committee of Foreign Relations; but from a conviction, that, as an abstract question or matter of general policy, I deem it for the interest and security of the United States, to begin the establishment of a Navy, to be perpetuated and extended hereafter – and, because I believe it may be accomplished, to the extent at present proposed, from the ordinary means we ought to possess, without adding any new burdens on the citizens. In order to decide whether it is for the interest of the United States we must examine and see how it is connected with the great and essential interest of the country. The basis of our national wealth is agriculture; the real substance of the nation is drawn from the earth. This arises from the great and extensive territory which we possess, thinly settled, low in price, of an excellent soil, capable, from its fertility and variety of climes, of affording produce of every kind, in the greatest abundance. The surplus of all is wanted in other countries, where nature has been less bountiful; and it must be a great while before the labor of our citizens can be diverted extensively into other channels – I mean manufactures. This is a condition in which we ought to rejoice for the causes, which bind us in this necessity, are those which tend to preserve the morals, the happiness, and the independence of the nation. And until our lands are taken up, and population becomes redundant, the basis of our national wealth must be the farming interest. But, sir, in a country so blessed by nature; where the inhabitants have the greatest stimulus to industry, the fruits of their labor secured by just and equal laws; where the property cannot be taken from the owner without his consent, there will be a vast surplus, beyond what the consumption of the country requires. Hence, commerce springs up as the daughter and handmaid of agriculture. Without commerce, agriculture would languish. With it, wealth is consolidated, and industry promoted. It diffuses its benign influence, discoverable in the splendid and delightful improvements, which rejoice the eye of the traveller, throughout the country. And it is as unnatural for the farming interest to oppress the commercial, as it is for the parent to abandon its offspring. They mutually cherish and support each other; and, by natural sympathy, must be affected by the checks and disorders which each may receive. But commerce must be protected. It cannot protect itself against force. Being carried on abroad on the ocean, (for I am speaking of foreign commerce,) it is subject to annoyance, interruption, and hazard. We must pass the common highway of nations to get to a market; and in this route, the weak and defenceless must, and always will be the sport and prey of the strong and violent, whom they meet in the way. From the wretched state of those nations with whom we have intercourse, we, from weakness, must fall victims to their violence. This is an evil which we shall always experience as a neutral, coming in collision with belligerents. Shall we then abandon commerce, or shall we strive to support it? It will be for the interest of the country to support it, if possible; for if we abandon it, the evil will recoil on the agricultural part, who, no longer than foreign commerce is supported, can find a vent for their surplus; and without a vent for the surplus, a bare competency might be endangered. Internal commerce would always fail, for that, being but a stream from foreign commerce, must dry when the fountain from whence it issues fails. Enterprise ceases, and languor and poverty ensue. It is then for the interest of the nation to cherish commerce. But how can this be done? Will a navy have this effect? I think it will. Indeed, if the little navy which was commenced some years ago, had been supported and increased as it might have been without any difficulty, we might, and in all probability should, have avoided our present calamities. We are now the defenceless prey of both France and England; deprived of the common rights of nations and citizens of the world. Will it then be asked, shall we not go to war and fight our way? I have already recorded my negative on the several questions preparatory to that step, and I am decidedly against going to war. We have not the means necessary, and unsuccessful resistance will only make our condition worse. I verily believe, if this nation had fostered our infant navy, from the time it was commenced, and had not, by a strange infatuation, abandoned and neglected it, it would now have been too important to be despised, by either France or England. Our prosperity would have continued. Our strength would have been dreaded, and our friendship courted by both nations. While they have been contending for the mastery, we, with such naval force as we ought to have had, and a strict course of neutrality, might have pursued a lawful and gainful trade. We might have had a perpetual revenue of sixteen millions, instead of the pittance now received at the Treasury. I believe, that with the navy we might have had, and a correct strict neutral course, there would have been neither Berlin and Milan Decrees, nor Orders in Council, to annoy our lawful commerce.

Mr. Roberts observed, that there appeared to be a disposition in the committee to take the question on the filling the blank in the first section without further debate. As he could not vote for appropriating $480,000 for the repair of the vessels of war unfit for service, it would perhaps be the most proper time to submit his opinions. I have not, Mr. Chairman, said he been a listless hearer of the very ingenious arguments advanced by gentlemen in favor of the report. He had, however, been so unfortunate as to be more confirmed in his inclination to vote against the bill, from attentively weighing these arguments. The select committee in their report (for they had reported specially as well as by bill) have said, with oracular confidence, that this country is inevitably destined to become a naval power. He had not, with them, become a fatalist. Though he was disposed to claim a high destiny for his country, he did not believe that destiny was yet immutably fixed. He, however, believed the question now to be decided must have an influence on that destiny, that might at an early day, if decided affirmatively, obliterate our happy civil institutions; if negatively, preserve them long the best blessings of posterity. Gentlemen who have advocated a naval establishment, have chosen to consider this bill and report as the furtherance of a system already in existence, and that, however short of their wishes the committee may be disposed to go, they stand prepared to view whatever might be done to augment the naval force as an evidence of assent to their system. Mr. R. said at one time he had inclined to vote for the appropriation of a sum to equip such of the vessels now out of service as might be found worthy of refittal. But on discovering it would be considered as an acknowledgment that a navy was proper in the sense it had been brought into view by the committee, and doubting, on better consideration, whether there was not great likelihood the money would be worse applied in repairing old, than in building new vessels, and feeling a conviction that if these vessels should be deemed worthy of repair, they could not be brought into action in that exigence of war when they could be useful, as in that case land defence must be resorted to, and the consequent expense incurred, he should feel it his duty to vote against this appropriation.

It has been observed that the constitution has invested Congress with power to regulate commerce, to provide and maintain a navy, &c. There is nothing, said Mr. R., imperative in this. It was necessary in a general grant of powers to insert many items to be left to the sound discretion of Congress, to use or not to use. Soon after the Government came into operation, it became a favorite object with one set of politicians to form a navy. On the occasion of our commerce being depredated upon by the Barbary corsairs, the question first came up. It became a matter of deliberation whether a peace should be purchased of them with money and presents; whether some European power should be subsidized to keep a few frigates on that station, or whether a naval force should be equipped for the purpose (as alleged) of enabling the President to negotiate to better effect. The party with whom I have always found it my duty to act, said Mr. R., opposed, on that occasion, the commencement of a navy system, when it was invited under circumstances so specious. They were, however, in the minority. The ships of war were voted – with what effect on the Algerines, he did not stop to inquire. If this opposition to the commencement of a Naval Establishment was wrong in the minority, their successors ought not to follow them; but if it should be found that they were right, the ground ought never to be quitted. The question of increasing the navy was again discussed in the celebrated times of '98-9. The collisions with France had raised the war fever very high. A navy was vociferously contended for as the most efficient means of defence. It was when things were in this state, that the President, in his reply to the Marine Society of Boston, who had with much fervor tendered him their approbation of his measures, hoped to see the wooden walls of America considered as her best defence. Because Athens, when she was invaded by the hosts of Xerxes, had chosen to interpret the oracle that promised her safety in wooden walls, rationally, America must take the same course, however dissimilarly situated. The people of Attica, inhabiting a circumscribed territory, found safety in their fleet, and they could have found it nowhere else. But such cannot be the case with America. Even the hosts of Xerxes could not make it necessary for the American people to quit their territory – the figure would not hold. On this occasion, too, the Republican party consistently opposed a navy; strange blindness and obstinacy, if they were not sustained by reason as well as principle. On this occasion, the supporters of a navy system were a majority in council. For a moment they succeeded with their measures. But the public councils were soon filled by the people with men of other minds, and the question was put to rest.