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Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Volume III
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Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Volume III

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Life of Napoleon Bonaparte. Volume III

When slight inconveniences, according to Buonaparte's expression, put an end to his hopes of invading Britain, or when, as at other times he more candidly admitted, the defeat at Trafalgar induced him "to throw helve after hatchet," and resign all hope of attaining any success by means of his navy, he became desirous of sapping and undermining the bulwark, which he found it impossible to storm; and, by directing his efforts to the destruction of British commerce, he trusted gradually to impair the foundations of her national wealth and prosperity. He erred, perhaps, in thinking that, even if his object could have been fully attained, the full consequences would have followed which his animosity anticipated. Great Britain's prosperity mainly rests on her commerce, but her existence as a nation is not absolutely dependent upon it; as those foreigners are apt to imagine, who have only seen the numerous vessels with which she covers the ocean and fills foreign ports, but have never witnessed the extent of her agricultural and domestic resources. But, entertaining the belief which Napoleon did, in regard to the indispensable connexion betwixt British commerce and British power, the policy of his war upon the former cannot be denied. It was that of the Abyssynian hunter, who, dreading to front the elephant in his fury, draws his sabre along the animal's heel-joint, and waits until the exertions of the powerful brute burst the injured sinews, and he sinks prostrate under his own weight.

BERLIN DECREES.

The celebrated Decrees of Berlin appeared on the 21st November, 1806, interdicting all commerce betwixt Great Britain and the continent; which interdiction was declared a fundamental law of the French empire, until the English should consent to certain alterations in the mode of conducting hostilities by sea, which should render her naval superiority less useful to herself, and less detrimental to the enemy. This measure was justified upon the following grounds: – That England had either introduced new customs into her maritime code, or revived those of a barbarous age – that she seized on merchant vessels, and made their crews prisoners, just as if they had been found on board ships of war – declared harbours blockaded which were not so in reality – and extended the evils of war to the peaceful and unarmed citizen.

This induction to the celebrated project, afterwards called the Continental System of the Emperor, was false in the original proposition, and sophistical in those by which it was supported. It was positively false that Great Britain had introduced into her maritime law, either by new enactment, or by the revival of obsolete and barbarous customs, any alteration by which the rights of neutrals were infringed, or the unarmed citizen prejudiced, more than necessarily arose out of the usual customs of war. The law respecting the blockade of ports, and the capture of vessels at sea, was the same on which every nation had acted for three centuries past, France herself not excepted. It is true, that the maritime code seemed at this period to be peculiarly that of England, because no nation save herself had the means of enforcing them; but she did not in this respect possess any greater advantage by sea than Napoleon enjoyed by land.

The reasoning of the Emperor Napoleon upon the inequality and injustice of the maritime mode of exercising war, compared with the law of hostilities by land, was not more accurate than his allegation that Britain had innovated upon the former for the purpose of introducing new, or reviving old severities. This will appear plain from the following considerations: —

At an early period of society, the practice of war was doubtless the same by land or sea; and the savage slaughtered or enslaved his enemy whether he found him in his hut or in his canoe. But when centuries of civilisation began to mitigate the horrors of barbarous warfare, the restrictive rules introduced into naval hostilities were different from those adopted in the case of wars by land, as the difference of the services obviously dictated. A land army has a precise object, which it can always attain if victorious. If a general conquer a town, he can garrison it; he can levy contributions; nay, he may declare that he will appropriate it to himself in right of sovereignty. He can afford to spare the property of private individuals, when he is at liberty to seize, if he is so minded, upon all their public rights, and new-mould them at his pleasure. The seaman, on the other hand, seizes on the merchant vessel and its cargo, by the same right of superior force, in virtue of which the victor by land has seized upon castles, provinces, and on the very haven, it may be, which the vessel belongs to. If the maritime conqueror had no right to do this, he would gain nothing by his superiority except blows, when he met with vessels of force, and would be cut off from any share of the spoils of war, which form the reward of victory. The innocent and unarmed citizen, perhaps the neutral stranger, suffers in both cases; but a state of war is of course a state of violence, and its evils, unhappily, cannot be limited to those who are actually engaged in hostilities. If the spirit of philanthropy affected in the peroration to Buonaparte's decrees had been real, he might have attained his pretended purpose of softening the woes of war, by proposing some relaxation of the rights of a conqueror by land, in exchange for restrictions to be introduced into the practice of hostilities by sea. Instead of doing so, he, under the pretext of exercising the right of reprisals, introduced the following Decrees, unheard of hitherto among belligerent powers, and tending greatly to augment the general distress, which must, under all circumstances, attend a state of war.

I. The British isles were declared in a state of blockade. II. All commerce and correspondence with England was forbidden. All English letters were to be seized in the post-houses. III. Every Englishman, of whatever rank or quality, found in France, or the countries allied with her, was declared a prisoner of war. IV. All merchandise, or property of any kind, belonging to English subjects, was declared lawful prize. V. All articles of English manufacture, and articles produced in her colonies, were in like manner declared contraband and lawful prize. VI. Half of the produce of the above confiscations was to be employed in the relief of those merchants whose vessels had been captured by the English cruizers. VII. All vessels coming from England, or the English colonies, were to be refused admission into any harbour. Four additional articles provided the mode of promulgating and enforcing the decree, and directed that it should be communicated to the allies of France.

This was the first link of a long chain of arbitrary decrees and ordinances, by which Napoleon, aiming at the destruction of British finance, interrupted the whole commerce of Europe, and destroyed for a season, and as far as lay in his power, that connexion between distant nations which unites them to each other by the most natural and advantageous means, the supply of the wants of the one country by the superfluous produce of the other. The extent of public inconvenience and distress, which was occasioned by the sudden suppression of commercial communication with England, may be judged of by reflecting, how many of the most ordinary articles of consumption are brought from foreign countries – in how many instances the use of these articles have brought them into the list of necessaries – and how, before an ordinary mechanic or peasant sits down to breakfast, distant climes must be taxed to raise the coffee and sugar which he consumes.255

The painful embarrassment of those deprived of their habitual comforts, was yet exceeded by the clamour and despair of the whole commercial world on the continent, who were thus, under pretext of relieving them from the vexation of the English cruizers, threatened with a total abrogation of their profession. Hamburgh, Bourdeaux, Nantes, and other continental towns, solicited, by petitions and deputations, some relaxation of decrees which inferred their general ruin. They pleaded the prospect of universal bankruptcy, which this prohibitory system must occasion. "Let it be so," answered the Emperor; "the more insolvency on the continent, the greater will be the distress of the merchants in London. The fewer traders in Hamburgh, the less will be the temptation to carry on commerce with England. Britain must be humbled, were it at the expense of throwing civilisation back for centuries, and returning to the original mode of trading by barter."

But, great as was Buonaparte's power, he had overrated it in supposing, that, by a mere expression of his will, he could put an end to an intercourse, in the existence of which the whole world possessed an interest. The attempt to annihilate commerce, resembled that of a child who tries to stop with his hand the stream of an artificial fountain, which escapes in a hundred partial jets from under his palm and between his fingers. The Genius of Commerce, like a second Proteus, assumed every variety of shape, in order to elude the imperial interdiction, and all manner of evasions was practised for that purpose. False papers, false certificates, false bills of lading, were devised, and these frauds were overlooked in the seaports, by the very agents of the police, and customhouse officers, to whom the execution of the decrees was committed. Douaniers, magistrates, generals, and prefects, nay, some of the kindred princes of the House of Napoleon, were well pleased to listen to the small still voice of their interest, rather than to his authoritative commands; and the British commerce, though charged with heavy expenses, continued to flourish in spite of the Continental System.256 The new, and still more violent measures, which Napoleon had recourse to for enforcing his prohibitions, will require our notice hereafter. Meantime, it is enough to say, that such acts of increasing severity had the natural consequence of rendering his person and power more and more unpopular; so that, while he was sacrificing the interests and the comforts of the nations under his authority to his hope of destroying England, he was, in fact, digging a mine under his own feet, which exploded to his destruction long before the security of England was materially affected.

Napoleon had foreseen, that, in order to enforce the decrees by which, without possession of any naval power, he proposed to annihilate the naval supremacy of England, it would be necessary to augment to a great extent the immense superiority of land forces which France already possessed. It was necessary, he was aware, that to enable him to maintain the prohibitions which he had imposed upon general commerce, as well as to prosecute the struggle in which he was about to be engaged with Russia, a large draught should be made on the population of France. He had, accordingly, by a requisition addressed to the Senate, dated from Bamberg, 7th of October, required a second anticipation of the conscription of 1807, amounting to a levy of eighty thousand men.

The measure was supported in the Senate by the oratory of Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, an ancient Republican. This friend of freedom saw nothing inconsistent in advocating a measure, which the absolute monarch recommended as the necessary step to a general peace. The conscripts who had first marched had secured victory; those who were now to be put in motion were to realize the prospect of peace, the principal object of their brethren's success. The obsequious Senate readily admitted these arguments, as they would have done any which had been urged in support of a request which they dared not deny. The sole purpose of Regnault's eloquence, was to express in decent amplification the simple phrase, "Napoleon so wills it."

A deputation of the Senate,257 carrying to Napoleon in person their warm acquiescence in the proposed measure, received in guerdon the honourable task of conveying to Paris the spoils of Potsdam and Berlin, with three hundred and forty-six stand of colours, the trophies of the war against Prussia – with the task of announcing the celebrated Decrees, by which the general commerce of Europe and of France itself was annihilated, to secure it from the aggressions of the British naval force. The military trophies were received – the Decrees were recorded; and no one dared undertake the delicate task of balancing the victories of the Emperor against the advantage which his dominions were likely to derive from them.

PRUSSIA.

In the meanwhile, the unfortunate Frederick William, whose possession of his late flourishing kingdom was reduced to such territories as Prussia held beyond the Vistula, and a few fortresses on the Oder, which still held out, sent an embassy to Berlin, for the purpose of learning upon what terms he might be yet admitted to treat for peace with the victor, who had hold of his capital and the greater part of his dominions. The Marquis Lucchesini was employed on this mission, a subtle Italian, who, being employed in negotiations at Paris, had been accustomed to treat with France on a footing of equality. But these times were passed since the battle of Jena; and the only terms to which Prussia could be now admitted, were to be so dearly purchased, that even a mere temporary armistice was to cost the surrender of Graudentz, Dantzick, Colberg, – in short, all the fortresses yet remaining to Prussia, and still in a state of defence. As this would have been placing himself entirely at the mercy of Buonaparte, and in as bad circumstances as he could be reduced to even by the most unsuccessful military operations, the King refused to acquiesce in such severe terms, and determined to repose his fate in the chance of war, and in the support of the auxiliary army of Russia, which was now hastily advancing to his assistance.

CHAPTER XXXVI

Retrospect of the Partition of Poland – Napoleon receives addresses from Poland, which he evades – He advances into Poland, Bennigsen retreating before him – Character of the Russian Soldiery – The Cossacks – Engagement at Pultusk, on 26th November, terminating to the disadvantage of the French – Bennigsen continues his retreat – The French go into winter quarters – Bennigsen appointed Commander-in-chief in the place of Kaminskoy, who shows symptoms of insanity – He resumes offensive operations – Battle of Eylau, 8th February, 1807 – Claimed as a victory by both parties – The loss on both sides amounts to 50,000 men killed, the greater part Frenchmen – Bennigsen retreats upon Königsberg – Napoleon offers favourable terms for an Armistice to the King of Prussia, who refuses to treat, save for a general Peace – Napoleon falls back to the line of the Vistula – Dantzick is besieged, and surrenders – Russian army is poorly recruited – the French powerfully – Actions during the Summer – Battle of Heilsberg, and retreat of the Russians – Battle of Friedland, 14th June – An Armistice takes place on the 23d.

POLAND.

Napoleon was politically justified in the harsh terms which he was desirous to impose on Prussia, by having now brought his victorious armies to the neighbourhood of Poland in which he had a good right to conceive himself sure to find numerous followers and a friendly reception.

The partition of this fine kingdom by its powerful neighbours, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, was the first open and audacious transgression of the law of nations, which disgraced the annals of civilized Europe. It was executed by a combination of three of the most powerful states of Europe against one too unhappy in the nature of its constitution, and too much divided by factions to offer any effectual resistance. The kingdom subjected to this aggression had appealed in vain to the code of nations for protection against an outrage, to which, after a desultory and uncombined, and therefore a vain defence, she saw herself under the necessity of submitting. The Poles retained, too, a secret sense of their fruitless attempt to recover freedom in 1791, and an animated recollection of the violence by which it had been suppressed by the Russian arms. They waited with hope and exultation the approach of the French armies; and candour must allow, that, unlawfully subjected as they had been to a foreign yoke, they had a right to avail themselves of the assistance, not only of Napoleon, but of Mahomet, or of Satan himself, had he proposed to aid them in regaining the independence of which they had been oppressively and unjustly deprived.258

This feeling was general among the middling classes of the Polish aristocracy, who recollected with mortified pride the diminution of their independent privileges, the abrogation of their Diets, and the suppression of the Liberum Veto, by which a private gentleman might render null the decision of a whole assembly, unless unanimity should be attained, by putting the dissentient to death upon the spot.259 But the higher order of nobility, gratified by the rank they held, and the pleasures they enjoyed at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, and especially at Petersburgh, preferred in general the peaceful enjoyment of their immense estates to the privileges of a stormy independence, which raised the most insignificant of the numerous aristocracy to a rank and importance nearly resembling their own. They might, too, with some justice, distrust the views of Napoleon, though recommended by the most specious promises. The dominion of Russia, in particular, from similarity of manners, and the particular attention paid to their persons and interests, was not so unpopular among the higher branches of the aristocracy as might have been expected, from the unjust and arbitrary mode in which she had combined to appropriate so large a part of their once independent kingdom. These did not, therefore, so generally embrace the side of France as the minor nobles or gentry had done. As for the ordinary mass of the population, being almost all in the estate of serfage, or villanage, which had been general over Europe during the prevalence of the feudal system, they followed their respective lords, without pretending to entertain any opinion of their own.

ADDRESSES FROM POLAND.

While Russia was marching her armies hastily forward, not only to support, or rather raise up once more, her unfortunate ally the King of Prussia, but to suppress any ebullition of popular spirit in Poland, Buonaparte received addresses from that country, which endeavoured to prevail on him to aid them in their views of regaining their independence. Their application was of a nature to embarrass him considerably. To have declared himself the patron of Polish independence, might have, indeed, brought large forces to his standard – might have consummated the disasters of Prussia, and greatly embarrassed even Russia herself; and so far policy recommended to Napoleon to encourage their hopes of her restored independence. But Austria had been a large sharer in the various partitions of Poland, and Austria, humbled as she had been, was still a powerful state, whose enmity might have proved formidable, if, by bereaving her of her Polish dominions, or encouraging her subjects to rebel, Buonaparte had provoked her to hostilities, at the time when he himself and the best part of his forces were engaged in the North of Europe. The same attempt would have given a very different character to the war, which Russia at present waged only in the capacity of the auxiliary of Prussia. The safety and integrity of the Russian empire, south of the Volga, depends almost entirely upon the preservation of those territories which she has acquired in Poland; and, if she had engaged in the war as a principal, Buonaparte was scarcely yet prepared to enter upon a contest with the immense power of that empire, which must be waged upon the very frontier of the enemy, and as near to their resources as he was distant from his own. It might have been difficult, also, to have stated any consistent grounds, why he, who had carved out so many new sovereignties in Europe with the point of the sword, should reprobate the principle of the partition of Poland. Influenced by these motives, the modern setter-up and puller-down of kings abstained from re-establishing the only monarchy in Europe, which he might have new-modelled to his mind, in the character not of a conqueror, but a liberator.

While Napoleon declined making any precise declaration, or binding himself by any express stipulations to the Polish delegates, the language he used to them was cautiously worded, so as to keep up their zeal and animate their exertions. Dombrowski,260 a Polish exile in the French army, was employed to raise men for Napoleon's service, and the enthusiasm of those who entered, as well as the expectations of the kingdom at large, were excited by such oracular passages as the following, which appeared in the thirty-sixth bulletin: – "Is the throne of Poland to be re-established, and will that great nation regain her existence and independence? Will she be recalled to life, as if summoned to arise from the tomb? – God only, the great disposer of events, can be the arbiter of this great political problem."261

The continuance of war was now to be determined upon; a war to be waged with circumstances of more than usual horror, as it involved the sufferings of a winter campaign in the northern latitudes. The French, having completely conquered the Prussian estates to the east of the Oder, had formed the sieges of Great Glogau, of Breslau, and of Graudentz, and were at the same time pushing westward to occupy Poland. The Russian general, Bennigsen, had on his side pressed forward for the purpose of assisting the Prussians, and had occupied Warsaw. But finding that their unfortunate allies had scarcely the remnant of an army in the field, the Russian general retreated after some skirmishes, and recrossed the Vistula, while the capital of Poland, thus evacuated, was entered on the 28th November by Murat, at the head of the French vanguard.

About the 25th, Napoleon, leaving Berlin, had established himself at Posen, a central town of Poland, which country began to manifest an agitation, partly the consequence of French intrigues, partly arising from the animating prospect of restored independence. The Poles resumed in many instances their ancient national dress and manners, and sent deputies to urge the decision of Buonaparte in their favour. The language in which they entreated his interposition, resembled that of Oriental idolatry. "The Polish nation," said Count Radyiminiski, the Palatine of Gnesna, "presents itself before your Majesty, groaning still under the yoke of German nations, and salutes with the purest joy the regenerator of their dear country, the legislator of the universe. Full of submission to your will, they adore you, and repose on you with confidence all their hopes, as upon him who has the power of raising empires and destroying them, and of humbling the proud." The address of the President of the Judicial Council-Chamber of the Regency of Poland, was not less energetic. "Already," he said, "we see our dear country saved; for in your person we adore the most just and the most profound Solon. We commit our fate and our hopes into your hands, and we implore the mighty protection of the most august Cæsar."

Not even these Eastern hyperboles could extort any thing from Buonaparte more distinctly indicative of his intentions, than the obscure hints we have already mentioned.

In the meanwhile, Warsaw was put into a state of defence, and the auxiliary forces of Saxony and the new confederates of the Rhine were brought up by forced marches, while strong reinforcements from France repaired the losses of the early part of the campaign.

The French army at length advanced in full force, and crossed successively the rivers Vistula and Bug, forcing a passage wherever it was disputed. But it was not the object of Bennigsen to give battle to forces superior to his own, and he therefore retreated behind the Wkra, and was joined by the large bodies of troops commanded by Generals Buxhowden and Kaminskoy. The latter took the general command. He was a contemporary of Suwarrow, and esteemed an excellent officer, but more skilled in the theory than the practice of war. "Kaminskoy," said Suwarrow, "knows war, but war does not know him – I do not know war, but war knows me." It appears also, that during this campaign Kaminskoy was afflicted with mental alienation.

On the 23d December, Napoleon arrived in person upon the Wkra, and ordered the advance of his army in three divisions. Kaminskoy, when he saw the passage of this river forced, determined to retreat behind the Niemen, and sent orders to his lieutenants accordingly. Bennigsen, therefore, fell back upon Pultusk, and Prince Galitzin upon Golymin, both pursued by large divisions of the French army. The Russian Generals Buxhowden and D'Anrep also retreated in different directions, and apparently without maintaining a sufficiently accurate communication either with Bennigsen, or with Galitzin. In their retrograde movements the Russians sustained some loss, which the bulletins magnified to such an extent, as to represent their army as entirely disorganised, their columns wandering at hazard in unimaginable disorder, and their safety only caused by the shortness of the days, the difficulties of a country covered with woods and intersected with ravines, and a thaw which had filled the roads with mud to the depth of five feet. It was, therefore, predicted, that although the enemy might possibly escape from the position in which he had placed himself, it must necessarily be effected at the certain loss of his artillery, his carriages, and his baggage.262

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