Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

Representatives of the United States:

I lay before Congress copies of resolutions entered into by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, which have been transmitted to me, with that view, by the Governor of that State, in pursuance of one of the said resolutions.

JAMES MADISON.

Washington, December 27, 1811.

Oliver Evans' claim for different applications of Steam Power

Mr. Leib presented the memorial of Oliver Evans, stating that the memorialist verily believes himself to be the original proposer of steam-boats and steam-wagons in the United States, (Doctor Franklin only excepted;) and that he conceives his patent, dated February 14, 1804, secured to him the right to use his engine for boats, mills, and land carriages, and praying to be left in full possession of those rights, for reasons stated at large in the memorial; which was read, and ordered to lie on the table.

Monday, December 30

Burning of the Richmond, Va., Theatre

Mr. Bradley submitted the following motion for consideration:

Resolved, That the members of this House will wear crape on the left arm for one month, in testimony of the national respect and sorrow for the unfortunate persons who perished in the city of Richmond, in Virginia, on the night of the 26th of the present month.

Tuesday, December 31

Mr. Bradley called up the motion made yesterday on the subject; and, on his motion, it was amended and agreed to as follows:

Resolved, That the members of this House will wear crape on the left arm for one month, in testimony of the condolence and sorrow of the Senate for the calamitous event by which the Chief Magistrate of the State of Virginia, and so many of her citizens, perished by fire, in the city of Richmond, on the night of the 26th of the present month.

Thursday, January 16, 1812

Hostile policy of Great Britain

The following message was received from the President of the United States:

To the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States:

I communicate to Congress a letter from the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain to the Secretary of State, with the answer of the latter.

The continued evidence afforded in this correspondence, of the hostile policy of the British Government against our national rights, strengthens the considerations recommending and urging the preparation of adequate means for maintaining them.

JAMES MADISON.

Washington, January 16, 1812.

The Message and documents enclosed were read, and referred to the committee to whom was referred, on the 8th of November last, so much of the Message of the President of the United States as concerns the relations between the United States and France and Great Britain, to consider and report thereon; and five hundred copies thereof ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate.

Friday, January 17

Incorporation of a Mining Company in Upper Louisiana

Mr. Bradley, from the committee appointed on the petition of Moses Austin and John R. Jones, reported a bill to incorporate Moses Austin, John Rice Jones, Henry Austin, and others, into a company, by the name of the Louisiana Lead Company; and the bill was read, and passed to the second reading.

Wednesday, January 29

The bill establishing a land office was read the second time.

Additional Military Force

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the consideration of the bill, entitled "An act authorizing the President of the United States to accept and organize certain volunteer military corps," together with the amendments reported thereto by the select committee.

Mr. Giles rose and opposed at length the bill as it came from the House, reserving to himself the privilege of acting on the proposed amendment according to the result of further reflections. He believed the bill would be productive of no practical efficacy. It proposed a force which could not be raised; and if raised, from the short period of its service, in the event of serious hostilities, would be utterly incompetent to effect the objects of those hostilities. The bill would be inoperative, because, in the States of Massachusetts and Vermont, (and he presumed in other States,) no power or provision existed by which these volunteers could be commissioned, so as to perform the contemplated service; and if the Government were deprived of the volunteers in Massachusetts and Vermont, he did not know where they could obtain volunteers for the object which he believed all branches of the Government had in view. He presumed that the system of volunteers was the favorite system of the Government; and this he inferred from their having recommended to the other House the raising of ten thousand regulars only, and from the Message of the President, sent in after both Houses had passed the bill for raising twenty-five thousand regulars, and communicating the correspondence between Mr. Foster and Mr. Monroe, as a ground for urging Congress to persevere in the preparations they were engaged in making. The President must, therefore, have deemed a volunteer force essential for the contemplated service. And here he observed he thought, if his correspondence with the British Envoy, which afforded evidence of "continued hostility" towards us, furnished matter of sufficient importance to press upon Congress the utility of hastening their measures of preparation, that the other business of the Department of State might have been allowed to repose long enough for a reply to have been made to Mr. Foster, before nearly a month had elapsed after the date of his letter. He did not advert to this circumstance from any want of respect to this Government: he should always treat them with the highest respect. He should prefer the reduction of the number of the volunteers to twenty-five thousand, rather than the retention of the fifty thousand, because it would increase the momentum of actual force, and decrease the expenses, about which so much has been said. Surely, he said, he did not mean that it would not increase the momentum of force proposed by the other House, but that proposed by the Executive. The Executive had asked for ten thousand regulars, and fifty thousand volunteers – in all, sixty thousand men. The other House had agreed to give him eighty-five thousand. The proposed amendment would, therefore, bring the quantum of force down nearly to the Executive requisition. But the bill proposed a force which would be utterly inefficient, as all other volunteer bills had been. The returns under the thirty thousand volunteer law, passed two or three years ago, were so few, that the Secretary of War did not register them. He asked, how efficient could that species of force be, of which the Chief Magistrate did not think it worth while to have a record kept? It was only a formidable display of armies on paper – a tender of services – which only produced very handsome replies from the President. He did not censure the Secretary of War or the President; very far from it; the defect had been in the law. He begged gentlemen to look seriously at the subject. If a war should ensue, it must be a serious one. The responsibility attached to Congress of placing an adequate force in the hands of the President for the war. But if they passed a law which would give the President only a nominal force, totally incompetent to effect any desirable object, he, for one, should be unwilling to take any share of responsibility on himself.

Thursday, February 27

Increase of the Navy

The Senate resumed, as in Committee of the Whole, the consideration of the bill entitled "An act concerning the Naval Establishment," together with the amendments reported thereto by the select committee.

Mr. Lloyd. – Mr. President, the amendments proposed by the committee to whom this bill has been referred, having been gone through with, I now beg leave to offer a new one, by an additional section to the following effect:

"Be it further enacted, That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, authorized to cause to be built as speedily as may be, on the most approved model, – frigates, not exceeding thirty-six guns each; and that a sum not exceeding – dollars be, and the same is hereby appropriated for building the said frigates, out of any moneys in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated."

It is my intention, sir, to move for twenty new frigates; but the number I have left blank in order, should the Senate be favorably disposed to an increase of the Navy, and disagree with me as to the degree of that increase, they might regulate the number at their pleasure.

Sir, I have been induced to offer this amendment from an impulse of duty towards my more immediate constituents, and also from a sense of the obligation imposed upon me, however feebly I may be able to respond to it, in the honorable station in which I am placed, to endeavor to the extent of my ability to support the dignity, protect the rights, and advance the best interests of the United States. Sir, I trust the amendment under consideration, if adopted, would have a relation, and a favorable relation, to all these objects.

If it be not the determination of the Government to engage in an open, actual, efficient war; to place the nation in such a complete state of preparation as to avert war, from our state of readiness to meet it; then the measures of the present session, those of filling up the existing Military Establishments, and thereby adding to it between six and seven thousand men, that of enlisting a standing army of twenty-five thousand men to serve for five years, unless sooner discharged – of providing for the employment of fifty thousand volunteers, and of holding in readiness one hundred thousand of the militia, would be not only inexcusable, but nearly treasonable; as they would in such case, without any adequate object, impose severe and heavy burdens upon the people of the United States, from which years of the highest degree of prosperity would not relieve them. But, sir, I am bound to believe, that unless redress be obtained, it is the determination of the Government of the United States to enter into an actual, vigorous, real war, or at any rate to put the nation into a perfect State of readiness to commence it, should it be necessary; and in either of these cases, an efficient naval force is as indispensable, nay much more indispensable, than a land force.

In the year 1793, when Great Britain depredated upon your commerce, you had a man at the head of your Government who fought no battles with paper resolutions, nor attempted to wage war with commercial restrictions, although they were then pressed upon him. He caused it to be distinctly and with firmness made known to Great Britain, that if she did not both cease to violate our rights, and make us reparation for the wrongs we had sustained – that young and feeble as we then were, just in the gristle, and stepping from the cradle of infancy, we would try the tug of war with her. What was the consequence? Her depredations were stopped – we made a treaty with her, under which we enjoyed a high degree of prosperity. Our claims were fairly heard, equitably adjudged, and the awards were honorably and punctually paid to the sufferers. In this instance you did something for commerce.

Next came the war with Tripoli – the Barbary States preyed upon our commerce – you determined to resist, and despatched a small squadron to the Mediterranean: this ought to have been considered as the germ of your future maritime greatness: the good conduct and bravery of that squadron, and the self-immolation of some of its officers, spread the renown of your naval prowess to all quarters of the civilized globe. What did you in this instance? At the moment when victory had perched upon your standard – when you might have exhibited the interesting spectacle of the infant Government of the United States holding in subjugation one of the Powers of Barbary, to whom all Europe had been subservient – at this moment when conquest was completely within your grasp – civil agency stepped in – the laurel was torn from the brow of as gallant a chieftain as ever graced the plains of Palestine, and we ignominiously consented to pay a tribute, where we might have imposed one.

After this you had the Berlin decree, the Orders in Council, the Milan decree, the Rambouillet decree, the depredations of Spain, the robberies even of the renegado black chief of St. Domingo, and the unprovoked and still continued plunder of Denmark, a nation of pirates from their origin. What cause of complaint has Denmark, or ever had Denmark, against us? Her most fond and speculative maritime pretensions we have willingly espoused, and yet she continues daily to capture and condemn our vessels and cargoes, and contemptuously tells us that the Government of the United States is too wise to go to war for a few merchant ships. And this we bear from a people as inferior to the United States in all the attributes of national power or greatness, as I am inferior to Hercules. Yes, sir, commerce has been abandoned, else why prohibit your merchants from bringing the property, to a large amount, which they have fairly purchased and paid for, into the ports of our country, else why, by this exclusion, perform the double operation of adding to the resources of the enemy you are going to war with and impoverishing your own citizens.

Yes, sir, commerce has been abandoned, "deserted in her utmost need by those her former bounty fed." Yes, sir, she has been abandoned. She has been left as a wreck upon a strand, or as a derelict upon the waters of the ocean, to be burnt, sunk, or plundered, by any great or puny assailant who could man an oar or load a swivel for her annoyance.

What was the leading object of the adoption of the Federal Constitution in the northern parts of the Union? Most emphatically, it was for the protection of commerce. What was the situation of some branches of our commerce then? And what is it now? Look at the statement which was laid upon our tables about a fortnight past, and taken from the returns of the Treasury. What effect has it had upon our fisheries, which were so nobly and successfully contended for by the American Commissioners who settled the Treaty of 1783; which for a time suspended that Treaty; and which, both the duplicity and intrigue of France and the interest of England strove to deprive us of – of our fisheries, which were then considered, and still ought to be considered, as a main sinew of our strength, and a nursery for our seamen?

Monday, March 2

Increase of the Navy

Mr. Crawford. – The honorable gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Lloyd) thinks that nothing has been done by the Government for commerce, whilst commerce has done every thing for the nation; that commerce has paid into the public Treasury $200,000,000. If it is contended that this sum has been paid exclusively by commerce, nothing can be more incorrect. The money collected from imposts and duties is paid by the consumer of merchandise upon which the duties are imposed. It is collected immediately from the merchant, and ultimately from the nation. The only money paid into the Treasury which can justly be placed to the exclusive credit of commerce, is the sum retained by the Government upon debentures, which is only 7-10ths of one per cent. upon goods paying a duty of twenty per cent. ad valorem, and has never amounted to $400,000 in any one year. The export of foreign productions from the United States in the year 1807, exceeded $59,000,000, and the sum paid into the Treasury that year on account of drawbacks was about $390,000, which is the greatest amount received from that source of revenue since the organization of the Government.

The duty upon tonnage, like the duty imposed on merchandise, is paid by the consumer or grower of the cargoes transported by the ship-holders, of whom this duty is immediately collected. The ultimate payment of this duty by the grower or consumer will depend upon the relative demand for, and supply of the articles in the market to which they are exported. If the demand for the article is greater than the quantity in the market, it is paid by the consumer; if the supply exceeds the demand, it is paid by the grower, in the form of a reduction of the price of the article equal to the duty imposed.

Who are the most interested in commerce, the growers of the articles, the exchange and transportation of which constitute commerce, or the factors and freighters employed in the exchange and transportation of those articles? Can any man doubt for one moment that the growers, the rightful owners of the articles to be exchanged, are more deeply interested in commerce than the merchant and ship-holder, who only make a profit from the sale and transportation of the articles exchanged? If the profit they derive from commerce should be so enormous as to exceed the original value of those articles in the hands of the growers, still it can be demonstrated that the interest of the latter is more vitally affected by a prosperous or adverse state of commerce, than that of the merchant or ship-holder. The merchant will be regulated in the price which he gives to the grower, by the state of the market and the price of transportation to the market. Let the price be what it may in foreign markets, the merchant is regulated by it, and can only be affected by sudden changes in those markets which may be prejudicial or advantageous to him. It is a matter of small moment to him whether the articles in which he deals bring a high or low price in the market to which they are sent, if that price is not variable, because he will regulate the price he gives for them by the price which he can obtain. But the price which those articles will bring in the market to which they are sent, is all-important to the grower, because it will regulate the price which he is to receive for them beyond the power of his control. Every circumstance which tends to destroy competition and reduce the number of markets to which our produce is sent, vitally affects the interest of the grower. The planter, the farmer, is, therefore, more deeply interested in the prosperity of that commerce which finds a market for the annual surplus productions of his industry, than the merchant or ship-holder. This direct commerce is indispensable to the internal growth and improvement of the country, and to the comfort and happiness of the people, and more so to the people of the Southern and Western States than any other part of the United States. Sir, we are not so grossly ignorant as to mistake our interest in this matter. We know that, without commerce, without a market for the surplus productions of our labor, we should be deprived of many of those articles which long habit has made necessary to our ease and comfort. If, then, we are not grossly ignorant of our true interest, nothing can be more unfounded than the accusation of the gentleman from New York, (Mr. German.) The charge must be the result of ignorance or prejudice. Mr. C. said he would not follow the example of that gentleman by saying, "perhaps this prejudice might be an honest prejudice." No, he would not insult the feelings of that gentleman; he would not question his veracity or integrity by stating hypothetically, "that perhaps his opinions were honest." Whilst he repelled this unfounded charge in the manner which its nature imperiously demanded, he had no hesitation in admitting that the opinions of that gentleman, whether the result of prejudice or of ignorance, were strictly honest. Mr. C. said there was no man in the nation more friendly to that commerce which he had described than he was, and that no part of the nation cherished it with more ardor than that which he in part had the honor to represent on this floor. But, sir, there is a commerce which has been prosecuted to a very great extent by the commercial capitalists of the United States, for the prosperity of which the agricultural part of the nation do not feel the same solicitude.

In the year 1807, the United States exported upwards of $59,000,000 of foreign productions. This commerce has no connection with or dependence upon the annual surplus productions of the country, which is the only commerce that essentially promotes domestic industry and multiplies the domestic comforts of the great mass of the people. This commerce, which is the legitimate offspring of war, and expires with the first dawning of peace, is prosecuted principally by our commercial cities to the east and north of the Potomac. The landholders, the country people, the great mass of agriculturists in the United States, never had, and never can have any direct interest in it. The farmer of the Eastern and Middle States, and the planter of the Southern and Western States, stand in the same relation to this commerce. Whether it be prosperous or adverse, is a matter of small concern to them, and nothing but an effort of pure, disinterested patriotism could induce them to jeopardize the peace and happiness of the nation, and stake the prosperity of the direct commerce of the country, for the protection of this mushroom commerce.

The use proposed to be made of these frigates, if built, certainly meets my approbation. The idea of protecting our commerce by a naval force, which has been pressed with so much vehemence by some of our navy gentlemen, is worse than visionary. A navy can injure commerce, but cannot afford it protection, unless it annihilates the naval force of the adverse nation. Unless, therefore, we have the means of creating and supporting a naval force able to contend successfully with the British navy for the empire of the seas, we must abandon all idea of protecting our commerce against that nation. Great Britain, with her thousand ships of war, is unable to protect her commerce even in sight of her own coasts. According to my understanding of the views of the honorable gentlemen, these thirty frigates are to be employed in destroying the commerce of the enemy, and not in fighting her public armed vessels. They are in fact to be national privateers. In this point of view, the proposition to cashier the officer who should strike the American flag seems to be at war with the nature of their employment. They are to direct their efforts to the destruction of merchant vessels, and to avoid collision with the ships of war. It is to be apprehended that men, whose duty it is to avoid serious conflicts with the enemy, will grow timid from habit, and will resist but feebly when inevitably forced into them. The character of the naval officers of the United States makes a regulation of this kind wholly unnecessary. Their enterprise, their courage, and intrepidity, are too well established to require a regulation of such severity. As then the gentleman does not intend to dispute the sovereignty even of our own seas with our expected enemy with this naval force, but intends to employ it in the destruction of merchant vessels, an increase of that force appears to me to be wholly unnecessary and impolitic. Individual enterprise, directed by individual interest, will more effectually destroy the commerce of the enemy, than any number of frigates in the power of this Government to build and employ. The Baltimore Federal Republican states that a French privateer in the Atlantic Ocean has captured about thirty merchant vessels, and that the impression made by this single privateer was so serious that thirteen vessels, several of which were frigates, were employed in cruising for her. The truth of this statement may be relied on, because that paper is not in the habit of exaggerating French successes, or of aggravating British sufferings. But it is said that, although our privateers were successful at the commencement of the Revolutionary War, before the conclusion of that contest they were entirely destroyed. Admitting the fact to be true, it does not necessarily follow that such will be the result of the war now in contemplation. After the first years of that contest, the British forces were in possession of the principal ports and harbors of the United States, which made it extremely hazardous for our privateers to approach our own coasts, or enter our own harbors. It is expected that our situation will be very different in the event of war at this time. Instead of possessing the principal ports of the United States, we expect to expel them from the whole of their continental possessions in our neighborhood. If this should be the result of the war, their means of annoying our commerce, and of destroying our privateers, will be greatly diminished, and their power of protecting their commerce from the depredations of our privateers will suffer an equal diminution.