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The Collected Works of Arthur Schopenhauer
Table of Contents
The World As Will And Idea
Translators' Preface.
Preface To The First Edition.
Preface To The Second Edition.
First Book. The World As Idea.
First Aspect. The Idea Subordinated To The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Object Of Experience And Science.
Second Book. The World As Will.
First Aspect. The Objectification Of The Will.
Third Book. The World As Idea.
Second Aspect. The Idea Independent Of The Principle Of Sufficient Reason: The Platonic Idea: The Object Of Art.
Fourth Book. The World As Will.
Second Aspect. The Assertion And Denial Of The Will To Live, When Self-Consciousness Has Been Attained.
Footnotes
The World As Will And Idea II
Contents
Appendix: Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy.
Supplements to the First Book. First Half. The Doctrine Of The Idea Of Perception. (To § 1-7 of the First Volume.)
Chapter I. The Standpoint of Idealism.
Chapter II. The Doctrine of Perception or Knowledge Of The Understanding.
Chapter III. On The Senses.
Chapter IV. On Knowledge A Priori. Notes to the Annexed Table.
(1) To No. 4 of Matter.
(2) To No. 18 of Matter.
Second Half. The Doctrine of the Abstract Idea, or Thinking.
Chapter V.16 On The Irrational Intellect.
Chapter VI. On The Doctrine of Abstract or Rational Knowledge.
Chapter VII.19 On The Relation of the Concrete Knowledge of Perception to Abstract Knowledge.
Chapter VIII.20 On The Theory Of The Ludicrous.
Chapter IX.21 On Logic In General.
Chapter X. On The Syllogism.
Chapter XI.22 On Rhetoric.
Chapter XII.23 On The Doctrine Of Science.
Chapter XIII.25 On The Methods Of Mathematics.
Chapter XIV. On The Association Of Ideas.
Chapter XV. On The Essential Imperfections Of The Intellect.
Chapter XVI.26 On The Practical Use Of Reason And On Stoicism.
Chapter XVII.27 On Man's Need Of Metaphysics.
Supplements to the Second Book.
Chapter XVIII.29 On The Possibility Of Knowing The Thing In Itself.
Chapter XIX.30 On The Primacy Of The Will In Self-Consciousness.
Chapter XX.34 Objectification Of The Will In The Animal Organism.
Note On What Has Been Said About Bichat.
Footnotes
The World As Will And Idea III
Contents
Supplements To The Second Book.
Chapter XXI. Retrospect and More General View.
Chapter XXII.1 Objective View of the Intellect.
Chapter XXIII.3On The Objectification Of The Will In Unconscious Nature.
Chapter XXIV. On Matter.
Chapter XXV. Transcendent Considerations Concerning The Will As Thing In Itself.
Chapter XXVI.4 On Teleology.
Chapter XXVII. On Instinct And Mechanical Tendency.
Chapter XXVIII.6 Characterisation Of The Will To Live.
Supplements to the Third Book.
Chapter XXIX.9 On The Knowledge Of The Ideas.
Chapter XXX.10 On The Pure Subject Of Knowledge.
Chapter XXXI.11 On Genius.
Chapter XXXII.14 On Madness.
Chapter XXXIII.17 Isolated Remarks On Natural Beauty.
Chapter XXXIV.18 On The Inner Nature Of Art.
Chapter XXXV.19 On The Æsthetics Of Architecture.
Chapter XXXVI.20 Isolated Remarks On The Æsthetics Of The Plastic And Pictorial Arts.
Chapter XXXVII.21 On The Æsthetics Of Poetry.
Chapter XXXVIII.23 On History.
Chapter XXXIX.25 On The Metaphysics Of Music.
Supplements to the Fourth Book.
Chapter XL. Preface.
Chapter XLI.27 On Death And Its Relation To The Indestructibility Of Our True Nature.
Chapter XLII. The Life Of The Species.
Chapter XLIII. On Heredity.
Chapter XLIV. The Metaphysics Of The Love Of The Sexes.
Chapter XLV.40 On The Assertion Of The Will To Live.
Chapter XLVI.41 On The Vanity And Suffering Of Life.
Chapter XLVII.43 On Ethics.
Chapter XLVIII.44On The Doctrine Of The Denial Of The Will To Live.
Chapter XLIX. The Way Of Salvation.
Chapter L. Epiphilosophy.
Appendix.
Abstract.
Chapter I.
Chapter II.
Chapter III.
Chapter IV.
Chapter V.
Chapter VI.
Chapter VII.
Chapter VIII.
THE BASIS OF MORALITY
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION.
THE QUESTION
PART I.
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I.
THE PROBLEM.
CHAPTER II.
GENERAL RETROSPECT.
PART II.
CRITIQUE OF KANT'S BASIS OF ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY REMARKS.
CHAPTER II.
ON THE IMPERATIVE FORM OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
CHAPTER III.
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF DUTIES TOWARDS OURSELVES IN PARTICULAR.
CHAPTER IV.
ON THE BASIS OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
NOTE.
CHAPTER V.
ON THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
CHAPTER VI.
ON THE DERIVED FORMS OF THE LEADING PRINCIPLE OF THE KANTIAN ETHICS.
CHAPTER VII.
KANT'S DOCTRINE OF CONSCIENCE.
CHAPTER VIII.
KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE [1] AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTER. THEORY OF FREEDOM.
NOTE.
CHAPTER IX.
FICHTE'S ETHICS AS A MAGNIFYING GLASS FOR THE ERRORS OF THE KANTIAN.
PART III.
THE FOUNDING OF ETHICS.
CHAPTER I.
CONDITIONS OF THE PROBLEM.
CHAPTER II
SCEPTICAL VIEW.
CHAPTER III.
ANTIMORAL[1] INCENTIVES.
CHAPTER IV.
CRITERION OF ACTIONS OF MORAL WORTH.
CHAPTER V.
STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY TRUE MORAL INCENTIVE.
CHAPTER VI.
THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE.
CHAPTER VII.
THE VIRTUE OF LOVING-KINDNESS.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE PROOF NOW GIVEN CONFIRMED BY EXPERIENCE.
CHAPTER IX.
PART IV.
ON THE METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION OF THE PRIMAL ETHICAL PHAENOMENON.
CHAPTER I.
HOW THIS APPENDIX MUST BE UNDERSTOOD.
CHAPTER II.
THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK.
JUDICIUM
REGIAE DANICAE SCIENTIARUM SOCIETATIS.
JUDGMENT OF THE DANISH ROYAL SOCIETY OF SCIENCES.
ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER:
TRANSLATED BY MRS. RUDOLF DIRCKS.
WITH AN INTRODUCTION.
CONTENTS
ON AUTHORSHIP AND STYLE ON NOISE ON EDUCATION ON READING AND BOOKS THE EMPTINESS OF EXISTENCE ON WOMEN THINKING FOR ONESELF SHORT DIALOGUE ON THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE BEING BY DEATH RELIGION—A DIALOGUE PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS METAPHYSICS OF LOVE PHYSIOGNOMY ON SUICIDE
PRELIMINARY.
R.D.
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.
FOOTNOTES:
ESSAYS OF SCHOPENHAUER.
ON AUTHORSHIP AND STYLE.
FOOTNOTES:
ON NOISE.
FOOTNOTES:
ON READING AND BOOKS.
THE EMPTINESS OF EXISTENCE.
ON WOMEN.
FOOTNOTES:
THINKING FOR ONESELF.
FOOTNOTES:
SHORT DIALOGUE ON
THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE BEING BY DEATH.
RELIGION.
A DIALOGUE.
FOOTNOTES:
PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.
FOOTNOTES:
METAPHYSICS OF LOVE.
FOOTNOTES:
PHYSIOGNOMY.
ON SUICIDE.
THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: THE ART OF CONTROVERSY
TRANSLATED BY
T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.
CONTENTS.
THE ART OF CONTROVERSY— 1. PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC 2. THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC 3. STRATAGEMS ON THE COMPARATIVE PLACE OF INTEREST AND BEAUTY IN WORKS OF ART PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS GENIUS AND VIRTUE
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
T.B.S.
THE ART OF CONTROVERSY.
PRELIMINARY: LOGIC AND DIALECTIC.
THE BASIS OF ALL DIALECTIC.
STRATAGEMS.
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
VIII.
IX.
X.
XL.
XII.
XIII.
XIV.
XV.
XVI.
XVII.
XVIII.
XIX.
XX.
XXI.
XXII.
XXIII.
XXIV.
XXV.
XXVI.
XXVII.
XXVIII.
XXIX.[1]
XXX.
XXXI.
XXXII.
XXXIII.
XXXIV.
XXXV.
XXXVI.
XXXVII.
XXXVIII.
ON THE COMPARATIVE PLACE OF INTEREST AND BEAUTY IN WORKS OF ART.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.
ON THE WISDOM OF LIFE: APHORISMS.
GENIUS AND VIRTUE.
THE ESSAYS OF ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER: STUDIES IN PESSIMISM
CONTENTS.
ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD ON THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE ON SUICIDE IMMORTALITY: A DIALOGUE PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS ON EDUCATION OF WOMEN ON NOISE A FEW PARABLES
NOTE.
T.B.S.
ON THE SUFFERINGS OF THE WORLD.
THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE.
ON SUICIDE.
IMMORTALITY:[1] A DIALOGUE.
THRASYMACHOS—PHILALETHES.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OBSERVATIONS.
ON EDUCATION.
OF WOMEN.
ON NOISE.
A FEW PARABLES.
THE ESSAYS
THE WISDOM OF LIFE. CONTENTS.
CHAPTER INTRODUCTION I. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT II. PERSONALITY, OR WHAT A MAN IS III. PROPERTY, OR WHAT A MAN HAS IV. POSITION, OR A MAN'S PLACE IN THE ESTIMATION OF OTHERS— Sect. 1. Reputation " 2. Pride " 3. Rank " 4. Honor " 5. Fame
INTRODUCTION.
THE WISDOM OF LIFE.
CHAPTER I.
DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.
CHAPTER II.
PERSONALITY, OR WHAT A MAN IS.
CHAPTER III.
PROPERTY, OR WHAT A MAN HAS.
CHAPTER IV.
POSITION, OR A MAN'S PLACE IN THE ESTIMATION OF OTHERS.
THE ESSAYS
T. BAILEY SAUNDERS, M.A.
ON HUMAN NATURE. CONTENTS.
HUMAN NATURE GOVERNMENT FREE-WILL AND FATALISM CHARACTER MORAL INSTINCT ETHICAL REFLECTIONS
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
T.B.S.
HUMAN NATURE.
GOVERNMENT.
FREE-WILL AND FATALISM.
CHARACTER.
MORAL INSTINCT.
ETHICAL REFLECTIONS.
THE ART OF LITERATURE. CONTENTS.
PREFACE ON AUTHORSHIP ON STYLE ON THE STUDY OF LATIN ON MEN OF LEARNING ON THINKING FOR ONESELF ON SOME FORMS OF LITERATURE ON CRITICISM ON REPUTATION ON GENIUS
TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
T.B.S.
ON AUTHORSHIP.
ON STYLE.
ON THE STUDY OF LATIN.
ON MEN OF LEARNING.
ON THINKING FOR ONESELF.
ON CRITICISM.
ON REPUTATION.
ON GENIUS.
COUNSELS AND MAXIMS.
CHAMFORT.
CONTENTS. CHAPTER
INTRODUCTION I. GENERAL RULES II. OUR RELATION TO OURSELVES III. OUR RELATION TO OTHERS IV. WORLDLY FORTUNE V. THE AGES OF LIFE
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER I.
GENERAL RULES.—SECTION 1.
SECTION 2. To estimate a man's condition in regard to happiness, it is necessary to ask, not what things please him, but what things trouble him; and the more trivial these things are in themselves, the happier the man will be. To be irritated by trifles, a man must be well off; for in misfortunes trifles are unfelt.
SECTION 3. Care should be taken not to build the happiness of life upon a broad foundation—not to require a great many things in order to be happy. For happiness on such a foundation is the most easily undermined; it offers many more opportunities for accidents; and accidents are always happening. The architecture of happiness follows a plan in this respect just the opposite of that adopted in every other case, where the broadest foundation offers the greatest security. Accordingly, to reduce your claims to the lowest possible degree, in comparison with your means,—of whatever kind these may be—is the surest way of avoiding extreme misfortune.
CHAPTER II.
OUR RELATION TO OURSELVES.—SECTION 4.
SECTION 5. Another important element in the wise conduct of life is to preserve a proper proportion between our thought for the present and our thought for the future; in order not to spoil the one by paying over-great attention to the other. Many live too long in the present—frivolous people, I mean; others, too much in the future, ever anxious and full of care. It is seldom that a man holds the right balance between the two extremes. Those who strive and hope and live only in the future, always looking ahead and impatiently anticipating what is coming, as something which will make them happy when they get it, are, in spite of their very clever airs, exactly like those donkeys one sees in Italy, whose pace may be hurried by fixing a stick on their heads with a wisp of hay at the end of it; this is always just in front of them, and they keep on trying to get it. Such people are in a constant state of illusion as to their whole existence; they go on living ad interim, until at last they die.
SECTION 6. Limitations always make for happiness. We are happy in proportion as our range of vision, our sphere of work, our points of contact with the world, are restricted and circumscribed. We are more likely to feel worried and anxious if these limits are wide; for it means that our cares, desires and terrors are increased and intensified. That is why the blind are not so unhappy as we might be inclined to suppose; otherwise there would not be that gentle and almost serene expression of peace in their faces.
SECTION 7. Whether we are in a pleasant or a painful state depends, ultimately, upon the kind of matter that pervades and engrosses our consciousness. In this respect, purely intellectual occupation, for the mind that is capable of it, will, as a rule, do much more in the way of happiness than any form of practical life, with its constant alternations of success and failure, and all the shocks and torments it produces. But it must be confessed that for such occupation a pre-eminent amount of intellectual capacity is necessary. And in this connection it may be noted that, just as a life devoted to outward activity will distract and divert a man from study, and also deprive him of that quiet concentration of mind which is necessary for such work; so, on the other hand, a long course of thought will make him more or less unfit for the noisy pursuits of real life. It is advisable, therefore, to suspend mental work for a while, if circumstances happen which demand any degree of energy in affairs of a practical nature.
SECTION 8. To live a life that shall be entirely prudent and discreet, and to draw from experience all the instruction it contains, it is requisite to be constantly thinking back,—to make a kind of recapitulation of what we have done, of our impressions and sensations, to compare our former with our present judgments—what we set before us and struggle to achieve, with the actual result and satisfaction we have obtained. To do this is to get a repetition of the private lessons of experience,—lessons which are given to every one.
SECTION 9. To be self-sufficient, to be all in all to oneself, to want for nothing, to be able to say omnia mea mecum porto—that is assuredly the chief qualification for happiness. Hence Aristotle's remark, [Greek: hae eudaimonia ton autarchon esti][1]—to be happy means to be self-sufficient—cannot be too often repeated. It is, at bottom, the same thought as is present in the very well-turned sentence from Chamfort:
SECTION 10. Envy is natural to man; and still, it is at once a vice and a source of misery.[1] We should treat it as the enemy of our happiness, and stifle it like an evil thought. This is the advice given by Seneca; as he well puts it, we shall be pleased with what we have, if we avoid the self-torture of comparing our own lot with some other and happier one—nostra nos sine comparatione delectent; nunquam erit felix quem torquebit felicior.[2] And again, quum adspexeris quot te antecedent, cogita quot sequantur[3]—if a great many people appear to be better off than yourself, think how many there are in a worse position. It is a fact that if real calamity comes upon us, the most effective consolation—though it springs from the same source as envy—is just the thought of greater misfortunes than ours; and the next best is the society of those who are in the same luck as we—the partners of our sorrows.
SECTION 11. Give mature and repeated consideration to any plan before you proceed to carry it out; and even after you have thoroughly turned it over in your mind, make some concession to the incompetency of human judgment; for it may always happen that circumstances which cannot be investigated or foreseen, will come in and upset the whole of your calculation. This is a reflection that will always influence the negative side of the balance—a kind of warning to refrain from unnecessary action in matters of importance—quieta non movere. But having once made up your mind and begun your work, you must let it run its course and abide the result—not worry yourself by fresh reflections on what is already accomplished, or by a renewal of your scruples on the score of possible danger: free your mind from the subject altogether, and refuse to go into it again, secure in the thought that you gave it mature attention at the proper time. This is the same advice as is given by an Italian proverb—legala bene e poi lascia la andare—which Goethe has translated thus: See well to your girths, and then ride on boldly.[1]
SECTION 12.
SECTION 13. In all matters affecting our weal or woe, we should be careful not to let our imagination run away with us, and build no castles in the air. In the first place, they are expensive to build, because we have to pull them down again immediately, and that is a source of grief. We should be still more on our guard against distressing our hearts by depicting possible misfortunes. If these were misfortunes of a purely imaginary kind, or very remote and unlikely, we should at once see, on awaking from our dream, that the whole thing was mere illusion; we should rejoice all the more in a reality better than our dreams, or at most, be warned against misfortunes which, though very remote, were still possible. These, however, are not the sort of playthings in which imagination delights; it is only in idle hours that we build castles in the air, and they are always of a pleasing description. The matter which goes to form gloomy dreams are mischances which to some extent really threaten us, though it be from some distance; imagination makes us look larger and nearer and more terrible than they are in reality. This is a kind of dream which cannot be so readily shaken off on awaking as a pleasant one; for a pleasant dream is soon dispelled by reality, leaving, at most, a feeble hope lying in the lap of possibility. Once we have abandoned ourselves to a fit of the blues, visions are conjured up which do not so easily vanish again; for it is always just possible that the visions may be realized. But we are not always able to estimate the exact degree of possibility: possibility may easily pass into probability; and thus we deliver ourselves up to torture. Therefore we should be careful not to be over-anxious on any matter affecting our weal or our woe, not to carry our anxiety to unreasonable or injudicious limits; but coolly and dispassionately to deliberate upon the matter, as though it were an abstract question which did not touch us in particular. We should give no play to imagination here; for imagination is not judgment—it only conjures up visions, inducing an unprofitable and often very painful mood.
SECTION 14. The sight of things which do not belong to us is very apt to raise the thought: Ah, if that were only mine! making us sensible of our privation. Instead of that we should do better by more frequently putting to ourselves the opposite case: Ah, if that were not mine. What I mean is that we should sometimes try to look upon our possessions in the light in which they would appear if we had lost them; whatever they may be, property, health, friends, a wife or child or someone else we love, our horse or our dog—it is usually only when we have lost them that we begin to find out their value. But if we come to look at things in the way I recommend, we shall be doubly the gainers; we shall at once get more pleasure out of them than we did before, and we shall do everything in our power to prevent the loss of them; for instance, by not risking our property, or angering our friends, or exposing our wives to temptation, or being careless about our children's health, and so on.
SECTION 15. The things which engage our attention—whether they are matters of business or ordinary events—are of such diverse kinds, that, if taken quite separately and in no fixed order or relation, they present a medley of the most glaring contrasts, with nothing in common, except that they one and all affect us in particular. There must be a corresponding abruptness in the thoughts and anxieties which these various matters arouse in us, if our thoughts are to be in keeping with their various subjects. Therefore, in setting about anything, the first step is to withdraw our attention from everything else: this will enable us to attend to each matter at its own time, and to enjoy or put up with it, quite apart from any thought of our remaining interests. Our thoughts must be arranged, as it were, in little drawers, so that we may open one without disturbing any of the others.
