Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

The American Cabinet understands all this very well, although this House may not. Their policy is founded upon it. The project of this bill is to put at a still further distance the chance of amicable arrangement, in consequence of the dispositions which the threat of invasion of their colonies, and attempt to execute it, will excite in the British nation and Ministry. I have some claim to speak concerning the policy of the men who constitute the American Cabinet. For eight years I have studied their history, characters, and interests. I know no reason why I should judge them severely, except such as arise from those inevitable conclusions, which avowed principles and distinct conduct have impressed upon the mind. I say, then, sir, without hesitation, that in my judgment, the embarrassments of our relations with Great Britain, and keeping alive between this country and that a root of bitterness, has been, is, and will continue to be, a main principle of the policy of this American Cabinet. They want not a solid settlement of our differences. If the nation will support them in it, they will persevere in the present war. If it will not, some general arrangements will be the resort, which will leave open opportunities for discord; which on proper occasions will be improved by them. I shall give my reasons for this opinion. I wish no sentiments of mine to have influence any farther than the reasons upon which they are founded justify. They are public reasons, arising from undeniable facts; the nation will judge for itself.

The men who now, and who, for these twelve years past, have, to the misfortune of this country, guided its councils and directed its destinies, came into power on a tide, which was raised and supported by elements constituted of British prejudices and British antipathies. The parties which grew up in this nation took their origin and form at the time of the adoption of the treaty negotiated by Mr. Jay, in 1794. The opposition of that day, of which the men now in power were the leaders, availed themselves, very dexterously, of the relics of that hatred towards the British name which remained after the Revolutionary war. By perpetually blowing up the embers of the ancient passions, they excited a flame in the nation; and by systematically directing it against the honorable men who at that time conducted its affairs, the strength and influence of those men were impaired. The embarrassments with France, which succeeded, in 1798 and 1799, were turned to the same account. Unfortunately, those who then conducted the public affairs attended less to the appearance of things, than to their measures; and considered more what was due to their country than was prudent, in the state of the prejudices and jealousies of the people, thus artfully excited against them. They went on, in the course they deemed right, regardless of personal consequences, and blind to the evidences of discontent which surrounded them. The consequences are well known. The supreme power in these United States passed into the hands which now possess it; in which it has been continued down to the present time. The transfer of power was effected, undeniably, principally on the very ground of those prejudices and antipathies which existed in the nation against Great Britain; and which had been artfully fomented by the men now in power, and their adherents, and directed against their predecessors. These prejudices and passions constitute the main pillar of the power of these men. In my opinion, they never will permit it to be wholly taken away from them. They never will permit the people of this country to look at them and their political opponents, free of that jaundice with which they have carefully imbued the vision of their own partisans. They never will consent to be weighed in a balance of mere merits; but will always take care to keep in reserve some portion of these British antipathies, to throw as a make-weight into the opposite scale, whenever they find their own sinking. To continue, multiply, strengthen, and extend these props of their power, has been, still is, the object of the daily study and the nightly vigils of our American Cabinet. For this the British Treaty was permitted to expire by its own limitation; notwithstanding the state of things which the Treaty of Amiens had produced in Europe was so little like permanent peace, that the occurrence of the fact, on which the force of that limitation depended, might easily have been questioned, with but little violence to the terms, and in perfect conformity with its spirit. For this a renewal of the Treaty of 1794 was refused by our Cabinet, although proffered by the British Government. For this the treaty negotiated by Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney in 1807 was rejected. For this, in 1811, fifty thousand dollars were paid out of the public Treasury to John Henry, for the obvious purpose of enabling the American Cabinet to calumniate their political opponents, on this very point of British influence, upon the eve of elections, occurring in Massachusetts, on the event of which the perpetuation of their own power was materially dependent.

Mr. Speaker, such men as these never will permit a state of things to pass away, so essential to their influence. Be it peace or war arrangement or hostility, the association of these British antipathies in the minds of the mass of the community, with the characters of their political opponents, constitutes the great magazine of their power. This composes their whole political larder. It is, like Lord Peter's brown loaf, their "beef, mutton, veal, venison, partridge, plum-pudding, and custard."

From the time of the expiration of the British Treaty of 1794, and the refusal to renew it, the American Cabinet have been careful to precede negotiation with some circumstances or other, calculated to make it fail, or at least to make a successful result less certain. Thus in 1806, when, from the plunder of commerce, by British cruisers, a negotiation, notwithstanding the obvious reluctance of the Cabinet, was forced upon them, by the clamors of the merchants, the non-importation law of April, in that year, was obtruded between the two countries. In the course of the debate upon that law, it was opposed upon this very ground, that it was an obstacle to a successful negotiation. It was advocated, like the bill now under discussion, as an aid to successful negotiation. It was also said by the opponents of the law of 1806, that Great Britain would not negotiate under its operation, and that arrangement, attempted under proper auspices, could not be difficult, from the known interests and inclinations of that nation. What was the consequence? Precisely that which was anticipated. The then President of the United States was necessitated to come to this House, and recommend a suspension of the operation of that law, upon the openly-avowed ground of its being expedient to give that evidence of a conciliatory disposition; really, because, if permitted to continue in operation, negotiation was found to be impracticable. After the suspension of that law, a treaty was formed. The merits of that treaty, it is not within the scope of my present argument to discuss. It is sufficient to say, it was deemed good enough to receive the sanction of Messrs. Monroe and Pinkney. It arrived in America and was rejected by the authority of a single individual; apparently because of the insufficiency of the arrangement about impressment. Really because a settlement with Great Britain, at that time, did not "enter into the scope of the policy" of the American Cabinet. The negotiation was indeed renewed, but it was followed up with the enforcement of the non-importation law, and the enactment of the embargo. Both which steps were stated at the time, as they proved afterwards, to be of a nature to make hopeless successful negotiation.

In this State the Executive power of this nation formally passed into new hands, but substantially remained under the old principles of action, and subject to the former influences. It was desirable that a fund of popularity should be acquired for the new Administration. Accordingly, an arrangement was made with Mr. Erskine, and no questions asked, concerning the adequacy of his powers. But, lest this circumstance should not defeat the proposed arrangement, a clause was inserted in the correspondence containing an insult to the British Government, offered in the face of the world, such as no man ever gave to a private individual whom he did not mean to offend. The President of the United States said, in so many words, to the person at the head of that Government, that he did not understand what belonged to his own honor, as well as it was understood by the President himself. The effect of such language was natural, it was necessary; it could not but render the British Government averse to sanction Mr. Erskine's arrangement. The effect was anticipated by Mr. Robert Smith, then acting as Secretary of State. He objected to its being inserted, but it was done in the President's own handwriting. As Mr. Erskine's authority was denied by the British Government, it is well known that in fact, on the point of this indignity, the fate of that arrangement turned. Can any one doubt that our Cabinet meant that it should have this effect? I send you word, Mr. Speaker, that I have agreed with your messenger, and wish you to ratify it. I think you, however, no gentleman, notwithstanding; and that you do not understand, as well as I, what is "due to your own honor." What think you, sir? Would you ratify such an arrangement if you could help it? Does a proffer of settlement, connected with such language, look like a disposition or an intention to conciliate? I appeal to the common sense of mankind on the point.

The whole stage of the relations, induced between this country and Great Britain, in consequence of our embargo and restrictive systems, was, in fact, a standing appeal to the fears of the British Cabinet. For, notwithstanding those systems were equal in their terms, so far as they affected Foreign Powers, yet their operation was notoriously almost wholly upon Great Britain. To yield to that pressure, or to any thing which should foster, in this country, the idea that it was an effectual weapon of hostility, was nothing more than conceding that she was dependent upon us. A concession, which, when once made by her, was certain to encourage a resort to it by us on every occasion of difficulty between the two nations. Reasoning, therefore, upon the known nature of things, and the plain interests of Great Britain, it was foretold that, during its continuance she would concede nothing. And the event has justified these predictions. But the circumstance the most striking, and that furnishing the most conclusive evidence of the indisposition of the American Cabinet to peace, and their determination to carry on the war, is that connected with the pretended repeal of the French decrees, in November, 1810, and the consequent revival, in 1811, of our restrictive system against Great Britain.

If ever a body of men were pledged to any thing, the American Cabinet, its friends and supporters, were pledged for the truth of this fact; that the French decrees of Berlin and Milan were definitively repealed as it respects the United States, on the first of November, 1810. If ever any body of men staked their whole stock of reputation upon any point, our Cabinet did it on this. They and their partisans asserted and raved. They denounced every man as a British partisan who denied it. They declared the restrictive system was revived by the mere effect of the proclamation. But lest the courts of law should not be as subservient to their policy as might be wished, they passed the law of the 2d of March, 1811, upon the basis of this repeal, and of its being definitive. The British Government refused, however, to recognize the validity of this repeal, and denied that the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the first of November, 1810, as our Cabinet asserted. Thus, then, stood the argument between the British Ministry and our Cabinet. The British Ministry admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, they were bound to revoke their Orders in Council. But they denied that repeal to exist. Our Cabinet, on the other hand, admitted that if the Berlin and Milan decrees were not repealed on the 1st of November, 1810, the restrictive system ought not to have been revived against Great Britain. But they asserted that repeal to exist. This was, virtually, the state of the question between the two countries on this point. And it is agreed, on all hands, that this refusal of the British Government to repeal their Orders in Council, after the existence of the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, as asserted by the American Cabinet, was the cause of the declaration of war between the two countries. So that in truth, the question of the right of war depended upon the existence of that fact; for if that fact did not exist, even the American Cabinet did not pretend that, in the position in which things then stood, they had a right to declare war, on account of the continuance of the British Orders in Council.

Now, what is the truth in relation to this all-important fact, the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees on the 1st of November, 1810; the pivot upon which turned the revival of the restrictive system and our declaration of war? Why, sir, the event has proved that in relation to that fact the American Cabinet was, to say the least, in an error. Bonaparte himself, in a decree, dated the 28th of April, 1811, but not promulgated till a year afterwards, distinctly declares that the Berlin and Milan decrees were not definitively repealed, as relates to the United States, on the 1st of November, 1810. He also declares that they are then, on that twenty-eighth of April, for the first time, repealed. And he founds the issuing of this decree on the act of the American Congress of the 2d of March, 1811. That very act, which was passed upon the ground of the definitive repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, on the 1st of November, 1810; and which, it is agreed on all sides, the American Government were bound in honor not to pass, except in case of such antecedent repeal.

Were ever a body of men so abandoned in the hour of need, as the American Cabinet, in this instance by Bonaparte? Was ever any body of men so cruelly wounded in the house of their friend? This, this was "the unkindest cut of all." But how was it received by the American Cabinet? Surely they were indignant at this treatment. Surely the air rings with reproaches upon a man who has thus made them stake their reputation upon a falsehood; and then gives little less than the lie direct, to their assertions. No, sir, nothing of all this is heard from our Cabinet. There is a philosophic tameness that would be remarkable, if it were not, in all cases affecting Bonaparte, characteristic. All the Executive of the United States has found it in his heart to say, in relation to this last decree of Bonaparte, which contradicts his previous allegations and asseverations, is, that "This proceeding is rendered, by the time and manner of it, liable to many objections!"

I have referred to this subject as being connected, with future conduct, strikingly illustrative of the disposition of the American Cabinet to carry on the war, and of their intention, if possible, not to make peace. Surely, if any nation had a claim for liberal treatment from another, it was the British nation from the American, after the discovery of the error of the American Government, in relation to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan decrees, in November, 1810. In consequence of that error, the American Cabinet had ruined numbers of our own citizens, who had been caught by the revival of the non-intercourse law; they had revived that law against Great Britain, under circumstances which now appeared to have been fallacious; and they had declared war against her, on the supposition, that she had refused to repeal her Orders in Council, after the French decrees were in fact revoked: whereas, it now appears that they were in fact not revoked. Surely the knowledge of this error was followed by an instant and anxious desire to redress the resulting injury. As the British Orders in Council were in fact revoked, on the knowledge of the existence of the French decree of repeal, surely the American Cabinet at once extended the hand of friendship; met the British Government half way; stopped all farther irritation; and strove to place every thing on a basis best suited to promote an amicable adjustment. No, sir, nothing of all this occurred. On the contrary, the question of impressments is made the basis of continuing the war. On this subject, a studied fairness of proposition is preserved, accompanied with systematic perseverance in measures of hostility. An armistice was proposed by them. It was refused by us. It was acceded to by the American General on the frontiers. It was rejected by the Cabinet. No consideration of the false allegation on which the war in fact was founded; no consideration of the critical and extremely consequential nature to both nations of the subject of impressment; no considerations of humanity, interposed their influence. They renewed hostilities. They rushed upon Canada. Nothing would satisfy them but blood. The language of their conduct is that of the giant, in the legends of infancy:

"Fee, faw, fow, fum,I smell the blood of an Englishman;Dead or alive, I will have some!"

Can such men pretend that peace is their object? Whatever may result, the perfect conviction of my mind is, that they have no such intention, and that if it comes it is contrary both to their hope and expectation.

I would not judge these men severely. But it is my duty to endeavor to judge them truly; and to express fearlessly the result of that judgment, whatever it may be. My opinion results from the application of the well-known principle of judging concerning men's purposes and motives: to consider rather what men do, than what they say; and to examine their deeds in connection with predominating passions and interests; and on this basis decide. In making an estimate of the intentions of these or any other politicians, I make little or no account of pacific pretensions. There is a general reluctance at war, and desire of peace, which pervades the great mass of every people; and artful rulers could never keep any nation at war any length of time, beyond their true interests, without some sacrifice to that general love of peace which exists in civilized men. Bonaparte himself will tell you that he is the most pacific creature in the world. He has already declared, by his proclamation to Frenchmen, that he has gone to Moscow for no other end than to cultivate peace, and counteract the Emperor of Russia's desire of war. In this country, where the popular sentiment has so strong an impulse on its affairs, the same obtrusive pretension must inevitably be preserved. No man or set of men ever can or will get this country at war, or continue it long in war, without keeping on hand a stout, round stock of gulling matter. Fair propositions will always be made to go hand in hand with offensive acts. And when something is offered so reasonable that no man can doubt but it will be accepted, at the same moment something will be done of a nature to embarrass the project, and if not to defeat at least to render its acceptance dubious. How this has been in past time, I have shown. I will now illustrate what is doing and intended at present.

As from the uniform tenor of the conduct of the American Cabinet, in relation to the British Government, I have no belief that their intention has been to make a solid arrangement with that nation; so, from the evidence of their disposition and intention, existing abroad and on the table, I have no belief that such is at present their purpose. I cannot possibly think otherwise, than that such is not their intention. Let us take the case into common life. I have demands, Mr. Speaker, against you, very just in their nature, but different. Some of recent, others of very old date. The former depending upon principles very clearly in my favor. The latter critical, difficult, and dubious, both in principle and settlement. In this state of things, and during your absence, I watch my opportunity, declare enmity; throw myself upon your children and servants and property, which happen to be in my neighborhood, and do them all the injury I can. While I am doing this, I receive a messenger from you, stating that the grounds of the recent injury are settled; that you comply fully with my terms. Your servants and children, whom I am plundering and killing, invite me to stay my hand until you return, or until some accommodation can take place between us. But, deaf to any such suggestions, I prosecute my intention of injury to the utmost. When there is reason to expect your return, I multiply my means of injury and offence. And no sooner do I hear of your arrival, than I thrust my fist into your face, and say to you – "Well, sir, here are fair propositions of settlement; come to my terms, which are very just; settle the old demand in my way, and we will be as good friends as ever." Mr. Speaker, what would be your conduct on such an occasion? Would you be apt to look as much at the nature of the propositions, as at the temper of the assailant? If you did not at once return blow for blow, and injury for injury, would you not at least take a little time to consider? Would you not tell such an assailant, that you were not to be bullied nor beaten into any concession? If you settled at all, might you not consider it your duty in some way to make him feel the consequences of his strange intemperance of passion? For myself, I have no question how a man of spirit ought to act under such circumstances. I have as little, how a great nation, like Great Britain, will act. Now, I have no doubt, sir, that the American Cabinet view this subject in the same light. They understand well, that by the declaration of war, the invasion of Canada, the refusal of an armistice, and perseverance in hostilities, after the principal ground of war had been removed, they have wrought the minds of the British Cabinet and people to a very high state of irritation. Now is the very moment to get up some grand scheme of pacification; such as may persuade the American people of the inveterate love of our Cabinet for peace, and make them acquiescent in their perseverance in hostilities. Accordingly, before the end of the session, a great tub will be thrown out to the whale. Probably, a little while before the Spring elections, terms of very fair import will be proffered to Great Britain. Such as, perhaps, six months ago our Cabinet would not have granted, had she solicited them on her knees. Such as probably, in the opinion of the people of this country, Great Britain ought to accept; such perhaps as in any other state of things, she would have accepted. But such as, I fear, under the irritation produced by the strange course pursued by the American Cabinet, that nation will not accept. Sir, I do not believe that our Cabinet expect that they will be accepted. They think the present state of induced passion is sufficient to prevent arrangement. But to make assurance doubly sure, to take a bond of fate, that arrangement shall not happen, they prepare this bill. A bill, which proposes an augmentation of the army for the express purpose of conquering the Canadas. A bill which, connected with the recent disposition evinced by our Cabinet, in relation to those provinces, and with the avowed intent of making their subjugation the means of peace, through the fear to be inspired into Great Britain, is as offensive to the pride of that nation as can well be imagined; and is, in my apprehension, as sure a guarantee of continued war as could be given. On these grounds, my mind cannot force itself to any other conclusion than this, that the avowed object of this bill is the true one; that the Canadas are to be invaded the next season; that the war is to be protracted: and that this is the real policy of the American Cabinet.

I will now reply to those invitations to "union," which have been so obtrusively urged upon us. If by this call to union is meant a union in a project for the invasion of Canada, or for the invasion of East Florida, or for the conquest of any foreign country whatever, either as a means of carrying on this war or for any other purpose, I answer, distinctly, I will unite with no man nor any body of men for any such purposes. I think such projects criminal in the highest degree, and ruinous to the prosperity of these States. But, if by this invitation is meant union in preparation for defence, strictly so called; union in fortifying our seaboard; union in putting our cities into a state of safety; union in raising such a military force as shall be sufficient with the local militia in the hands of the constitutional leaders, the Executives of the States, to give a rational degree of security against any invasion; sufficient to defend our frontiers, sufficient to awe into silence the Indian tribes within our Territories; union in creating such a maritime force as shall command the seas on the American coasts, and keep open the intercourse, at least between the States: if this is meant, I have no hesitation; union on such principles you shall have from me cordially and faithfully. And this, too, sir, without any reference to the state of my opinion, in relation to the justice or necessity of this war. Because I will understand such to be the condition of man, in a social compact, that he must partake of the fate of the society to which he belongs, and must submit to the privations and sacrifices its defence requires, notwithstanding these may be the result of the vices or crimes of its immediate rulers. But there is a great difference between supporting such rulers in plans of necessary self-defence, on which the safety of our altars and firesides especially depend, and supporting them in projects of foreign invasion, and encouraging them in schemes of conquest and ambition, which are not only unjust in themselves, but dreadful in their consequences; inasmuch as, let the particular project result as it may, the general effect must be, according to human view, destructive to our own domestic liberties and constitution. I speak as an individual. Sir, for my single self, did I support such projects as are avowed to be the objects of this bill, I should deem myself a traitor to my country. Were I even to aid them by loan, or in any other way, I should consider myself a partaker in the guilt of the purpose. But when these projects of an invasion shall be abandoned; when men yield up schemes which not only openly contemplate the raising of a great military force, but also the concentrating them at one point, and placing them in one hand; schemes obviously ruinous to the fates of a free Republic – as they comprehend the means by which such have ever heretofore been destroyed; when, I say, such schemes shall be abandoned, and the wishes of the Cabinet limited to mere defence and frontier and maritime protection, there will be no need of calls to union. For such objects there is not, there cannot be, but one heart and soul in this people.