Prolegomena to any kind of knowledge

2.5.3 Anyone who has seen a child who fears you as if you were a Barmaléan or an elephant cannot say that the child is merely processing information from the outside.

2.5.4 Even to find a red pencil, we must first visualize what it looks like and notice its distinguishing features, even if only a small part of it is sticking out from under the notebook.

2.5.5. In front of you is a chair. It is white. You can’t see the red chair because the model’s triggers (eyes) are active. Close your eyes and you will be able easily visualize a red chair because your triggers do not prevent you from changing the color of the chair in your representation through top-down activation. This is a straightforward argument for interactive constructivism.

2.5.6. The steady-state thermal problem (Fourier equation) and the electrostatic problem (Poisson equation) are mathematically equivalent. Although these two mathematical structures are identical, the physical phenomena they describe are entirely different. This suggests that we use the same constructs for different purposes. This means they are definitely not caused by something outside of us, but rather, are constructed by us.

2.5.7. There can be no truth as such in constructivism. If hypotheses about the same phenomenon can differ and change with new data, then true statements can also become false in a new model. This contradicts the very definition of correspondence truth. A statement can be called true only if it is not in contradiction with other statements in a given schema; this is coherent truth. However, the truth of such a statement loses all meaning when reviewing the hypothesis in which it is agreed upon.

2.5.8. We can create many models that seem to be about the same thing. For example, light can be represented as an illuminating ray, a wave, or a stream of photons. However, not all of these representations exist at the same time. Are we discussing a dualism of light’s properties, or the possibility of different theories of light? Adherents of objectivism are not helped even by apparent contradictions, such as the dualism of physical phenomena, in doubting their views.

2.5.9. What is knowledge from the perspective of constructivism? A model contains all possible variants of what it represents. However, knowledge is the selection of one variant from among all the possible variants in the model. For example, the sky is blue, but not green, although green is a possible color (as seen in the northern lights). That’s what knowledge or fact consists of: it consists of a constraint on the combinability of the variants in the predicate “the sky is blue”.

2.5.10. Constructivism reconciles empiricism and rationalism. It asserts that we generate rational ideas, which then undergo empirical testing to determine their validity. This is the only way of knowing. What is the reason for coming up with ideas, how variants arise, and how they are tested in experience? These questions will be addressed further.

2.5.11. We create a representation of the world not as a tracing of it, but according to our own maps, created by us for the convenience of distinguishing and harmonizing knowledge, for the convenience of operating it. These are not Plato’s shadows; these are just constructs of our minds, resting on the reality of the body, rather than the world. It is clear that the sense organs cannot convey the full richness of concepts, but only help to separate one concept from another, make it possible to distinguish between them. It seems to us that when we construct a sentence, we perceive and describe reality. But in reality, we build it in order to distinguish the perceived one from the same possible ones by finding a predicate for the distinction. It is an elephant, but not a gray elephant, but a blue one.

2.5.12. We create concepts to which nothing outside of us is comparable, but it is convenient for us to use them to construct schemas for our thinking. For example “zero”, “time”, and “infinity”, which some scientists even consider it to exist, although it is obvious that “zero” cannot be an entity, as well as any number, and time as such is just a function of memory and consciousness, and cannot be pointed at with a finger. But if we continue with such an analysis, it quickly becomes clear that nothing corresponds directly to our concepts “out there” beginning with color and sound, which are the primary sensations from which all our concepts are composed.

2.5.13. Why do we cognize by means of our constructs? To address this question, let us imagine a subject who possesses an internal structure yet remains unaware of the external environment. The question that must be addressed is how this subject can create an adequate “model” of that environment in order to be able to act in it. The imprint is not a model because it is static and cannot be used to organize action in a changing environment. All that such a structure has is the ability to act. In order to create a model of the environment, it is necessary to take discrete steps that can be mapped within oneself. In the event that one wall is situated three steps to the right and another wall is located two steps to the left, this will inherently generate a representation of the space between the walls equivalent to five steps. This model will serve as a representation of the environment in which one can navigate, with the ability to recognize when one will reach the wall. It is made up of the subject’s steps, not a measure of space. And it is only the model of the steps that creates space, not the other way around.

2.5.14. The nature of the representations generated and limited by the schema indicates that in the phenomenon of the world, only specific facets are perceived, i.e., only the relation of certain features emphasized by the schema, rather than the whole phenomenon. This can be attributed to the creation of new schemas regarding the same phenomenon, which in turn leads to the discovery of new facets. Consequently, the identification of novel characteristics within a phenomenon is dependent upon our existing schemas, rather than the inherent properties of the phenomenon itself. We can create different schemas for the same phenomena, and therefore the phenomenon has as many facets as we can create different models of it.

2.5.15. The nervous system is capable of predicting its own states, rather than the external world. The nervous system has the capacity to recode all impacts in receptors into its internal code, which does not correspond in any way in content to the external impact (neuron commissures are the same from all receptors). The modality of a receptor is defined as a distinct physical device that elicits a similar neural response as other receptors. All signals from different receptors are transmitted in the same way (through commissures). The nervous system has no goal to cognize, for example, a light wave, but it does have a goal to adapt to its changes by finding an acceptable variant of the possible states of its model in response to a change in the environment detected by the nervous system’s triggers; for example, to wake up in the morning when it becomes light.

2.5.16. One who moves and wants to survive must anticipate, that is, have a model of what will happen, rather than what has already happened. A model with memory came into being when movement came into being. The state had to be memorized so that what had occurred could be compared with what had been predicted, and proper adjustments to the model could be made.

2.5.17. Hypotheses about the world as a model require no proof of their correctness, except for internal consistency of statements and consistency with experience. The viability of any hypothesis is contingent upon its capacity to reflect relationships that are susceptible to empirical scrutiny. The hypothesis that aligns most closely with the observed changes in action is considered applicable. Competition in the application of hypotheses is better than any criterion of truth.

2.5.18. The world is organized according to our schemas. In order to cope with the chaos of the perceived, thinking constructs a world according to a structure that allows us to distinguish, compare, and, most importantly, to act in a schema-marked world. The act of thinking unfolds the world in space, while consciousness unfolds it in time. This temporal unfolding enables the return to the past for the self, thereby establishing a sequence order and cause.

2.5.19. But why, for all its obviousness, has constructivism not yet been accepted in the scientific community as the scientific paradigm that conditions all reasoning about cognition? Because until now there has been no convincing answer to the question of how in this case we cognize the new things around us, how our representations agree with experience, with the world, although everything is just our representation.

2.6.1. Constructivism is opposed to realism because in the old paradigm they are opposed. The author of the present study posits that interactive constructivism reconciles them. The latter argues that whenever we create a representation of “A” it is already one of the variants, because for us there is at least a variant of “not-A”. And such constructivism is no longer solipsistic, because there is a choice. And it is only from experience that one of the two possible variants is chosen, in interaction with the world through perception as a model trigger. That is why it is interactive.

2.6.2. We do not have direct access to the world; however, its existence is proved by the fact that we are not the ones who choose the possible variants in our models of the world. It is only in these choices that we come into contact with the world. Only this choice independent of our will is the proof of a world beyond our constructs. What is independent of us is really there.

2.6.3. No model can describe the world as it is. One can always ask the question “Why?” to any predicate and find one that has no answer. That is why new hypotheses are created; it is only worth looking closely at the predicates of a model and applying a different ruler to them. We are actively building the model. We are constantly seeking to improve it through the question and the experience gained from the answer.

2.6.4. All sensations are variative. We distinguish many colors, and seeing one color immediately implies the potential for distinguishing other colors. This is a perceptual model that acts as a trigger for the model variants we construct; for example, the colors of a car. The neurons from the auditory cochlea do not convey the character of the sound itself; they only convey changes in the sound, as do the neurons of the eyes and skin. The very character of sound and color is encoded in the cerebral cortex, rather than in the sense organ.

2.6.5. But how the model’s coherence with reality is achieved? By change! If the color of the apple has changed from green to red, it can be eaten, even though the color does not exist in the world, it is just our mode of representation that has variants (colors). This creates consistency of the subjective model with the world in terms of simultaneity of change. “Objective” in the model is only the change of state of the triggers and their particular combination in the model.

2.6.6. What does it mean to see? It means to distinguish, and to distinguish means to perform actions of distinguishing, comparing one thing with another, for example, by moving the gaze. This is how we distinguish colors and lines. If we stop moving our eyes, both line and color will disappear. This is how, even at the primary level of intelligence, knowledge depends on experience.

2.6.7. The scientific method is a demonstration of interactive constructivism. It involves generating hypotheses as models that are not internally contradictory within the chosen logical system of axioms and rules. These models are based on existing conventional knowledge. Falsifiability is the presence of several variants in an instrumental model whose values are not predetermined by the model itself. A model with no variants is non-falsifiable.

2.6.8. A model with successive variants allows us to recognize changes. We capture what was not previously and has become, rather than what is (static). How does this happen? Movements produce change, which the model captures as a transition from one variant to another. For example, a boundary is a change in representation, such as from dark to light. Therefore, in order to see, we constantly and imperceptibly move our eyes, crossing boundaries. We only see the boundary in the dynamics of such a change. Even when we see a static object in front of us, there is still a change: the object’s appearance in our field of vision changes, or the position of our head changes when we turn.

2.6.9. Boundaries and lines are actually associated with continuous change due to imperceptible eye movement. However, what we see appears static, constant, and unchanging. The dynamics turns unto constant. This is the focus that our brain demonstrates us. This constancy of sensation is necessary so that we can make decisions based on stable data rather than on things that change every second. This is how we can build constant models.

2.6.10. A model predicts the next state. The prediction is always multiple! When we open a door, we anticipate seeing different things rather than just one thing. However, we don’t assume to see everything either. Seeing a dinosaur behind the door would scare us. However, we won’t be surprised by seeing a porch behind the door. This is a fundamental difference between models in interactive constructivism – a construct, which assumes several possible variants, rather than just one variant. These variants are predicted by us but are chosen by perception.

2.6.11. When we enter a dark room, we reach our arms out in front of us. We hypothesize what we might bump into, such as furniture, but we don’t know exactly what is there or where it is. This is a model of how we perceive the room furnishings. We choose a variant using our sense organs, in this case our arms stretched forward. Imagine our hands detected the size and texture; the conclusion would be indisputable: that of a sofa. However, if we didn’t know that a sofa could be here and didn’t know what its texture is like groping it with our hands would yield nothing. It would be a “soft” mystery if we didn’t have an image of a sofa in our mind beforehand. If we felt something slippery, wet, rough, and moving in a dark room, we would be frightened because it is not part of the model of the room.

2.6.12. We call this process of selecting variants from a range of assumed variants “information acquisition,” but it is actually a selection from variants already present in the model. It is at the moment of choosing a “sofa” from the possible, yet undefined, variants (sofa, chair, table, or cupboard) that we become aware of the knowledge that there is a sofa in the room.

2.6.13. In order to find out when a train will arrive, one must know what a train and time are with all their possible variants. Switching the time variant to “1 p.m.,” as seen in the timetable, tells us the train’s arrival time. All possible arrival times are stored in our mind as a series of numbers. The timetable only switches to one of the variants in the series. However, we interpret this as obtaining information about the arrival time of a train from the schedule.

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Примечания

1

A. B. Khomyakov. A new method of finding analogues as a means of studying language, thinking, and the construction of artificial intelligence systems. Philosophical Problems of Information Technologies and Cyberspace, 2024; (1): 77—88. (in Russian).