Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

Against the administration of Mr. Adams, I, in common with many others, did and do yet entertain a sentiment of hostility, and have repeatedly cried out against it for extravagance, and for profusion, and for waste – wanton waste – of the public resources. I find, however, upon consideration – whether from the nature of man, or from the nature of things, or from whatever other cause – that that Administration, grossly extravagant as I did then and still do believe it to have been, if tried by the criterion of the succeeding one, was a pattern of retrenchment and economy; and I ask the House to put the question to themselves, whether we are likely to see, at any future period, an Administration more economical than that of which we have just now taken leave? And this I say, without meaning to cast the slightest imputation on the present. The person now at the head of affairs, has, at least in one respect, conducted himself in his high office in a spirit dear to my heart – it is the spirit of a gentleman. The first session of Congress under the last Administration was a period of retrenchment. Throw the session of last summer out of the question, and this must be the session of reform under the present. Have we any reason to conclude, from what we have seen or heard, that we can look forward to any policy more economical than that of the Administration of which we have just taken leave? I wish it to be clearly understood, that in the year 1800, in which our expenses amounted to $3,448,060, we had three 44-gun frigates; six frigates, from 44 to 32; two of 32, of a large size; four of 32, smaller; eight from 32 to 20; three sloops of war and four brigs, from 18 to 16; and five brigs and schooners, from 14 to 12 guns – employing a total of 7,296 seamen. This Administration, too, it should be remarked, not only built every frigate, every vessel of respectable force – yes, sir, built them from the stump – which the United States now have, but many others, which have been since sold, and the proceeds of which have gone into the Treasury. At this time, then, when the United States had this formidable force afloat; when nearly 8,000 seamen were employed; (I know the documents only state 7,300, but I am told from the best authority there were nearly 8,000;) when our flag at least triumphed in our own seas; when we had nothing of that system of drawing within our shell, which the gentleman from Connecticut so justly derides; when we had not reached the soft-shelled state in which we were placed by the non-intercourse law; – at that time, the Navy of the United States cost nearly three millions and a half, making for each seaman about $472. I know, sir, that these statements are dry, but they are useful in proportion as they are dry. According to the statement which my colleague (Mr. Bassett) has made, and which he has told you not only came from the Secretary of the Navy, but was in the Secretary's own handwriting, the number of seamen which he had last year in employ was 2,723, which cost the nation $2,427,000 – for each man employed, within a trifle of $900! Now, sir, if every seaman under the last Administration cost double the expense which was incurred for the same man under the preceding one, if the same system is continued, we have no reason to doubt that the seamen next year will cost double of their present expense. But, even suppose the expense to remain the same as it now is, will the Representatives of the American people agree to maintain a naval force which costs us $900 (within $13) per man, the use of which no man has attempted to guess, much less to demonstrate!

I wish to be indulged in a little further comparative political economy. I believe, sir, that the same good results in politics from comparing the merits of different Administrations, that results in medicine and surgery from the dissection of the human body – that they are fairly to be tried by the same rules. I find, then, that in the year 1800 the estimated pay of the officers is $391,000, and that the estimated pay of the seamen in the same year is $818,000. And yet, sir, by the estimate now before me, and which any gentleman can turn to, made for the year 1800, the subsistence of the officers, their pay, and that of the seamen, amounts only to $296,000 – a sum less, by nearly $100,000, than the estimated pay alone of the officers in 1800 – while the expense of the whole Establishment approach for the last year within $1,000,000 of the expense of the year first mentioned. I am at a loss to account for these manifest inconsistencies, and I might say solecisms, in our political arithmetic. We have a Navy which we are told employs 2,700 men, which costs within a third as much as a Navy employing nearly 8,000 men, and yet, when we come to compare the great objects of expense – to wit: pay and subsistence of the officers and seamen, the reward of valor and merit – we find a contrast which I believe no man in this House is prepared to explain.

Now, sir – for the whole subject, thank God, is now before us – let us look at the expenses of the Marine corps. I have always understood that marines were necessary in proportion to the extent of the Navy – that such a force is put on board of every ship of such a number of guns. I find that in the year 1800, when we had nearly forty ships of war in commission, manned with nearly 8,000 men, the expenses of the Marine corps amounted to $162,000; and in 1809, when we have ten or fifteen vessels of all sorts, manned with 2,300 seamen, the expense of the Marine corps amounts to $211,000. And yet, sir, if we look at the items, there does not seem to be a very great variation between some of the most important – for instance, I find that the clothing in 1800 was estimated at $33,000, in 1809 at but $32,000 – and yet, the troops whose clothing costs $1,000 less, cost in the aggregate $50,000 more. But, if we look at some of the items of this account, we shall be struck at once with the difference. The pay and subsistence for instance in 1800 was $102,000, in 1809 it was $160,000. I have been at the pains even to note the prices of the most material articles of provision, and find that in the old estimate beef is rated at $13, pork at $14, and flour at $10 per barrel; while in the last year the same articles stood in the estimate of $14, $18, and $8. The material article (flour) being much lower than in 1800, and the market value of the others also, I believe the inference would necessarily follow, that the subsistence ought to have been cheaper. But, sir, look at their establishment at the navy-yard, and I believe we shall want no ghost – certainly no argument of mine – to show the cause of this difference of expense.

Then comes the navy-yards. Of these, that of Washington alone has cost nearly one-half of the sum expended on them all. Well might my colleague say it was worth as much as the whole, when it had cost as much; when, indeed, we have witnessed a considerable town – and the most flourishing town, too, in this wide region called the City of Washington – built out of the public treasury.

Yes, sir, we have economized until we absolutely have reduced the annual cost of a seaman from $472 – as it was under the very wasteful expenditure of Mr. Adams's administration – down to the moderate sum of $887! We have economized until a paltry fleet, consisting of vessels built to our hand – to say nothing of those that have been sold, and the warlike stores of which have been retained and preserved; which fleet was built, equipped, and every cannon and implement of war purchased under the old Administration – has cost us $12,000,000, when it cost the preceding Administration but $9,000,000! Is this no argument for reduction? The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Dana) tells you he does not wish an annihilation, but a reform of the Naval Establishment. Sir, as long as a single chip remains in that navy-yard, you will never see any thing like reform; as long as you have a chip of public property – one chip of live oak belonging to the United States – you will have a man riding in his carriage, with a long retinue and deputies and clerks to take care of it. And, sir, if the gentleman from Connecticut does not mean utterly to disgust the people of the United States against a navy – if in truth he is a friend to a navy – he ought to join and put down this navy-yard, and not, with my friend from North Carolina, (Mr. Macon,) keep it up, in hopes the enormity of the evil will at some time or other correct itself. Among the many reasons offered to this House for retaining the various parts of this Establishment, no one said a word in favor of the Marine corps – that went sub silentio– but a great deal was said in favor of Washington. We were told that our fleet might be Copenhagened, and that it was therefore necessary to stow it away here. We also heard of the great press of work in the large towns – of the mercantile employ which there came in competition with that of the United States. I believe, sir, that our workmen, and men of all descriptions, from the highest to the lowest – I speak of subordinates – have long ago found the truth of the old proverb, that "The King's chaff is better than other men's corn." But it seems, that in order to get a commodity cheap, we are not to go where it is to be had – oh no, there is competition! – but we must bring workmen here in the mail-coach, by which conveyance I understand not only live stock for the navy-yard but copper bolts, and such light articles, are sometimes brought, I suppose, to get out of the way of competition – competition in the markets of Philadelphia and Baltimore, where they are bought at private sale. In this way have seamen, in some instances, been conveyed; and unquestionably every material of ship timber and naval store has been repeatedly brought from Norfolk to this place at an immense cost, worked up here by men collected from Baltimore, Philadelphia, &c., in order that, so worked up, it might go back to Norfolk, there to remain. But, sir, if our object really be to prevent our fleet from being Copenhagened, we had better put it above the Falls of Niagara. There it would unquestionably be most secure, unless the party on the other side of the lake should fit out a fleet to attack it; in which case, I suppose, we must resort to another series of measures similar to those lately adopted for the protection of commerce and the Navy. An embargo to protect ships of war! This is, indeed, putting the cart before the horse. We are to have a navy for the protection of commerce, and all our measures in relation to it are calculated on the basis of keeping it (poor thing! like some sickly child) out of harm's way! On the same principle of economy on which the navy-yard is kept up here, viz: for fear that merchants and others should come into competition with the Government, I presume, we have sent abroad for workmen to carry on the public buildings. If the navy-yard is to be kept up here merely that it may be under our eye, I would humbly suggest, sir, that we first pluck out the beam that has so long blinded us. We need only to do that to see this building falling to pieces over our heads; and yet an enormous appropriation is called for towards finishing it, which I have no doubt my worthy colleague (Mr. Lewis) will press very strongly before the close of the session.

I had forgotten the gunboats; and perhaps the best notice which can be taken of them, is that which is taken on some occasions of other things – to pass by them with contempt. They are not worth bringing into account, except for their expense. Children must have toys and baubles, and we must indulge ourselves in an expense of many millions on this ridiculous plaything!

But, sir, the sale of our superfluous vessels met with the high objection that they were to be purchased up by Christophe and Petion, and that the constituents of my colleague (Mr. Bassett) are to be terrified, if not into bodily fear, at least out of their peace of mind, by these vessels; and, at the same time, we are told that Christophe was in such good credit, only forty miles off, that vessels are building at Baltimore for his use; and yet, sir, no gentleman has brought forward a bill making it penal to supply these barbarians with ships of war and warlike stores. In other words, sir, to avoid the possibility of Christophe and his seamen foundering on board these rotten hulks, my colleague would much rather drive him into Baltimore, where he can purchase good vessels, which will answer his purpose much better than these frigates, which the barbarians would not know how to manage, and which are not calculated, from their great draught, for predatory warfare in the West India seas. My worthy colleague has given us a curious illustration of the superiority of naval over military force, by comparing the navy of Great Britain with her army. I suppose, if the argument were retorted on my colleague by a comparison of the army of Bonaparte with his navy, he would say that the same amount was not there expended upon the navy as upon the army; whereas in England, the amount of money expended on each is equal. But, does not my colleague know that one and the chief cause of the superiority of the British navy over the army, is, that in the navy men rise by merit – that they do not get in, to use a seaman's phrase, at the cabin windows – and that the army, if we give credit to the Parliamentary investigation, is a mere sink of corruption – a mere engine of patronage – a place in which a corrupt commander-in-chief acts according to his vile pleasure, and the pleasure of all the pimps and parasites and harlots who environ him. This, sir, is the cause of the superiority of the naval over the military force of Great Britain. But, when the British navy shall have effected what the armies of other nations from time immemorial have done – when it shall have subjugated whole continents – then will I agree in the superior power of naval over military force. I have no hesitation in saying that I would rather vote for naval than military force, and it is because a naval force has not the same power as a military one. I have never heard of a despotic power created by a naval force, unless perhaps in the chieftain of a band of pirates.

But it would appear that the politics of my unfortunate friend from North Carolina, (Mr. Stanford,) who sits near the Speaker, are a mere counting-house business of pounds, shillings, and pence, or dollars and cents; that, in fact, the spirit of lucre is transferred from the warehouses and counting-rooms of the merchants to the tobacco-fields and cotton plantations of the Southern planters; and that, to such a pitch has the patriotism of the mercantile class risen, that they are really ready to sacrifice one-half of their property for the protection of the Government of their country. If the gentleman from New York (Mr. Mumford) will permit me, I will protest against this idea. I have once before protested in company with that gentleman, and I hope he will permit me to protest, even when I have not the sanction of his respectable authority. With regard to the politics of my worthy friend from North Carolina, I recollect very well, in the days which were called the days of profusion, patronage and terror, his politics were not of that minute and microscopic grade that no scale could be graduated sufficiently low to measure them; that, if his republicanism was a matter of pounds, shillings, and pence, then and now, it was not that sort of republicanism which was too cheap to be measured by the value of the smallest known coin, even by a doit. I really feel something like sympathy with the gentleman from North Carolina – and it is not at all to be wondered at; for the republicanism of that gentleman used to be that which I always have professed – and if the remark applied to the gentleman from North Carolina, who I believe is not yet quite out of the pale of the political church, how much more forcibly did it apply to an unpardonable political sinner like myself! With respect, sir, to this patriotism, or this republicanism, that has left the tobacco fields and cotton plantations, and taken up its dwelling in the counting-house, I beg leave to express my doubt of the fact. I never have had that high opinion of the mercantile class expressed by some gentlemen in this House. I think of them as of other men – that in proportion to the temptations to which they are exposed, so are they virtuous or otherwise. But, sir, I have not and cannot have confidence in a man to whom the great Emperor has given a paternal squeeze, whose property is sequestered at Bayonne or St. Sebastian – I disclaim any thing like personal allusion; I speak of a class – I cannot have the confidence, on the subject of our foreign relations, in a man so situated, that I can have in the planter or farmer whose property is growing on his land around the house in which he nightly sleeps – and why? Because, mutatis mutandis, I should not have the same confidence in myself. I should not believe it possible, if I had rich cargoes under sequestration in France, that I could vote free from the bias which the jeopardy of that property would throw on my mind.

Sir, I have been very irregular, because I have been compelled to follow, not the current of my own ideas, but the objections started by gentlemen in different quarters, and (as it is the fashion to express it) on different sides of the House, whom I have found united against the bill as reported by myself. I would ask, in a few words, if we ought to continue this establishment in its present state? I ask if it is necessary? For the expense of a navy has been proved to be in inverse ratio to its utility. To what purpose do we keep up the Marines, another branch of the Establishment? If I am correctly informed, these men are willing to run away whenever they have a chance to desert – if they can get an opportunity – and I am willing that they shall quit the service without being exposed to be brought to a court martial for desertion. Nothing, indeed, was said on the subject of the Marine corps, when the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Key) moved to strike out the whole section of the bill. Fertile as the gentleman may be in reasons, he did not offer one. He must have supposed it to be perfectly correct that a Marine establishment should be kept up for a navy employing 2,700 seamen, more expensive than the same establishment for a navy employing 8,000. It was, indeed, facetiously urged in the select committee, as a reason why these men should be retained, that they came to this House regularly on Sundays to serve the Lord – to assist at the weekly pageant here performed. Sir, far be it from me to say, or even to think, with the Protector Cromwell, that this is a House where the Lord has not been served for many years. But, permit me to state, that in our country, it is the practice to pay no man out of the public purse, even for advocating the cause of other people with the Most High, much less for advocating his own. In other words, that when men with us serve the Lord, they do it at their own expense.

We have heard to-day, sir – and I hope the report of Congress at their next session will verify it – that a grant of power to the Executive in relation to any subject – say borrowing of money – does not necessarily imply an exercise of that power. We have heard, too, that notwithstanding the power devolved on the President of the United States, by the bill authorizing him to borrow to an amount of upwards of five millions of dollars, which this day passed this House, to enable the Government to get along, we shall at our next session probably be presented with the joyful tidings that it is not necessary to make use of the power, at least in its full extent; but it depends upon our own act, whether this expectation be realized or not. We are, in this instance at least, of that description of prophets who have it in their power to bring about the event they predict. And I do earnestly hope that the House will not, by a disagreement with the report of the select committee, insure the defeat of their hope – the nonfulfilment of the prediction. I hope we shall take up the subject, and go through with it; that we shall account, and account rationally too, for some of the facts at least which I have presented to the House this day, in terms extremely defective, I know; but the time was short – now or never – and I presented them in the only mode in which I could possibly do it.

In the course of my observations, I think I forgot to mention that when the United States kept forty sail of armed vessels afloat, and employed 8,000 seamen, we had no navy-yards at all. If we had, there must have been some extraordinary oversight committed by the then Secretary of the Treasury; and I believe politicians were not any more apt then than now to omit any items of public expense; they crowded in all they could. In the estimate which I hold in my hand, there is no item of that expense. I hope, if the House agree (which God forbid!) to so much of the report of the Committee of the Whole as retains the frigates and ships of war, that they will at least consent to put down the navy-yard at this place, and break down the supernumerary Marines. Really, sir, I am fond of music, but I do not mean to grant $211,000 of the people's money annually for a song. I hope at least that the Marines will be reduced, and that we shall retain at least not more navy-yards than ships. What would an honest Dutchman in the West think of a man who kept as many stables as horses, and those of the most expensive construction, too?

I have done, sir. I have endeavored to discharge my duty. No man is more sensible of a failure in the manner than I am; but I will thank any one to convince me of the utility of a navy, according to the doctrines and practice of the new school, and to facts, as far as they have been stated.

Mr. Bassett said that his colleague could not always adhere to the principle that it was his duty to ferret out every error. Error is the lot of human nature, said Mr. B., and no one is infallible. Give a small authority to-day, and it will increase to an unexpected amount before to-morrow. I am authorized to state that such has been the case in the Navy Department; that under the late Secretary of the Navy large expenses had been incurred; and that before he left his office he commenced a reduction of them. Since the present Secretary (Mr. Hamilton) has been in office, the expenditures have been much reduced. In the navy-yard at this place, for example, a permanent reduction has been made in the expenses to the amount perhaps of 30 or 40 per cent., and a very considerable reduction also as to immediate disbursements. It is nevertheless our duty, after the suggestions that have been made, to commence a thorough investigation, and I can only regret that the subject has been introduced to our attention at so late a period of the session. Instead of regretting what has been said, I am glad of it, and hope that at an early period in the next session an investigation will be made. Without any particular direction of the House, the committee of the Naval Establishment thought it their duty to examine the whole establishment at the navy-yard in this city. All the good expected from doing so was to convince them that the eye of the Government was upon them. I am proud to say that not only myself, but every gentleman of the committee with me, was much pleased with the appearance of things as they stood. It was not in our power to investigate minutiæ. On visiting the establishment of the Marine corps we saw every thing in order; we saw the armory establishment, wherein we discovered that arms which had been injured were usefully and handsomely repaired. As well as we could discover by the eye, every thing was pleasing to my mind – and one innovation in discipline in the Marine corps gave me very great satisfaction, viz: the substitution of solitary confinement for personal chastisement. In the navy-yard, the expense of which has been much complained of, we saw great piles of useful buildings. These were not constructed without cost. The present establishment there, in addition to store-houses, &c., consists of an extensive forgery, where all the iron work for the navy is done, a lead foundry, a brass foundry, where articles are made out of worn-out old metals, which otherwise would be of no use. I was desirous, both for my own information as well as that of the House, to procure an account of the work done at the navy-yard, to compare it with the expense – for that is the only way of fairly estimating the value of the establishment; but the time allotted to us during this session is not sufficient to attain that object.