Zonal Marking

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That proved prescient. Zaccheroni commenced the campaign with his usual system, although there was only one guaranteed starter up front. His old favourite Bierhoff began all 34 games and managed 19 goals: two penalties, three from open play with his feet, and 14 headers. Out wide, Zaccheroni struggled to find the right balance. George Weah wasn’t suited to the left-sided role, and despite his unquestionable talent, the 1995 Ballon d’Or winner wasn’t prolific, never finishing within ten goals of Serie A’s top goalscorer. Meanwhile, Maurizio Ganz scored some crucial late goals, but was workmanlike rather than explosive. Zaccheroni tried deploying playmakers rather than forwards in his front three. The magical Brazilian Leonardo showed flashes of brilliance, but was more effective coming off the bench.

Milan, Lazio and Fiorentina emerged as the three title contenders that season. Fiorentina were briefly favourites, but slumped after Gabriel Batistuta injured his knee in a goalless draw with Milan, and then his strike partner Edmundo allowed himself a mid-season break because he fancied heading to the carnival in Rio. Milan’s goalless draw at Lazio in early April, with eight games remaining, meant Lazio were nailed-on title favourites. But then came a major tactical shift.

Throughout the season Zaccheroni had only ever deployed Zvonimir Boban, the wonderfully gifted, tempestuous Croatian number 10, as one of his two central midfielders. Boban’s two dismissals in the first half of the campaign, meanwhile, meant two suspensions, two dressing-downs from Zaccheroni and widespread speculation that he would leave in January. However, a week after that goalless draw with Lazio, Milan welcomed Parma to San Siro and, for the first time, Zaccheroni deployed Boban as a number 10, floating behind Bierhoff and Weah in a 3–4–1–2, in a tactical change supposedly suggested by Demetrio Albertini and Alessandro Costacurta, two dressing-room leaders. Milan started nervously, and went behind. But Boban took control, and after Paolo Maldini smashed a brilliant right-footed equaliser past Gianluigi Buffon from outside the box, Milan piled on the pressure.

Boban, a tall, swaggering figure and the only Milan player to wear his shirt untucked, provided the game’s pivotal moment. Collecting the ball in the left-back position under pressure, he nonchalantly poked it past Parma’s Diego Fuser with the outside of his boot, charging onto it before teammate Guly could get in his way. Then, from just inside his own half, Boban launched a long pass over the top of the Parma defence with such perfect weight that it tempted Buffon to advance, but also enabled Milan striker Ganz to prod it past the Parma goalkeeper on the volley, before he outpaced the recovering Fabio Cannavaro to slide it into an empty net. 2–1. Boban was magnificent, and received a standing ovation from the Milan supporters as he was substituted. Later that day Lazio lost the Rome derby 3–1 to a Francesco Totti-inspired Roma. Suddenly, the title race was on. More importantly, number 10s were now sexy again.

The following weekend Zaccheroni and Bierhoff returned to Udinese. Both received a rapturous reception upon emerging from the tunnel; Zaccheroni put on his sunglasses as if trying to hide the tears, while Bierhoff, strangely, was presented with Udinese’s Player of the Year award ten months after he’d departed the Stadio Friuli. But neither were in the mood for niceties. Milan won 5–1, their most dominant performance of the campaign and a perfect demonstration of their new attacking trident’s powers. Boban scored the first two, Bierhoff added the next two – both headers, of course – and then came the most telling goal of Milan’s run-in. Boban received the ball in the number 10 position, casually sidestepped a dreadful two-footed lunge from Udinese defender Valerio Bertotto, and found himself with Weah running into the left-hand channel and Bierhoff running into the right-hand channel. Boban glanced towards Weah but slipped in Bierhoff, who chipped a cross over goalkeeper Luigi Turci, allowing Weah to nod into an empty net. Milan were rampant, and now top for the first time, having suddenly stumbled on this system. It was the perfect trio: Boban offered the invention, Weah the speed and Bierhoff the aerial power. ‘The type of player I am means I’m best suited to being behind the main strike force,’ Boban said. ‘I can’t be at my best in that role for all of the 34 games but I much prefer being in the centre of the field, where I’m more involved … Zaccheroni has made it possible for me to give my best. A lot has changed.’

It wasn’t plain sailing all the way to the title, and Milan had to rely on a last-minute own goal to defeat Sampdoria 3–2. Their most crucial victory came away at Juve. Milan were on the back foot throughout the first half, but after half-time a long, bouncing ball in behind gave Weah the chance to open the scoring by cleverly nodding over Angelo Peruzzi. Their second was another showcase of their front trio’s varied skill sets; Bierhoff battled for a high ball, Boban picked up possession and delicately half-volleyed the ball over the defence for Weah, who raced through, steadied himself and drove the ball home. The next week Milan defeated Empoli 4–0, with a Bierhoff hat-trick, and then recorded a final-day 2–1 victory at Perugia, a match interrupted when rioting home fans invaded the pitch, supposedly to delay the game and allow their relegation-threatened side an advantage by knowing the results of rivals’ matches. This delayed Milan’s confirmation as champions, too, but Zaccheroni’s side were eventually home and dry. It was one of the less convincing title victories of this era, but Milan captain Paolo Maldini declared it the most memorable of his seven Scudetti because it was so unexpected. Zaccheroni had overcome Milan’s obsession with 4–4–2, implemented a front three, and taken the Rossoneri – who finished in the bottom half the previous season – to the title.

Questions persisted about precisely who had suggested the change in system, and one man inevitably insisted on taking all the credit. Milan owner Silvio Berlusconi claimed it was his idea to deploy Boban as the number 10, which deeply offended Zaccheroni.

Whatever the truth, the number 10 had returned to prominence, and while 1999/2000 was an ugly season in Italian football, dominated by refereeing conspiracies and settled in controversial fashion on the final day, it was nevertheless a wonderful campaign for trequartisti.

A good example came at Giovanni Trapattoni’s Fiorentina, who finished as last of the seven sisters but offered arguably the most cohesive attacking trident. Gabriel Batistuta was the most complete striker of this era, and his closest support came from Enrico Chiesa, a speedy, two-footed forward capable of operating wide and shooting from acute angles. Behind them was Rui Costa, a classic number 10 adept at dribbling past challenges and slipping delicate passes in behind.

Fiorentina’s equaliser in a 1–1 draw with fierce rivals Juventus shortly before Christmas was a perfect example of their attacking potential; Rui Costa brought the ball through midfield and prodded it into the path of Chiesa down the left, and he fired a near-post cross into Batistuta, who converted smartly. This was precisely how the attacking trident was supposed to operate: the number 10 initiating the break, the second striker running into the channel, the number 9 scoring. Fiorentina’s opener in a 2–1 victory over Inter was another typical goal, coming when Rui Costa passed out to Chiesa on the left; his devilish cross tempted Angelo Peruzzi to advance, but the goalkeeper grasped at thin air, and Batistuta nodded into an empty net. However, Fiorentina didn’t produce these moments consistently enough, and their underwhelming league finish meant Batistuta’s nine-year love affair with Fiorentina was over – he moved to Roma.

Fabio Capello’s Roma had only finished one place above Fiorentina, but they were an exciting prospect. Capello was previously a strict 4–4–2 man, and therefore his decision to build the side around Totti, Italian football’s next great trequartista, was a significant moment in the revival of the number 10. Cafu and Vincent Candela were ready-made wing-backs, so Capello was another who turned to 3–4–1–2.

Fielded permanently behind two strikers, Totti was sensational. He dropped deep to create from midfield, and could arrive late in the penalty area to score. But Totti’s natural home was between the lines, and his speciality was a specific pass – retreating slightly to receive a ball from midfield and then whipping the ball around the corner first-time for a runner down the right, usually either Vincenzo Montella breaking in behind or Cafu sprinting from deep.

Roma’s best performance was their 4–1 derby victory over Lazio in November. All four goals came within the first half-hour and were scored in similar circumstances, with Delvecchio and Montella racing in behind, scoring two apiece, while Totti prowled between the lines. Roma briefly went top in autumn, although they collapsed dramatically in spring, winning just one of their last ten, failing to score in five of them. But that was a blessing in disguise, as it prompted Roma’s signing of Batistuta, and his goals fired Roma to Totti’s only Serie A title in 2000/01.

Fifth-placed Parma had a disjointed campaign. They were hindered by the inconsistency of their number 10 Ariel Ortega, who, having replaced Juan Verón successfully at Sampdoria, now replaced him less convincingly at Parma. A 3–0 victory over Verona in October showed their 3–4–1–2 had potential, with Ortega grabbing a goal, an assist and a pre-assist, and the two forwards, Hernán Crespo and Márcio Amoroso, all getting on the scoresheet.

Ortega linked particularly well with the wing-backs Fuser and Paolo Vanoli, but sadly struggled with alcoholism throughout his career, rarely justified his tag as the first of the many ‘new Maradonas’ and started fewer than half of the matches in 1999/2000. Without him, the manager Alberto Malesani varied between a more cautious 3–5–2, or a 3–4–3 with Amoroso and Di Vaio flanking Crespo, but in both systems Parma missed a trequartista.

Significantly, however, Parma finished level on points with Inter, who started 1999/2000 with unrivalled attacking options: Ronaldo, Christian Vieri, Iván Zamorano, Álvaro Recoba and – last and very much least in the eyes of coach Marcello Lippi – Roberto Baggio. His excellent season at Bologna had convinced Inter to sign him in the summer of 1998, although he endured a difficult first campaign, in a typically chaotic Inter season that featured three changes of coach.

Just as Baggio had been devastated at being reunited with Sacchi at Milan, now at Inter he suffered from the appointment of Lippi, with whom he’d rowed at Juventus. Lippi had little interest in Baggio, and even less interest in fielding a number 10; Vieri and Ronaldo were expected to cope by themselves, although injury problems meant they only once started together all season, in a 2–1 derby defeat to Milan, when Ronaldo was dismissed after half an hour for elbowing Roberto Ayala.

Like Parma, Inter struggled to create chances when playing 3–5–2, collecting only ten points from the nine matches before the opening of the January transfer window. They then completed a significant signing: Real Madrid’s Clarence Seedorf. Although the Dutchman had spent the majority of his career in a deeper position, he was instantly deployed as a number 10, and transformed Inter. On his debut, Inter defeated Perugia 5–0. Seedorf assisted the first, then dribbled inside from the left flank, produced a stepover so mesmeric that it left Perugia defender Roberto Ripa on the ground, and lifted the ball into the corner. Three more Inter goals followed, and Seedorf was substituted to a standing ovation. His arrival, and the shift from 3–5–2 to 3–4–1–2, meant Inter collected 23 points from their next ten games.

Baggio, meanwhile, didn’t start a single Serie A game until mid-January – Lippi was using anyone else he could find. For a January trip to Verona, Ronaldo, Vieri and Zamorano were all out, so Seedorf played behind Álvaro Recoba and unknown 21-year-old Adrian Mutu, making his first-ever Serie A start. Inter went 1–0 down, and Lippi spent the final stages of the first half speaking to a nonplussed Baggio on the edge of the technical area, giving him instructions with a succession of hand gestures in such a deliberate, overt way that he was surely asserting his authority as much as detailing specific plans. At half-time, Lippi introduced him as his number 10.

Baggio, never one for instructions, did his own thing. Two minutes into the second half, his through-ball to Vladimir Jugović bounced fortuitously to Recoba, who swept the ball home. Fifteen minutes from time, Recoba attacked down the left and stabbed a cross into the box that was met by Baggio, who slid in and diverted the ball into the far corner. Baggio celebrated passionately and, in typical fashion, used his post-match interview to slam Lippi for having questioned his level of fitness.

This didn’t stop Baggio from being handed his first start the following week, at home to Roma. Once again he won the game for Inter. After eight minutes he collected a pass from Seedorf in the inside-left channel, dribbled menacingly towards goal before poking a through-ball into the path of Vieri, who finished. Vieri, Baggio and Seedorf embraced, a trident on the same wavelength. They again connected shortly afterwards, but Vieri’s touch failed him. Roma equalised, but Inter responded; Vieri scuffed a shot into a defender, and the ball broke for onrushing wing-back Francesco Moriero, whose shot was saved by Francesco Antonioli and looped up into the air. Baggio took a couple of steps backwards to catch up with the ball, then produced a perfect over-the-shoulder volley, lobbing the ball over the recovering Cafu and delicately into the net. Baggio again celebrated wildly, and so did Lippi. Yet with others returning from injury, Baggio was dropped for the following weekend and used sparingly until the final weeks, once more omitted by an authoritarian coach.

Inter’s city rivals Milan started the campaign as defending champions, although their campaign was handicapped by injuries to Boban, who missed the first and last couple of months, meaning Zaccheroni sometimes reverted to 3–4–3. Milan were clearly better with Boban; he ran the show in a 2–1 victory over Parma, scoring both goals from free-kicks, which inevitably meant Berlusconi approved the system. ‘Boban was brilliant today, back to his best,’ he declared. ‘Today he had him playing behind a front two, which is one of the formations I like.’

Zaccheroni remained frustrated by Boban’s languidness and petulance, but he kept on proving his worth. In January 2000, Milan trailed Lecce 2–0 at San Siro having started with three outright strikers, so Zaccheroni replaced José Mari with Boban and switched from 3–4–3 to 3–4–1–2. Milan got a goal back immediately, then Boban crossed to Bierhoff for the equaliser, with the German striker wheeling away and pointing to Boban in his celebration. Then, in the final stages, Boban stepped up to take a free-kick and bent the ball over the wall and onto the angle between crossbar and post. The match finished 2–2, and Boban was the star despite playing only half an hour.

He was also the game’s outstanding player in a 2–1 victory over Lazio in February, receiving a standing ovation when he was substituted, before encountering yet more injury problems. These derailed Milan’s campaign. ‘We’d got very used to him playing behind us,’ said Andrei Shevchenko, who won the Capocannoniere with 24 goals in his first Serie A campaign. ‘He created the chances, he was the brains of the team, with amazingly creative ideas which he translated into balls for us to score. Now we have to take other routes to goal. That will take time.’

Second-placed Juventus were yet another side who used 3–4–1–2 throughout 1999/2000. That wasn’t particularly surprising considering they’d previously played that way under Lippi, but it became more significant when you considered the identity of their manager: Ancelotti. He was previously a strict 4–4–2 man who refused to accommodate a number 10. He didn’t want Zola, he didn’t want Baggio. At Juve, though, he couldn’t resist Zidane.

Upon his arrival at Juventus, Ancelotti discovered the squad were happy to make allowances for Zidane. One day, before an away trip, Zidane was late for the team coach and no one could get hold of him. A furious Ancelotti ordered the driver to leave without him, only for centre-back Paolo Montero to rush to the front of the coach and declare that they weren’t leaving without their talisman. Ancelotti relented, Zidane arrived ten minutes later, played well, and Juventus won the game. Gradually, Ancelotti understood the need to indulge number 10s, and started to regret his treatment of Baggio.