Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

The gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Story) had said that except we begun with this bill, and got his fast-sailing frigates, we should never regain our rights. If that were really the case, Mr. W. said he was ready to abandon them. He considered that the sort of maintenance of our rights adverted to by the gentleman from Massachusetts, would be destructive to those rights. Gentlemen must have forgotten that when Hamburg was in the greatest state of prosperity, she did not possess even a single gunboat. Why! there was not wealth enough in this whole nation, if every one were to carry his all, thus to maintain our rights against the navy of Great Britain. If we were carried into a war, and every thing really seemed to be tending that way, we must rely upon the enterprise of our citizens; and that, when set at liberty, would be found more desperate than the navy of any country. When we arrived at the end of the Revolutionary war we had but one frigate, and the best thing we ever did was to give that one away. The State of South Carolina had not yet got clear of the curse. She embarked one frigate in the general struggle, and she had not rid herself of the debts incurred by it yet. Private enterprise must be depended upon. The people from the Eastward had shown in the last war what they would do. When vessels were loaded with sugar they would fight like bull-dogs for it. He recollected a story, he said, of one of our privateers being beat off by a Jamaica man, whom they attacked. The captain not liking to lose the prize, and finding his crew disheartened, told them she was full of sugar. "Is she?" said they, "by G – d; let us at them again." They scarcely ever failed in their enterprises.

In allusion to the case at Savannah, Mr. W. regretted that an insult should be offered to the people of the country. The insult at Savannah had by this time been redressed, he had no doubt. He had no information to induce him to believe so, but the knowledge that the sloop-of-war Hornet was stationed off Charleston, and of course cruised near the place. The Hornet was perfectly adequate to drive any vessel of twenty guns out of our waters. She was one of the best vessels of the United States, and as well officered as any. [Mr. Troup observed that the Hornet was off Charleston. Now, he wanted a frigate at Savannah.] Mr. W. said that Savannah was the very place where gunboats would be perfectly effectual. He meant to make no reflection against the proposer of the gunboat system, but he did against those who had only given one-half of the system, and omitted the other – the marine militia. And now, when an attack was menaced at Savannah, gentlemen wanted a frigate! If nine-tenths of the people were opposed to the evasions of the embargo law, Mr. W. said it would not be evaded. The evaders would be considered as traitors – as the worst of traitors. As to preparing a force for the protection of navigation, the gentleman from Georgia must well know that the whole revenue of the United States would not be competent to maintain a sufficient number of vessels to convoy our merchantmen.

Mr. W. concluded by saying, that he wished the nation to be protected, and its wrongs to be redressed; but when he reflected that at Castine the soil had been most abominably violated, he could not view the insults in our waters as being equal to it; for, said he, touch the soil and you touch the life-blood of every man in it.

Mr. Durell considered the present subject as one of the most important which had been introduced at this session. It would indeed be difficult to reason gentlemen into a modification of a principle to which they were opposed throughout; but he trusted that this House was not generally so disposed. He believed that a large majority of the House were at the present moment in favor of embargo or war, because the House had been so distinctly told by a committee on our foreign relations, that there was no alternative but submission; and almost every gentleman who had the honor of a seat within these walls, had committed himself on the subject, either to persevere in the embargo or resort to war. What would be the object of a war? Not the right of the soil, not our territorial limits, but the right of navigating the ocean. Were we to redress those wrongs, those commercial injuries, on the land? Not altogether, he conceived. Would it be good policy, he asked, to let our means of carrying on war on the ocean rot in our docks, and not make use of them? These vessels would also be useful as a defence. Why then should they not be manned and put in readiness for service? It was said that we could not cope with the British navy. Mr. D. said this argument proved too much, if it proved any thing. If he did not feel perfectly comfortable in a cold day, should he therefore divest himself of all clothing? Why send out the sloop of war Hornet, alluded to by the gentleman last up – why rely upon it for redressing the insult at Savannah, if naval force was useless? It was no reason, because Great Britain had more vessels than we, that we should not use what we had. Indeed, those gentlemen who objected to naval force, appeared to be mostly from the interior, and of course could not properly estimate its value.

Mr. Sawyer was wholly opposed to the amendments from the Senate. The objection to this particular increase of naval force on the score of expense, was not to be disregarded. He called the attention of gentlemen to the state of the Treasury. The expense of this system would be three millions; and when this sum was added to other sums which would be requisite if measures now pending were adopted, it would render it necessary for Congress now to borrow money on the credit of posterity. The expedient of direct taxation would not be resorted to. It had already been the death-blow to the political existence of one Administration. This Government, he said, was founded on public opinion, and whenever the approbation of the people was withdrawn, from whatever cause, the whole superstructure must fall.

Mr. S. dwelt at some length on the disadvantage of loans. He said, if this nation was destined to raise a navy for the protection of commerce, it should have begun earlier, in the year 1793, when such outrageous violations had been committed on our commerce. The expense of such an establishment would have far exceeded the amount in value of captures made since that period. He concluded, from a number of observations which he made on this subject, that, on the score of the protection of trade, it would not be proper to fit out a navy. This proposition, he said, was the mere entering-wedge. The system was either unnecessary, or would be wholly futile in practice. Our seamen would cost us at least double of what is the expense of her seamen to Great Britain; and it required her utmost exertions to pay the interest of the enormous debt with which her unwieldy navy had saddled her. He therefore certainly thought that an attempt to justify it on the score of profit would not succeed. He deprecated the extension of Executive patronage, which would result from an increase of the Naval Establishment. Need he go back, he asked, to the time when the black cockade was necessary, in some parts of the country, to secure a man from insult from the officers of the navy? He wished to limit the Executive patronage; to adhere closely to the maxims of our forefathers. By sending out a navy, too, he said, we should volunteer to support the ascendency of the British navy, become the mere jackals of the British lion. Mr. S. went at some length into an examination of the former Administration in relation to a navy. There was nothing, he observed, in the nature of our Government, or of our foreign relations, to require a navy. If we could not carry on foreign commerce without a navy, he wished to have less of it and more of internal commerce, of that commerce which the natural advantages of the country would support between different parts of it. If we were to build a navy for the protection of foreign commerce, we should throw away our natural advantages for the sake of artificial ones. He was in favor of the embargo at present. There was more virtue in our barrels of flour as to coercion than in all the guns of our navy; and we had lately given our adversaries a supplementary broadside, which he hoped would tell well. Mr. S. stated the origin and progress of navies at some length, commencing with the Republic of Genoa. Our chief reliance as to defence must be on our militia. So little did Great Britain now rely on her navy for defence of her soil, that she had called upon every man in the country to be at his post, if danger came. Other nations might be justified in supporting a naval force, because they had colonies separated from them by the sea, with whom they were obliged to have means of intercourse, but we had not that apology for a navy. Mr. S. concluded his observations, after speaking near an hour, not, he said, that he had gone through the subject; but, as it was late in the day, he yielded the floor to some other gentleman.

Mr. J. G. Jackson said, that gentlemen should not be influenced, in discussing the present question, by a belief that they were now discussing the propriety of raising a naval force for offensive purposes. This was not the question. It was only whether, at this crisis, the House would employ a little force for the purpose of resisting attacks made on our territory at home. The gentleman from South Carolina (Mr. Williams) had said that an attack on the soil touched the life-blood of every man in it. Yes, Mr. J. said, it did; whether the invasion was on our jurisdiction, on land or water, it touched equally the life-blood of the nation. He would as soon resist an attack on our territorial jurisdiction on sea as on land. It made no difference with him whether a foreign frigate came up to the piles of Potomac bridge and fired over into the town, or whether its crew came on shore and assaulted us with the bayonet. The territory, he said, was equally invaded in either case. Were we not to resist Great Britain because of her 1,130 sail of armed vessels? This would amount to a declaration that we must succumb to her, because she could at any time send a squadron sufficient to destroy our naval force at a single blow. This was the tendency of the argument. Mr. J. said it would be more honorable to fight, while a single gun could be fired, notwithstanding her overwhelming force. This mode of reasoning had a tendency to destroy the spirit of the people. He would never consent to crouch before we were conquered; this was not the course of our Revolutionary patriots, and he trusted it was one which we should not follow. He would rather, like the heroic band of Leonidas, perish in the combat, although the force of the enemy was irresistible, than acknowledge that we would submit. This naval force was not, however, intended to cope with the navy of Great Britain, but to chastise the petty pirates who trespassed on our jurisdiction; pirates, he called them, because the British Government had not sanctioned their acts. It had not justified the murder of Pierce, or asserted the right of jurisdiction claimed by an officer within the length of his buoys, &c., because, if she had, it would have then been war. For this reason he wished our little pigmy force to be sent on the ocean, notwithstanding the giant navy of Great Britain. Some gentlemen had opposed this on the score of expense. Our most valuable treasure, Mr. J. said, was honor; and the House had almost unanimously declared that it could not submit without a sacrifice of that honor.

Saturday, January 21

Extra Session

On motion of Mr. Smilie the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the bill to alter the time of the next meeting of Congress.

Mr. J. G. Jackson moved to strike out the "fourth" Monday in May, and insert the "last," stating as a reason, that as the Virginia elections took place in April, the Representatives could not arrive here in time.

Mr. Macon wished a division of the question so as first to strike out, with a view to insert "September," instead of May. The motion to strike out was negatived – 62 to 35. It was supposed that this question tried the principle of the bill.

The committee rose and reported the bill.

Mr. D. Williams moved to strike out May for the purpose of inserting "September."

Mr. Milnor hoped the motion would not be agreed to. If the new Congress could commence its session on the 4th day of March next, he said he should think it extremely proper that it should do so. And, if he could think that the majority would fix an earlier day than the fourth Monday of May for the meeting, he should vote for the present motion. He agreed with gentlemen that this was a momentous crisis; that the country was in a situation of extreme difficulty and danger. It appeared to him, therefore, that Congress, who were the guardians of the public welfare; to whom were confided the destinies of the nation, so far as the nation could control them, should be constantly in session, till a more favorable state of affairs took place. It was possible, but was it probable that any event would occur to alter our situation for the better? There was no hope that the belligerents would recede from their injurious restrictions on our commerce. It was not probable that any thing would occur which would do away the necessity of an extra session. The present Congress having determined to persevere in the embargo and the present system of measures a while longer, the peace and welfare of the country required that a different system should be adopted. The present had been sufficiently tested, and would never produce those effects anticipated from it. It was proper that an early opportunity should be given to the next Congress to approve the present system, or give it up and adopt some other in its stead.

Mr. D. R. Williams said he was opposed to Congress coming here at the time proposed. Why should they come here then? He wished some one to answer, and let him understand why they were coming. In his opinion there was every possible objection to such a procedure. On the fourth day of March, a new President comes into power. Is it not presumable that the President would choose to have some communication with our Ministers abroad before the meeting of Congress? Could any man say that it was not proper that he should have it? Mr. W. said he hoped that the President would send special messengers, unfashionable as that policy was. If you are willing to wait for a declaration of war till the fourth Monday in May, will there be any necessity of declaring it before the first Monday in June or July? You have suffered the public mind to assuage in its resentment, and I very much doubt, that before a full experiment be made of the embargo, it will be wholly allayed. It has been said through the nation, and indeed avowed on this floor, that the Administration does not wish for peace. Having failed to take hold of the affair of the Chesapeake for a declaration of war, you have nothing now to give the people that interest which I hope they always will have in a declaration of war. Suppose you were to send special Ministers, and they were to be treated as our Ministers to France were under a former Administration, would not this treatment make every man in the nation rally around you? Would it not prove beyond doubt that the Administration was sincere in its wishes for peace? Undoubtedly it would. Why are your Ministers now loitering in foreign Courts? With a hope of accommodation, sir, I would send other Ministers there, and if they failed of immediate accommodation, would order them all home. If they are compelled to return, you will have the whole nation with you, which you must have when you go to war.

Mr. J. G. Jackson replied to Mr. Williams. The gentleman had asked emphatically why Congress should convene here in May. Occurrences of every day, said Mr. J., are presenting themselves in such a way as to render it highly important and necessary that some other ground should be taken. Are we to adhere to the embargo forever, sir? I have said, and again say, that a total abandonment of the ocean would be submission. I think, by passing this bill, we give the nation a pledge that it shall be the ne plus ultra, which shall give to foreign nations time to revise their conduct towards us, and will give them time to consider whether or not they will have war with us. The gentleman wants a special mission. Sir, are we to continue in this state any longer? Shall negotiation be spun out further? No man can doubt the capacity of our Ministers abroad, and their disposition to represent their Government correctly. The doors are shut in the face of our Minister at the Court of St. James, and worse than shut at the Court of St. Cloud – for, from the latter, contemptuous silence is all the answer we have received, if indeed silence can convey an answer. Are we to renew negotiation, then, when every circumstance manifests that it would be useless? Need I refer to what took place the other day – I allude to the publication of a letter by Mr. Canning, in a highly exceptionable manner, through Federal presses, or presses more devoted to the interests of that country than any other? One universal burst of indignation accompanied the publication of that letter in this House. And are we, under such circumstances, to renew negotiation by extra missions? I conceive that the cup of negotiation and conciliation is exhausted to the dregs, and that we should but further degrade ourselves by sending further extra missions. It has been stated to me that a proposition had actually been reduced to writing by a member of this House the other day for sending away foreign Ministers and calling our Ministers home, and I am sorry that the proposition was not offered to the House, for, under present circumstances, it might not have been improper to have adopted it.

Mr. Smilie said, if there were no other reason, the present suspension of commerce, and discontents at home, were sufficient reasons for calling Congress earlier than the first Monday in December. When the new Administration should come into office, it was proper that they should have an opportunity of meeting Congress as early as possible. It was his opinion that, at the next session, a change of measures would take place. What would be the substitute for the present measure he could not say; but, at this time, he must say that he could see no way of avoiding war. With regard to extra missions, he really had no idea of a measure of that kind. If there should be any other means to secure the interest and honor of the nation but war, he hoped in God that it would be adopted, but he did not now see any such prospect.

Mr. Rhea, of Tennessee, said it was of no importance in the consideration of the present question what the next Administration should think or do. He wished that there could be an understanding with foreign nations for our good, but he much doubted such a result. He would not undertake to say whether war, or what other measure, ought to be adopted at the extra session; but, it was his opinion, that Congress ought to meet, and he should vote against every proposition going to defeat the object of the bill. Although this nation had not immediately retaliated the attack on the Chesapeake, would any man rise on this floor and say that the act of dishonor was done away because the House refused immediately to avenge it? He believed not; and, as long as it remained unatoned, it was cause for this nation to act. The only question for the House now to determine was this: Are there reasons to induce gentlemen to believe that a meeting of Congress is necessary on the fourth Monday of May next? As it appeared to him that such reasons did exist, he said he was bound on his responsibility to vote for the bill.

Mr. Durell asked if gentlemen meant to continue the embargo forever. He believed somewhat in the doctrine that an explosion might take place under it in a certain portion of the country. Gentlemen said an extra session was, therefore, necessary to save the nation. Mr. D. asked if the nation was to be saved by long speeches? He had seen almost two whole sessions of Congress pass away, the one of six months, the other of three, and the nation in the same situation still, and still told, in long stories, from day to day, that it was in a critical situation. He had no idea that the nation was to be saved by much speaking. He did firmly believe, that more than forty-eight hours would not be necessary to pass all laws to meet the impending crisis. If a declaration of war was thought proper, this would be sufficient time for it; if an extraordinary mission, as suggested by the gentleman from South Carolina, forty-eight hours would be time enough for the House to decide on recommending it. The present was a state of suspense, from which the nation ought to be removed, and he was unwilling to prolong this state by the passage of the bill.

Mr. Burwell said he was one of those who would vote for an earlier meeting of Congress than usual. In Great Britain, in whose government there were some features approximating to ours, there was always an uneasiness, lest the Parliament should not meet often enough. Whence could be the objection to Congress meeting at an earlier day? If the public sentiment was not then prepared for war, it would not be adopted. It appeared to him that an early session, instead of producing mischief, would essentially contribute to tranquillize the minds of the people. If peace was attainable, we must have peace; but if not, we have no choice but war. The gentleman from South Carolina suggests the propriety of sending a special mission, said Mr. B. Let me ask him, if Administration should not take this course, whether it would not be perfectly proper that Congress should be in session? Certainly it would. With respect to a special mission, Mr. B. said he was perfectly at a loss to conceive what could be the nature of any proposition which could be made to Great Britain. A proposition had already been made to her, in effect, to go to war with her against France, and insultingly refused; for no other interpretation could be made of the offer to suspend the embargo, if she would rescind her Orders in Council, except Mr. Canning chose to misunderstand everything that could be said. Unless gentlemen would point out some new proposition, which could be made to Great Britain or France, he could not see the propriety of the course recommended. As to the continuance of the embargo, Mr. B. said it seemed to be perfectly well understood by every man, that when the Government determined on that course, it did not determine to persevere in it eternally. If it could be made manifest to him that any particular favorable consequence would be produced by postponing the session beyond the fourth Monday in May, he might be induced to accede to it. As to the disposition of the Administration to preserve peace, could the gentleman conceive it possible to remove the impressions of those who were determined not to be convinced? This nation had sued for peace, but in vain; they had offered to give up almost every thing in contest, if Great Britain would yield a thing which neither Mr. Canning nor any other member of the British Government ever said they had a right to do, and which was only justified on the ground of necessity. There was therefore no plausibility in the assertion that peace had not been earnestly sought for.

Mr. G. W. Campbell said that if nothing occurred between this time and the time proposed by the bill for the next meeting of Congress, which would particularly render a change necessary, he was yet of opinion that it would be then necessary to change our situation; for this reason: that at that period, time sufficient would have elapsed to give us information as to what ground Great Britain would take, after she had heard of the position which Congress had maintained. After that ground was taken, Congress would know how to act. I never voted for the embargo as a permanent measure, said Mr. C., nor did I ever use an expression which would authorize such a supposition; nor do I suppose that any other gentleman entertained such an idea. As to a special mission, I should as soon think of sending a special messenger to the moon as to Great Britain or to France, for the cup of humiliation is exhausted already, and I will never put it in their power to offer us another cup.

Mr. Macon said he had not intended to have said any thing, but that the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Burwell) had broached a doctrine which he did not approve – that this Government was like that of Great Britain.