The Journal of Negro History, Volume 5, 1920

Considered, therefore, as an American slave in time of peace and an American soldier in time of danger, it is no anomaly that the status of the Negro complicated the negotiations between military representatives of Great Britain and the United States. Extended but fruitless negotiations ensued. A satisfactory settlement of the return of the Negroes seemed impossible. With independence assured through the representatives assembled, the Treaty of Paris was negotiated in 1783. Franklin urged in his communication with Oswald, 1779, that the question as to the return of Negroes taken away by Great Britain be adjusted immediately.579 This suggestion was strengthened by the support given it by the American representative, Henry Laurens, who had been in confinement in London during the war and whose chance arrival on the closing day gave the subject increased importance. Thus credit for the incorporation of the article on the Negro into the Treaty of Paris is given to Henry Laurens.580

By the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris,581 it was stipulated that the British troops should withdraw from the United States without carrying away or destroying any property belonging to the citizens of the United States. In spite of this agreement at the peace conference, this stipulation was not fulfilled by Great Britain. Convincing evidence of an infraction of this stipulation is seen in a letter written by General Washington to Sir Guy Carleton, May 6, 1783, in which the former expressed himself as being surprised to hear that embarkations of Negroes had taken place during the whole of that year.582 He, moreover, expressed his private opinion to the effect that such an action "is totally different from the letter and spirit of the treaty." A few days thereafter the Virginia delegates in Congress wrote to the Governor of Virginia that they would make this the subject of a "pointed remonstrance from our minister in Europe to the British Court with a demand for reparation and in the meantime urge General Washington to insist on a more faithful observance of that stipulation at New York."583

Notwithstanding further orders which were issued by Sir Guy Carleton, May 12, 1783, to prevent the carrying away of any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants many other infractions of the provision were reported.584 Even General Washington remarked585 that "some of his own slaves and those of friends living with him were probably carried away to New York." "If by chance," continued he, "you should come at the knowledge of any of them, I will be much obliged by your securing them so that I can obtain them again." So numerous were the violations of this part of the treaty that Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, in a letter written to Vergennes, the Foreign Minister of France, asked for suggestions from France in regard to the infractions of this article of the Treaty of Paris. In it, he expressed the objection of the Crown, which was to the effect that Negroes had come within the British lines under the promise of freedom and protection and that this promise was fulfilled by Great Britain in preference to the stipulation in the treaty.586

The situation became more aggravated. The breach between the two countries was gradually widening. Sensing this acute situation, Washington suggested that Carleton meet him in a conference at Orangetown, New Jersey, May, 1783. At one of their meetings Washington called the attention of Carleton to several resolutions passed by Congress relating to the return of all Negroes and other property of American inhabitants taken away by the British forces. Concerning these, Carleton replied that he wished to be considered as giving no construction of the treaty, but that he "conceived it could not have been the intention of the British Government by the treaty of peace to reduce themselves to the necessity of violating their faith to the Negroes who came within the British lines under the proclamation of the predecessors in command."587 In point of fact, however, he said "delivering up the Negroes to their former masters would be delivering them up—some to execution and others to punishments which would in his own opinion be a dishonorable violation of the public faith." He concluded, nevertheless, that if the sending off of the Negroes should hereafter be declared an infraction of the treaty, "compensation ought to be made by Great Britain to the owners."588

In regard to the last suggestion of Carleton, Washington observed that many difficulties would arise in compensating the proprietors for their Negroes. He also thought it impossible to ascertain the value of the Negroes, for the value of a slave, contended he, "consists chiefly in his industry and sobriety." Another difficulty Washington observed was that of identifying the slave. He was of the opinion that the slave would give the wrong name of his master. Washington considered this conduct on the part of General Carleton, moreover, a departure from both the letter and spirit of the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris.

In answer to these contentions Carleton said that as the Negroes were free and secured against their masters they could have no inducement to conceal their true name or that of their masters. In commending compensation Carleton was of the opinion that he was pursuing a course which would operate most for the security of the proprietors. "If the Negroes were left to themselves," he remarked, "numbers of them would very probably go off and not return to the parts of the country from whence they came or clandestinely would get on board the transports in such a manner as would not be in his power to prevent." "In either case," continued Carleton, "an inevitable loss would ensue to the proprietors."589 But as the business was then conducted they had at least a chance for compensation.

In conformity with these views, Carleton suggested that commissioners be appointed by the two countries "to agree upon the mode of compensating as well as the amount and other points with respect to which there was no provision made in the treaty." This suggestion was approved by Congress, and in compliance with it Egbert Benson, William Smith, and Daniel Parker were appointed590 with specific instructions from Washington to "assist representatives of Great Britain in inspecting and superintending the embarkation of persons and property in fulfillment of the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris."591

These commissioners began their work immediately by examining the claim of one Phillip Lott to a Negro named Thomas Francis592 on board a vessel called the Fair American in New York harbor and about to be carried to the island of Jamaica. Concerning this inquiry a pointed remonstrance was made to Sir Guy Carleton. After the details of the examination were presented to him, the commissioners requested Great Britain to prohibit its representatives from carrying away the Negro and to deliver Francis to Lott. Notifying Washington, June 14, 1783, of their progress, the commissioners reminded him that Sir Guy Carleton intimated an impropriety in the claim, as the property was not suggested to be in danger of being sent away. "This left room," said the commissioners, "for an idea that possibly property about to be sent away would be restored … and we conceive it is now reduced to a certainty that all applications for the delivery of property will be fruitless and we therefore desist from them."593

A few days later the commissioners reported to Washington that in superintending an embarkation of fourteen transports bound for Nova Scotia "about 3000 souls, among whom were at least 130 Negroes who appeared to be property of the citizens of the United States," were carried away. They also indicated that these embarkations were made in spite of their presence and remonstrance and for this reason asked General Washington for "further directions on this subject."594 Other reports of the commissioners to General Washington, June 17, 1783, show that on many other occasions Negroes not residing within the British lines were taken away. To the remonstrances of the commissioners, Sir Guy Carleton gave a deaf ear. They, in the meantime, wrote General Washington that they had interpreted Carleton's silence as a "determination that all future applications should remain equally unnoticed." That they realized that their efforts were fruitless goes without saying, for they confessed that their work was ineffective and that the British vessels were never subjected to any rigid inspections and it was, therefore, impossible to determine, from the register provided by Sir Guy Carleton, the exact number of Negroes carried away in those vessels.595

The work of the commissioners, nevertheless, was noteworthy. They called Washington's attention to the fact that Sir Guy Carleton affected to distinguish between the cases of such Negroes as came within the British lines in consequence of the promise of freedom and protection promulgated by Carleton's predecessors and such as came in either previous to the proclamations or subsequent to the cessation of hostilities. "Negroes of the first description," insisted Carleton, "were not included in the treaty." The commissioners soon realized that even this limited construction given to the article was not intended to be fulfilled by Carleton's subordinate officers. They based their contention upon the fact that printed certificates granting Negroes the privilege of embarking596 were distributed by the commandant of New York City, "as their convenience might require."597 These certificates fell into the hands of many persons for whom they were not intended. So loosely were they distributed that one was picked up by the commissioners who transmitted the same to General Washington.

On the other hand, the commissioners insisted that the treaty stipulated specifically that his Brittanic Majesty should withdraw all his armies, garrisons and fleets from the United States and from every port, place and harbor within the same without causing any destruction or carrying away any Negroes or other property of the American inhabitants.598 With these two interpretations of the Seventh Article invariably insisted upon by Carleton on the one hand and the commissioners on the other an agreement was less likely to be reached and, in spite of the efforts to the contrary, the deportation of Negroes took place steadily until all the British departed.599

In the meantime, Congress was discussing the ratification of the Treaty of Paris. The non-observance of the Seventh Article on the part of Great Britain and the destruction worked by Carleton evoked many resolutions opposing the ratification of the treaty for the expressed reason that it did not provide for the loss of Negroes. One of these resolutions was to the effect that it was "inexpedient to concur in passing laws necessary for carrying into effect the treaty."600 These efforts of Congress, however, like those of the commissioners were of no avail. Complaints of American citizens of the loss of their property were expressed by the representatives in Congress. They, to be sure, had their effect, for soon thereafter, Congress transferred the question of the return of Negroes to the realm of actual diplomacy.601

John Adams, 1788, who, by the way, was one of the representatives of the United States who signed the Treaty of Paris, received an appointment as representative of this country to England to settle the alleged violations of the Treaty of Paris. He was instructed in 1785 to press for a fulfillment of the terms of the treaty of peace on the part of Great Britain.602 He had little time, however, to press his claim before representatives of Great Britain were inquiring why the United States did not perform her part in this reciprocal contract. To these inquiries, Adams replied that "America could not; that it was hardly a government at all." He, moreover, informed Congress that the reason assigned by Laurens for incorporating the Seventh Article was that the people of the United States would be unable to comply with the part of the treaty which respects debts unless the provision which respects Negroes was made. "This construction," he continued, "was never denied and that it seemed to be understood by the ministry that on a settlement with the United States compensation must be made."

Obviously, then, both Great Britain and America understood that the Seventh Article would be fulfilled by Great Britain only when the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles were fulfilled by the United States.603 This point, however, was discussed pro and con for many months and was seldom admitted by the American diplomatic representatives, Adams himself said that he could "get no comfort from his mission." The construction given the Seventh Article making its fulfillment by Great Britain contingent upon the execution of other provisions only complicated matters.

Another mission was planned in 1789,604 but before another representative was appointed Washington urged upon Gouverneur Morris, who contemplated visiting London, "to find out the reasons why Great Britain had not complied with the Seventh Article." In a letter written to Morris, October 13, 1789, Washington desired Morris to converse with his Brittanic Majesty's Ministers as to whether there was any objection to performing those articles remaining to be performed on his part. "Learn with precision," he concluded, "what they mean to do on this head." In compliance with this request, on April 7, 1790, Morris interviewed the British representative, the Duke of Leeds, who gave to him only "general assurances" for a faithful observance of the articles and, becoming a "little embarrassed," could not say how the matter in regard to the Negroes stood. After many days of silence, the Duke of Leeds, April 23, 1790, "lamented every circumstance" which delayed the fulfillment of engagements on the part of the United States.605 He also indicated that, if circumstances rendered their final completion impracticable, he had no scruples in declaring the object of Great Britain would be to "retard the fulfillment of such subsequent parts of the treaty as depend entirely upon Great Britain until redress is granted to their subjects upon the specific points of the treaty itself or a fair and just compensation for the non-performance of those engagements on the part of the United States."606

Informing Washington of his progress, May 29, 1790, Morris disclosed the fact that he was no longer contending for the return of the Negroes, for that would involve either "breaking faith" with those whom they had seduced by the offer of freedom or the violation of the stipulation which they had made with the United States in the Treaty of Paris. In presenting America's side, however, he insisted upon compensation in order that it would not be difficult for the planters to show that they had sustained a heavy loss from the want of men to cultivate their lands and thereby produce the means of paying their debts. To this the Duke of Leeds replied that he wished to "consider the treaty subject generally" and thought that some compensation could be mutually made. He declared, nevertheless, that he would rather "make a new treaty than perform the Seventh Article of the Treaty of Paris."607

Subsequent diplomatic negotiations between Jefferson and Hammond, the Minister of Great Britain, indicate that Washington was not satisfied with the status of the case after Jefferson cited specific infractions of the Seventh Article of the treaty, enclosing documents supporting these claims. Hammond informed the United States, November 30, 1791, that the King had suspended the execution of the Seventh Article in consequence of the non-compliance on the part of the United States of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Articles. In short, he insisted that the stipulations should be performed in the order in which they stood. He stated, moreover, that the "two objects were so mutually connected with each other as not to admit of separation either in the mode of discussing them or in any subsequent engagements which might result from that discussion."608

It was soon evident then that such extended discussions were fruitless. This state of affairs, to be sure, could not exist very much longer. Citizens of the United States were pressing "more zealously" for the return of the Negroes. For almost a decade the subject had been discussed without an amicable adjustment. In a communication to the Congress, April 16, 1794, Washington showed that he had grasped the situation by informing that body of the fact that "despatches received from our minister in London contain a serious aspect of our affairs with Great Britain." He suggested, therefore, to the Senate that an envoy extraordinary be sent to England. To this end Washington appointed John Jay to settle the infractions of the Treaty of Paris.609

In Jay's instructions nothing was specifically said concerning the carrying away of the Negroes by the British, but, as it appeared from subsequent transactions, it is quite certain that the infractions of the Seventh Article as well as those of other articles were to be adjusted. In this wise, the "irrepressible question"—relating to the return of Negroes carried away by Great Britain during the Revolutionary War became one of the purposes of Jay's mission.610

During the negotiation with Grenville there took place many heated debates, in which each party accused the other of the first aggression. Meanwhile Jay ascertained, September 13, 1794, that Grenville supported the contention held by his predecessors, that the article of the treaty was intended to prevent depredations at the departure of the army; that no alteration in the actual state of property was intended by the Seventh Article; that every Negro who strayed or escaped from the American lines and came into the lines of the British Army became by the laws of war British property; and that to extend the Seventh Article of the treaty to include Negroes who came within the British lines under the proclamation of freedom was to give it a "wider latitude than the terms of it would warrant."611 In short, Grenville contended that in regard to those within the British lines before the signing of the treaty they were "left entirely without restrictions."612

In reply to Grenville's argument Jay divided the subject of the Negroes into three groups: first, the Negroes captured or disposed of during the course of the war; second, the Negroes who remained with and belonged to American citizens within the British lines; and third, the Negroes who, confiding in the promise of freedom, fled from their masters and took refuge with the British. Concerning the first two groups, no extended discussion followed. Grenville stated, however, in regard to the second group, that he was "not so sure." The last-named group on the other hand, produced much pourparler, for Jay maintained that these Negroes were "clearly comprehended by the terms of the treaty." According to his argument, Negroes could not by "mere flight" alter their slave character. He soon appreciated the difficult position of England in trying to keep the pledges of freedom offered to the Negroes and at the same time fulfill, according to the American interpretation, the article of the treaty in regard to the return of Negroes.

During the negotiation Jay admitted, moreover, that the carrying away of Negroes was justifiable in view of the promises of freedom and protection promulgated by British military representatives.613 He concluded, however, with the thought that "Great Britain ought not to expect to escape the consequence of the folly of her Generals in America." For this reason he restated the idea expressed by other American representatives to Great Britain, that compensation should be obtained for the Negroes carried away. In spite of Jay's change of position Grenville persisted with unyielding opposition in the view that such slaves were no longer American property. "On this point" wrote Jay to Randolph, "we could not agree."

Concerning this question, Jay said, moreover,614 that "various articles have been under consideration but did not meet with mutual approbation and consent." Sensing the situation Randolph declared to Jay, December 3, that he was extremely afraid that the reasoning of Grenville about the Negroes would not be satisfactory. "Indeed I own," said Randolph, "that I can not myself yield to its force." Randolph knew of the anti-British sentiment in the South and realized that the treaty would be opposed by the South because that section would feel that it had been neglected,615 should it receive no compensation for the Negroes carried away by the British.

In a communication to Jay two weeks later it is obvious that there was no concerted opinion even in America in regard to the much mooted question. Jay and Randolph, for instance, differed as to whether the slaves concerned ever became the property of Great Britain. Jay held that the Negroes in question never became the property of Great Britain whereas, Randolph held that while property is acquired in movables as soon as they come within the power of the enemy, yet "property rights thus acquired in war may by the treaty of peace be removed."616

To the contention of Great Britain that the Seventh Article meant merely an engagement against further depredations, Randolph declared the stipulation "superfluous"; for he maintained that the mere cessation of war meant that much. To this point, Grenville declared the treaty "odious," if the stipulation were interpreted to include Negroes who sought British lines under the promise of freedom and protection "on the basis of common morality." Great Britain was not to be expected to execute a stipulation with such an interpretation. Obviously, then, Great Britain would not recede from her position. Citizens of America, especially those deprived of their property, were beginning to think that our diplomatic relations were not properly taken care of by Jay. Expressions of disapproval of the treaty by resolutions in the Senate evinced the temper of the people. Jay, in the meantime was called "traitor"; his mission was declared a failure and the treaty was attacked from many sides.

At this juncture special mention must be made of the objections of the southerners on the ground that the treaty did not provide for the return of their property, while the objection of the North was not so pressing. In fact, northerners acquiesced in the opinion of Hamilton who had substantially the same view that Grenville had.617 Thus we see the first glimpse of the North becoming estranged from the South because of the difference of opinion in regard to the Negro.

The leading source of dissatisfaction of the treaty of Jay seemed to be a failure to get compensation for the Negroes carried away by Great Britain. The stipulation, moreover, was not definite, for many constructions could be placed upon it. The words of the treaty, moreover, were too vague and uncertain to express accurately the intention of the signers. Whether Negroes whom the British carried away could any longer be considered American property, seemed to be the crux of the situation. Although no definite settlement could be reached by the two nations, authorities of international law618 give the case to Great Britain. One rule which was recognized by the foremost nations of the world was to the effect that a slave escaping in war becomes free. Concerning this Halleck says that such slaves cannot be regained by their former masters.619 Woolsey says that "a slave sojourning to a free land cannot be treated as his master's property—as destitute of jural capacity." To the same purport, Heffter says "in no case is a state bound to allow the slavery which subsists in others." Dana, in his edition of Wheaton's International Law supports this contention.620

Dissatisfied with results but not discouraged, however, Washington appointed commissioners, December 7th, 1798, to work with commissioners from Great Britain and proceed with the infractions of the treaty. A short time thereafter President Adams in an address to Congress, November 23, 1797, reported that several decisions on the claims of citizens of the United States for losses and damages sustained by reason of irregular and illegal captures or condemnations of their vessels or other property had been made by the commissioners in London, conformably to the Seventh Article of the Treaty. "The sums awarded by the Commissioners," said he, "have been paid by the British Government; a considerable number of other claims where costs and damages and not captured property were the only objects in question have been decided by arbitration, and the sums awarded to the citizens of the United States have also been paid."621 These decisions served to allay the discontent in America. Still later, Adams informed Congress that "such progress had been made in the examination and decision of cases … which were the subject of the Seventh Article that it is supposed the Commissioners will be able to bring their business to a conclusion in August of the ensuing year."622