The Memoirs of the Conquistador Bernal Diaz del Castillo, Vol 2 (of 2)

As soon as each brigantine was fully equipped for war, Cortes ordered a flag, bearing the royal arms, to be hoisted; and a second one, bearing the number of the vessel. The following were the commanders appointed: viz. Pedro Barba, Garcia Holguin, Juan de Limpias, the deaf Carvajal, Juan Xaramillo, Geronimo de la Mota, the other Carvajal, who now lives at an advanced age in the street San Francisco; a certain Portillo, an excellent soldier, who had just arrived from Spain and had brought a beautiful wife with him. The naval captain Zamora, who lives at present in Guaxaca. A certain Colmero, who was both a good sailor and a good soldier. Further, Lerma, Gines, Nortes, Briones of Salamanca, Miguel Diaz de Auz, and one other officer, whose name has slipped my memory.

The whole of the crews were strictly enjoined to pay implicit obedience to their commanders; and any one who left his vessel was liable to severe punishment. The several commanders then received their particular instructions as to the manner in which they were to cooperate with the land forces.

All these matters had just been arranged when Cortes received intelligence that the Tlascallan chiefs were marching with a large body of troops, consisting of Tlascallans and Huexotzincans. The chief command of these had been intrusted to the younger Xicotencatl, the same who commanded against us in our battles with Tlascalla. He was likewise accompanied by his two brothers, the two younger sons of the excellent Don Lorenzo de Vargas. One of the chiefs of Cholulla likewise made his appearance, but with a very small body of men; for, though the Cholullans had broken off their alliance with Mexico from the time we had punished them so severely, yet they never stood upon the best of terms with us; on the contrary, they appeared as if waiting to see how matters would terminate, and then to side with the triumphant party. After our direful retreat from Mexico, they were almost upon the point of declaring against us.

When Cortes was informed of Xicotencatl's approach, who had come a day before the time appointed, he went out with Alvarado and several other officers to a distance of about a mile from Tezcuco, and welcomed him and his brothers with every demonstration of joy. Xicotencatl, with his men, marched forward in the best order, and all were accoutred in their best garments. Every company had a standard, on which was embroidered a white bird with expanded wings, being the arms of Tlascalla, and resembled an eagle. Every one of the men had a bunch of plumes stuck on his head; they struck up their war music, waved their flags, and continually cried out, "Long live the emperor, our master! Spain for ever! Tlascalla for ever!"

It took these troops about three hours before they had all entered the town, and our general ordered them to be provided with good quarters, and the best food we could get. When they had all entered the town, he once more bid them heartily welcome, assuring them he would enrich them all, and then desired them to rest from their fatigues, adding, that he would let them know the next day the duty they would have to perform.

Almost at the very moment these Tlascallans were marching into Tezcuco, a letter was put into Cortes' hands from Hernando de Barrientos, who was at Chinantla, about 360 miles from Mexico. Barrientos related that, while he was exploring the mines, being left behind for that purpose by Pizarro, the Mexicans had attacked him, and killed three of his companions, and that he alone had been fortunate enough to escape to the inhabitants of Chinantla, who were at enmity with the Mexicans. This was the same people who had furnished us with those long lances in our battle against Narvaez.

Without wishing to repeat the whole contents of this letter, I will only state that Cortes, in answer to it, told him he was about to besiege Mexico, and cautioned him to keep on good terms with the caziques of the country, and not to leave that place until he should receive further intelligence from head-quarters; for he would run great danger of being murdered on the road by the Mexicans.

CHAPTER CL

Of Cortes' further dispositions for the siege.

Cortes now divided the whole of our troops into three divisions. The first division, consisting of one hundred and fifty foot, all well armed with swords and shields, thirty horse, and eighteen musketeers and crossbow-men, was commanded by Alvarado, under whom Guiterrez de Badajoz, Andreas de Monjaraz, and Jorge de Alvarado had each the command of fifty men and a third part of the musketeers and crossbow-men; the cavalry being under the immediate command of Alvarado himself. To this division 8000 Tlascallans were added, and Alvarado, in whose division I also was, received orders to take up his position in the town of Tlacupa. Cortes particularly recommended us to furnish ourselves with good weapons, helmets, gorgets, and steel coverings for the legs, to protect our bodies from the destructive weapons of the Mexicans. These precautions were, indeed, very necessary; but, notwithstanding all our defensive armour, scarcely a day past by in which the enemy did not kill or wound some of our men.

The second division was placed under the command of Oli, and consisted of thirty horse, one hundred and sixty-five foot, and twenty crossbow-men and musketeers. Andreas de Tapia, Verdugo, and Lugo commanded under him, he himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. To this division, likewise, 8000 Tlascallans were added, and they were to take up their position in the town of Cojohuacan, about eight miles from Tlacupa.

Sandoval was appointed to the command of the third division, consisting of twenty-four horse, fourteen crossbow-men and musketeers, and one hundred and fifty foot armed with shields and swords. To this division were added 8000 Indians from the townships of Chalco, Huexotzinco, and other places in alliance with us. Cortes appointed Luis Marin and Pedro de Ircio, two intimate friends of Sandoval, to command under him, the latter himself having the immediate command of the cavalry. This division was to take up a position near Iztapalapan, and Sandoval's instructions were to attack that town, and do as much damage there as he could, until he received further orders. Sandoval did not leave Tezcuco before Cortes was about to step on board, who himself took the chief command of the brigantines. On this flotilla there were altogether 325 men. Thus Sandoval, Oli, and Alvarado were each ordered off to different points: one marched to the left, the other to the right; and those who are not acquainted with the situation of this town or of the lake in general, would imagine that these divisions were removing from one common centre rather than approaching it. Each of these three captains received particular instructions for his plan of operation, and the next morning was fixed for our departure.

In order to be detained as little as possible, we sent off the whole body of Tlascallans in advance to the Mexican frontiers. These troops marched out in the best possible humour, under their commander Chichimeclatecl and other officers, but discovered that their commander-in-chief, the younger Xicotencatl, had remained behind. After considerable inquiries, it was found that he had secretly returned to Tlascalla on the previous night to take forcible possession of the caziquedom and territory of Chichimeclatecl. It appears, according to the accounts of the Tlascallans, that he wished to avail himself of this favorable opportunity of raising himself to supreme power in his own country, which the absence of Chichimeclatecl offered to him, who, in his opinion, was the only person that stood in his way since the death of Maxixcatzin, as he did not fear any opposition from his old blind father. This Xicotencatl, the Tlascallans further added, had never felt any real inclination to join us in the war against Mexico, but had frequently assured them it would terminate in the destruction of us all.22

When Chichimeclatecl received information of this, he instantly returned to Tezcuco in order to apprize Cortes of it. Our general, on hearing this, despatched five distinguished personages of Tezcuco, and two Tlascallans, who were his particular friends, after Xicotencatl, to request his immediate return to his troops, in Cortes' name. They were to remind him that his father Lorenzo de Vargas would certainly have marched out against Mexico in person, if blindness and old age had not prevented him; that the whole population of Tlascalla continued loyal to his majesty, and that the revolt he wished to excite would throw dishonour on his own country. These representations Cortes desired should be accompanied by large promises, to induce him to return to obedience. Xicotencatl, however, haughtily replied, that he was determined to abide by his resolve, and our dominion in this country would not have continued thus long if his father and Maxixcatzin had followed his advice.

Upon this our general ordered an alguacil to repair in all haste with four of our horse and five distinguished men of Tezcuco to Xicotencatl's abode, to take him prisoner, and hang him without any further ceremony. "All kindness," added Cortes, "is thrown away upon this cazique. His whole time is spent in devising plots and creating mischief. I cannot suffer this to continue any longer; the matter has now come to a crisis."

As soon as Alvarado received information of these commands, he urgently begged of Cortes to pardon Xicotencatl. Our general replied that he would consider about it, though he secretly gave the alguacil peremptory orders to put him to death, which was accordingly done. Xicotencatl was hung in a town subject to Tezcuco, and thus an end was put to all his plottings. Many Tlascallans assured us that the elder Xicotencatl himself had cautioned Cortes against his son,23 and had advised him to put him to death.

This affair delayed our departure from Tezcuco for one day; and thus it was not till the 13th of May, 1521, that we commenced our march. As our road lay for a considerable distance in the same direction, our division under Alvarado and that under Oli marched out at the same time. The first night we encamped in the township of Alcuman, to which place Oli had despatched some men in advance to prepare quarters for his troops, and had ordered that the houses which they took possession of should, by way of distinction, be decorated with green boughs. When we arrived with Alvarado, we found, to our surprise, that every house had been taken, and the two divisions were just about to settle the matter, sword in hand, when the officers stepped in between, and thereby put a stop to the dispute. But the insult which had thus been offered to us was not so easily to be forgotten; when, therefore, this circumstance became known to Cortes, he sent off father Melgarejo and Luis Marin to us, with letters to every officer and soldier, in which he reproached us for quarrelling, and admonished us to keep peace with each other. From this moment Alvarado and Oli were never upon such friendly terms as formerly.

The following morning the two divisions continued their march, and we encamped for the night in a town subject to Mexico, but which was quite deserted by its inhabitants. This was likewise the case in Quauhtitlan, where we took up our quarters the next night.

Tenayucan and Escapuzalco, through which we marched the day following, were also quite deserted. Our Tlascallan friends spread themselves all through these townships, and entered into every house during the fore part of the evening, from which they brought in quantities of provisions. We adopted every military precaution for the night, as we were not far distant from Mexico, and could plainly hear the Mexicans, who were lying in crowds in their canoes on the lake and along the causeways, hooting and yelling fearfully throughout the whole of the night, and challenging us to the combat. Their object, was to induce us to fall upon them in the dark, when they would have had a great advantage over us. We had, however, received a sufficient warning by our former misfortune, and very wisely kept ourselves as quietly as possible until next morning, which was a Sunday.

After father Juan Diaz had said mass, we commended ourselves to the protection of the Almighty, and both divisions marched forward to cut off the aqueduct of Chapultepec, which lies about two miles from Tlacupa, and supplies Mexico with water. On our way thither, we fell in with several bodies of Mexicans, who had received intelligence that this was to be the commencement of our operations against Mexico. The enemy had in every way the advantage ground over us, and attacked us vigorously with lances, arrows, and stones, by which three of our men were wounded; but we soon put them to flight, and they were so closely pursued by the Tlascallans that they lost twenty killed, and seven or eight were taken prisoners. We were now able to destroy the aqueduct without any further opposition, and the city of Mexico was deprived of this source of obtaining water during the whole of the siege.

As soon as we had destroyed this aqueduct, our officers determined to make an attempt upon one of the bridges on the causeway leading from Tlacupa. We had scarcely begun to move along the causeway when numbers of canoes, filled with troops, advanced swiftly from both sides, while other large bodies of the enemy came marching up the causeway against us, so that we were quite astounded at the very sight. In the first encounter thirty of our men were wounded and three killed. Notwithstanding all this, we fought our way up to the first bridge. According to what we afterwards heard, it was the wish of the Mexicans that we should pass over the bridge; for we had no sooner done so than we were assailed by such terrific crowds, as to be unable to move. What indeed could we do on a causeway which was no more than eight paces in breadth, where we were attacked on all sides at once? Our crossbow-men and musketeers certainly kept up a continued fire on the canoes, but the enemy received but a trifling loss this way, for they had raised boards alongside of their canoes, by which their troops were sheltered from our fire. Those of the enemy's troops which attacked us on the causeway itself we certainly drove back each time into the water, but fresh troops kept pouring in too fast for us to gain much advantage this way. Here our cavalry was of no manner of use to us, while the horses were greatly exposed to the attacks of the enemy on each side of the causeway, and many were consequently wounded. If our cavalry attempted to pursue the enemy into the water, the latter had provided against this by palisades, behind which they retired, and stretched out against them their long lances, to which they had fastened the swords we unfortunately lost on our retreat from Mexico.

In this way the battle continued for upwards of an hour, the enemy each time returning to the attack with such excessive fury that, at length, we could stand our ground no longer: nor was this all, for we now saw another large fleet of canoes approaching with a fresh body of men, who were ordered to fall upon our rear. We therefore determined to retreat back along the causeway, for which purpose we ordered the Tlascallans to move off first, that we might effect our retreat in perfect good order. Here the Tlascallans had greatly embarrassed us in our movements, who, it is well known, never can fight standing in the water.

The instant the Mexicans perceived we were turning back, and saw the Tlascallans moving off the causeway, they set up most distracting yells, and attacked us man to man with great fierceness. It is indeed out of my power to describe it. The whole of the causeway was instantly covered with lances, arrows, and stones, besides that vast quantities fell into the water. When we had again reached the mainland, we returned fervent thanks to the Almighty for having rescued us from this severe battle.

Eight of our men were killed and fifty wounded: added to all this, we were obliged to put up with the hootings and jeers of the enemy, who kept calling upon the Tlascallans to come with double their numbers next time, and they would very soon settle their impudence. Our first deeds of arms, therefore, merely consisted in destroying the aqueduct of Chapultepec, and in reconnoitring the lake along the causeway, in which we did not exactly reap much honour.

For the rest, we passed the following night very quietly in our quarters, posted our sentinels, and dressed our wounds. One of our horses was so severely wounded that it died soon after.

The following morning Oli determined upon taking up the position assigned to his division at Cojohuacan, about six miles further on; and however Alvarado and the other cavaliers might beg of him not to separate the two divisions, yet he would not alter his determination. Christobal de Oli was a man of uncommon bravery, whose pride was wounded at the unsuccessful attempt we had made upon the causeway, and he accused Alvarado of inconsiderateness for having ordered the attack. Nothing, therefore, could induce him to stay, and he marched off with his men to Cojohuacan.

The separation of the two divisions was very impolitic at this juncture; for if the Mexicans had been aware of the smallness of our numbers, and had attacked either of the divisions during the five following days, before the brigantines had arrived, we should with difficulty have escaped destruction. Both divisions, therefore, remained as quiet as the enemy would allow them, though not a day passed by that the Mexicans did not land troops to annoy us in our camp, and, if possible, to entice us into places where we should be unable to act, and they could attack us to greater advantage.

Sandoval, as we have seen, left Tezcuco with his division four days after the feast of Corpus Christi, and marched towards Iztapalapan. His route lay through townships which were either subject to, or in alliance with Tezcuco. As soon as he arrived at Iztapalapan, he commenced his military operations by burning down the greater portion of the houses which stood on the mainland.

It was not long before large bodies of Mexican troops arrived for the protection of Iztapalapan, with whom Sandoval had a severe skirmish, and drove them back again to their canoes; but still they continued to shower their arrows and darts upon him, and wounded several of his men.

During this conflict a thick smoke was seen to rise from several signal fires which had been lighted on the surrounding hills. This had been a signal to call in all the canoes of Mexico and of the other towns situated on the lake, as Cortes had just run out from Tezcuco with the thirteen brigantines.

The first attack our general made with this fleet was against a rocky height on an island near Mexico. This place had been strongly fortified, and was garrisoned by a great number of Mexicans and inhabitants of other townships. All the canoes of Mexico, Xochimilco, Cojohuacan, Huitzilopuzco, Iztapalapan, and Mexicalzinco, had united in a body to oppose Cortes, which was the reason why the attack was carried on with so little vigour against Sandoval, who, however, was not able to do the enemy much damage, as most of the houses stood in the water; though, in the commencement of the attack, our allies had made many prisoners. In Iztapalapan, Saudoval found himself on a peninsula in the lake, and the only way by which he could reach Cojohuacan was by a causeway which ran half way through the lake, on which he would have been assailed from both sides by the enemy, without his being able to defend himself with much advantage.

When Cortes observed the vast number of canoes which kept continually crowding around the brigantines, he began to feel alarmed, and this not without reason, for their number amounted to above 4000. He therefore abandoned his attack upon the rock, and selected a position with his brigantines, where he would be able to observe all the enemy's movements, and steer off in any direction he might choose. He likewise issued orders to the respective commanders of the brigantines not to commence an attack on the canoes before the wind, which had just commenced blowing from the land, should have increased. When the Mexicans found our fleet was moving off again, they not incorrectly ascribed it to fear, and they immediately advanced with their canoes to fall upon the brigantines. There now suddenly arose a stiffish breeze, our rowers pulled with all their might, and Cortes ordered the brigantines to run right in among the canoes. Numbers were bored into the ground, many of the enemy killed and wounded, and all the rest of the canoes turned round, and made off at a rapid rate, to seek refuge between the houses built in the lake, where they could not be followed by the brigantines. This was our first naval engagement, and Cortes gained the victory, thanks be to the Almighty.

After this encounter he steered for Cojohuacan, where Oli had taken up his position. Here again he fell in with large bodies of the enemy, who lay in wait for him at a point of considerable danger, and attempted to carry off two of the brigantines. They attacked him at the same time from their canoes, and from the tops of the temples. Cortes now fired in upon them with the cannon, and killed great numbers. The artillerymen fired away so incessantly upon this occasion, that all their powder was consumed, and some of them had their faces and hands burnt. Cortes then despatched the smallest brigantine to Iztapalapan, to bring away all the powder Sandoval had with him there, and wrote word to him not on any account to quit that place. He himself staid the two next days with Oli, on whose position the enemy continued their attacks without intermission.

I must now also relate what took place at this time in Tlacupa, where I was stationed with Alvarado.

When we received intelligence that Cortes had run out with the brigantines, we advanced along our causeway up to the bridge, but this time with greater precaution. Our cavalry was stationed in front of the causeway, while the remaining troops moved along in a close body up to the bridge, the crossbow-men and musketeers keeping up an incessant fire upon the enemy. In this way we renewed the attack each day, and repaired the gaps in the causeway, but three of our men had been killed.

In the meantime the enemy did Sandoval considerable damage from the tops of the houses which stood in the water, and he therefore resolved to attack those which he was best able to get at. Quauhtemoctzin then sent off a large body of troops to the assistance of the town, with commands to cut through the causeway in Sandoval's rear. Cortes observing a vast number of canoes going in the direction of Iztapalapan, instantly steered with the brigantines for the same place, and ordered Oli, with the whole of his division, to shape his course thither along the causeway. They found the Mexicans already hard at work in cutting through the causeway, and concluded from this that Sandoval was destroying the houses which stood in the water. They found him, as they had suspected, already in the heat of an engagement with the enemy, who, however, retired on the approach of the brigantines.

Cortes now ordered Sandoval to quit Iztapalapan with his troops, and to take up his position at Tepeaquilla, in front of the causeway, which leads from this place to Mexico. This Tepeaquilla is at present dedicated to our dear lady of Guadaloupe, where so many miracles have happened, and still daily take place.

CHAPTER CLI

How Cortes assigns particular stations to the twelve brigantines, the thirteenth being considered unfit for service.

Cortes, our officers, and the whole of the troops were now convinced that it was impossible to fight our way to the city along the causeways, unless we were covered on each side by a couple of the brigantines. Our general therefore joined four of these to Alvarado's division, he himself retaining six others near his head-quarters, which he had taken up where Oli was stationed; the remaining two he sent to Sandoval, for the smallest brigantine was not considered of sufficient bulk to make head against the large canoes, and was taken out of the service altogether, and the men distributed among the crews of the other twelve.

As soon as the brigantines arrived at our station Alvarado placed two on each side of the causeway, which were to cover us as we advanced to the attack of the bridges. We now fought with better success than we had previously done for the brigantines kept off the canoes, and prevented them from attacking our flanks; so that we now succeeded in forcing some of the bridges, and in destroying several of the enemy's entrenchments. The conflict, however, was no less severe; on the contrary, the Mexicans made so good a use of their lances, arrows, and slings, that, although our jackets were thickly quilted with cotton, they wounded the greater part of our men; nor did they desist from the attack till night came on; but they had the great advantage over us, that they could relieve their troops from time to time, by pouring in fresh men, and could shower innumerable quantities of stones, arrows, and lances, upon our brigantines, from the tops of the houses. Indeed I cannot find a more appropriate expression than shower, although they alone can feel its full force who were present on the occasion. If we did at times succeed, with the utmost exertion, to force an entrenchment or a bridge, and we omitted to station a strong detachment to guard it, the enemy returned in the night, made another opening in the causeway, threw up larger entrenchments, and dug deep pits, which immediately filled with water, and these they covered slightly over, that we might sink down into them in the midst of the battle of the following day, when the canoes would hasten up to profit by the confusion, and carry off our men prisoners. For this purpose numbers of canoes were lying wait in places where they were out of the reach of our brigantines, though they were always ready at hand, if their assistance was required. But the enemy had provided in another artful way to render our brigantines useless in certain spots of the lake, by driving numbers of stakes into the water, whose tops were just below the surface; so that it was often impossible for our vessels to avoid them, and they consequently stuck fast, and left our troops open to the attacks of the canoes.