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The October Revolution of 1917 was the result of slow and inconsistent actions of the Provisional Government headed by Alexander Kerensky. Of course, he also faced a complicated context of agricultural labor crises and national conflicts. The fact that Russia continued to participate in the World War exacerbated the nationwide crisis. As a consequence, the influence of the radical Left increased in the centre of the country and the influence of the Nationalists in the periphery. The most active party was the Bolshevist Social Democratic Party. The members of the party espoused the ideals of a Socialist Revolution in Russia which they thought would give an impetus for the Worldwide Revolution. The Bolsheviks proclaimed popular slogans: «Peace, to the people», «Land, to the peasants», «Factories, to the labor class». At the end of August – beginning of September, the Bolsheviks gained the majority in the Soviets of Petrograd and Moscow and proceeded to prepare for an armed rebellion, towards the opening of Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets. On the night of 24–25 of October (November, 6–7), armed workers, soldiers of the Petrograd garrison and sailors of the Baltic Fleet stormed the Winter Palace and arrested the Provisional Government. The Congress (the majority of which was built up by the Bolsheviks and left-side socialists-revolutionary) approved the overthrow of the government, passed Decrees on Peace and Land and organized the government, the Council of People’s Commissars headed by Vladimir Lenin.
The oppositional forces loyal to the Provisional Government were soon crushed. Soon the Bolsheviks established predominance in most industrial cities. The main adversary – the Kadet Party was outlawed and the oppositional press was prohibited. Nevertheless, the Bolsheviks obtained only 25 % of the popular vote during the Constituent Assembly elections (November, 24 (12)). They dispelled The Constituent Assembly (Petrograd, January, 5 (18)) which refused to accept a number of demands of the Bolsheviks. This led to further splits and divisions in the Russian countryside, exacerbating the Civil War. The Soviet Government was firmly established in European Russia; it nationalized the banks and enterprises and wrapped up a truce with Germany. The Triple Entente countries tried to preclude Russia from disengagement and consolidation of Soviets authority. This is when the intervention of foreign countries started.
How do Revolutions begin? Theoretically, this is a trivial question. While searching for a non-trivial answer, it would be interesting to observe the behavior of the «leaders» on the eve of the revolution. For example, what happened during the Revolution of 1905? After much contemplation, Nicholas II signed the decree «The Outline for a Course of Government Perfection» on the 14 of December, 1904. In order to calm the nation after a number of defeats in the Russo-Japanese War Nicholas II promised to improve peasants life, to expand the rights of Zemstvos (district councils) and City Duma, to abolish press restrictions and to reduce the scope of emergency measures in inflamed regions of the Russian Empire (such as Finland). Nevertheless this document didn’t contain any information about real land reform, political liberties, or a new constitution. Several days before that, on the 9 of January, 1905, the Emperor and his advisors decided that people should be «taught a lesson» and be discouraged from complaining about lawlessness and hardships. It is well known that the rejection of the reforms turned into «Bloody Sunday», Moscow barricades and The Battleship «Potemkin».
Pavel Milyukov, a Liberal political leader and historian, was one of the main figures of the year 1917. He offered a scheme according to which the revolutions become inevitable:
– When the people urgently need a large-scale political or social reform;
– When the government is against peaceful settlement of the problem;
– When the government is no longer able to act by force;
– When the people not only stop fearing the government but also start despising it and laughing at it openly.
What Surprises Contemporaries in during Revolutions? All Russia’s Revolutions prove the famous Napoleonic phrase: «You cannot start or stop a revolution.» Therefore, it is little wonder that it is impossible to separate synthetically a political revolution from a social one. What is most surprising about revolutionary times is the rapid devaluation of democratic ideals, a phenomenon characteristic among both the «leaders» and the «masses.» There are clear reasons for this. For example, in 1917–1918 there were two forms of democracy: an «established» form which was based on Duma traditions and oriented towards European standards, and a soviet form which had never been practiced in history before. These two forms could not find any middle ground; first there was crisis and then they turned to ostensibly outdated systems of rule.
Thus the Soviet «democracy» turned to single-party rule based on military patterns. «Established» democracy, on the other hand, was forced to cooperate with and later comply to «white» generals with pseudo-fascist ambitions. As a result, the country had to choose not between two forms of democracy, but rather between «red» and «white» dictatorships.
But these realities were not well understood by contemporaries who analyzed events using highly emotional language to express their feelings about the revolution: «flood», «windstorm», «maelstrom», «hurricane», «explosion», and «ecstasy». «Purification» and «regeneration» – this is what was expected to be seen after the cataclysm. And even Lev Tolstoy, one of the most vigorous critics of violence, compared the revolution of 1905 with the birth of a new life and admitted that it was beneficial and creates an «abyss of good».
Thus, carried away by revolutionary enthusiasm, few paid any attention to the actions of The Black Hundreds or the appearance of a great number of adventurists – people without any past, with made-up biographies. But as time went on, the «dirty foam» of the revolution and the immorality of its participants moved to the forefront. The well-known Manifesto of the 17 of October, 1905 (which guaranteed Russia the main civil liberties and gave the country the Legislative Duma) evoked the massacres of «patriots» in hundreds of cities in 36 Russian provinces. During one month more than 4,000 people died and about 10,000 people were disabled in the course of The Black Hundreds pogroms. Universities and gymnasiums were under siege. Due to nonfeasance of the authorities and particularly Nicholas II, in many towns a terror set in.
During the months of February and March 1917, the cruel chaos grew: there were corpses of gendarmes with ripped open bellies in Petrograd, the mad chase of officers in Kronstadt, vigilante justice in Yelets. An officer Fyodor Stepun, a future philosopher and sociologist, described Petrograd of 1917:
«I thought that I would find it exasperate, magnificent, filled with revolutionary romantics… My impression was indeed strong but the opposite of what I expected. Petrograd – from the outside to the inside – presented an utter picture of dissoluteness, monotony and platitude. The town looked unusual and was definitely going through rough times. Endless red flags were fluttering in the air, but not as banners and colors of revolution, but, instead, they were hanging down along grey walls as dusty red pieces of cloth. A crowd of grey soldiers wearing shirts and greatcoats was drilling around grand squares and wide streets of the city, a picture obviously contradicting the scale and grandeur of the event. Occasionally, armored cars and trucks full of soldiers and workers passed by with noise: guns atilt, tumbled hair and angry, mad eyes. No, this is not the great idea of the revolution that I had heard about at the front, neither is it the nation desire to justify freedom, but its vile antithesis… This is a drunken joy that «the day is ours,» that we are making merry and not going to have to explain anything to anybody.»
«The source of true folk-spirit of the people» often produced something that didn’t comply with the primary ideas of the revolutionaries. The spontaneous socialism of the opposed contained not only constructive but also destructive principles. Those who had faced it were ready to put testify that the revolution «evokes in a person not only a beast but also a fool.» (Emigrant Sociologist Pitirim Sorokin).
One of the Bolsheviks’ leaders – while complaining about the economical crisis after October, 1917 – admitted regrettably that a worker turns into a pensioner of the state, into a parasite sponging on it. But this remark as well as many others was lost in the overall appetence to a new culture, a new man. Few indeed thought about the consequences and the costs of the revolution. There was no need to think about the past and the present when the old was being replaced by the new, when the «new man» was being formed.
The Russian Revolutions of the XX century have not avoided the destiny of The French Revolution: some people glorify them as a historical landmark in humanity’s liberation from oppression, others curse them as a catastrophe and crime; some consider the revolutionaries as saints, while for others they are monsters.
Is it Possible to Control a Revolution?
Sometimes a revolution is compared to an abdominal surgical operation, the charge that one has to pay for having rejected preventive routine treatment. At the same time drastic intervention can sometimes be the only guarantee of recovery.
The Twentieth century produced two paths towards revolution: either the current power regime quickly intercepts the initiative from revolutionists and extinguishes as soon as possible the flames of popular indignation, or revolutionists themselves fully bring their slogans to life. The revolution of 1905 made the government cast away its endless hesitation and doubts, stop talking and start doing. At that, a more radical reform project of a larger scale was chosen. The two greatest Russian reformers, Sergey Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, headed the Council of Ministers. During the revolution situation, they worked to simultaneously suppressed popular anger and rebellion, while conducting reform measures. In short, they followed the classical rule: if all forces are spent fighting the revolution, its consequences can be temporarily eliminated. But while, relying on force, if fundamental changes and reforms are implemented, the revolutions causes can be eliminated.
In 1905–1907, personal immunity, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of unions were declared, agrarian reform was put into practice, redemption of payments for peasants were cancelled, duration of military service was reduced, universities received their autonomy, fines for participating in economic strikes were abolished. But at the same time, there were dragoons and drum-head court martial to stifle mass rebellions.
After February Revolution of 1917, along with democratic changes the Provisional Government also initiated an institutional basis for forced measures. To settle the summer crisis of 1917 the Provisional Government instigated, for instance, armed food detachments, which withdrew bread from peasants in the villages. The Provisional Government based itself on the brutal examples of the recent past: food requisitions, on the basis of set prices in 1914; a bread allotment of November of 1916 on the initiative of Rittikh, the tsar’s land minister; and «soldier groups» for compulsory agricultural tasks. Thus brutality led to brutality.
The Bolsheviks having taken power in Russia continued orienting themselves towards world revolution – the new era, in which working people all over the world would unite in a single world-commune. From October 1917 until March 1918, Lenin and his entourage took pains to indicate the form of the new Soviet State system and its regime. This led not only to anarchy, but massive armed rebellions of an absolutely anarchical mood and vision.
A bewildering number of different institutions appeared («labor communes», federations of «labor communes»). Many of these institutions enjoyed some autonomy; they had their own councils of people’s commissars. Soon each of them considered itself the legitimate local power, accepting the decrees of the central power as they saw fit. The same slogan of expropriation of expropriators was understood as «steal what has been stolen», as an appeal to take piece by piece all national property back to one’s own houses, attics and cellars.
All of this could have been predicted. But in that case Nikolay Berdyaev could not have been amazed by the «superhuman efforts» of Lenin, who in the span of five months came from being a marginalized party functionary to leading a massive national transformation. He called for the communization of all property, discipline, responsibility, and a complete restructuring. He exposed revolutionary phrase mongering, anarchic tastes and making «conjurations over an abyss.»
Indeed the most pitiless truth was discovered in the spring of 1918: it was impossible to overcome the crisis in the situation when each province represented «an independent republic,» while there was individual and group egoism, and anarchy ruled the market. Nothing but strong central power was able to reestablish lost economic ties and revered tries with the countryside rehabilitate a broken financial system, establish order and discipline.
In their practical activity the Bolsheviks too resorted to force, but on a much more massive scale then ever before witnessed in Russian history. At first forced was used systematically only in the limited patches of the most critical areas of supplying food. These methods continued the authoritarian tendencies of the war period. However, from May-June 1918 – a period, when there was a threat of restoration and counter-revolution, the Bolsheviks openly choose the way of defending soviet «strength» by any available means.
It is clear that the gradual retreat of both revolutionaries and their adversaries into «emergency» policy of force and violence was preceded by a long chain of events. The question «Who was the first to start?» usually leads nowhere. It is important to define the logic of the escalation violence itself because only that type of knowledge can inform politicians of the dangers in their decisions and actions. Perhaps we could accept the thesis «any violence is evil.» But when social confrontation reaches the point of civil war, society disintegrates. At such moments enemies and adversaries are kept beyond the moral, they are considered «inhuman», to which common human standards don’t apply. Then mere statements on the immorality of violence cannot stop anyone.
Long lasting extreme conditions were beneficial for the bureaucracy and state machinery because they received ever increasing power. This was the situation in 1905–1907, but it was even more evident after October 1917, when the old party Guard consisting of professional revolutionists exhausted itself. When new groups, led by «the common man,» arrived, the question of whether Russia was actually ready for a new regime became acute. Holding important posts, «the common man» introduced a whole range of new understandings to professional revolutionary activity, most notably the golden age of bureaucracy.
When directly connected to different social groups, bureaucracy is not dreadful. It’s not dreadful even when people infected by some anarchical illnesses come to the front. But when «the common man» is in charge, bureaucracy, the eternal problem of Russia comes to the fore. In fact, as Nikolay Osinskiy wrote to Lenin in October 1919: «the people actually bringing the dry algebraic formulas (created by Lenin) into practice are either poor managers or good functionaries (and often even bad functionaries). Only «bureaucrats» work at the most important posts. For important jobs we have a large amount of those who «know how to be on good terms with others», without hurting them.»
In bureaucracy form dominates over content. Bureaucracy in Russia became not only archaism but in a way a compensating machine in conditions when superficial forms do not have a proper support in industrial or technological potential. The efforts to artificially maintain sagging quasi-socialistic forms required social power. It was the Bureaucracy and national security forces which came to embody this power.
Is it Possible to avoid the Catastrophe of Revolution? Often the history of revolution turns out to be nothing more than a code of notions about revolutions. These histories characterize the mentality of those who reconstruct history, rather than the real history of the revolution itself. It seems clear enough, however that the «mystery» of Russian revolutions lies in the passion for extremes, a hope and belief that at in one stroke all problems can be solved, that unwanted past stays buried, and right away something new will be created.
Only smart policy can resist the logic of Russian radicalism and maximalism. Where there isn’t enough of it, an extraordinary commissar or commissioner appears. Yes, Russian revolutionaries along with Saint-Just might: the nature of events themselves leads us to results that we never had in mind. However, before 1905 as well as before 1917, reality contained a large diversity of evolutionary paths. But most importantly, history demonstrates that Russia could have been reformed. These are the true reforms that can prevent catastrophic situations; they represent the best way to break the spirit of revolution and lead its energy in a peaceful direction without turning towards radicalism.
However, nowadays most historians admit that the link between revolution and reform is more complicated, than it was once believed. Reforms can prevent a revolution but in certain cases they can give it an incentive. Late or half-completed reforms may stoke the flames of revolution. To avoid this, one shouldn’t be scared into not recognizing defects in the system and the need for corrections. By looking for excuses – functionaries are to blame, local officials are to blame, overzealous bureaucrats are the problem – sooner or later the blame will inevitably concentrate on the state itself.
Revolutionary forces can be held in check not only by the state, but also by society. Society is not a rival of to the state but a partner equally responsible for finding solutions in critical situations. It is society that is able to exercise pressure on the authorities; society can bring about timely renovation of the political elite, create a system of renovation and control its functions.
Revolution cannot be cast away, no matter how much someone wishes to do so. The heritage of revolution is still in institutions of the present. The revolution is no longer seen as infallible. Yes, it is true that its image is now vague and unclear, but the symbols of revolution have not disappeared, have not lost their value, regardless of subjective intentions of those who wish to control the past and the present. The Revolution will always have adherents, who see in it the realization of such ideals as freedom, equality and fraternity of people and nations. The revolution will also have adversaries unwilling to forget radical tendencies. The question posed by great humanist Jean-Jaures remains unanswered: «Revolution is a barbaric form of progress. Will we have a chance to see the day when the form of human progress will be truly humane?»
Theme 4
EMERGENCY MEASURES AND THE «EXTREME EMERGENCY REGIME» IN THE SOVIET REPUBLIC AND OTHER STATE FORMATIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF RUSSIA, 1918‒1920
In 1917, a democratic republic with maximum political legality began to take shape. It was the first time that the state began to reject authoritarian mechanisms; retributive policies declined; police and the secret political police force «Okhranka» were disbanded. That was the moment when two alternative forms of democracy came into sight on the political arena: one of them was Petrograd Soviet of Workers and Soldiers Deputies, an unofficial but highly legitimate body elected by workers, soldiers, and sailors to represent their interests – but it was untested. The other was the Provisional Government, which based itself on Duma (that is, parliamentary) traditions and embraced European models. This government promised to convene a «Constituent Assembly» in order to establish a new form of government for Russia. The holders of both types promised people to pull the country out of World War I and overcome the extreme crisis the country found itself in. Moreover, all sides promised to do so without resorting to a regime of so-called «high state of alert» based on the Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace (the security law of August 14, 1881), the rules of which were so intimately known to the majority of territories of the Russian Empire since 1881.
History gave the possibility to test this crucial statement both to the Bolsheviks and their political opponents. Soon the idea of democracy lost widespread public support. The Petrograd Soviet and the Provisional Government failed compromise or find agreement on basis issues, and subsequently found themselves in the state of crisis. Both sides turned to seemingly outmoded forms of authoritarian politics. The country had to choose between two kinds of dictatorship: «the Whites» and «the Reds», and not between two forms of democracy, based on either the Provisional Government or the Petrograd Soviet. Soviet democracy was transformed into a one-party militarized dictatorship.. The members of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly began to cooperate with, and later knuckled under to, the «white» restorationist generals.
In the Soviet Republic and new state formations that appeared on the territory of Russia during 1918–1920, this process was accompanied by the establishment of «firm authority.» Extraordinary forces played a certain role in this, but more than anything else the «emergency regime» that was announced by the ruling circles – quite consciously but without any real need – was put in place for the sake of keeping power in their hands. There was a certain synchronicity in this process, with both sides exhibiting similar tendencies. In addition, this process occurred despite doctrinal statements from each of the opposing forces that rejected such a regime.
What set apart the regime of emergency measures? First of all, it began the turn to mass terror as a form of governance, as a means of liquidating enemies, moral intimidation and suppression of any resistance. This process was inevitably cloaked in some appropriate ideological language («a threat of counterrevolution», «radicalization of the class struggle», «a threat to democracy», etc.). Part of the population was declared to be «enemies of the people»: they were double-dealers, betrayers, spies, diversionists, saboteurs. It meant that they were not «friends» but «foes,» and so any means were admissible in the fight against them. The «extreme emergency» regime also meant the suppression of regular governing bodies by extraordinary ones, and the simplification of justice through bypassing legal proceedings. In general, it enabled a particular style of leadership and empowered certain social groups.
The emergency situation (withdrawal from the World War, accompanied by demilitarization of the economy and demobilization of the army, famine, the threat of the restoration of the former regime, etc.) objectively called into existence the idea of a «firm authority.» This idea entailed a system of extraordinary bodies, which, according to Lenin’s order, were vested with full dictatorial powers; as well as progressive delegation of some emergency functions to a number of the regular state forces (for instance, to the People’s Commissariat of Communications and Provisions). At first this process was perceived as a temporary phenomenon, which no one associated with the Bolsheviks’ basic prescriptions. The staff of the extraordinary bodies was not numerous; their creation came with a proviso on the observance of certain conditions – they were to function under broad local control; they were to be temporary, local, and finally subordinated directly to Lenin, who was not seen as dictatorial.
The decree of The Council of People’s Commissars on November 22, 1917 confirmed the principles governing the activities of people’s courts and revolutionary tribunals, which had under their jurisdiction special committees of inquiry fighting against counterrevolution. They were elected by the Soviets, consisted of the chairman and two members and considered cases of counterrevolutionary misdeeds, speculation and anti-regime agitation. On May 29, 1918, under the jurisdiction of All-Russian Central Executive Committee (VTsIK), the Revolutionary courts martial (Revtribunal) was founded. It investigated cases of special importance. It was not unusual that the Soviets carried out judicial functions since the «bourgeois principle» of the separation of powers into legislative, executive and judicial branches was totally abandoned.
By the term «revolutionary justice» most Bolshevik chairmen did not mean equal justice for everybody, because, according to their opinion, there was no and could not be any justice in a class society. At the same time, until the summer of 1918, when the Civil War re-intensified, people witnessed mild sanctions being applied to the most evident oppositionists to the Revolution, such as release from custody on parole and conditional sentences, even as they also witnessed cruel lynchings, pogroms and slaughter. For example, in January 1918, Moscow courts passed out thirteen percent suspended sentences, while in the second part of the year, the number of such sentences mounted to 40 %.
On December 7, 1917, the decree of The Council of People’s Commissars established All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Speculation and Sabotage (the Cheka) to protect the gains of the Revolution. Felix Dzerzhinsky became the Cheka’s head. He made the relationship of these organs to law enforcement agencies clear in his inaugural address: «Do not think that I am seeking any forms of revolutionary justice; we do not need justice today. Now we have to fight, face to face, it is a struggle for life or death, who will win out?! I propose – indeed, I insist on organizing revolutionary slaughter of counter-revolutionary agents».
However, only three months later did the Cheka obtain the right to found local Extraordinary Commissions in provincial and district centers. The decree of the Council of People’s Commissars of February 21, 1918 – «The Socialist motherland in danger» – gave it the right of extrajudicial killing of «enemy agents, speculators, housebreakers, hooligans, counter-revolutionary propagandists as well as German spies.»
It goes without saying that there was nothing unusual in the formation of extraordinary agencies. However, there was one condition – that their activity should have been based on the people’s self-activity; emergency measures and corresponding bodies should have compensated for the failures and weaknesses of the Soviets. Under an authoritarian administration, special governing bodies take a different meaning and play a different role in the power structure.
In May 1918, the Bolshevik government found itself at an impasse regarding economic policy. It was impossible to establish a bread monopoly gently. External as well as internal military pressure had reached its critical point. In such conditions for their own sake the authorities made a conscious decision to go beyond the limits of simple emergency measures. They plunged themselves and the society into the «extreme emergency» regime. The commissars believed that only extreme measures, and not planned legal activities, could solve acute contradictions and transform them into something new. Provisional dictatorship was imposed; the VTsIK began to expel the Mensheviks, right orientated social revolutionaries and then left orientated social revolutionaries from the Committee. In his speech at the rally in Butyrsky district of Moscow, after the attempted assassination of Lenin, which took place on August 30, 1918, Nikolai Osinskii said: «All the bourgeois elements placed on record and taken under public supervision must be divided into three groups. We will annihilate the active ones and those who constitute a threat. The others will be clapped by the heels. The third group will be subjected to hard labor, and those who are not able to work will go to camps.
Little by little, such methods assumed an uncontrollable character. Moreover, extraordinary agencies did not yet have strictly determined prescriptions and legitimate principles regulating their activity. The committees of the poor (kombeds), food brigades (prodotryads), blocking troops (barrier troops), revolutionary tribunals and local authorities were becoming almost uncontrollable. Quite soon the Cheka formed its net in all guberniyas and uyezds (provincial centers); it gained the right of peremptory judgments on questions of life and death. In a number of offices it could even exercise control over the activity of local judicial bodies and subordinate local committees of the ruling party.
In their letters people asked Lenin avowedly and harshly: «Why has the dictatorship of the proletariat in local offices turned into a criminal dictatorship of lower class criminals?» «How come, that even on this great day, the day of the anniversary of the Great October Revolution, working people do not have any real rights and possibilities but have to fear the Cheka agents and their searches?»
The «extreme emergency» regime did not manage to strengthen the communist government. On the contrary it weakened it and generated a situation of anarchy. Neither the upper class, nor the lower class could control the activity of the other. A weak system of power was rapidly losing its social foundation. All classes of the society tired of the anarchy engulfing the country. Peasants and ordinary citizens had only one dream: order. The destiny of the Bolsheviks depended on the transformation of the «extreme emergency» regime into a strictly organized form of dictatorship.
Beginning in September 1918, one could record the reining in of some manifestations of the «extreme emergency» regime, first and foremost the use of mass terror as a form of governing. The emergency measures and agencies were also brought within bounds of the law and strict regulatory activity. Only with this strategy could they manage to win over the majority of the population and form a firm rear echelon.
The decrees of the IV All-Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets in November 1918 proclaimed amnesty. Local extraordinary committees lost the right to seize hostages, and consequently only the central office of the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission was authorized to do so. A considerable number of hostages who had been seized before were freed. The committees of the poor (the kombeds) were eliminated. «Revolutionary law» came into force. All these decisions manifested the readiness of the Bolsheviks for a long-term war, as well as comprehension that they could not make war in the conditions of disorder and instability that marked the «extreme emergency» regime. In justifying the necessity of the aforementioned decrees, and primarily of the one concerning amnesty, the authorities wanted to demonstrate that they were sufficiently strong, and that they were ready to reconcile with all their enemies who would agree to submit to Soviet power.
On February 17, 1919, with reference to the decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, the VTsIK declared the transfer of the right of adjudication from the extraordinary commissions to revolutionary tribunals. But this did not mean that these measures put an end to the manifestations of the «extreme emergency» regime. The Cheka kept its full powers in the regions where Soviet power had proclaimed martial law, and in 1919 such regions prevailed. Revolutionary tribunals were not, and could not be, a model of justice. Extraordinary commissions issued their judgments at the end of a trial, and revolutionary tribunals examined the cases on the basis of these judgments. Moreover, members of extraordinary committees were required to be members of the revolutionary tribunals. Standing orders on the revolutionary tribunals, which were adopted by VTsIK on April 12, 1919, prescribed that they were to be governed only by the conditions of the case and revolutionary conscience while judging.
Revolutionary tribunals were formed in the Military Revolutionary Councils at the fronts, and in the armies and corps as well; they were called Military Revolutionary Tribunals. Not only military men and prisoners of war were under their jurisdiction, but all criminals who had committed crimes within the zone of military operations as well. The sentences were enforced immediately. Death sentences were executed after two days; their enforcement could be stopped by the corresponding Military Revolutionary Council.
All extraordinary committees underwent organizational changes. This was, perhaps, the main sign of a return to the regime of regular emergency measures. Indicative in this context were the warnings by Petr Kropotkin, the anarchist theorist, in his letter to Lenin dated September 17, 1918, that the extraordinary bodies were on the eve of a serious trial. Like all other theorists of the revolution, Kropotkin appealed to the experience of the French Revolution. He tried to show how the terrorists of the Committee of General Security (the National Guard) became its grave-diggers in 1794. His studies of the literature made Kropotkin conclude that along with the Committee of General Rescue and particularly with the Paris Commune founded in 1793, «along with this revolutionary force, which was already partly constructive, another type appeared that was a police force, presented by Committee of General Security and its police departments. At first, this police force that had achieved momentum during the Reign of Terror, demolished the Sections (agencies of the People’s Revolution that appeared in large cities – G. B.), then the Commune and finally the Committee of General Security itself,» he wrote to Lenin.
Kropotkin did not conceal from Lenin the reason why he needed to examine this period of history: «Your comrades/terrorists are about to do the same in the Soviet Republic.» The Russian people have a great reserve of creative potential. Hardly had these forces begun to rebuild life on a new foundation from the complete ruin brought on by the war and revolution, when «the police, with their duties imposed on them by the Terror, commenced their corrosive and pernicious activity». They paralyzed any kind of construction and appointed completely inadequate people. Police cannot be a «builder» of a new life. But nevertheless it was the police who were becoming the supreme power in all small towns and villages. «Where will such a situation lead Russia?» asked Kropotkin. «I believe it will provoke the fiercest reaction.» The first signal of understanding this danger was «The decree on the All-Russian and local extraordinary committees» adopted by VTsIK in October 28, 1918. The document stipulated the controlled status of the local Chekas and their subordination to the Soviets and executive committees. In January 1919, Political Bureaus replaced local extraordinary committees in the districts. They were headed by the chiefs of the local police departments. Beginning February 17, 1919, in accordance with the decree of VTsIK, the All-Russian Extraordinary Committee had the right to administer punishment only in regions under martial law.
However, regulation of the activity of all extraordinary committees as well as of revolutionary tribunals had an ambiguous character and in reality its effect was minimal. Their activity was directly subordinate to Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party through Dzerzhinsky’s office; to be more precise, it was subordinated to Lenin personally.
All of these contradictions in reforming the structure of the extraordinary bodies caused new surges of the «extreme emergency regime» throughout the Civil War. It would be enough to mention how they tried to solve the food problem of February and April of 1919, the summer punitive expedition of 1919 to Ukraine, the Crimean events in late 1920, and the events in Tambov guberniya in 1920–1921.
The dissolution of the Ukrainian Rada at the end of 1918 and the foundation of the Ukrainian State in place of the Ukrainian People’s Republic signaled the dictatorial tendency of numerous newly organized state formations which were out of Bolshevik control. «The law on the interim state structure of the Ukrainian government» vested hetman Skoropadski with dictatorial authority.
The situation in the North of Russia was almost the same. At the end of 1918, in Archangelsk, Soviet power was overthrown and a «socialist» supreme government of the North region was formed. The city was opened to the troops of interventionist countries. However, after a failed military coup undertaken by the «Rightists», contradictions between «democratic» authorities and the occupation administration finally led to the formation in early October of a new «neosocialist» Provisional government. Socio-political powers were reorganized toward the «Rightists» and a regime of «hard power.»
In August, political organizations such as «The Unity of Renaissance» and «The National Center» – masterminds of the «White cause» – formed a consolidated platform, the meaning of which was articulated in the following statement: «In the process of state formation and until the moment the state structure is completed, authority […] must be vested in an authorized, strong, and independent supreme body capable of acting. Its structure will consist of a directorate of three: a Commander-in-Chief of counterrevolutionary armies and two representatives of socialist and non-socialist movements».
When in September the destiny of the Committee of Russian Constituent Assembly members was called in question due to the activity of the Red Army, state power started to concentrate in Omsk. The Council of Ministers was deprived of its decision-making function, which was delegated to the Administrative Council. It embodied the heads of all ministries of the Siberian regional government and their deputies. On September 8, the Siberian regional Duma came under full jurisdiction of the Administrative Council, which even had the right to dissolve it.
At the same time Grishin-Almazov, a moderate defense minister, was removed from office and replaced by Ivanov-Rinov. The latter did not just quickly restore the signs and symbols of the former regime but also gave the army absolute freedom of action by his directives. The army was permitted to do with civilians whatever it wished. Any semblance of civilian control over the military was eliminated.
The Directory of Ufa shared the same fate. Finally, in September 1918, during a meeting of merchants and manufacturers in Omsk the following statement was announced: «We’ve seen all the political parties in power, but the only result has been the destruction of Russia. We need a strong reasonable authority with a heart of stone to keep Russia alive. Russia is at war, every piece of its territory is a theater of operations, so there cannot be two ruling powers, there has to be only one, and that one should be the military.»
It was Admiral Kolchak who was entrusted with the mission of creating a strong power structure. As a consequence of the coup d’etat of November 1918, he became Supreme Leader of the Russian State. He stated then: «They call me a «dictator» – so be it… I’m not afraid of this word and I always remember that from the earliest times dictatorship has been a republican institution. As well as the Senate of ancient Rome, which appointed a dictator to rule the country passing through hard times, the Council of Ministers of Russia named me to the Supreme Governor during the most difficult period of the state.»
The extraordinary bodies formed in Kolchak’s administration (under such generals as Denikin, Yudenich and others), strongly resembled «state power,» though under the generals’ jurisdiction. Military bodies played a particular role in the machinery of punishment and repression. Those military bodies were represented by front-line and military field courts, but particularly by the counter-intelligence agencies that appeared haphazardly and everywhere. These departments of military control never were as much applied as during the Civil War. They were created by the main headquarters, military governors, in almost every military unit, political organization and governmental authority. Like extraordinary committees in the Soviet Republic, they symbolized the lack of trust and suspiciousness that reigned all over the country.
Apart from a counterintelligence service, Kolchak formed special purpose police units. In March 1919, the agencies of «state security» were founded under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior. They were attached to the regional governors; their purpose was to fight against political criminals. According to the law enacted in April, an enterprise or any other establishment using their private funds could hire «police teams» for their own protection.
The creation of special extraordinary bodies, such as Osvag (agencies controlling a web of informants under the jurisdiction of the head of the special Council affiliated to the Commander-in-Chief), was a peculiar feature of the southern armed forces. Besides fulfilling counterintelligence functions, it had to supervise the political moods of the population. Special committees of the Volunteer armies (the generals’ extraordinary agency) were also founded to examine the pre-revolutionary background of the officer corps.
«The Whites» exercised judicial authority as strangely as the Reds, despite official separation of powers. «Regular» law enforcement agencies of the new state formations as well as of regions freed from the «Reds» went by pre-revolutionary legislation, though with certain alterations. But they acted only after military field courts. According to the «white» court procedure, an arrested person’s case was to be examined within 24 hours. Then the prisoner, whoever he might be, was either released (in this case he was supplied with an appropriate paper) or executed by shooting.
According to the legislation of war time, the list of grounds for prosecution included such causes as Bolshevik party membership or a top rank or political post in the Red Army. However, according to G. William’s (a «white» emigrant) recollections about the activity of the Novorossiisk counterintelligence agency, it was «so very easy to get in that dreadful place that might as well lead you to the grave». All an agent needed to do to start a classic counterintelligence prosecution was to find out that somebody living in the Volunteer Army region had a nice (in the agent’s opinion) sum of money. Political loyalty of all common people was «questioned.» At the same time, senior officers at the front were above any suspicion. They were supported and protected by counterintelligence, the criminal investigation department, and state guards. From William’s point of view, it was that «throng» of protected officers that finally brought the Volunteer Army to destruction.
No state formation before, during or after Kolchak’s dictatorship could avoid manifestations of the extreme emergency regime. The Committee of the Constituent Assembly before its breakdown resorted to execution by shooting of disgruntled inhabitants of towns and villages. Lieutenant general Rychkov, who headed the social revolutionary military units in Kazan, announced the order that confirms this information after a demonstration of Kazan workers in September 1918: «In case of the slightest attempt to disturb the peace on the part of any social group, and particularly workers, in any district where it happens, we will open fire.» And indeed, working districts in Kazan were shelled. In October 1918, leaving Samara, the Committee of the Constituent Assembly sent a punitive detachment to the factory center Ivaschenkovo.
Eighteen rebellions, civil disturbances and manifestations of disobedience, which took place from August 1918 until August 1919, indicate what means the Interim Government of the North areas resorted to. In January 1919, General Miller arrived in Arkhangelsk. Extraordinary measures and Terror, including economic extraordinary measures directed against the local bourgeoisie, became his governing methods.
Admiral Kolchak frankly spoke about his first months in power. He said: «Dissatisfaction with the internal administration is caused by the illegal activity of the lowest government agents, both military and civil. The activity of the heads of local police departments as well as of special purpose units is openly criminal.» Local Cossack organizations, which were taking part in liberating Siberia in the autumn 1918, turned out to be virtually useless as a support for the authorities. Kolchak admitted that atamans Kalmykov, Semenov, Unguern-Shtenberg, Gamov, Annenkov’s detachments «easily assumed functions of the political police and created special counterintelligence bodies.»
These agencies did not have any link with prosecutor’s office. The land council of Primorie complained about the fact that Cossack detachments organized private extrajudicial killings of political opponents – that is, everybody they met on their way. The Semipalatinsk cooperative union formally protested against ataman Annenkov’s activity several times, giving a warning note that his actions could destroy the reputation of the Omsk government and threaten the common mission of reconstituting the Russian state.
Admiral Kolchak also complained about the fact that counterintelligence offices were formed on the pattern of those which acted in Siberia under the Soviet regime, though counterintelligence should be presented only to Kolchak’s headquarters. They did not manage to control and oppress outposts, barrier troops on the railroads, or commissars authorized to represent the commanders at the front.
With the help of a whole range of decrees Kolchak tried to put an end to numerous cases of illegal confiscations, abuse of authority and the existence of police torture chambers. However, six months after coming to power he had to admit that the «malicious evil that has been killing our state and military forces since 1914 has re-appeared and is spreading.»
Sensing imminent defeat, military leaders left no stone unturned. In many places, manifestations of the extreme emergency regime appeared in the rear of Kolchak’s army, initiated from the top. It is sufficient to cite General Matkovsky’s brief order concerning the slaughter of insurgents in the villages near Omsk revolting against Kolchak’s soldiers:
«I. To scrupulously search every armed inhabitant of villages in rebellion; shoot them at the scene as enemies and traitors.
II. On the basis of evidence obtained from the inhabitants, to arrest all propagandists, members of the Soviet of Deputies who helped to organize riots, deserters, sympathizers, and those who conceal rebels and to take them to the military field court.
III. To deport unreliable and depraved persons to the Berezovsky and Nerchensky regions, sending them to the police.
IV. To bring to court, impose harsh sentences, and apply death-penalties to local authorities who did not show adequate resistance to bandits, who executed their orders and did not take steps for the liquidation of the Reds using their own means and capabilities.
V. To demolish villages where repetitive rebellions have been organized with redoubled severity, up to their complete liquidation.»
«White» armies acquired deplorable habits under General Denikin. Robberies, brigandism and other crimes against property were not prosecuted, so they became an ordinary phenomenon. An honest soldier became a prowler. Mean motives and rough arbitrariness replaced political correctness and mere human decency.
The negative influence of these battlefield morals on the rear was particularly felt in the Crimea after the retaking of Novorossiysk. Here are prince Obolensky’s reminiscences: «One morning on their way to school, children saw dead people with protruded tongues who had been hung from lamp posts in the streets of Simferopol. Never before had Simferopol seen anything like that. Even the Bolsheviks tempered their bloody business without such demonstrations.» It turned out that it was General Kutepov’s order, his way of terrorizing Simferopol Bolsheviks. The local Duma passed an official objection, and the Mayor went to Kutepov to persuade him to immediately remove the corpses from the street lamps. Kutepov gave the following answer to the the petition to cease public executions: «I have never abused public executions, but the current situation forced me to fall back upon such measures.»
In his memoirs Denikin called this and other similar incidents «black chapters» in the history of his Army. He did not hide the fact that most of the counterintelligence offices, particularly in Kiev, Kharkov, Odessa and Rostov, represented hotbeds of provocation and organized plundering. A two-way struggle was organized against this kind of offence; on the one hand they fought the agencies themselves, and on the other hand they fought individuals. In the long run the General had to admit the inefficiency and tardiness of the struggle.
Baron Wrangell tried as well to put an end to the ills of the epoch of «voluntarism.» This is demonstrated by his orders from April 1920 to June 1920, which mandated the end to violence against people. On April 27, the Department of Justice was detached from the civil government to fight against criminality. A peculiar judicial measure was Wrangell’s decree dated May 11, which ordered administrative deportation to Soviet Russia. Governors and fortress commandants were authorized to resort to such measures under a prosecutor’s supervision. The counterintelligence agencies, which were brought under control, almost stopped brigandage and acts of outrage. Criminals were subject to harsh sentencing. In his order of September 14, 1920 Wrangell expressed the following opinion about the military court commissions formed for civil protection against robbery and plunder: «The whole population living on the territories occupied by the troops of the Russian Army respects and trusts these commissions and their activity; in the immediate battle area, where a civil governing machinery is not yet properly formed, people believe these commissions to be their only protectors and address them with all their complains and problems.»
However, there was another opinion. Ivan Kalinin, former chairman of the Don Army military court commission, related that «Wrangell’s commissions never did any good,» that «the leader’s intention to establish a kind of «White Cheka» for the eradication of the lawlessness went down in flames». Later on, Wrangell himself had to admit the inadequacy of the counterintelligence agencies’ activities and criminal investigation actions, whose operations, in his opinion, were lagging. He wrote that «the population was tired of the Bolsheviks; at first, people waiting for peace greeted and welcomed enthusiastically the progress of the Army, but toward November 1919, little by little they began to feel again the atrocities of robberies, violence and arbitrariness. As a result the front collapsed and the rear rose in revolt.»
Thus, the Civil War has added new chapters to the history of the emergency regime that plagued Russia for long decades of the 19th and 20th centuries. An estimated 8 to 13 million people died on the battlefield, and of diseases, starvation, and terror. By the end of the war, about 2 million people had left the country. The damage to the national economy amounted to about 50 billion gold imperial rubles, industrial production dropped to between 4 and 20 percent of its 1913 level, and agricultural productivity decreased by almost fifty percent.
Despite the assurances of the Bolsheviks and the Provisional Government and its allies to permanently eliminate a system of governance based on the tsarist Statute on Measures to Protect State Order and Public Peace, their regimes added new dimensions to those rules. The extreme emergency regime introduced by the «Reds» and the «Whites» left traces across the whole battleground of the Civil War. In General Denikin’s words, this regime «caused the people’s cup of sorrow to overflow with new tears and blood, and it blurred the colors of the politico-military spectrum in the minds of the population, erasing the differences between the Savior and the Enemy.» To tell the truth, from time to time the Bolsheviks managed to restrain the war and regularize activity in the rear, which helped the Army and assisted in repulsing the attacks of the enemy. In the long run, it affected the outcome of the Civil War in the Bolsheviks’ favor. Nevertheless, extraordinary bodies that were once considered interim proliferated to a huge degree and became a state within a state. It was becoming more and more difficult to keep them within strict bounds and to put them under the supervision of regular state bodies. The end of the Civil War and the transition to the New Economic Policy provided hope that there would be dramatic changes in the structure of state administration.
Theme 5
FROM «WAR COMMUNISM» TO THE NEW ECONOMIC POLICY: CONTRADICTIONS OF THE NEP
The disturbances that struck Russia in 1914 reached their peak in early 1920s. Devastation of the industrial and transport sectors, fuel crises, strikes, demobilization, the revolt of the sailors of the Baltic fleet and Kronstadt: these are well-known manifestations of the general crisis. There are two phenomena, however, that more than others influenced the crisis situation. The first was the largest peasant rebellion since the times of Yemelian Pugachev. The second was the terrible famine that struck many regions of the country, mostly the Volga region.
Understanding the essence of the transition from the Civil War to peace requires analyzing the interconnection and correlation of the following phenomena: Soviet government policy, the peasant movement and the famine.
A new stage of the Civil War began in the summer of 1920. A peasant movement against the Bolsheviks, who did not want to change the policy of «War Communism» and its food rationing system (the system of surplus appropriation), spread to almost all provinces of Russia and Ukraine (the most notable rebellions were conducted by Makhno and Antonov). The struggle between peasants and Soviet troops was extremely severe. The struggle began in the context of the 1920 harvest failure and the surplus appropriation system that led to confiscation of more food from peasants than in 1918 and 1919.
So what could end such a vast peasant rebellion? Could it be the change of ration policy by the Bolsheviks, i.e. the replacement of the surplus appropriation system with an agricultural tax in kind? Or perhaps the military suppression of mass rebellions? Or simply famine?
Until recently, historians have regarded the adoption of the agricultural tax in kind as a political decision that made peasants immediately shift their alignment towards the Bolsheviks. But analysis of related documents does not provide any proof for this theory. It was only in central industrial provinces that most of peasants gladly accepted the adoption of agricultural tax in kind. People in other regions regarded it as a new form of surplus appropriation. The strongest resistance to efforts to collect the tax was manifested in Western Russia. Due to a severe crop failures in the South of Russia, the Soviet government made a decision to collect the bulk of the agricultural tax in kind from Siberia. Peasants’ resistance toward the tax collection was followed by punitive actions.
The agricultural tax in kind was perceived as another form of surplus appropriation in many Russian and Ukrainian provinces besides Siberia. This is a report of the State Political Directorate (GPU) made in October 1922: «Over two thirds of the crops will be gathered as the agricultural tax in kind in Pskov province. Peasants of Riazan and Tver provinces will starve if they are forced to pay 100 percent of the agricultural tax in kind. But it all pales in comparison to the incidence of suicides committed by peasants in Kiev province because of the excessive rates of the agricultural tax in kind.»
This is why the agricultural tax in kind did not really mean any relief for most of peasants in the situation of famine and economic chaos in 1921 and 1922, and therefore it could not have had a real impact on pacifying the insurgent peasants. The Bolshevik administration decided to crush the peasant movement. In Tambov province, for instance, regular troops under the command of Mikhail Tukhachevsky were deployed for this purpose. He issued a secret order in June 1921: «The remnants of defeated bands that fled from villages are gathering in forests. To immediately clear these forests I hereby command: Use poisonous gases in the forests where bandits are hiding, so that the poison cloud fills all the forest killing anyone hiding in it». Concentration camps were established in the province, families of insurgent peasants who refused to surrender became hostages, and their property was confiscated. But, after comparing various sources, we know that all these government steps were ineffective in suppressing the mass insurgency of peasants.
