Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

Here, then, is a leading fact, that the article in the constitution had a condition of things, notorious at the time when it was adopted, upon which it was to act, and to meet the exigency resulting from which, such an article was requisite. That is to say: new States, within the limits of the United States, were contemplated at the time when the foundations of the constitution were laid. But we have another authority upon this point, which is, in truth, a cotemporaneous exposition of this article of the constitution. I allude to the resolution, passed on the 3d of July, 1788, in the words following:

[Here the resolution was read.]

In this resolution of the old Congress, it is expressly declared, that the Constitution of the United States having been adopted by nine States, an act of the old Congress could have no effect to make Kentucky a separate member of the Union, and that, although they thought it expedient that it should be so admitted, yet that this could only be done under the provisions made in the new constitution. It is impossible to have a more direct contemporaneous evidence that the case contemplated in this article was that of the Territories within the limits of the United States; yet the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) for whose integrity and independence I have very great respect, told us the other day, that "if this article had not territories within the limits of the old United States to act upon, it would be wholly without meaning. Because the ordinance of the old Congress had secured the right to the States within the old United States, and a provision for that object, in the new constitution, was wholly unnecessary." Now, I will appeal to the gentleman's own candor, if the very reverse of the conclusion he draws is not the true one, after he has considered the following fact: That, by this ordinance of the old Congress, it was declared, that the boundaries of the contemplated States, and the terms of their admission, should be, in certain particulars, specified in the ordinance, subject to the control of Congress. Now, as by the new constitution the old Congress was about to be annihilated, it was absolutely necessary for the very fulfilment of this ordinance, that the new constitution should have this power for the admission of new States within the ancient limits, so that the ordinance of the old Congress, far from showing the inutility of such a provision for the Territories within the ancient limits, expressly proves the reverse, and is an evidence of its necessity to effect the object of the ordinance itself.

I think there can be no more satisfactory evidence adduced or required of the first part of the position, that the terms "new States" did intend new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States. For it is here shown, that the creation of such States, within the territorial limits fixed by the treaty of 1783, had been contemplated; that the old Congress itself expressly asserts that the new constitution gave the power for that object; that the nature of the old ordinance required such a power, for the purpose of carrying its provisions into effect, and that it has been from the time of the adoption of the federal constitution, unto this hour, applied exclusively to the admission of States, within the limits of the old United States, and was never attempted to be extended to any other object.

Now, having shown a purpose, at the time of the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, sufficient to occupy the whole scope of the terms of the article, ought not the evidence be very strong to satisfy the mind, that the terms really intended something else, besides this obvious purpose; that it may be fairly extended to the entire circle of the globe, wherever title can be obtained by purchase, or conquest, and the new partners in the political power may be admitted at the mere discretion of this Legislature, any where that it wills. A principle thus monstrous is asserted in this bill.

But I think it may be made satisfactorily to appear not only that the terms "new States" in this article did mean political sovereignties to be formed within the original limits of the United States, as has just been shown, but, also, negatively, that it did not intend new political sovereignties, with territorial annexations, to be created without those original limits. This appears first from the very tenor of the article. All its limitations have respect to the creation of States within the original limits. Two States shall not be joined; no new State shall be erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of Congress. Now, had foreign territories been contemplated, had the new habits, customs, manners, and language of other nations been in the idea of the framers of this constitution, would not some limitation have been devised, to guard against the abuse of a power, in its nature so enormous, and so obviously, when it occurred, calculated to excite just jealousy among the States, whose relative weight would be so essentially affected, by such an infusion at once of a mass of foreigners into their Councils, and into all the rights of the country? The want of all limitation of such power would be a strong evidence, were others wanting, that the powers, now about to be exercised, never entered into the imagination of those thoughtful and prescient men, who constructed the fabric. But there is another most powerful argument against the extension of this article to embrace the right to create States without the original limits of the United States, deducible from the utter silence of all debates at the period of the adoption of the Federal Constitution, touching the power here proposed to be usurped. If ever there was a time in which the ingenuity of the greatest men of an age was taxed to find arguments in favor of and against any political measure, it was at the time of the adoption of this constitution. All the faculties of the human mind were, on the one side and the other, put upon their utmost stretch, to find the real and imaginary blessings or evils, likely to result from the proposed measure. Now I call upon the advocates of this bill to point out, in all the debates of that period in any one publication, in any one newspaper of those times, a single intimation, by friend or foe to the constitution, approving or censuring it for containing the power here proposed to be usurped, or a single suggestion that it might be extended to such an object as is now proposed. I do not say that no such suggestion was ever made. But this I will say that I do not believe there is such a one any where to be found. Certain I am, I have never been able to meet the shadow of such a suggestion, and I have made no inconsiderable research upon the point. Such may exist – but until it be produced, we have a right to reason as though it had no existence. No, sir. The people of this country at that day had no idea of the territorial avidity of their successors. It was, on the contrary, an argument, urged against the success of the project, that the territory was too extensive for a republican form of government. But, now there is no limits to our ambitious hopes. We are about to cross the Mississippi. The Missouri and Red River are but roads, on which our imagination travels to new lands and new States to be raised and admitted (under the power, now first usurped) into this Union, among undiscovered lands in the west. But it has been suggested that the Convention had Canada in view, in this article, and the gentleman from North Carolina told this House, that a member of the Convention, as I understood him, either now, or lately a member of the Senate, informed him that the article had that reference. Sir, I have no doubt the gentleman from North Carolina has had a communication such as he intimates. But, for myself, I have no sort of faith in these convenient recollections, suited to serve a turn, to furnish an apology for a party, or give color to a project. I do not deny, on the contrary I believe it very probable, that among the coursings of some discursive and craving fancy, such thoughts might be started; but that is not the question. Was this an avowed object in the Convention when it formed this article? Did it enter into the conception of the people when its principles were discussed? Sir, it did not, it could not. The very intention would have been a disgrace both to this people and the Convention. What, sir! Shall it be intimated; shall it for a moment be admitted, that the noblest and purest band of patriots this or any other country ever could boast, were engaged in machinating means for the dismemberment of the territories of a power to which they had pledged friendship, and the observance of all the obligations which grow out of a strict and perfect amity? The honor of our country forbids and disdains such a suggestion.

But there is an argument stronger, even, than all those which have been produced, to be drawn from the nature of the power here proposed to be exercised. Is it possible that such a power, if it had been intended to be given by the people, should be left dependent upon the effect of general expressions; and such too, as were obviously applicable to another subject; to a particular exigency contemplated at the time? Sir, what is this power we propose now to usurp? Nothing less than a power, changing all the proportion of the weight and influence possessed by the potent sovereignties composing this Union. A stranger is to be introduced to an equal share, without their consent. Upon a principle, pretended to be deduced from the constitution – this Government, after this bill passes, may and will multiply foreign partners in power, at its own mere motion; at its irresponsible pleasure; in other words, as local interests, party passions, or ambitious views may suggest. It is a power that, from its nature, never could be delegated; never was delegated; and as it breaks down all the proportions of power guarantied by the constitution to the States, upon which their essential security depends, utterly annihilates the moral force of this political contract. Would this people, so wisely vigilant concerning their rights, have transferred to Congress a power to balance, at its will, the political weight of any one State, much more of all the States, by authorizing it to create new States at its pleasure, in foreign countries, not pretended to be within the scope of the constitution or the conception of the people, at the time of passing it?

This is not so much a question concerning the exercise of sovereignty, as it is who shall be sovereign. Whether the proprietors of the good old United States shall manage their own affairs in their own way; or whether they, and their constitution, and their political rights, shall be trampled under foot by foreigners introduced through a breach of the constitution. The proportion of the political weight of each sovereign State, constituting this Union, depends upon the number of the States which have a voice under the compact. This number the constitution permits us to multiply at pleasure, within the limits of the original United States; observing only the expressed limitations in the constitution. But when in order to increase your power of augmenting this number you pass the old limits, you are guilty of a violation of the constitution in a fundamental point; and in one, also, which is totally inconsistent with the intent of the contract, and the safety of the States which established the association. What is the practical difference to the old partners, whether they hold their liberties at the will of a master, or whether, by admitting exterior States on an equal footing with the original States, arbiters are constituted, who by availing themselves of the contrariety of interests and views which in such a confederacy necessarily will arise, hold the balance among the parties which exist and govern us, by throwing themselves into the scale most conformable to their purposes? In both cases there is an effective despotism. But the last is the more galling, as we carry the chain in the name and gait of freemen.

I have thus shown, and whether fairly, I am willing to be judged by the sound discretion of the American people, that the power, proposed to be usurped, in this bill, results neither from the general nature, nor the particular provisions, of the Federal Constitution; and that it is a palpable violation of it in a fundamental point; whence flow all the consequences I have intimated.

The present President of the United States, when a member of the Virginia Convention for adopting the constitution, expressly declares that the treaty-making power has limitations; and he states this as one, "that it cannot alienate any essential right." Now, is not here an essential right to be alienated? The right to that proportion of political power which the constitution has secured to every State, modified only by such internal increase of States as the existing limits of the Territories at the time of the adoption of the constitution permitted. The debates of that period chiefly turned upon the competency of this power to bargain away any of the old States. It was agreed, at that time, that by this power old States within the ancient limits could not be sold from us. And I maintain that, by it, new States without the ancient limits cannot be saddled upon us. It was agreed, at that time, that the treaty-making power "could not cut off a limb." And I maintain, that neither has it the competency to clap a hump upon our shoulders. The fair proportions devised by the constitution are in both cases marred, and the fate and felicity of the political being, in material particulars, related to the essence of his constitution, affected. It was never pretended, by the most enthusiastic advocates for the extent of the treaty-making power, that it exceeded that of the King of Great Britain. Yet, I ask, suppose that monarch should make a treaty, stipulating that Hanover or Hindostan should have a right of representation on the floor of Parliament, would such a treaty be binding? No, sir; not, as I believe, if a House of Commons and of Lords could be found venal enough to agree to it. But although in that country the three branches of its legislature are called omnipotent, and the people might not deem themselves justified in resistance, yet here there is no apology of this kind; the limits of our power are distinctly marked; and when the three branches of this Government usurp upon this constitution in particulars vital to the liberties of this people, the deed is at their peril.

I have done with the constitutional argument. Whether I have been able to convince any member of this House, I am ignorant – I had almost said indifferent. But this I will not say, because I am, indeed, deeply anxious to prevent the passage of this bill. Of this I am certain, however, that when the dissension of this day is passed away, when party spirit shall no longer prevent the people of the United States from looking at the principle assumed in it, independent of gross and deceptive attachments and antipathies, that the ground here defended will be acknowledged as a high constitutional bulwark, and that the principles here advanced will be appreciated.

I will add one word, touching the situation of New Orleans. The provision of the treaty of 1803, which stipulates that it shall be "admitted as soon as possible," does not therefore imply a violation of the constitution. There are ways in which this may constitutionally be effected – by an amendment of the constitution, or by reference to conventions of the people in the States. And I do suppose, that, in relation to the objects of the present bill, (with the people of New Orleans,) no great difficulty would arise. Considered as an important accommodation to the Western States, there would be no violent objection to the measure. But this would not answer all the projects to which the principle of this bill, when once admitted, leads, and is intended to be applied. The whole extent of Louisiana is to be cut up into independent States, to counterbalance and to paralyze whatever there is of influence in other quarters of the Union. Such a power, I am well aware that the people of the States would never grant you. And therefore, if you get it, the only way is by the mode adopted in this bill – by usurpation.

The objection here urged is not a new one. I refer with great delicacy to the course pursued by any member of the other branch of the Legislature; yet I have it from such authority that I have an entire belief of the fact, that our present Minister in Russia, then a member of that body, when the Louisiana treaty was under the consideration of the Senate, although he was in favor of the treaty, yet expressed great doubts on the ground of constitutionality, in relation to our control over the destinies of that people, and the manner and the principles on which they could be admitted into the Union. And it does appear that he made two several motions in that body, having for their object, as avowed, and as gathered from their nature, an alteration in the constitution, to enable us to comply with the stipulations of that convention.

I will add only a few words in relation to the moral and political consequences of usurping this power. I have said, that it would be a virtual dissolution of the Union; and gentlemen express great sensibility at the expression. But the true source of terror is not the declaration I have made, but the deed you propose. Is there a moral principle of public law better settled, or more conformable to the plainest suggestions of reason, than that the violation of a contract by one of the parties may be considered as exempting the other from its obligations? Suppose, in private life, thirteen form a partnership, and ten of them undertake to admit a new partner without the concurrence of the other three, would it not be at their option to abandon the partnership, after so palpable an infringement of their rights? How much more, in the political partnership, where the admission of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangers and evils! Again: it is settled as a principle of morality, among writers on public law, that no person can be obliged, beyond his intent at the time of the contract. Now, who believes, who dare assert, that it was the intention of the people, when they adopted this constitution, to assign, eventually, to New Orleans and Louisiana, a portion of their political power, and to invest all the people those extensive regions might hereafter contain with an authority over themselves and their descendants? When you throw the weight of Louisiana into the scale, you destroy the political equipoise contemplated at the time of forming the contract. Can any man venture to affirm that the people did intend such a comprehension as you now, by construction, give it; or can it be concealed that, beyond its fair and acknowledged intent, such a compact has no moral force? If gentlemen are so alarmed at the bare mention of the consequences, let them abandon a measure which sooner or later will produce them. How long before the seeds of discontent will ripen, no man can foretell; but it is the part of wisdom not to multiply or scatter them. Do you suppose the people of the Northern and Atlantic States will, or ought to, look on with patience and see Representatives and Senators from the Red river and Missouri pouring themselves upon this and the other floor, managing the concerns of a seaboard fifteen hundred miles at least from their residence, and having a preponderancy in councils, into which, constitutionally, they could never have been admitted? I have no hesitation upon this point. They neither will see it, nor ought to see it, with content. It is the part of a wise man to foresee danger, and to hide himself. This great usurpation, which creeps into this House under the plausible appearance of giving content to that important point, New Orleans, starts up a gigantic power to control the nation. Upon the actual condition of things, there is, there can be, no need of concealment. It is apparent to the blindest vision. By the course of nature, and conformable to the acknowledged principles of the constitution, the sceptre of power in this country is passing towards the Northwest. Sir, there is to this no objection. The right belongs to that quarter of the country; enjoy it; it is yours. Use the powers granted as you please; but take care, in your haste after effectual dominion, not to overload the scales by heaping it with these new acquisitions. Grasp not too eagerly at your purpose. In your speed after uncontrolled sway, trample not down this constitution. Already the old States sink in the estimation of members, when brought into comparison with these new countries. We have been told that "New Orleans was the most important point in the Union." A place out of the Union the most important place within it! We have been asked, "What are some of the small States when compared with the Mississippi Territory?" The gentleman from that Territory (Mr. Poindexter) spoke the other day of the Mississippi as "of a high road between" – . Good heavens, between what, Mr. Speaker? Why, "the Eastern and Western States." So that all the Northwestern Territories, all the countries once the extreme western boundary of our Union, are hereafter to be denominated Eastern States.

[Mr. Poindexter explained. He said that he had not said that the Mississippi was to be the boundary between the Eastern and Western States. He had merely thrown out a hint, that, in erecting new States, it might be a good high-road between the States on its waters. His idea had not extended beyond the new States, on the waters of the Mississippi.]

I make no great point of this matter. The gentleman will find, in the National Intelligencer, the terms to which I refer. There will be seen, I presume, what he has said, and what he has not said. The argument is not affected by the explanation. New States are intended to be formed beyond the Mississippi. There is no limit to men's imaginations, on this subject, short of California and Columbia river. When I said that the bill would justify a revolution, and would produce it, I spoke of its principle and its practical consequences. To this principle and those consequences, I would call the attention of this House and nation. If it be about to introduce a condition of things absolutely insupportable, it becomes wise and honest men to anticipate the evil, and to warn and prepare the people against the event. I have no hesitation on the subject. The extension of this principle to the States, contemplated beyond the Mississippi, cannot, will not, and ought not to be borne. And the sooner the people contemplate the unavoidable result, the better; the more likely that convulsions may be prevented; the more hope that the evils may be palliated or removed.

Mr. Speaker: What is this liberty of which so much is said? Is it to walk about this earth, to breathe this air, and to partake the common blessings of God's providence? The beasts of the field and the birds of the air unite with us in such privileges as these. But man boasts a purer and more ethereal temperature. His mind grasps in its view the past and the future, as well as the present. We live not for ourselves alone. That which we call liberty, is that principle on which the essential security of our political condition depends. It results from the limitations of our political system, prescribed in the constitution. These limitations, so long as they are faithfully observed, maintain order, peace, and safety. When they are violated in essential particulars, all the concurrent spheres of authority rush against each other, and disorder, derangement, and convulsion are, sooner or later, the necessary consequences.

With respect to this love of our Union, concerning which so much sensibility is expressed, I have no fear about analyzing its nature. There is in it nothing of mystery. It depends upon the qualities of that Union, and it results from its effects upon our and our country's happiness. It is valued for "that sober certainty of waking bliss" which it enables us to realize. It grows out of the affections, and has not, and cannot be made to have, any thing universal in its nature. Sir, I confess it, the first public love of my heart is the commonwealth of Massachusetts. There is my fireside; there are the tombs of my ancestors —

"Low lies that land, yet blest with fruitful stores,Strong are her sons, though rocky are her shores;And none, ah! none, so lovely to my sight,Of all the lands which heaven o'erspreads with light."

The love of this Union grows out of this attachment to my native soil, and is rooted in it. I cherish it, because it affords the best external hope of her peace, her prosperity, her independence. I oppose this bill from no animosity to the people of New Orleans, but from the deep conviction that it contains a principle incompatible with the liberties and safety of my country. I have no concealment of my opinion. The bill, if it passes, is a death-blow to the constitution. It may, afterwards, linger; but lingering, its fate will, at no very distant period, be consummated.