Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Volume V

311

Rogniat, p. 341, says that a great portion of the French army only reached Charleroi late on the 15th, and Fleurus at 11 A.M. on the 16th. – See Grouchy, p. 36.

312

Official Despatch; Muffling, pp. 8, 10, 18.

313

Muffling, p. 17. Yet a story is told of Fouché, who is said to have sent intelligence of Buonaparte's movements to Lord Wellington. The courier was attacked and waylaid, as supposed by Fouché's contrivance, so that he had an excuse ready for both parties.

314

Muffling, p. 64, allows that the position at Ligny was too much extended to the left, but the object of this was to have a line of communication with the Meuse and Cologne; a fault alluded to as arising from having two armies, and two chiefs, with different objects in view.

315

Grouchy, p. 47; Gourgaud, Liv. ix., p. 102.

316

It is hardly to be supposed that an officer of Ney's bold and enterprising character, with so much at stake, would have hesitated to attack at Quatre-Bras, if he had had his troops in readiness; but it appears that he could not have had time to move to that point at the early hour stated by Buonaparte. Ney had, also, too much experience of the nature of the troops he was opposed to, to act rashly.

317

The French did not attack until three P.M., the different corps not being arrived to make the necessary arrangements at an earlier hour. – Grouchy, p. 36; Rogniat, p. 341.

318

Ney's Letter to the Duc d'Otranto. Paris, 1815. – Muffling, p. 14.

319

Muffling, pp. 15-64. – Blucher had employed his reserves to support his right at St. Amand, and was not prepared for this change of attack. Muffling, however, considers, that, instead of his cavalry, had he moved his infantry from St. Amand to retake Ligny, he would have succeeded and gained the action.

320

Grouchy, p. 10, shows how little decisive the battle was. "La bataille de Ligny n'a fini que vers la neuf heure de soir, seulement alors la retraite des Prussiens a été présumée."

321

Here it was that Blucher was so nearly falling into the hands of the French cavalry.

322

Grouchy, p. 11, says, that, even on the 17th, it was supposed the Prussians had retired upon Namur, so feebly were they followed; the light cavalry of General Pajot pursued them in this direction on the 17th, captured a few guns, which, with some stragglers, as are found in all armies, was his whole success.

323

The St. Helena productions raise the amount to 20,000 men, 40 guns, standards, &c. See Grouchy, pp. 48, 49. – Montholon says they lost 60,000. – Liv. x., 148, says, that the Prussian army was reduced to 40,000 men by the loss they had sustained; 30,000 men killed and wounded, and 20,000 men, who had disbanded and ravaged the banks of the Meuse, and by the detachments sent to cover their retreat, and that of the baggage, in the direction of Namur.

324

The intention of the allied maréchals to remain together, whatever might be the issue, is known. Lord Wellington had ordered the inundations of Antwerp to be effected to their utmost extent. The fortresses were to have been abandoned to their own strength, and had the events of the 16th been such as to necessitate a retreat, and give up Brussels, Maestricht is probably the point on which both armies would have retired.

325

Had earlier or more positive information of the enemy's plans been received by Lord Wellington, and the troops put in movement on the evening of the 15th, the combinations of the two allied chiefs would have been perfect. Nothing more is necessary to show how well their plans had been laid, but which were not carried into full effect, by one of those accidental occurrences which no human foresight can prevent.

326

Liv. ix., p. 103. Buonaparte says, that Ney attacked with 16,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 44 guns, leaving 16,000 infantry, 4500 cavalry, and 64 guns, in reserve at Frasnes.

327

This belonged to the 69th regiment, not to the 42d, as Liv. ix. states, p. 104, and was almost the only one captured during the whole war. It may here be remarked, that if the French had carried one quarter the number of eagles with their regiments that we have of colours, a much larger proportion would now be found at Whitehall. A weak battalion of English infantry always carries two large colours, very heavy and inconvenient, whilst a French eagle, about the size of a blackbird, was only given to a regiment composed of several battalions, which was easily secured in case of defeat.

328

Liv. ix., p. 60. Buonaparte remarks, that the numbers of the allied army must not be rated at their numerical force. "Parceque l'armée des alliés étoit composée de troups plus ou moins bonnes. Un Anglois pourrait être compté pour un Français; et deux Hollandais, Prussiens, ou hommes de la confédération, pour un Français. Les armées ennemies étoient cantonnées sous le commandement de deux Généraux différents, et formées de deux nations divisées d'intérêts et de sentiments." His army, on the contrary, was under one chief, the idol of his soldiers, who were of the best description – veterans who had fought in the brilliant campaign of 1813-14, and draughts from the numerous garrisons who had since entered France from Antwerp, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dantzic, Mayence, Alexandria, Mantua, &c., with the numerous prisoners from England. Liv. ix., p. 201.

329

Three brigades of iron eighteen-pounders were preparing at Brussels, but not in a state of forwardness to be sent to Waterloo.

330

Muffling, p. 20, says, "that Blucher only asked for time to distribute food and cartridges to his men."

331

Montholon, vii., p. 134; Liv. ix., pp. 123-207; Gourgaud, p. 131.

332

See Liv. ix., p. 196. "Ainsi à cinq heures après midi, l'armée se trouva sans avoir une reserve de cavalerie. Si, à huit heures et demi, cette reserve eut existée," &c. &c. It is singular how great soldiers, in reporting military actions, will contradict each other. Napoleon ascribes the loss of the battle in great measure to his cavalry being so soon and generally engaged, that he had not a reserve left to protect his retreat. General Foy, on the contrary, affirms, that it was not the French, but the British cavalry, which was annihilated at Waterloo. —Guerre de la Péninsule, p. 116. Note.

333

On the 16th, at Quatre-Bras, the 33d regiment (British,) and afterwards two battalions of the Guards, when obliged to give way to an attack of the enemy, and pursued by the French cavalry, saved themselves in the wood of Bossu, formed along the skirts of it, and repelled the enemy with severe loss.

334

The armies were now placed under their favourite commanders, as the military of both nations had long wished; and on an arena which may be considered as fair a one as could well have offered in the chances of war. The British troops, however, were not composed of our best regiments, at least our infantry, nor equal to that army which had been in the preceding year in the south of France. Many of the most efficient regiments had been sent to America; first a brigade from Bourdeaux to Washington; another to Canada: and afterwards a force from Portsmouth to New Orleans. None of those returned in time for Waterloo, though they were on their way. – Liv. ix., p. 208. It has been shown how the French army was composed.

335

Buonaparte, liv. ix., 142, says, that he saw with pleasure that the English guards were placed on our right, as they were our best troops, which rendered his premeditated attack on our left more easy. Our guards are not, as is the case in other armies, the élite of our army; they are not selected, as in other services, from the best soldiers in other regiments, but are recruited exactly as troops of the line, except that they are required to be somewhat taller. It may be here remarked, the great superiority in appearance, that the French and other troops possessed over ours at the close of the war. The mode of recruiting accounts for this. Even our militia were much superior in this point of view to the troops of the line, and most of the best men were obtained from them. Our recruits were in general composed of the population of large cities, or of manufacturing towns, certainly not the best specimens of our population; the military service is not in any estimation amongst our peasantry, whilst the French army was composed of the picked men of thirty millions, and other nations in proportion.

336

Rogniat, p. 231, blames both generals for the too early employment of their cavalry. In the case here mentioned, he says, the success was "contre toute probabilité," as the cavalry charged unbroken infantry. The head of the attacking columns had, however, been already shaken by the charge of the 92d regiment, which took place nearly at the moment the cavalry charged.

337

Muffling, p. 26, observes, "La fumée étoit si épaisse que personne ne voyoit l'ensemble de l'action."

338

Liv. ix., p. 209. Buonaparte says, "L'infanterie Anglaise a été ferme et solide. La cavalerie pouvait mieux faire."

339

Rogniat, p. 231, says they amounted to 12,000, including other heavy cavalry.

340

The cavalry came up to one of the squares at a trot, and appeared to be hanging back, as if expecting our fire; they closed round two sides of it, having a front of seventy or eighty men, and came so close to one angle, that they appeared to try to reach over the bayonets with their swords. The squares were generally formed four deep, rounded at the angles: on the approach of the cavalry, two files fired, the others reserving their fire; the cavalry then turned, and it is not easy to believe how few fell, – only one officer and two men; no doubt many were wounded, but did not fall from their horses. Many squares fired at the distance of thirty paces, with no other effect. In fact, our troops fired too high, which must have been noticed by the most casual observer.

341

It has been said, that if the enemy had brought up infantry and light artillery, our squares must have given way. This would no doubt have been preferable: but then our reserve and cavalry would have been moved forward to check the cavalry, and the squares would have probably repelled the attack of the infantry. The enemy had tried to bring guns with the attacking columns, on our left, early in the day; the consequence was, that the horses were killed before they had advanced far, so that they could not follow the movements of the infantry, and were left behind. A similar attempt was made in the south of France, in the attack of Lord Hill's corps on the Nive; the guns were harnessed, so as to allow them to fire as they advanced, but the horses were soon killed or disabled, and the guns were abandoned when the attack was repulsed.

342

This was what Marmont had done at the Aripiles, at the battle of Salamanca, and for which he suffered so severely.

343

Muffling, p. 27, says, after this attack, which he states to be at four o'clock, "La bataille avoit été très sanglante, mais il n'y avoit point de danger pour l'armée Anglaise." He says it was then five o'clock.

344

See Muffling, p. 32, who makes the number amount to 10,000, and there is little doubt but that he is correct. A regiment of allied cavalry, whose uniform resembled the French, having fled to Brussels, an alarm spread that the enemy were at the gates. Numbers of those who had quitted the field of battle, and, let the truth be spoken, Englishmen too, fled from the town, and never halted until they reached Antwerp. This fact is too well attested to be doubted.

345

Muffling, p. 29. At four o'clock, he says, "Il n'avoit pas encore paru un homme de cette armée."

346

See Soult's letter to Grouchy, dated from the field of battle, at one o'clock.

347

Liv. ix., p. 175. Buonaparte says it was seven o'clock when Lobau repulsed them.

348

Of these, about 12,700 were cavalry.

349

Liv. ix., p. 193. This force is stated "4 à 5000 hommes."

350

Muffling, p. 58, mentions, that Buonaparte stated to some general officer on the morning of the 18th, that he had 75,000 men, and the English only 50,000. Liv. ix., p. 193, by taking Buonaparte's own account in this part of the book, upon calculation it will be seen that he there allows that he had upwards of 74,000.

351

See Muffling, pp. 22, 31, 62. Gourgaud, pp. 98 and 99, says it was half-past four when General Dumont informed Buonaparte of their arrival.

352

Liv. ix., pp. 168, 169, Buonaparte makes Bulow's attack after sunset.

353

Muffling, p. 62, says, it was hoped the Prussian army could have attacked at two o'clock, but that it was half-past four before a cannon was fired by them.

354

Liv. ix., p. 167, Ney's letter.

355

See Lord Wellington's dispatches.

356

Gneisnau says, it was half-past seven o'clock before Pirch's corps arrived. – See Blucher's dispatches.

357

Liv. ix. says it was eleven o'clock when the Prussians joined. Gourgaud and Montholon copy this. The letter from Soult to Grouchy, dated half-past one o'clock, stating that they were informed by a prisoner of Bulow's march, and that they thought they discovered his advanced posts at that hour, completely contradicts this. – Liv. ix.

358

Muffling, p. 61. "Il ne s'agit pas de savoir ce qu'un général ordinaire auroit fait; mais une nouvelle de cette nature auroit pu entraîner le général le plus distingué à prendre des precautions, ou la resolution de changer l'offensive vigoureuse en simple demonstration."