The Joyful Wisdom

136

The Chosen People.– The Jews, who regard themselves as the chosen people among the nations, and that too because they are the moral genius among the nations (in virtue of their capacity for despising the human in themselves more than any other people) – the Jews have a pleasure in their divine monarch and saint similar to that which the French nobility had in Louis XIV. This nobility had allowed its power and autocracy to be taken from it, and had become contemptible: in order not to feel this, in order to be able to forget it, an unequalled royal magnificence, royal authority and plenitude of power was needed, to which there was access only for the nobility. As in accordance with this privilege they raised themselves to the elevation of the court, and from that elevation saw everything under them, – saw everything contemptible, – they got beyond all uneasiness of conscience. They thus elevated intentionally the tower of the royal power more and more into the clouds, and set the final coping-stone of their own power thereon.

137

Spoken in Parable.– A Jesus Christ was only possible in a Jewish landscape – I mean in one over which the gloomy and sublime thunder-cloud of the angry Jehovah hung continually. Here only was the rare, sudden flashing of a single sunbeam through the dreadful, universal and continuous nocturnal-day regarded as a miracle of "love," as a beam of the most unmerited "grace." Here only could Christ dream of his rainbow and celestial ladder on which God descended to man; everywhere else the clear weather and the sun were considered the rule and the commonplace.

138

The Error of Christ. —The founder of Christianity thought there was nothing from which men suffered so much as from their sins: – it was his error, the error of him who felt himself without sin, to whom experience was lacking in this respect! It was thus that his soul filled with that marvellous, fantastic pity which had reference to a trouble that even among his own people, the inventors of sin, was rarely a great trouble! But Christians understood subsequently how to do justice to their master, and how to sanctify his error into a "truth."

139

Colour of the Passions. —Natures such as the apostle Paul, have an evil eye for the passions; they learn to know only the filthy, the distorting, and the heart-breaking in them, – their ideal aim, therefore, is the annihilation of the passions; in the divine they see complete purification from passion. The Greeks, quite otherwise than Paul and the Jews, directed their ideal aim precisely to the passions, and loved, elevated, embellished and deified them: in passion they evidently not only felt themselves happier, but also purer and diviner than otherwise. – And now the Christians? Have they wished to become Jews in this respect? Have they perhaps become Jews?

140

Too Jewish. —If God had wanted to become an object of love, he would first of all have had to forgo judging and justice: – a judge, and even a gracious judge, is no object of love. The founder of Christianity showed too little of the finer feelings in this respect – being a Jew.

141

Too Oriental.– What? A God who loves men provided that they believe in him, and who hurls frightful glances and threatenings at him who does not believe in this love! What? A conditioned love as the feeling of an almighty God! A love which has not even become master of the sentiment of honour and of the irritable desire for vengeance! How Oriental is all that! "If I love thee, what does it concern thee?"9 is already a sufficient criticism of the whole of Christianity.

142

Frankincense. – Buddha says: "Do not flatter thy benefactor!" Let one repeat this saying in a Christian church: – it immediately purifies the air.

143

The Greatest Utility of Polytheism.– For the individual to set up his own ideal and derive from it his laws, his pleasures and his rights —that has perhaps been hitherto regarded as the most monstrous of all human aberrations, and as idolatry in itself; in fact, the few who have ventured to do this have always needed to apologise to themselves, usually in this wise: "Not I! not I! but a God, through my instrumentality!" It was in the marvellous art and capacity for creating Gods – in polytheism – that this impulse was permitted to discharge itself, it was here that it became purified, perfected, and ennobled; for it was originally a commonplace and unimportant impulse, akin to stubbornness, disobedience and envy. To be hostile to this impulse towards the individual ideal, – that was formerly the law of every morality. There was then only one norm, "the man" – and every people believed that it had this one and ultimate norm. But above himself, and outside of himself, in a distant over-world, a person could see a multitude of norms: the one God was not the denial or blasphemy of the other Gods! It was here that individuals were first permitted, it was here that the right of individuals was first respected. The inventing of Gods, heroes, and supermen of all kinds, as well as co-ordinate men and undermen – dwarfs, fairies, centaurs, satyrs, demons, devils – was the inestimable preliminary to the justification of the selfishness and sovereignty of the individual: the freedom which was granted to one God in respect to other Gods, was at last given to the individual himself in respect to laws, customs and neighbours. Monotheism, on the contrary, the rigid consequence of the doctrine of one normal human being – consequently the belief in a normal God, beside whom there are only false, spurious Gods – has perhaps been the greatest danger of mankind in the past: man was then threatened by that premature state of inertia, which, so far as we can see, most of the other species of animals reached long ago, as creatures who all believed in one normal animal and ideal in their species, and definitely translated their morality of custom into flesh and blood. In polytheism man's free-thinking and many-sided thinking had a prototype set up: the power to create for himself new and individual eyes, always newer and more individualised: so that these are no eternal horizons and perspectives.

144

Religious Wars.– The greatest advance of the masses hitherto has been religious war, for it proves that the masses have begun to deal reverently with conceptions of things. Religious wars only result when human reason generally has been refined by the subtle disputes of sects; so that even the populace becomes punctilious and regards trifles as important, actually thinking it possible that the "eternal salvation of the soul" may depend upon minute distinctions of concepts.

145

Danger of Vegetarians.– The immense prevalence of rice-eating impels to the use of opium and narcotics, in like manner as the immense prevalence of potato-eating impels to the use of brandy: – it also impels, however, in its more subtle after-effects to modes of thought and feeling which operate narcotically. This is in accord with the fact that those who promote narcotic modes of thought and feeling, like those Indian teachers, praise a purely vegetable diet, and would like to make it a law for the masses: they want thereby to call forth and augment the need which they are in a position to satisfy.

146

German Hopes. —Do not let us forget that the names of peoples are generally names of reproach. The Tartars, for example, according to their name, are "the dogs"; they were so christened by the Chinese. "Deutschen" (Germans) means originally "heathen": it is thus that the Goths after their conversion named the great mass of their unbaptized fellow-tribes, according to the indication in their translation of the Septuagint, in which the heathen are designated by the word which in Greek signifies "the nations." (See Ulfilas.) – It might still be possible for the Germans to make an honourable name ultimately out of their old name of reproach, by becoming the first non-Christian nation of Europe; for which purpose Schopenhauer, to their honour, regarded them as highly qualified. The work of Luther would thus be consummated, – he who taught them to be anti-Roman, and to say: "Here I stand! I cannot do otherwise!" —

147

Question and Answer.– What do savage tribes at present accept first of all from Europeans? Brandy and Christianity, the European narcotics. – And by what means are they fastest ruined? – By the European narcotics.

148

Where Reformations Originate.– At the time of the great corruption of the church it was least of all corrupt in Germany: it was on that account that the Reformation originated here, as a sign that even the beginnings of corruption were felt to be unendurable. For, comparatively speaking, no people was ever more Christian than the Germans at the time of Luther; their Christian culture was just about to burst into bloom with a hundred-fold splendour, – one night only was still lacking; but that night brought the storm which put an end to all.

149

The Failure of Reformations.– It testifies to the higher culture of the Greeks, even in rather early ages, that attempts to establish new Grecian religions frequently failed; it testifies that quite early there must have been a multitude of dissimilar individuals in Greece, whose dissimilar troubles were not cured by a single recipe of faith and hope. Pythagoras and Plato, perhaps also Empedocles, and already much earlier the Orphic enthusiasts, aimed at founding new religions; and the two first-named were so endowed with the qualifications for founding religions, that one cannot be sufficiently astonished at their failure: they just reached the point of founding sects. Every time that the Reformation of an entire people fails and only sects raise their heads, one may conclude that the people already contains many types, and has begun to free itself from the gross herding instincts and the morality of, custom, – a momentous state of suspense, which one is accustomed to disparage as decay of morals and corruption, while it announces the maturing of the egg and the early rupture of the shell. That Luther's Reformation succeeded in the north, is a sign that the north had remained backward in comparison with the south of Europe, and still had requirements tolerably uniform in colour and kind; and there would have been no Christianising of Europe at all, if the culture of the old world of the south had not been gradually barbarized by an excessive admixture of the blood of German barbarians, and thus lost its ascendency. The more universally and unconditionally an individual, or the thought of an individual, can operate, so much more homogeneous and so much lower must be the mass that is there operated upon; while counter-strivings betray internal counter-requirements, which also want to gratify and realise themselves. Reversely, one may always conclude with regard to an actual elevation of culture, when powerful and ambitious natures only produce a limited and sectarian effect: this is true also for the separate arts, and for the provinces of knowledge. Where there is ruling there are masses: where there are masses there is need of slavery. Where there is slavery the individuals are but few, and have the instincts and conscience of the herd opposed to them.

150

Criticism of Saints.– Must one then, in order to have a virtue, be desirous of having it precisely in its most brutal form? – as the Christian saints desired and needed; – those who only endured life with the thought that at the sight of their virtue self-contempt might seize every man. A virtue with such an effect I call brutal.

151

The Origin of Religion.– The metaphysical requirement is not the origin of religions, as Schopenhauer claims, but only a later sprout from them. Under the dominance of religious thoughts we have accustomed ourselves to the idea of "another (back, under, or upper) world," and feel an uncomfortable void and privation through the annihilation of the religious illusion; – and then "another world" grows out of this feeling once more, but now it is only a metaphysical world, and no longer a religious one. That however which in general led to the assumption of "another world" in primitive times, was not an impulse or requirement, but an error in the interpretation of certain natural phenomena, a difficulty of the intellect.

152

The greatest Change.– The lustre and the hues of all things have changed! We no longer quite understand how earlier men conceived of the most familiar and frequent things, – for example, of the day, and the awakening in the morning: owing to their belief in dreams the waking state seemed to them differently illuminated. And similarly of the whole of life, with its reflection of death and its significance: our "death" is an entirely different death. All events were of a different lustre, for a God shone forth in them; and similarly of all resolutions and peeps into the distant future: for people had oracles, and secret hints, and believed in prognostication. "Truth" was conceived in quite a different manner, for the insane could formerly be regarded as its mouthpiece – a thing which makes us shudder, or laugh. Injustice made a different impression on the feelings: for people were afraid of divine retribution, and not only of legal punishment and disgrace. What joy was there in an age when men believed in the devil and tempter! What passion was there when people saw demons lurking close at hand! What philosophy was there when doubt was regarded as sinfulness of the most dangerous kind, and in fact as an outrage on eternal love, as distrust of everything good, high, pure, and compassionate! – We have coloured things anew, we paint them over continually, – but what have we been able to do hitherto in comparison with the splendid colouring of that old master! – I mean ancient humanity.

153

Homo poeta.– "I myself who have made this tragedy of tragedies altogether independently, in so far as it is completed; I who have first entwined the perplexities of morality about existence, and have tightened them so that only a God could unravel them – so Horace demands! – I have already in the fourth act killed all the Gods – for the sake of morality! What is now to be done about the fifth act? Where shall I get the tragic dénouement! Must I now think about a comic dénouement?"

154

Differences in the Dangerousness of Life.– You don't know at all what you experience; you run through life as if intoxicated, and now and then fall down a stair. Thanks however to your intoxication you still do not break your limbs: your muscles are too languid and your head too confused to find the stones of the staircase as hard as we others do! For, us life is a greater danger: we are made of glass – alas, if we should strike against anything! And all is lost if we should fall!

155

What we Lack.– We love the grandeur of Nature, and have discovered it; that is because human grandeur is lacking in our minds. It was the reverse with the Greeks: their feeling towards Nature was quite different from ours.

156

The most Influential Person.– The fact that a person resists the whole spirit of his age, stops it at the door and calls it to account, must exert an influence! It is indifferent whether he wishes to exert an influence; the point is that he can.

157

Mentiri.– Take care! – he reflects: he will have a lie ready immediately. This is a stage in the civilisation of whole nations. Consider only what the Romans expressed by mentiri!

158

An Inconvenient Peculiarity.– To find everything deep is an inconvenient peculiarity: it makes one constantly strain one's eyes, so that in the end one always finds more than one wishes.

159

Every Virtue has its Time.– The honesty of him who is at present inflexible often causes him remorse; for inflexibility is the virtue of a time different from that in which honesty prevails.

160

In Intercourse with Virtues.– One can also be undignified and flattering towards a virtue.

161

To the Admirers of the Age.– The runaway priest and the liberated criminal are continually making grimaces; what they want is a look without a past. But have you ever seen men who know that their looks reflect the future, and who are so courteous to you, the admirers of the "age," that they assume a look without a future? —

162

Egoism.– Egoism is the perspective law of our sentiment, according to which the near appears large and momentous, while in the distance the magnitude and importance of all things diminish.

163

After a Great Victory.– The best thing in a great victory is that it deprives the conqueror of the fear of defeat. "Why should I not be worsted for once?" he says to himself, "I am now rich enough to stand it."

164

Those who Seek Repose.– I recognise the minds that seek repose by the many dark objects with which they surround themselves: those who want to sleep darken their chambers, or creep into caverns. A hint to those who do not know what they really seek most, and would like to know!

165

The Happiness of Renunciation.– He who has absolutely dispensed with something for a long time will almost imagine, when he accidentally meets with it again, that he has discovered it, – and what happiness every discoverer has! Let us be wiser than the serpents that lie too long in the same sunshine.

166

Always in our own Society.– All that is akin to me in nature and history speaks to me, praises me, urges me forward and comforts me – : other things are unheard by me, or immediately forgotten. We are only in our own society always.

167

Misanthropy and Philanthropy.– We only speak about being sick of men when we can no longer digest them, and yet have the stomach full of them. Misanthropy is the result of a far too eager philanthropy and "cannibalism," – but who ever bade you swallow men like oysters, my Prince Hamlet?

168

Concerning an Invalid.– "Things go badly with him!" – What is wrong? – " He suffers from the longing to be praised, and finds no sustenance for it." – Inconceivable! All the world does honour to him, and he is reverenced not only in deed but in word! – "Certainly, but he is dull of hearing for the praise. When a friend praises him it sounds to him as if the friend praised himself; when an enemy praises him, it sounds to him as if the enemy wanted to be praised for it; when, finally, some one else praises him – there are by no means so many of these, he is so famous! – he is offended because they neither want him for a friend nor for an enemy; he is accustomed to say: 'What do I care for those who can still pose as the all-righteous towards me!'"

169

Avowed Enemies.– Bravery in presence of an enemy is a thing by itself: a person may possess it and still be a coward and an irresolute num-skull. That was Napoleon's opinion concerning the "bravest man" he knew, Murat: – whence it follows that avowed enemies are indispensable to some men, if they are to attain to their virtue, to their manliness, to their cheerfulness.

170

With, the Multitude.– He has hitherto gone with the multitude and is its panegyrist; but one day he will be its opponent! For he follows it in the belief that his laziness will find its advantage thereby: he has not yet learned that the multitude is not lazy enough for him! that it always presses forward! that it does not allow any one to stand still! – And he likes so well to stand still!

171

Fame.– When the gratitude of many to one casts aside all shame, then fame originates.

172

The Perverter of Taste.– A: "You are a perverter of taste – they say so everywhere!" B: "Certainly! I pervert every one's taste for his party: – no party forgives me for that."

173

To be Profound and to Appear Profound.– He who knows that he is profound strives for clearness; he who would like to appear profound to the multitude strives for obscurity. The multitude thinks everything profound of which it cannot see the bottom; it is so timid and goes so unwillingly into the water.

174

Apart.– Parliamentarism, that is to say, the public permission to choose between five main political opinions, insinuates itself into the favour of the numerous class who would fain appear independent and individual, and like to fight for their opinions. After all, however, it is a matter of indifference whether one opinion is imposed upon the herd, or five opinions are permitted to it. – He who diverges from the five public opinions and goes apart, has always the whole herd against him.

175

Concerning Eloquence.– What has hitherto had the most convincing eloquence? The rolling of the drum: and as long as kings have this at their command, they will always be the best orators and popular leaders.

176

Compassion.– The poor, ruling princes! All their rights now change unexpectedly into claims, and all these claims immediately sound like pretensions! And if they but say "we," or "my people," wicked old Europe begins laughing. Verily, a chief-master-of-ceremonies of the modern world would make little ceremony with them; perhaps he would decree that "les souverains rangent aux parvenus."

177

On "Educational Matters."– In Germany an important educational means is lacking for higher men; namely, the laughter of higher men; these men do not laugh in Germany.

178

For Moral Enlightenment. – The Germans must be talked out of their Mephistopheles – and out of their Faust also. These are two moral prejudices against the value of knowledge.

179

Thoughts. —Thoughts are the shadows of our sentiments – always however obscurer, emptier and simpler.

180

The Good Time for Free Spirits.– Free Spirits take liberties even with regard to Science – and meanwhile they are allowed to do so, – while the Church still remains! – In so far they have now their good time.

181

Following and Leading.– A: "Of the two, the one will always follow, the other will always lead, whatever be the course of their destiny. And yet the former is superior to the other in virtue and intellect." B: "And yet? And yet? That is spoken for the others; not for me, not for us! —Fit secundum regulam."

182

In Solitude.– When one lives alone one does not speak too loudly, and one does not write too loudly either, for one fears the hollow reverberation – the criticism of the nymph Echo. – And all voices sound differently in solitude!

183

The Music of the Best Future.– The first musician for me would be he who knew only the sorrow of the profoundest happiness, and no other sorrow: there has not hitherto been such a musician.

184

Justice.– Better allow oneself to be robbed than have scarecrows around one – that is my taste. And under all circumstances it is just a matter of taste – and nothing more!

185

Poor.– He is now poor, but not because everything has been taken from him, but because he has thrown everything away: – what does he care? He is accustomed to find new things. – It is the poor who misunderstand his voluntary poverty.

186

Bad Conscience.– All that he now does is excellent and proper – and yet he has a bad conscience with it all. For the exceptional is his task.

187

Offensiveness in Expression.– This artist offends me by the way in which he expresses his ideas, his very excellent ideas: so diffusely and forcibly, and with such gross rhetorical artifices, as if he were speaking to the mob. We feel always as if "in bad company" when devoting some time to his art.

188

Work.– How closely work and the workers now stand even to the most leisurely of us! The royal courtesy in the words: "We are all workers," would have been a cynicism and an indecency even under Louis XIV.

189

The Thinker.– He is a thinker: that is to say, he knows how to take things more simply than they are.

190

Against Eulogisers.– A: "One is only praised by one's equals!" B: "Yes! And he who praises you says: 'You are my equal!'"

191

Against many a Vindication.– The most perfidious manner of injuring a cause is to vindicate it intentionally with fallacious arguments.