Reports of the Committee on the Conduct of the War

Question. Under the flag of truce?

Answer. Yes, sir; as the flag of truce came in and went to the fort they came into the town.

Question. Is not that a direct and utter violation of the rules of warfare?

Answer. It is a direct violation of the flag of truce. I have had three or four boats up the Tennessee river all the time. There are three up there now, one having come out the day before yesterday. There were two to have started this morning at daylight, and I received a despatch this forenoon, saying that the enemy were reported to be crossing the Tennessee river at Birmingham and above, in force, from the west to the east side. I immediately telegraphed to Paducah and had two heavy gunboats go up to ascertain the truth of the report. I do not credit the story, but I have done all I possibly could do, with the limited number of boats at my command.

Question. How long have you been in the navy?

Answer. Fifteen years.

Question. You are acquainted with the administration of Captain Pennock, of the navy, here?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. What do you say of it?

Answer. I do not think any one could have done more than Captain Pennock has done, with the means at his command.

Question. Why is it that we do not hear more of the transactions of the gunboats out here, while we hear so much of what the army does?

Answer. One reason is that there is a general order by Admiral Porter, prohibiting any newspaper reporter from going on board any vessel in the Mississippi squadron.

Question. Is there a cordial understanding and co-operation between the navy here and the military forces under General Brayman?

Answer. I think there is to a very great degree. I never saw more cordiality existing between officers of the different services. I would like to say further, that during this late raid I convoyed General Veatch's division up the Tennessee river. It was ordered up there by General Sherman to land at or near Savannah, and go out to Purdy and the Hatchie, in that way intending to catch Forrest. I afterwards sent up another despatch of the same purport, from General Sherman to General Veatch, which reached him at the landing near Purdy. I sent up a third despatch to him, which was brought here by General Corse from General Sherman. That despatch never reached General Veatch for the reason that he had come back from Purdy, gone on up the Tennessee and disembarked his troops at Waterloo, Alabama, and was out of reach of my gunboats.

Captain Smith, commanding the Peosta, broke up a rebel recruiting office at Brooklyn, Illinois, a week ago last Sunday. The recruiting office was on board a trading vessel. He destroyed the boat, but saved seven new rebel uniforms that were on it. He could not discover the recruiting agent there, there being so many secesh sympathizers around there.

Question. In your opinion, has General Brayman acted with vigilance and activity, and done all he could with the forces intrusted to him, during these raids?

Answer. So far as I know, he has done all he could do.

Cairo, Illinois, April 24, 1864.

Major General Steven A. Hurlbut, sworn and examined.

By the chairman:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. I am a major general of volunteers, commanding the 16th army corps.

Question. Where have you been stationed?

Answer. I have been stationed at Memphis for the last sixteen months.

Question. How long have you been stationed along the river?

Answer. Ever since the battle of Shiloh. I have commanded at Bolivar and Jackson, Tennessee, until about the 20th of November, 1862, when I was ordered to Memphis.

Question. Now, with regard to this raid of Forrest, was that raid made in your department?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. Please give us, in your own way, a brief account of that raid.

Answer. Forrest first crossed the Memphis and Charleston railroad last December. I organized a force in Columbus, and moved it down and drove him out. General Sherman then ordered all the available troops in my command to be got together – leaving very small garrisons at the important points – for the Meridian expedition. I marched and crossed there, and marched back again. Two divisions of my command were then detailed to go up Red river, under General Banks. As an auxiliary to the infantry movement to Meridian, General W. S. Smith came to Memphis and took command of all my cavalry and another brigade which he brought over, all amounting to about seven thousand effective men, to move across the country, drive the enemy's force out, cut his way across to Columbus and Aberdeen, and to go down to the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and join us at Meridian. He failed to make that junction; was met by Forrest about West Point, and for some reason or other (I do not know what) retreated and fell back to Memphis. The effect of a retreat, at the rate at which they retreated, and the loss they met with, and the retreating before an inferior force, demoralized the cavalry very seriously. I returned to Memphis about the Three Points, marched, and found that Forrest was organizing a very considerable force, so far as I could find out, with the intention of moving up to West Tennessee. I had orders from the War Department to send home all the veteran regiments (cavalry especially) as rapidly as possible. I took an inventory of my force, and found that I had about six thousand cavalry to two thousand two hundred horses, which limited the efficiency of the cavalry. I furloughed and sent home the 3d Michigan, 2d Iowa, 3d, 6th, 7th, and 9th Illinois, and distributed their horses among the men that were left, so as to keep men enough always, and more, to mount with horses. Forrest moved up, and crossed the line of the Charleston and Memphis railroad, towards Jackson, Tennessee, and occupied it. General Grierson was directed by me to go out with his cavalry, feel him, attack him, and cripple him as much as possible. He went out, and reported that he was "a little too strong for him, and he could not touch him." My effective force at Memphis consisted of 2,200 cavalry, 2,100 white infantry, and 2,400 colored infantry. I had the choice to move out a force sufficiently strong to attack Forrest and leave Memphis open, with its immense amount of government stores, ordnance, hospitals, and everything of that nature. I became satisfied that if I moved out 4,000 men, (which was the lowest I considered safe to send out,) and they should move out 50 or 60 miles into the country, the enemy, being all mounted, would turn that force and come in and occupy Memphis, which I considered would be a greater disaster than to allow Forrest to range in West Tennessee. I therefore did not send them out, but I kept the cavalry out as far as we could go, or dared go. It was not possible to divine precisely what Forrest's intentions were. My own opinion was, that it was his intention to organize a force, cross the Tennessee river, and operate upon General Sherman's line of communication. I was at Cairo at the time Union City was attacked. Four regiments and a battery of one of my divisions, which were ordered up the Tennessee river, were here also. I directed General Brayman to take them and throw them up to Columbus in rear of Forrest when he was at Paducah, but they were peremptorily ordered up the Tennessee river.

Question. Ordered up by General Sherman?

Answer. Yes, sir. The result was, that there was not force enough, in my opinion, in the command on the Mississippi river, from Paducah to Memphis, to operate upon Forrest with any prospect of success.

Question. What was the estimated strength of Forrest's forces?

Answer. Forrest's entire force, according to the best of my information, was between 8,000 and 9,000 men altogether. That includes this division of Buford's that operated up here. I have somewhere among my papers a list of all his brigades. I know nearly all of them. I have run against nearly all of them. He had five of the oldest regiments in the confederate service detailed expressly for this purpose as a nucleus of his organization. These were troops that had seen a great deal of service along the line below Memphis – Chalmers's brigade, Ely's brigade, Bell's brigade, and McCullough's. I cannot estimate Forrest's force at less than between 8,000 and 9,000 men. The cause of his raid, unquestionably, was the fact that so large an amount of troops which had been holding this region of country had been removed – a portion of them up the Tennessee river to Decatur, and a portion up the Red river – also the fact that he knew perfectly well, from his spies at Memphis, the condition of our cavalry. Memphis, from the nature of the ground there, is a place that requires not less than five thousand men to garrison the outer line. It is the worst place to cover that I ever saw. We have a fort there that was built that would take seven thousand men as a reasonable amount to line the parapets. We have immense stores there, for from Memphis not only the 16th and 17th army corps are supplied, but General Steele's army at Little Rock are supplied from there also. We have large hospitals there, scattered all over the city. We have an unsteady and unreliable population; and the daily interior guard duty, for the city proper, requires over 300 men. I considered then, and I consider now, that the removal of any force competent to make any serious impression upon Forrest would have imperilled Memphis; and I believe that was what General Forrest wanted done.

Question. How large a force did you retain there for the safety of that place?

Answer. I retained the infantry – four thousand men. I kept the cavalry out all the time as far as they could go.

Question. How came you to reoccupy Fort Pillow? Had it been abandoned?

Answer. No, sir. When I moved to Meridian, the 52d Indiana regiment which had been there was withdrawn, and made a part of the expedition, and the 13th Tennessee cavalry, which was recruiting, was moved down there as a recruiting point. I afterwards re-enforced it by sending up Major Booth with four companies of colored heavy artillery and six guns, and a section of light artillery, making in all about 600 men.

Question. Do I understand you to say that the post had never been entirely abandoned?

Answer. No, sir. When the 52d Indiana was taken away it was temporarily abandoned until the 13th Tennessee came down to hold it as a recruiting point. I considered Fort Pillow as a place which ought to be held with a small garrison, and I think so yet, and any navy officer or river man will tell you that the situation of the channel there requires it.

Question. I am not questioning that at all. I merely inquired as to the fact.

Answer. I sent Major Booth there because I had great confidence in him as a soldier. He was an old soldier who had served in the regular army, and I considered him the best man I had for that purpose. I received a report from him "that he could hold that post against any force for forty-eight hours," which was all I expected him to do, and if he had not been killed I think he would have held it. I have no doubt that his death was the immediate cause of the capture of the place.

Question. Just in this connexion, please to state why you deemed it important to keep up a garrison at that place.

Answer. The steamboat channel at Fort Pillow runs right under the bluff, and brings every boat as it passes within musket-shot of the shore, and a couple of guns mounted up above there would stop most effectually the navigation of the river, and drive away any of the tin-clad gunboats we have, for a plunging fire would go right through them, and they could not get elevation enough to strike. The whole life of the army below, especially while these large movements were going on, depended upon an uninterrupted communication by the river, and the stopping that communication for two or three days might deprive us of necessary supplies just at the moment that they were required. These were my reasons for holding the place.

Question. What information have you in regard to the attack upon Fort Pillow; its capture, and the barbarities practiced there?

Answer. I am not positive about dates, but my recollection is that Fort Pillow was attacked on the 12th of April. Just about dusk of the 12th a boat came down to Memphis from Fort Pillow, bringing information that the place was attacked, but that Major Booth was perfectly confident of being able to hold out until he could be re-enforced. I immediately ordered a regiment to be got ready, with four days' rations and an extra supply of ammunition; took the steamer "Glendale," dropped her down to Fort Pickering, and the regiment was in the very act of going on board when another boat came down with the information that the fort was captured. The order to move up the regiment was countermanded, for there was no use in sending it then. There were at Fort Pillow two 10-pound Parrotts, two 6-pounder field guns, and two 12-pounder howitzers, and about 600 men. I cannot tell precisely the number of the 13th Tennessee cavalry, for it was a recruiting regiment, and filling off and on. If the men had been left in the position in which they had been placed by Major Booth, and from which position he had already repelled an assault of the enemy, I think they would have been able to have held the fort until re-enforced. I believe that the ground there is so strong that 600 men with that artillery ought to have held it; but the command devolved upon a very good gentleman, but a very young officer, entirely inexperienced in these matters. The enemy rushed on the fort from two or three directions, and confused him, I think, and broke him and carried it. The information which I have from all sources, official and otherwise, is that – whether by permission of their officers, or contrary to their permission, I cannot say – a butchery took place there that is unexampled in the record of civilized warfare. We always expect, in case of a place carried by assault, that some extravagance of passion will occur; but this seems to have been continued after resistance had ceased, when there was nothing to keep up the hot blood, and to have been of a nature brutal to an extent that is scarcely credible, and I have embodied in my official report to General McPherson (my present superior officer) my opinion that the black troops will hereafter be uncontrolable, unless the government take some prompt and energetic action upon the subject. I know very well that my colored regiments at Memphis, officers and men, will never give quarter.

Question. They never ought to.

Answer. They never will. They have sworn it; and I have some very good colored regiments there.

Question. What do you say of the fighting qualities of the colored troops?

Answer. That depends altogether upon their officers. If they are properly officered, they are just as good troops as anybody has. I have two or three regiments at Memphis that I am willing to put anywhere that I would put any soldiers which I have ever seen, with the same amount of experience.

Question. Did you learn anything of the particulars of those atrocities that were committed there at Fort Pillow?

Answer. I learned the particulars from the reports of the officers.

Question. Did you learn anything about any flags of truce being taken advantage of?

Answer. They always do that; that is a matter of habit with them.

Question. And they took advantage of them in this case, as you learn?

Answer. Yes, sir; and they did it at Paducah, and they tried it at Columbus.

Question. Did you hear anything about their setting fire to hospitals, while the wounded were in there?

Answer. I learn from what I consider unquestionable authority, that bodies were found which had been wounded by musket shots, and then their eyes bayoneted out; men wounded in a similar way, with their bowels cut open; and I have heard many other instances of equal barbarity.

Question. Did you hear, recently after that capture, of anybody being nailed to a building and burned?

Answer. I heard that Lieutenant Akerstrom was so treated.

Question. Did you learn that from a source that you could give credit to?

Answer. I had no reason to doubt it, with the exception of the identification of the body. The fact that somebody was so treated, I consider to be sufficiently proven; the identification I think is doubtful.

Question. Is there anything more you wish to state? If so, will you state it without further questioning?

Answer. I do not know that I can state anything more than my opinion in regard to certain things that might have been done. I do not know that it is worth while to do that. As I am under censure myself, at present I prefer not to.

Question. Will you give us a description of the situation of Fort Pillow?

Answer. It is a very difficult thing to describe. The original fortifications, as made by the rebels, were very much too large to be held by any force that we could spare. It was intended for a very large force; but there are two crowning heights – bold knobs – that stand up there, which command the entire region of approach, and which Major Booth was directed to occupy. He went up and examined the ground, and reported to me. A light work was thrown up upon one of them, and there was a portion of a work upon the other. The one to the south was not occupied during the fight; the one to the north of the ravine, which leads down to the landing, was occupied. That was the point which I considered should have been held; and I think yet it could have been, and would have been, if Major Booth had lived.

Question. Can you describe the position in which the men were placed by Major Booth?

Answer. Major Booth had his artillery upon this knoll, and held the slope of the hill with some rifle pits. From these rifle pits, as I am informed, he repulsed the enemy. The troops were afterwards drawn in by Major Bradford, into the fortification proper, and that was attacked on all sides. My opinion is that Major Bradford lost his head – got confused. The rush was too strong for him. The amount of the enemy's force that actually attacked there I do not know, but from all the testimony I could get, I should judge it to have been not less than 2,500 men.

Question. Who do you understand led the enemy's forces?

Answer. Forrest was there personally. I understand, however, that the main body of the force was Chalmers's command, who was also there. There was also a portion of Forrest's force there. Forrest will carry his men further than any other man I know of; he is desperate.

Question. Have we any force at Fort Pillow now?

Answer. No, sir.

Question. Do you consider that a point which should be occupied by a force, in order to make the navigation of the river safe?

Answer. I do.

Question. What force do you deem should be placed there to hold it?

Answer. I think 500 steady troops, properly supplied with artillery, and properly covered with works, could hold the place until re-enforced – hold it, all that is necessary.

Question. Did you ever have any instructions or orders to evacuate Fort Pillow? or did you, at any time, ever propose to evacuate it?

Answer. I never had any orders to evacuate it. My orders from General Sherman were to hold certain points on the river. I never had any instructions with regard to Fort Pillow one way or the other that I recollect. I considered it necessary to hold it, and never intended to abandon it.

Question. Had it been held by us for some considerable time?

Answer. It had been held since we first occupied the river.

Question. Do not the same reasons exist for holding it now, that had existed during all that period?

Answer. The same. The reasons are geographical, and do not change.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. Then I understand you to state that your instructions, in spirit, required you to hold it, and that it was necessary that it should be held?

Answer. My opinion is distinct that it should be held always, and there is nothing in my instructions that requires it to be abandoned. Some discretion, I suppose, belongs to an officer in charge of as much range as I have had to hold; and I certainly should not abandon that place, if I had troops to hold it.

By the chairman:

Question. Will you tell us what you know about the attack on Union City?

Answer. Colonel Hawkins, of the 7th Tennessee regiment, was at Union City as an advanced post. He had in round numbers about six hundred men. He was threatened by about fifteen hundred, I should think. They attacked him, and were repulsed. General Brayman moved from here with two thousand troops, and got down as far as the bridge, six miles from Union City, before Hawkins surrendered. They commenced the flag-of-truce operation on him, when they found they could do nothing else, threatening to open upon him with artillery, and to give no quarter. Contrary to the entreaties, prayers, and advice of all his officers and all his men, he did surrender his post, with a relieving force within six miles of him; and surrendered it, as I have no doubt, from pure cowardice.

Question. Was he aware of the re-enforcements approaching?

Answer. I think so, but I will not be positive. General Brayman can tell more about that than I can. I was at Columbus when General Brayman returned.

Question. Where is Colonel Hawkins now?

Answer. He is a prisoner. This is the second time he has surrendered to Forrest.

Captain Thomas P. Gray, sworn and examined.

By Mr. Gooch:

Question. What is your rank and position in the army?

Answer. For the last four months I have been holding the place of captain in the 7th Tennessee cavalry, but I have not been mustered in yet.

Question. Had you been in service before?

Answer. Yes, sir.

Question. For how long?

Answer. I enlisted in Illinois on the 24th of July, and was mustered into the United States service August 1, 1861.

Question. Were you at Union City when the late attack was made there?

Answer. I was.

Question. Will you give us an account of what occurred there?

Answer. On the 23d of March last it was generally understood by the troops there that the rebels were advancing upon us; we supposed under General Forrest. That night two companies, I think, were ordered to keep their horses saddled. The first orders I received were about half-past four, the morning of the 24th. The adjutant of our regiment came to me and told me to have my horses saddled. In perhaps half an hour after that we were ordered into line, and I held my company in line for some time waiting for orders. As Colonel Hawkins came by I asked him if he wanted me to take my position at the breastworks, and he said he did. I then took my position at a place where I thought I was most needed, at some breastworks that my company had thrown up on the east side. At this time the rebels were firing on our pickets. I think there was no general charge until about half-past 5 or 6 o'clock. That charge was made by cavalry, on the south side. They did not charge a great way, and were easily repulsed. The same men then reassembled, dismounted, and charged on the fort. This time they came very close to the breastworks, but were again repulsed. After that our troops were very exultant, and ready to meet the rebels anywhere. The next charge was made on the northwest; that was easily repulsed. The last charge was made on the northeast, fronting my position; that was repulsed tolerably easily, but with more loss to the rebels than previously. Then there was sharpshooting for about an hour and a half, and we were all in good spirits. At the expiration of that hour and a half a flag of truce came in in my front. I sent word to Colonel Hawkins that there was a flag of truce coming. I went in person to meet the flag, and halted it about two hundred yards from the breastworks, and asked them what they desired. They said they wished to see the commander of the forces there. I told them I had notified him, and he would be there in a moment. At that time they ordered me under arrest, because I made myself easy looking around upon their position. I demanded their right to order me under arrest under a flag of truce, and told them I had as much right to look around as they had. They then ordered me to sit down. I told them that was played out; that I was not only there under the right of a flag of truce, but that I was there to give them their orders if they made any mismoves. They gave up then, as Colonel Hawkins was in sight. When the colonel came a document was handed him. I do not know anything about it; for, as soon as the colonel came near, I went back to the breastworks. The flag of truce then retired. As soon as I got back I made it my business to go around inside the breastworks to get a view of the rebel troops. They were there upon stumps and logs, and every place where they could see.