Abridgement of the Debates of Congress, from 1789 to 1856 (4 of 16 vol.)

"Resolved, That the United States cannot, without a sacrifice of their rights, honor, and independence, submit to the late edicts of Great Britain."

Mr. G. W. Campbell concluded his observations of yesterday, as given entire in preceding pages.

Mr. Quincy. – Mr. Speaker, I offer myself to the view of this House with a very sensible embarrassment, in attempting to follow the honorable gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Campbell) – a gentleman who holds so distinguished a station on this floor, through thy blessing, Mr. Speaker, on his talents and industry. I place myself with much reluctance in competition with this, our great political Æneas, an illustrious leader of antiquity, whom, in his present relations, and in his present objects, the gentleman from Tennessee not a little resembles; since, in order to evade the ruin impending over our cities – taking my honorable colleague (Mr. Bacon) by one hand, and the honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Montgomery) by the other (little Iülus and wife Creusa) – he is posting away into the woods with Father Anchises and all the household gods.

When I had the honor of addressing this House a few days ago, I touched this famous report of our Committee of Foreign Relations perhaps a little too carelessly; perhaps I handled it a little too roughly, considering its tender age, and the manifest delicacy of its constitution. But, sir, I had no idea of affecting very exquisitely the sensibilities of any gentleman. I thought that this was a common report of one of our ordinary committees, which I had a right to canvass or to slight, to applaud or to censure, without raising any extraordinary concern, either here or elsewhere. But, from the general excitement which my inconsiderate treatment of this subject occasions, I fear that I have been mistaken. This can be no mortal fabric, Mr. Speaker. This must be that image which fell down from Jupiter, present or future. Surely, nothing but a being of celestial origin would raise such a tumult in minds tempered like those which lead the destinies of this House. Sir, I thought that this report had been a common piece of wood —inutile lignum– just such a piece of wood as any day-laborer might have hewed out in an hour, had he health and a hatchet. But it seems that our honorable chairman of the Committee of Foreign Relations, maluit esse Deum. Well, sir, I have no objections. If the workmen will, a god it shall be. I only wish, that when gentlemen bring their sacred things upon this floor, that they would blow a trumpet before them, as the heathens do, on such occasions, to the end that all true believers may prepare themselves to adore and tremble, and that all unbelievers may turn aside, and not disturb their devotions.

I assure gentlemen that I meant to commit no sacrilege. I had no intention, sir, of canvassing very strictly this report. I supposed, that when it had been published and circulated, it had answered all the purposes of its authors, and I felt no disposition to interfere with them. But the House is my witness that I am compelled, by the clamor raised on all sides by the friends of the Administration, to descend to particulars, and to examine it somewhat minutely.

My honorable colleague (Mr. Bacon) was pleased the other day to assert: – Sir, in referring to his observations, on a former occasion, I beg the House not to imagine that I am about to follow him. No, sir; I will neither follow nor imitate him. I hang upon no man's skirts; I run barking at no man's heel. I canvass principles and measures solely with a view to the great interests of my country. The idea of personal victory is lost in the total absorption of sense and mind in the impending consequences. I say he was pleased to assert that I had dealt in general allegations against this report, without pointing out any particular objection. And the honorable chairman (Mr. Campbell) has reiterated the charge. Both have treated this alleged omission with no little asperity. Yet, sir, it is very remarkable, that, so far from dealing in general allegations, I explicitly stated my objections. The alternatives presented by the report – war or suspension of our rights, and the recommendation of the latter, rather than take the risk of the former, I expressly censured. I went further. I compared these alternatives with an extract from an address made by the first Continental Congress to the inhabitants of Great Britain, and attempted to show, by way of contrast, what I thought the disgraceful spirit of the report. Yet, these gentlemen complain that I dealt in general allegations. Before I close, sir, they will have, I hope, no reason to repeat such objections. I trust I shall be particular, to their content.

Before entering upon an examination of this report, it may be useful to recollect how it originated. By the third section of the second article of the constitution, it is declared that the President of the United States "shall, from time to time, give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." It is, then, the duty of the President to recommend such measures as in his judgment Congress ought to adopt. A great crisis is impending over our country. It is a time of alarm, and peril, and distress. How has the President performed this constitutional duty? Why, after recapitulating, in a formal Message, our dangers and his trials, he expresses his confidence that we shall, "with an unerring regard to the essential rights and interests of the nation, weigh and compare the painful alternatives out of which a choice is to be made," and that "the alternative chosen will be maintained with fortitude and patriotism." In this way our Chief Magistrate performs his duty. A storm is approaching; the captain calls his choice hands upon deck; leaves the rudder swinging, and sets the crew to scuffle about alternatives! This Message, pregnant with nondescript alternatives, is received by this House. And what do we? Why, constitute a great Committee of Foreign Relations, and, lest they should not have their attention completely occupied by the pressing exigencies of those with France and Great Britain, they are endowed with the whole mass – British, Spanish, and French; Barbary Powers and Indian neighbors. And what does this committee do? Why, after seven days' solemn conclave, they present to this House an illustrious report, loaded with alternatives – nothing but alternatives. The cold meat of the palace is hashed and served up to us, piping hot, from our committee room.

In considering this report, I shall pay no attention to either its beginning or its conclusion. The former consists of shavings from old documents, and the latter of birdlime for new converts. The twelfth page is the heart of this report; that I mean to canvass. And I do assert, that there is not one of all the principal positions contained in it which is true, in the sense and to the extent assumed by the committee. Let us examine each, separately:

"Your committee can perceive no other alternative but abject and degrading submission, war with both nations, or a continuance and enforcement of the present suspension of our commerce."

Here is a tri-forked alternative. Let us consider each branch, and see if either be true, in the sense assumed by the committee. The first – "abject and degrading submission" – takes two things for granted: that trading, pending the edicts of France and Great Britain, is submission; and next that it is submission, in its nature, abject and degrading. Neither is true. It is not submission to trade, pending those edicts, because they do not command you to trade; they command you not to trade. When you refuse to trade, you submit; not when you carry on that trade, as far as you can, which they prohibit. Again, it is not true that such trading is abject and disgraceful, and that, too, upon the principles avowed by the advocates of this report. Trading, while these edicts are suspended over our commerce, is submission, say they, because we have not physical force to resist the power of these belligerents; of course, if we trade, we must submit to these restrictions, not having power to evade or break through them. Now, admit, for the sake of argument, (what however in fact I deny,) that the belligerents have the power to carry into effect their decrees so perfectly; that, by reason of the orders of Great Britain, we are physically disabled from going to France; and that, by the edicts of France, we are in like manner disabled from going to Great Britain. If such be our case, in relation to these powers, the question is, whether submitting to exercise all the trade which remains to us, notwithstanding these edicts, is "abject and degrading."

In the first place, I observe, that submission is not, to beings constituted as we are, always "abject and degrading." We submit to the decrees of Providence – to the laws of our nature. Absolute weakness submits to absolute power; and there is nothing in such submission shameful or degrading. It is no dishonor for finite not to contend with infinite. There is no loss of reputation if creatures, such as men, perform not impossibilities. If then it be true, in the sense asserted by some of the advocates of this report, that it is physically impossible for us to trade with France and Great Britain and their dependencies, by reason of these edicts, still there is nothing "abject or degrading" in carrying on such trade as these edicts leave open to us, let it be never so small or so trifling; which, however, it might be easily shown, as it has been, that it is neither the one nor the other. Sir, in this point of view, it is no more disgraceful for us to trade to Sweden, to China, to the Northwest coast, or to Spain and her dependencies – not one of which countries is now included in those edicts – than it is disgraceful for us to walk, because we are unable to fly; no more than it is shameful for man to use and enjoy the surface of this globe, because he has not at his command the whole circle of nature, and cannot range at will over all the glorious spheres which constitute the universe.

The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Campbell) called upon us just now to tell him what was disgraceful submission, if carrying on commerce under these restrictions was not such submission. I will tell that gentleman. That submission is "abject and disgraceful" which yields to the decrees of frail and feeble power, as though they were irresistible; which takes counsel of fear, and weighs not our comparative force; which abandons the whole, at a summons to deliver up a part; which makes the will of others the measure of rights, which God and nature not only have constituted eternal and unalienable, but have also endued us with ample means to maintain.

My argument on this clause of the report of the committee may be presented in this form: either the United States have or they have not physical ability to carry on commerce in defiance of the edicts of both or of either of these nations. If we have not physical ability to carry on the trade which they prohibit, then it is no disgrace to exercise that commerce which these irresistible decrees permit. If we have such physical ability, then, to the degree in which we abandon that commerce which we have power to carry on, is our submission "abject and disgraceful." It is yielding without a struggle; it is sacrificing our rights, not because we have not force, but because we have not spirit to maintain them. It is in this point of view that I am disgusted with this report. It abjures what it recommends; it declaims, in heroics, against submission, and proposes, in creeping prose, a tame and servile subserviency.

It cannot be concealed, let gentlemen try as much as they will, that we can trade, not only with one, but with both these belligerents, notwithstanding these restrictive decrees. The risk to Great Britain against French capture scarcely amounts to two per cent.; that to France against Great Britain is unquestionably much greater. But, what is that to us? It is not our fault, if the power of Britain on the ocean is superior to that of Bonaparte. It is equal and exact justice between both nations for us to trade with both, as far as it is in our power. Great as the power of Britain is on the ocean, the enterprise and intrepidity of our merchants are more than a match for it. They will get your products to the Continent in spite of her navy. But suppose they do not; suppose they fail, and are captured in the attempt; what is that to us? After we have given them full notice of all their dangers, and perfect warning, either of our inability or of our determination not to protect them, if they take the risk, it is at their peril. And, upon whom does the loss fall? As it does now, through the operation of your embargo, on the planter, on the farmer, on the mechanic, on the day-laborer? No, sir; on the insurer – on the capitalist – on those who in the full exercise of their intelligence, apprised of all the circumstances, are willing to take the hazard for the sake of the profit.

I will illustrate my general idea by a supposition. There are two avenues to the ocean from the harbor of New York – by the Narrows, and through Long Island Sound. Suppose the fleets, both of France and Great Britain, should block up the Narrows, so that to pass them would be physically impossible, in the relative state of our naval force. Will gentlemen seriously contend that there would be any thing "abject or disgraceful," if the people of New York should submit to carry on their trade through the Sound? Would the remedy for this interference with our rights be abandoning the ocean altogether? Again: suppose, that instead of both nations blockading the same point, each should station its force at a different one – France at the mouth of the Sound, Britain at the Narrows. In such case, would staying at home, and refusing any more to go upon the sea, be an exercise of independence in the citizens of New York? Great philosophers may call it "dignified retirement," if they will. I call it, and I am mistaken if the people would not call it, "base and abject submission." Sir, what in such a case would be true honor? Why, to consider well which adversary is the weakest, and cut our way to our rights through the path which he obstructs. Having removed the smaller impediment, we should return with courage, strengthened by trial and animated by success, to the relief of our rights, from the pressure of the strongest assailant. But, all this is war; and war is never to be incurred. If this be the national principle, avow it; tell your merchants you will not protect them; but, for Heaven's sake, do not deny them the power of relieving their own and the nation's burdens, by the exercise of their own ingenuity. Sir, impassable as the barriers offered by these edicts are in the estimation of members on this floor, the merchants abroad do not estimate them as insurmountable. Their anxiety to risk their property, in defiance of them, is full evidence of this. The great danger to mercantile ingenuity is internal envy – the corrosion of weakness or prejudice. Its external hazard is ever infinitely smaller. That practical intelligence which this class of men possesses, beyond any other in the community, excited by self-interest – the strongest of human passions – is too elastic to be confined by the limits of exterior human powers, however great or uncommon. Build a Chinese wall, and the wit of your merchants, if permitted freely to operate, will break through it or overleap it, or undercreep it.

–"mille adde catenasEffugiet tamen, hæc sceleratus vincula Proteus."

The second branch of the alternatives under consideration is equally deceptive – "War with both nations." Can this ever be an alternative? Did you ever read in history, can you conceive in fancy, a war of two nations, each of whom is at war with the other, without a union with one against the other immediately resulting? It cannot exist in nature. The very idea is absurd. It never can be an alternative, whether we shall find two nations each hostile to the other. But it may be, and if we are to fight at all, it is a very serious question, which of the two we are to select as an adversary. As to the third branch of these celebrated alternatives, "a continuance and enforcement of the present system of commerce," I need not spend time to show that this does not include all the alternatives which exist under this head – since the committee immediately admit, that there does exist another alternative, "partial repeal," about which they proceed to reason.

The report proceeds. "The first" (abject and degrading submission) "cannot require any discussion." Certainly not. Submission of that quality which the committee assume, and with the epithets of which they choose to invest it, can never require discussion at any time. But, whether trading under these orders and decrees be such submission, whether we are not competent to resist them in part, if not in whole, without a total abandonment of the exercise of all our maritime rights, the comparative effects of the edicts of each upon our commerce and the means we possess to influence or control either, are all fair and proper subjects of discussion; some of which the committee have wholly neglected and none of which have they examined, as the House had a right to expect.

The committee proceed "to dissipate the illusion" that there is any "middle course," and to reassert the position before examined, that "there is no other alternative than war with both nations, or a continuance of the present system." This position they undertake to support by two assertions. First, that "war with one of the belligerents only, would be submission to the edicts and will of the other." Second, that "repeal in whole or in part of the embargo, must necessarily be war or submission."

As to the first assertion, it is a miserable fallacy, confounding coincidence of interest with subjection of will; things in their nature palpably distinct. A man may do what another wills, nay, what he commands, and not act in submission to his will, or in obedience to his command. Our interest or duty may coincide with the line of conduct another presumes to prescribe. Shall we vindicate our independence at the expense of our social or moral obligations? I exemplify my idea in this way. Two bullies beset your door, from which there are but two avenues. One of them forbids you to go by the left, the other forbids you to go by the right avenue. Each is willing that you should pass by the way which he permits. In such case, what will you do? Will you keep house forever, rather than make choice of the path through which you will resume your external rights? You cannot go both ways at once, you must make your election. Yet, in making such election, you must necessarily coincide with the wishes and act according to the commands of one of the bullies. Yet who, before this committee, ever thought an election of one of two inevitable courses, made under such circumstances, "abject and degrading submission" to the will of either of the assailants? The second assertion, that "repeal in whole or in part of the embargo must necessarily be war or submission," the committee proceed to maintain by several subsidiary assertions. First – "a general repeal without arming would be submission to both nations." So far from this being true, the reverse is the fact; it would be submission to neither. Great Britain does not say, "you shall trade with me." France does not say, "you shall trade with me." If this was the language of their edicts, there might be some color for the assertion of the committee, that if we trade with either we submit. The edicts of each declare you shall not trade with my adversary. Our servile knee-crooking embargo says, "you shall, therefore, not trade." Can any submission be more palpable, more "abject, more disgraceful?" A general repeal without arming, would be only an exercise of our natural rights, under the protection of our mercantile ingenuity, and not under that of physical power. Whether our merchants shall arm or not, is a question of political expediency and of relative force. It may be very true that we can fight our way to neither country, and yet it may be also very true, that we may carry on a very important commerce with both. The strength of the national arm may not be equal to contend with either, and yet the wit of our merchants may be over-match for the edicts of all. The question of arming or not arming, has reference only to the mode in which we shall best enjoy our rights, and not at all to the quality of the act of trading during these edicts. To exercise commerce is our absolute right. If we arm, we may possibly extend the field beyond that which mere ingenuity would open to us. Whether the extension thus acquired be worthy of the risk and expense, is a fair question. But, decide it either way, how is trading as far as we have ability, made less abject than not trading at all?

I come to the second subsidiary assertion. "A general repeal and arming of merchant vessels, would be war with both, and war of the worst kind, suffering the enemies to plunder us, without retaliation upon them."

I have before exposed the absurdity of a war with two belligerents, each hostile to the other. It cannot be true, therefore, that "a general repeal and arming our merchant vessels," would be such a war. Neither if war resulted, would it be "war of the worst kind." In my humble apprehension, a war, in which our enemies are permitted to plunder us, and our merchants not permitted to defend their property, is somewhat worse than a war like this; in which, with arms in their hands, our brave seamen might sometimes prove too strong for their piratical assailants. By the whole amount of property which we might be able to preserve by these means, would such a war be better than that in which we are now engaged. For the committee assure us, that the aggressions to which we are subject, "are to all intents and purposes a maritime war, waged with both nations against the United States."

The last assertion of the committee, in this most masterly page is, that "a partial repeal must from the situation of Europe, necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors, and war with the other." In the name of common sense, how can this be true? The trade to Sweden, to Spain, to China, is not now affected by the orders or decrees of either belligerent. How is it submission, then, to these orders for us to trade to Gottenburg, when neither France nor Britain command, nor prohibit it? Of what consequence is it to us what way the Gottenburg merchant disposes of our products, after he has paid us our price? I am not about to deny that a trade to Gottenburg would defeat the purpose of coercing Great Britain, through the want of our supplies, but I reason on the report upon its avowed principles. If gentlemen adhere to their system, as a means of coercion, let the Administration avow it as such, and support the system, by arguments, such as their friends use every day on this floor. Let them avow, as those friends do, that this is our mode of hostility against Great Britain. That it is better than "ball and gunpowder." Let them show that the means are adequate to the end; let them exhibit to us, beyond the term of all this suffering, a happy salvation, and a glorious victory, and the people may then submit to it, even without murmur. But while the Administration support their system only as a municipal regulation, as a means of safety and preservation, those who canvass their principle are not called upon to contest with them on ground, which not only they do not take, but which, officially, they disavow. As partial repeal would not be submission to either, so, also, it would not be war with either. A trade to Sweden would not be war with Great Britain; that nation is her ally, and she permits it. Nor with France, though Sweden is her enemy, she does not prohibit it. Ah! but say the committee, "a measure which would supply exclusively one of the belligerents, would be war with the other." This is the State secret; this is the master-key to the whole policy. You must not only do what the letter of these orders prohibits, but you must not sin against the spirit of them. The great purpose is, to prevent your product from getting to our enemy, and to effect this you must not only so act as to obey the terms of the decrees, but keeping the great purpose of them always in sight, you must extend their construction to cases which they cannot, by any rule of reason, be made to include.