Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

Mr. Poindexter observed that the proposition of the gentleman from Tennessee for incorporating the present Mississippi Territory with West Florida and the Island of Orleans, to the sea, with a view to form of the whole one State, did not meet his approbation. From the Tennessee line, which would be the northern boundary of the State, to the confluence of the Mississippi with the bay of Mexico, is a distance of from eight hundred to a thousand miles, in the nearest direction, and following the meanders of the river, not less in my opinion than twelve hundred miles. Taking the distance generally from the Mississippi to the Georgia line, I should judge it to be about five hundred miles, and from the northernmost point of the State of Georgia to the junction of the Chatahoochee with the sea, cannot be far short of a thousand miles. This vast tract of country, in my humble conception, is too extensive for the purpose of local State government. Indeed, sir, it could hardly be expected, over such an immense territory, interspersed with numerous tribes of Indians, that even the Executive functionaries of Government could be able to perform their duty in the execution of their laws.

That geographical limits, other than those which now divide the Orleans and Mississippi Territories, might be designated, to comport more with the future convenience and prosperity of the country, cannot be denied. I would suggest for the reflection of gentlemen who have to act on this subject, the expediency of making the great river Mississippi the high road between the Eastern and Western States, to be formed on its waters; that no one State should possess both banks of that river. In that event, to commence on the eastern shore at the mouth of the Yazoo, in latitude 32 30; thence in a direct line to the head-waters of the Chatahoochee, thence to the sea, and along the coast, in a southwestern direction, to Lake Barrataria, thence up the Chafalaga to its junction with the Mississippi, and thence up that river to the mouth of the Yazoo. This tract of country would include about three degrees of latitude; it would combine all the settlements on the Eastern side of the Mississippi, except the county of Madison, which could be disposed of as the wisdom of Congress might hereafter direct. There are various political considerations which operate in favor of the formation of such a State. The people of the Territory of Orleans are petitioning to become an independent State, and I for one hope the prayer of their petition will in substance be granted. It is said that the French population of the city of New Orleans are unfriendly to the American Government. That they have strong prejudices in favor of France. Although, sir, I do not attach so much importance to that circumstance as some gentlemen do, I am willing to admit that French emigrants in Louisiana feel an attachment to their native country. I do not blush to say that were I in France, or any other foreign country, I could never forget that I was born an American citizen. I could never relinquish my attachments to the land of freedom, in which I inhaled my first breath. Judging therefore, of the feelings of others, by my own, I cannot doubt that many influential French inhabitants of New Orleans entertain a predilection for the country which gave them birth. But, sir, within the limits which I have submitted to the consideration of the committee, there is an American population at least sufficient to neutralize every exotic prejudice which may exist in New Orleans. A people whose origin, whose feelings and principles are American, and who are prepared to rally around the standard of the constitution, in every scene of difficulty and of danger.

Mr. Miller's amendment was not agreed to.

Monday, January 14

Orleans Territory

The House resumed the consideration of the engrossed bill to enable the people of the Territory of Orleans to form a constitution and State government, and for the admission of such State into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, and for other purposes.

The bill being on its final passage —

Mr. Pitkin said he had heretofore stated that he had some objections to the bill, which he had intended to have stated to the House when the bill was capable of amendment, but that he had not an opportunity so to do. I have stated, said Mr. P., that it was probable there would be some difficulty between Orleans, when it becomes a State, and the United States, respecting the extent of the State westward. I stated that the United States, in consequence of the purchase of Louisiana with the same extent that it had when Spain and France possessed it, had claimed the territory as far as the river called Rio Bravo; that the negotiations on this subject between the Governments of the United States and Spain were probably unknown to many members of the House, and that it required a pretty accurate knowledge of them, of the extent of the claim, and of the geography of the country, to understand precisely what I meant. I stated that there was an extent of country between a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches and Rio Bravo, of four or five hundred miles in width, which the United States had claimed as being their property. In the negotiations between the two countries, the United States offered to cede all the country between the Rio Bravo and the Colorado running east of it to Spain, on the condition that Spain would cede to the United States all the territory west of the Perdido. This proposition was rejected. Our Commissioners were instructed to assert our title as far as the Rio Bravo, or at least to the Bay of St. Bernard. It is so stated by the President of the United States in the introduction to the compilation of the land laws, in which he states that we unquestionably have a right to the country as far west as the sources of the rivers which fall into the Mississippi, to the sources of the Red River, Arkansas, and Missouri; that with respect to the territory immediately bounding on the Gulf of Mexico, we have claims to the "province of Texas," which it is well known is a very large province. By the bill before us, according to this construction, jurisdiction is extended over this very province; and it may be, and in fact will be, in the power of the State of Orleans to say that our limits extend so far, and therefore to extend their jurisdiction in like manner. In my apprehension, therefore, it is important, while we are making this Territory a State, where the boundaries are disputed, to retain in our own hands the power of settling them. It is known that, by the law which passed providing for the government of the Territory of Orleans, we had liberty to alter the boundary before we made them a State, but not after. Will it not be in the power of the new State to insist on their right to jurisdiction over the territory, at least as far west as the Colorado, and to prevent the United States from ceding any part of it? For instance, sir, the United States may wish, as we have taken Florida as far as the Perdido, subject to future negotiation, to make this arrangement: to cede to Spain a certain proportion west for East Florida. Now, sir, I ask when we have made this country a State if we can do this? I believe it will be said by every person that we cannot, after she becomes a State, alter the boundaries without her consent. I do apprehend, therefore, there will be difficulties on the subject hereafter, if the United States should attempt to settle the boundary in a manner disagreeable to the State; because, if they cannot extend their jurisdiction west of a meridional line passing through Nacogdoches, the territory will be in extent east and west but about one hundred miles, and north and south about one hundred and twenty, and this will make them comparatively a small State.

As the United States have settled a provisional line, to wit: a meridional line through Nacogdoches, it should not be in the power of the new State to extend its jurisdiction beyond that line. Provision might be made in this way: The western boundary might be made to conform to the provisional line; and a provision might then be made that there should be reserved to the United States the privilege of adding to it whatever land it should acquire westwardly. Such a provision would leave us at liberty to settle the limits without the interference of that State, and without, I apprehend, much difficulty. This was done in relation to the State of Ohio. Unless the right had been reserved, the consent of the State would have been necessary to a cession, or other alteration of its boundary. Such a course in this case will be perfectly safe for the United States, as well as for the new State. I wish we may so regulate the Territory as there may not in future be any collision between the State and the United States. The province of Texas is in the viceroyalty of New Spain. We know that the Viceroy sent his troops to oppose the passage of our troops, and a provisional line was established. New Spain is very powerful, and I should be very sorry that the new State should have power to embroil the United States with it. I would ask the chairman of the committee who reported this bill, what were his views respecting the western boundary, and how far it was his idea that the new State should extend, and whether it would not comport with his ideas that the change which I have suggested should be made? I could have wished that the bill was in such a state of its progress that I could have moved an amendment; but, as it is, unless I am satisfied that we shall not be involved in difficulty by the consequences I have stated, I shall be unwilling to pass the bill, and must vote against it.

Mr. Quincy. – Mr. Speaker, I address you, sir, with an anxiety and distress of mind with me wholly unprecedented. The friends of this bill seem to consider it as the exercise of a common power; as an ordinary affair; a mere municipal regulation which they expect to see pass without other questions than those concerning details. But, sir, the principle of this bill materially affects the liberties and rights of the whole people of the United States. To me, it appears that it would justify a revolution in this country; and that, in no great length of time, may produce it. When I see the zeal and perseverance with which this bill has been urged along its Parliamentary path, when I know the local interests and associated projects, which combine to promote its success, all opposition to it seems manifestly unavailing. I am almost tempted to leave, without a struggle, my country to its fate. But, sir, while there is life, there is hope. So long as the fatal shaft has not yet sped, if Heaven so will it, the bow may be broken, and the vigor of the mischief-meditating arm withered. If there be a man in this house, or nation, who cherishes the constitution under which we are assembled, as the chief stay of his hope, as the light which is destined to gladden his own day, and to soften even the gloom of the grave, by the prospect it sheds over his children, I fall not behind him in such sentiments. I will yield to no man in attachment to this constitution, in veneration for the sages who laid its foundations, in devotion to those principles which form its cement and constitute its proportions. What, then, must be my feelings; what ought to be the feelings of a man cherishing such sentiments, when he sees an act contemplated which lays ruin at the root of all these hopes? When he sees a principle of action about to be usurped, before the operation of which the bands of this constitution are no more than flax before the fire, or stubble before the whirlwind? When this bill passes, such an act is done, and such a principle usurped.

Mr. Speaker, there is a great rule of human conduct, which he who honestly observes cannot err widely from the path of his sought duty. It is, to be very scrupulous concerning the principles you select as the test of your rights and obligations; to be very faithful in noticing the result of their application; and to be very fearless in tracing and exposing their immediate effects and distant consequences. Under the sanction of this rule of conduct, I am compelled to declare it as my deliberate opinion, that, if this bill passes, the bonds of this Union are virtually dissolved; that the States which compose it are free from their moral obligations, and that, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, to prepare definitely for a separation – amicably if they can, violently if they must.

Mr. Quincy was here called to order by Mr. Poindexter.

Mr. Quincy repeated, and justified the remark he had made, which, to save all misapprehension, he committed to writing, in the following words: "If this bill passes, it is my deliberate opinion that it is virtually a dissolution of this Union; that it will free the States from their moral obligation, and, as it will be the right of all, so it will be the duty of some, definitely to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must."

After some little confusion,

Mr. Poindexter required the decision of the Speaker whether it was consistent with the propriety of debate, to use such an expression. He said it was radically wrong for any member to use arguments going to dissolve the Government, and tumble this body itself to dust and ashes. It would be found, from the gentleman's statement of his language, that he had declared the right of any portion of the people to separate —

Mr. Quincy wished the Speaker to decide, for if the gentleman was permitted to debate the question, he should lose one-half of his speech.

The Speaker decided that great latitude in debate was generally allowed; and that, by way of argument against a bill, the first part of the gentleman's observations was admissible; but the latter member of the sentence, viz.: "That it would be the duty of some States to prepare for a separation, amicably if they can, violently if they must," was contrary to the order of debate.

Mr. Quincy appealed from his decision, and required the yeas and nays on the appeal.

The question was stated thus: "Is the decision of the Speaker correct?" And decided – 53 yeas; 56 nays.

So the decision of the speaker was reversed; Mr. Quincy's observations were declared to be in order; and he proceeded.

I rejoice, Mr. Speaker, at the result of this appeal. Not from any personal consideration, but from the respect paid to the essential rights of the people, in one of their representatives. When I spoke of a separation of the States as resulting from the violation of the constitution, contemplated in this bill, I spoke of it as of a necessity, deeply to be deprecated; but as resulting from causes so certain and obvious, as to be absolutely inevitable when the effect of the principle is practically experienced. It is to preserve, to guard the constitution of my country, that I denounce this attempt. I would rouse the attention of gentlemen from the apathy with which they seem beset. These observations are not made in a corner; there is no low intrigue; no secret machinations. I am on the people's own ground – to them I appeal, concerning their own rights, their own liberties, their own intent in adopting this constitution. The voice I have uttered, at which gentlemen startle with such agitation, is no unfriendly voice. I intended it as a voice of warning. By this people, and by the event, if this bill passes, I am willing to be judged, whether it be not a voice of wisdom.

The bill, which is now proposed to be passed, has this assumed principle for its basis – that the three branches of this National Government, without recurrence to conventions of the people, in the States, or to the Legislatures of the States, are authorized to admit new partners to a share of the political power, in countries out of the original limits of the United States. Now, this assumed principle I maintain to be altogether without any sanction in the constitution. I declare it to be a manifest and atrocious usurpation of power; of a nature, dissolving, according to undeniable principles of moral law, the obligations of our national compact; and leading to all the awful consequences which flow from such a state of things.

Concerning this assumed principle, which is the basis of this bill, this is the general position on which I rest my argument – that if the authority, now proposed to be exercised, be delegated to the three branches of the Government, by virtue of the constitution, it results either from its general nature, or from its particular provisions. I shall consider distinctly both these sources, in relation to this pretended power.

Touching the general nature of the instrument called the Constitution of the United States, there is no obscurity – it has no fabled descent, like the palladium of ancient Troy, from the heavens. Its origin is not confused by the mists of time, or hidden by the darkness of past, unexplored ages; it is the fabric of our day. Some now living, had a share in its construction – all of us stood by, and saw the rising of the edifice. There can be no doubt about its nature. It is a political compact. By whom? And about what? The preamble to the instrument will answer these questions:

"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this constitution, for the United States of America."

It is, "we, the people of the United States, for ourselves and our posterity;" not for the people of Louisiana; nor for the people of New Orleans, or of Canada. None of these enter into the scope of the instrument; it embraces only "the United States of America." Who those are, it may seem strange, in this place, to inquire. But truly, sir, our imaginations have, of late, been so accustomed to wander after new settlements to the very end of the earth, that it will not be time ill-spent to inquire what this phrase means, and what it includes. These are not terms adopted at hazard; they have reference to a state of things existing anterior to the constitution. When the people of the present United States began to contemplate a severance from their parent State, it was a long time before they fixed definitely the name by which they would be designated. In 1774, they called themselves "the Colonies and Provinces of North America." In 1775, "the Representatives of the United Colonies of North America." In the Declaration of Independence, "the Representatives of the United States of America." And finally, in the Articles of Confederation, the style of the confederacy is declared to be "the United States of America." It was with reference to the old articles of confederation, and to preserve the identity and established individuality of their character, that the preamble to this constitution, not content, simply, with declaring that it is "we, the people of the United States," who enter into this compact, adds that it is for "the United States of America." Concerning the territory contemplated by the people of the United States, in these general terms, there can be no dispute; it is settled by the treaty of peace, and included within the Atlantic Ocean, and St. Croix, the lakes, and more precisely, so far as relates to the frontier, having relation to the present argument, within "a line to be drawn through the middle of the river Mississippi, until it intersect the northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of north latitude to the river Apalachicola, thence along the middle of this river to its junction with the Flint River, thence straight to the head of the St. Mary's River, and thence down the St. Mary's to the Atlantic Ocean."

I have been thus particular to draw the minds of gentlemen, distinctly, to the meaning of the terms used in the preamble; to the extent which "the United States" then included; and to the fact that neither New Orleans nor Louisiana were within the comprehension of the terms of this instrument. It is sufficient for the present branch of my argument to say, that there is nothing in the general nature of this compact from which the power contemplated to be exercised in this bill results. On the contrary, as the introduction of a new associate in political power implies, necessarily, a new division of power, and consequent diminution of the relative proportion of the former proprietors of it; there can, certainly, be nothing more obvious, than that from the general nature of the instrument no power can result to diminish and give away to strangers any proportion of the rights of the original partners. If such a power exists, it must be found, then, in the particular provisions in the constitution. The question now arising is, in which of these provisions is given the power to admit new States, to be created in territories, beyond the limits of the old United States. If it exists anywhere, it is either in the third section of the fourth article of the constitution, or in the treaty-making power. If it result from neither of these, it is not pretended to be found anywhere else.

That part of the third section of the fourth article, on which the advocates of this bill rely, is the following: "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress." I know, Mr. Speaker, that the first clause of this paragraph has been read, with all the superciliousness of a grammarian's triumph. "New States may be admitted, by the Congress, into this Union." Accompanied with this most consequential inquiry: "Is not this a new State to be admitted? And is not here an express authority?" I have no doubt this is a full and satisfactory argument to every one, who is content with the mere colors and superficies of things. And if we were now at the bar of some stall-fed justice, the inquiry would insure victory to the maker of it, to the manifest delight of the constables and suitors of his court. But, sir, we are now before the tribunal of the whole American people; reasoning concerning their liberties, their rights, their constitution. These are not to be made the victims of the inevitable obscurity of general terms; nor the sport of verbal criticism. The question is concerning the intent of the American people, the proprietors of the old United States, when they agreed to this article. Dictionaries and spelling-books are, here, of no authority. Neither Johnson, nor Walker, nor Webster nor Dilworth, has any voice in this matter. Sir, the question concerns the proportion of power, reserved by this constitution, to every State in the Union. Have the three branches of this Government a right, at will, to weaken and outweigh the influence, respectively secured to each State, in this compact, by introducing, at pleasure, new partners, situate beyond the old limits of the United States? The question has not relation merely to New Orleans. The great objection is to the principle of the bill. If this bill be admitted, the whole space of Louisiana, greater, it is said, than the entire extent of the old United States, will be a mighty theatre, in which this Government assumes the right of exercising this unparalleled power. And it will be; there is no concealment, it is intended to be exercised. Nor will it stop, until the very name and nature of the old partners be overwhelmed by new comers into the Confederacy. Sir, the question goes to the very root of the power and influence of the present members of this Union. The real intent of this article is, therefore, an inquiry of most serious import; and is to be settled only by a recurrence to the known history and known relations of this people and their constitution. These, I maintain, support this position: that the terms "new States," in this article, do intend new political sovereignties, to be formed within the original limits of the United States; and do not intend new political sovereignties with territorial annexations, to be erected without the original limits of the United States. I undertake to support both branches of this position to the satisfaction of the people of these United States. As to any expectation of conviction on this floor, I know the nature of the ground and how hopeless any arguments are, which thwart a concerted course of measures.

I recur, in the first place, to the evidence of history. This furnishes the following leading fact: that before, and at the time of the adoption of this constitution, the creation of new political sovereignties within the limits of the old United States was contemplated. Among the records of the old Congress will be found a resolution, passed as long ago as the 10th day of October, 1780, contemplating the cession of unappropriated lands to the United States, accompanied by a provision that "they shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct Republican States, which shall become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the other States." Afterward, on the 7th of July, 1786, the subject of "laying out and forming into States" the country lying northwest of the river Ohio, came under the consideration of the same body; and another resolution was passed recommending to the Legislature of Virginia to revise their act of cession, so as to permit a more eligible division of that portion of territory derived from her; "which States," it proceeds to declare, "shall hereafter become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom, and independence, as the original States, in conformity with the resolution of Congress of the 10th of October, 1780." All the Territories to which these resolutions had reference, were undeniably within the ancient limits of the United States.