Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

I will now resume the consideration of our situation upon the Lakes to Detroit and Fort Malden. Here it must be remembered that the British command the Lakes. We are told that Governor Hull is marching to the defence of Detroit with twelve hundred militia from the State of Ohio, together with four hundred regular troops, formed and disciplined for action by the brave Colonel Boyd. These troops, I hope, will be better supplied and provided for than those on the frontier of New York. It is whispered by some of the favorites who are suffered to know the projects of our Government, that the British have sent a part of their regular troops, together with a number of Indians, from Fort Malden to Fort Erie, near the Falls of Niagara; and this is taken as certain evidence of the weakness of the garrison at Fort Malden, and that that fort may consequently be surprised and taken by Governor Hull with little difficulty. Now, I draw the exact contrary conclusion from this circumstance; for the British must have known that Governor Hull was on his march to Detroit; and if they had been weak at Fort Malden they never would have detached part of their force and sent it to the aid of Fort Erie. But presuming they had not heard of Governor Hull's march, and that they had left that fort comparatively defenceless, they will assuredly learn it soon enough to have the detachment return by water before Governor Hull can reach Malden. And if in the attempt to take Fort Malden, Governor Hull should meet with a defeat, the consequences will be alarming; for no reinforcement can be sent him, nor any assistance afforded soon enough to prevent a disastrous termination of the expedition. In that case the British, with a partial aid from the Indians, might cross the river and take possession of Detroit; and if they should then obtain the assistance of the Indians generally, it will be in their power to drive in all the frontier settlements of Ohio; and there can be little doubt when this war is once commenced that nearly all the Indians will flock to the British standard.

Monday, June 15

The Senate resumed the consideration of the bill, entitled "An act declaring War between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories," together with the motion made by Mr. German to postpone the further consideration thereof until the first Monday in November next:

And on the question to agree to the motion, it was determined in the negative – yeas 10, nays 22, as follows:

Yeas. – Messrs. Bayard, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Hunter, Lambert, Lloyd, and Reed.

Nays. – Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Brent, Campbell of Tennessee, Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, Howell, Leib, Pope, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor Turner, Varnum, and Worthington.

On motion, by Mr. Leib, to amend the bill, as follows:

[The amendment was to authorize privateering both against Great Britain and France.]

On the question. Shall this bill pass to a third reading as amended? it was determined in the affirmative – yeas 19, nays 13, as follows:

Yeas. – Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Brent, Campbell of Tennessee, Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, Leib, Robinson, Smith of Maryland, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, and Varnum.

Nays. – Messrs. Bayard, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Horsey, Howell, Hunter, Lambert, Lloyd, Pope, Reed, and Worthington.

Tuesday, June 16

Declaration of War

The amendments to the bill from the House of Representatives, entitled "An act declaring War between Great Britain and her Dependencies, and the United States and their Territories," were reported by the committee correctly engrossed.

Mr. Bayard moved to postpone the further consideration of the bill to the thirty-first day of October next.

The motion did not oppose or deny the sufficiency of the causes, or the policy of the war. It went only to affirm what he trusted the course of his observations would render very evident, that this was not a time at which war ought to be declared.

He indulged a confidence, that upon so great an occasion the Senate would not be impelled to act by any little passions, nor by any considerations which did not arise out of an extended and distinct view of the interests of the country. It is not enough that we have cause of war; we must see that we are prepared, and in a condition to make war. You do not go to war for the benefit of your enemy, but your own advantage; not to give proofs of a vain and heedless courage, but to assert your rights and redress your wrongs. If you commence hostilities before you are prepared to strike a blow, and while your cities, your territory, and your property on the ocean, are exposed to the mercy of a Government possessing vast resources of war, what can you expect but to add new distresses, defeat, and disgrace to the wrongs of which you complain? It is a strange motive for war – a wish to gratify the rapacity, to swell the triumphs, and to increase the insolence of the enemy.

Mr. B. said, that neither the Government nor the people had expected, or were prepared for war. Even at this moment, the general opinion abroad was, that there would be no war, the mercantile and trading world had continued to act upon that opinion. Nor could people be persuaded that an unarmed nation was about to attack a nation armed cap-a-pie. No man had laid out his account for this war, and every one would be taken by surprise and unprepared for its shock.

You have at this moment an immense property abroad, a great portion of it in England, and part floating on the ocean and hastening to your ports. The postponement proposed might save a great portion of this property, and bring home the seamen now absent from the country. Gentlemen would remember the number of ships which left our ports on the eve of an embargo. These vessels had not had time to perform their voyages, and the greater part of them were still abroad. He knew that some members had no commiseration for the merchant who had dared to escape the embargo, and who had disregarded the salutary precautions, designed, as it was said, for his security. But he did not think it surprising, nor culpable, that those whose property consisted in ships, should be averse to seeing them rotting at the wharves, and even disposed to incur risks to find employment for them abroad.

Even, however, if it should be thought that the merchants had acted with indiscretion and folly, it is the part of a parental Government, such as this ought always to be, not to punish the citizens for their misfortunes, but to guard them against the effect of their errors. Besides, a loss of individual property was a loss to the State, as the public strength was derived from individual resources.

He stated that the question of war had been doubtful till the present moment. He did not believe that the President himself expected war at the opening of the session, nor for a long time after. A menacing language was held out; but the hopes of an accommodation were far from being abandoned. Much was expected from the Prince Regent's accession to his full powers. A change of Ministry was not doubted, and it was thought that in the change of men, there would have been found such a change of principles and measures, that the differences between the two Governments might be compromised and settled. This expectation was protracted till it became plainly evident that the Prince did not intend to change his father's Ministers, nor to depart from their principles or measures. When this discovery was made, the Administration had proceeded too far to recede.

Desperate as the course was which now alone remained to be pursued, they supposed they were obliged to advance or become the object of reproach and scorn both to friends and foes. This necessity they had brought upon themselves, but it was too late to consider whether the condition might have been avoided; they were pledged in this state of events to attempt to extort from Great Britain by force the concession of those points which their arguments had failed in persuading her to yield. He had no doubt but that, some months past, the Cabinet had seriously determined upon resorting to hostilities. But the concurrence of Congress was to be obtained, and whether a majority of both Houses could be brought to take the daring and hazardous step, no man in or out of the Government, without the gift of prophecy, could have predicted.

The public mind had been so repeatedly distracted and deceived by boisterous speeches, and bold but ephemeral resolutions, that it had sunk into a state of apathy, and was no longer excited even by the sound of war echoed in the ministerial paper from the proceedings of Government. When the bill before us was first brought up from the other House, it was the opinion of very few that it would obtain the support of a majority of this body; and, even now, it was likely to pass, not because it was approved by a majority, but of the differences of opinion which existed among gentlemen as to other courses which had been proposed.

If, with the light and information possessed in this body as to the views and designs of the Cabinet and of Congress, it has been doubtful among ourselves whether the Government would resort to war, how was it to be known by our merchants, or any other class of society unacquainted with the intentions and secret proceedings of those exercising the powers of the Government, that the nation would be wantonly plunged into a sudden war?

He had heard it said, that the embargo was a sufficient notice of the design of the Government to resort to hostilities upon its expiration, and that the people must be infatuated, who, after such warning, were not apprised of the approaching crisis. But it is too recently and deeply in our recollection to be forgotten, that this is not the first embargo we have experienced, and which, though of longer duration, we saw pass away without being followed by war.

The language held there, as to people out of doors who have doubted of the war, is retorted by the public voice with equal confidence and on better grounds. They rely upon your integrity and wisdom, and say that Congress cannot be so infatuated, destitute as they are of the means of aggression or defence, to draw upon themselves a war with one of the most powerful and formidable nations on the globe. If a war with Great Britain be thought unavoidable, yet, as she leaves to us the time of commencing it, surely we ought to select that time when the first shock shall be least disastrous, and can best be resisted. Why should we hurry into a war from which nothing but calamity can be expected? There is no danger that the redress of our wrongs, or the assertion of our rights, will be barred by the limitation of time. No time has existed for years past when we had less cause to complain of the conduct of Great Britain. Her vessels of war had all been withdrawn from our coast, as he presumed, in order to avoid collisions and hostility. If the war be suspended till November, the Government and the people will both be better prepared to sustain it. He was not a friend to the restrictive system, but with a choice out of evils, he should prefer the embargo to war. Postpone the war, and we will submit to the embargo till November. This will furnish time for the return of your ships and seamen; and if, at the same time, you will abandon the non-importation act, you will replenish your Treasury with at least twelve millions of dollars, and restore to your citizens sixty millions now abroad, and in danger of being lost. It appeared to him that the course which had been pursued was the most preposterous imaginable. For eighteen months past, we had been sending our property out of the country, and not suffering it to return; and, while contemplating a war with Great Britain, we saw our effects to an immense amount accumulating in that kingdom, liable at any moment, to fall a prey to the Government, and to be employed in support of the war against us. He asked, why rush with this precipitancy into the war? Are you provided with means to annoy the enemy, or to defend yourselves? Have you an army or navy which can make any impression? Are your exposed towns fortified and garrisoned? Was any nation ever less prepared for war? It would require the whole military force that you now possess to constitute an adequate defence for New Orleans, New York, and Newport. It is very well known that the General who will command at New Orleans has declared to the Government, that he will not be answerable for the security of the place with less force than ten thousand men, which is equal to all the effective troops yet raised. It would be natural to suppose that no Government would declare war till it was prepared to attack its enemy. In peace we require no defence, and shall we declare war in order to defend ourselves? But what blow are you prepared to strike? Were you able in the summer to recruit your army of twenty-five thousand men, could it be employed in any service in the course of this year? A soldier is not made in a day. The authority of a foreign officer, now in this country, of the highest military reputation, he had heard frequently cited, that it required at least fourteen months to form a soldier of a recruit. This remark applied to France, where the officers have generally received a military education, and where there are so many models to imitate, and so many instructors to teach. But here the officer is to form as well as the soldier. The officer has to learn his lesson first, before he can prescribe the task of the soldier. You may possibly have a herd of men, but you can have no army to lead into service this season; and if this herd be led against disciplined troops, you can expect nothing but defeat and disgrace.

But you have not got, nor can you get the men during the present year. These are not the days of Cadmus. It will require great patience and industry, and a considerable length of time, to collect twenty-five thousand men. Have you the least prospect, if you declare war, of attacking Canada this season? It is impossible that you can do it with effect. You will be sufficiently occupied in defending your frontiers against the savages.

It is not on land then that you expect immediately to assail your enemy. Is it on the ocean that the impression is to be made? You have twenty vessels of war – Britain upwards of a thousand. What will avail the activity or gallantry of your officers and seamen against such disparity of force? Your little Navy must fall immediately, or be driven from the ocean. Some gentlemen indulge great expectations from privateers; but has Great Britain any unarmed or unprotected trade which they can attack? Privateers have no other object than plunder and booty. They avoid armed vessels – and, defended as is the British commerce in every part of the world by her great naval force, it is little to be expected that privateering will be attended with much success or encouragement. But while we are searching for the means of annoying the commerce of Britain, does it become us to overlook at this moment the condition of our own? A valuable part of the trade from beyond the Cape of Good Hope has not yet arrived. Of the numberless vessels which sailed upon the eve of the embargo, few have returned. Your merchant vessels are without convoy and utterly defenceless. Your condition, therefore, is, that with more commerce exposed, your adversary will possess greater means of annoyance, and the consequence must be, that we shall lose infinitely more than we can expect to gain.

Under such circumstances, what should hurry us into the war? Are gentlemen afraid if they wait till November the world will not last long enough to afford them time to gratify in war their mighty resentment against Britain? He believed, as he hoped, that there was no honorable gentleman on the floor who would not live long enough to have a complete surfeit of the war, though it should be postponed for a few months.

The question on postponement was determined in the negative – yeas 11, nays 21.

On motion, by Mr. Bayard, to postpone the further consideration of the bill to the third day of July next, it was determined in the negative – yeas 9, nays 23.

On motion by Mr. Bayard, to postpone the further consideration of the bill to Monday next, it was determined in the negative – yeas 15, nays 17.

On motion, that the Senate adjourn, it was determined in the affirmative – yeas 18, nays 14.

So the Senate adjourned to 11 o'clock to-morrow.

Thursday, June 18

On motion, by Mr. Varnum,

Resolved, That the injunction of secrecy, in relation to the confidential Message of the President of the United States of the first instant, and also in relation to the private and confidential proceedings of the Senate since that date, be removed.

[End of the confidential proceedings.]

Friday, June 26

Treasury Notes

The amendment to the bill, entitled "An act authorizing the issuing of Treasury Notes," was reported by the committee correctly engrossed, and the bill was read a third time as amended.

On the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in the affirmative – yeas 23, nays 8, as follows:

Yeas. – Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Bradley, Brent, Campbell of Tennessee, Condit, Crawford, Cutts, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Gregg, Howell, Lambert, Leib, Reed, Robinson, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, Turner, Varnum, and Worthington.

Nays. – Messrs. Bayard, Dana, German, Gilman, Goodrich, Hunter, Lloyd, and Pope.

Sunday, July 5

Volunteers Bill

The amendment to the bill, entitled "An act supplementary to the act, entitled 'An act authorizing the President of the United States to accept and organize certain volunteer military corps,'" having been reported by the committee correctly engrossed, the bill was read a third time as amended.

On the question, Shall this bill pass as amended? it was determined in the affirmative – yeas 14, nays 6, as follows:

Yeas. – Messrs. Anderson, Bibb, Brent, Condit, Crawford, Franklin, Gaillard, Giles, Howell, Robinson, Smith of New York, Tait, Taylor, and Varnum.

Nays. – Messrs. Bayard, Gilman, Goodrich, Leib, Lloyd, and Smith of Maryland.

So it was resolved, that this bill pass with an amendment.

Monday, July 6, 6 o'clock, p.m

Recess of Congress, and adjournment

The Senate proceeded to consider the resolution from the House of Representatives for the appointment of a joint committee to wait on the President of the United States, and notify him of the intended recess, and concurred therein, and Messrs. Robinson and Anderson were appointed a committee on the part of the Senate.

The following Message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit to the Senate copies and extracts of documents in the archives of the Department of State, falling within the purview of their resolution of the fourth instant, on the subject of British impressments from American vessels. The information, though voluminous, might have been enlarged with more time for research and preparation. In some instances it might, at the same time, have been abridged, but for the difficulty of separating the matter extraneous to the immediate object of the resolution.

July 6, 1812.

JAMES MADISON.

The Message and documents were read, and ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

A message from the House of Representatives informed the Senate, that the House, having finished the business before them, are about to adjourn.

Mr. Robinson, from the committee, reported that they had waited on the President of the United States, who informed them that he had no further communications to make to the two Houses of Congress.

Ordered: That the Secretary inform the House of Representatives that the Senate, having finished the legislative business before them, are about to adjourn.

Agreeably to the joint resolution, the President then adjourned the Senate, to meet on the first Monday in November next.

Executive Proceedings.

[Confidential.]

Saturday, June 20, 1812

A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Harper and Mr. Fisk, two of their members – Mr. Harper, chairman.

Mr. President: The House of Representatives have passed a "resolution authorizing the President of the United States to issue a proclamation to the inhabitants of the British American Continental Provinces," in which they request the concurrence of the Senate.

The resolution was read, as follows:

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress assembled, That in case it shall be deemed necessary, in order to vindicate the just rights, or to secure the safety of the United States, to invade the provinces of Upper and Lower Canada, Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick, or either of them, the President of the United States be, and he hereby is authorized and empowered to issue a proclamation, addressed to the inhabitants of said provinces, assuring them, in the name of the people of these States, that in case the said provinces, or any of them, shall come into the possession of this Government, the inhabitants of such province or provinces shall be secured and protected in the full enjoyment of their lives, liberty, property, and religion, in as full and ample manner as the same are secured to the people of the United States by their constitutions; and that the said proclamation be promulgated and circulated, in the manner which, in the opinion of the President, shall be best calculated to give it general publicity.

Ordered, That the resolution pass to a second reading.

Friday, June 26

Occupation of the Floridas

A message from the House of Representatives by Messrs. Mitchill and Hall, two of their members.

Mr. President: The House of Representatives have passed a bill, entitled "An act authorizing the President to take possession of a tract of country lying south of the Mississippi Territory and of the State of Georgia, and for other purposes," in which they request the concurrence of the Senate, and that the bill be considered confidentially.

The bill last brought up for concurrence was read, as follows:

"An Act authorizing the President to take possession of a tract of country lying south of the Mississippi Territory and of the State of Georgia, and for other purposes.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled: That the President be, and he is hereby authorized to occupy and hold, the whole or any part of East Florida, including Amelia Island, and also those parts of West Florida which are not now in possession and under the jurisdiction of the United States.

"Sec. 2. And be it further enacted: That, for the purpose of occupying and holding the country aforesaid, and of affording protection to the inhabitants, under the authority of the United States, the President may employ such parts of the military and naval force of the United States as he may deem necessary.

"Sec. 3. And be it further enacted: That, for defraying the necessary expenses, one hundred thousand dollars are hereby appropriated, to be paid out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, and to be applied to the purposes aforesaid, under the direction of the President.

"Sec. 4. And be it further enacted: That, until further provision shall be made by Congress, the President shall be, and he hereby is empowered to establish within the country he may acquire by this act, a temporary government, the civil and military authorities of which shall be vested in such person and persons as he may appoint, and be exercised in such manner as he may direct: Provided: That he shall take due care for the preservation of social order, and for securing to the inhabitants the enjoyment of their personal rights, their religion, and their property: And provided, also: That the section of country herein designated, that is situated to the Eastward of the river Perdido, may be the subject of further negotiation."

Ordered: That it pass to a second reading.