

# The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought

*Edited by*

Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi'



**The Blackwell Companion to  
Contemporary Islamic Thought**

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EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

# Contemporary Islamic Thought: One or Many?

Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi'

The progress of opinion is fluid and indefinite; it does not easily lend itself to any system of dates and clear-cut chronological divisions.

D.C. Somervell, *English Thought in the Nineteenth Century* (London: Methuen & Co., 1929), 1.

Modernization has taken place throughout the world through a series of social, political, and cultural movements that, unlike movements of change and rebellion in many other historical situations, have tended to combine orientations of protest and those of center-formation and institution-building. It has fostered the establishment of a universal civilization in which different societies have served one another as mutual reference points . . . The continuous spread of these assumptions throughout the world in a variety of guises – liberal, national, or socialist movements and ideologies – has greatly undermined the basis of legitimation found in historical or “traditional” societies.

S.N. Eisenstadt, “Post-Traditional Societies and the Continuity and Reconstruction of Tradition,” *Daedalus: Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, Winter 1973, 6.

The Renaissance breaks with medieval thought. Modern thought distinguishes itself from that of the medieval period by renouncing the dominant metaphysical preoccupation. The importance of partial truths is systematically valorized, while the pursuit of absolute knowledge is left to amateurs.

Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1989), 79.

Enlightenment thought . . . embraced the idea of progress, and actively sought that break with history and tradition which modernity espouses. It was, above

all, a secular movement that sought the demystification and desacralization of knowledge and social organization in order to liberate human beings from their chains.

David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 12–13.

In his seminal 1946 essay entitled “Politics and the English Language,” George Orwell bemoans the decline of English prose after World War Two, and points out that what is troublesome about some major English writing is *lack of precision, sheer incompetence, and vagueness*. This insight into the political language of England in the 1940s is, more or less, applicable to a good number of Western writings on Islam and the Muslim world, especially the journalistic type of writing. Our journalistic prose has often confused such terms as: (i) Islam; (ii) the Muslim world; (iii) Islamic history; and (iv) Islamic revivalism or fundamentalism.

The concept “contemporary Islamic thought” reflects a wide variety of intellectual currents dominating the contemporary Muslim world since roughly the end of World War Two, the rise of the nation-state and the beginning of the decolonization process. It is possible to delineate four major intellectual movements dominating contemporary Muslim intellectual life: (i) nationalism; (ii) Islamism; (iii) Westernization; and (iv) state ideology. Far from being monolithic, each of the preceding categories contains a diverse number of positions on national, religious, political, social, and economic issues and problems.<sup>1</sup>

Because of the complexity of the contemporary Muslim world and the nature of the political dynamics that have given rise to the nation-state in this world, it is impossible to talk of one homogenous Islamic intellectual history. In order to begin to analyze the different intellectual forces and modalities of the contemporary Muslim world, it is imperative to highlight the different intellectual histories of this world. Although there are some major commonalities between the several intellectual histories that make up contemporary Islamic thought, each intellectual history has responded to a unique set of circumstances and criteria that have in turn defined it over the past several decades. For example, the Partition of India and the subsequent creation of the modern nation-states of India and Pakistan in 1947 define, to a large extent, the contemporary intellectual history of Islam in South Asia. In the same vein, the emergence of the nation-state in Indonesia after centuries of Dutch colonialism defines the intellectual experience of the Muslims in that country.

It is only in the preceding sense that one can discern multiple intellectual histories in the contemporary Muslim world. These multiple intellectual histories reflect the complex cultural and economic transformations taking place in the Muslim world since the nineteenth century, to say the least, that is to say, since the advent of Western capitalism into many a Muslim country. As such, multiple intellectual histories have registered the cultural, religious, and intellectual responses to this encounter and documented the rise of new social classes, new blocs of power, and new intellectual forces in almost every Muslim country. This has been the more poignant since the official end of colonialism in the 1950s and 1960s.

In the political area, many journalists and political scientists have written the general outlines, at least, of the political history of the modern Muslim world. In a more specialized way, due to academic division of labor, a number of scholars have written the social and political histories of each Muslim country. However, writing the intellectual histories of the modern and contemporary Muslim world has been a formidable task indeed. To carry this out requires a team of scholars who are versed in several Islamic and Western languages and who are familiar with the social, economic, and intellectual histories of the modern and contemporary Muslim world. The collection of articles in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* is intended to fill a major lacuna in this area and alert us to the various currents of thought dominant in the contemporary Muslim world and their articulation of the questions and challenges facing it. In addition, this collection of articles helps us formulate comprehensive perspectives on the current movements of thought in Muslim societies.

Speaking of multiple Islamic intellectual histories reflects the following criteria: one is the diversity of intellectual trends in each intellectual history; second is the host of issues and problems each intellectual history tackles; and third is the starting point of each intellectual history. For example, as mentioned above, contemporary Islamic intellectual history in South Asia is more or less predicated on the Partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and the intellectual, moral, and political questions and burden generated by such Partition. In the case of Indonesia, contemporary Indonesian intellectual history begins more or less after the independence of the country in 1945 and as a response to the great problems facing the country since independence. In the same vein, Arab intellectual history in both the Middle East and North Africa begins with the onset of the decolonization process of the 1950s and 1960s and the construction of the nation-state in different parts of the Arab world. Contemporary Turkish thought, on the other hand, owes its existence to the Kemalist experiment and the foundation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923. In the latter case, it is quite impossible to address all the Turkish trends of thought emerging in the post-Republic phase without coming to grips with the intellectual genesis of Kemalism and its aversion to religion, that is, Islam in its private and public pronouncements and practices.<sup>2</sup>

So far, we have discerned four broad currents of thought in the contemporary Muslim world and ascertained that each current is deeply diverse, extremely complex, and is the product of various vital political, philosophical, religious, social, and historical conditions and formations. In other words, although some intellectual historians, such as the American Lovejoy,<sup>3</sup> argue that intellectual history is an autonomous field of knowledge, it is autonomous to the extent that it reflects the social and intellectual forces of each country. And it is a basic fact that these forces have been in constant interplay with one another.

Several worldviews constitute a people's intellectual history and as such, intellectual history is necessarily multidisciplinary by nature. It cuts across different fields of specialization, especially philosophy, theology, history, politics, and political economics. It is also guided by different philosophical and ideological positions. As it is clear in the various essays included in this *Companion*, ideology is at the heart of intellectual history. In other words, even a careful reading of any particular worldview constituting intellectual history will not render a purely objective picture of that trend. *Intellectual history*

is ideological by nature. Being ideological, one must read the constituent elements of intellectual history against their social, economic, and political backgrounds and contexts. What this means is that, "Intellectual history cannot claim to be the true or only history . . . It exists only in connection with, and in relation to, the surrounding political, economic, and social forces. The investigation of subjects of intellectual history leads beyond the purely intellectual world, and intellectual history per se does not exist."<sup>4</sup>

Because of the different worldviews they represent, intellectual historians do not work on the assumption of a shared specific method. This justifies the notion that intellectual history lacks one governing problematic. In effect, contemporary Islamic intellectual histories, far from being reduced to one problematic, are distinguished at the core by a variety of conceptual approaches and questions with varying degrees of intensity and interrelationship.

One may summarize these problematics as both internal and external. On the internal side, modern and contemporary Muslim intelligentsia have wrestled with the meaning of Muslim identity and tradition and their relevance to the contemporary concerns of the Muslim world. For example, Muslim women have begun to examine the position of the primary sources of Islam, that is to say, the Qur'an and hadith, on women and the relevance of these primary sources to the current realities of the Muslim world. The debate on women and Islam is most poignant in such countries as Iran, Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt, and Pakistan. On the external side, Muslim intellectuals have been wrestling with the big questions of modernity and globalization, their impact on Muslim societies, and the relationship between the Muslim world and the advanced capitalist West. All of these debates have something to say about the nature of the state, i.e., the ruling system, in the Muslim world. In other words, part of the story of multiple intellectual histories in the Muslim world revolves around the meaning of "the state" in contemporary Muslim intellectual discourse and the political elite's influence on contemporary Muslim societies. One might add that the intellectual history of "the state" in the modern and contemporary Muslim world is yet to be written. In other words, the intellectual history of the political elite in the contemporary Muslim world must be written in order to reflect the ideological positions of this elite over a period of time and its position on national as well as foreign issues.

In reading the articles of this *Companion*, it is imperative to form a general sense of the elite in contemporary Muslim societies. By and large, one can differentiate four different types of elite in the Muslim world: (i) political elite; (ii) business elite; (iii) military elite; and (iv) intellectual elite. One must pay special attention to the connection between the political and intellectual elite in the contemporary Muslim world. Although it is quite difficult to summarize this relationship in a few sentences, it suffices to say that the political elite of many Muslim countries does not hail from the educated classes and that power and wealth have been used by the ruling power elite to acquire knowledge or acquire men of knowledge who can be useful in maintaining the political and social status quo. To a large extent, the power elite has also put to use some religious intelligentsia in order to promote the status quo in the eyes of the masses. This is true in almost every Muslim country. However, that is not to say that all religious intelligentsia have been subservient to the state. A good number

of them have opposed the authority of the political elite and their international allies.<sup>5</sup>

*The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* wrestles with the works of those Muslim intellectuals who represent a variety of social and intellectual positions, and in that sense the various articles in this *Companion* will help us appreciate the core ideas discussed by some of the main intellectuals in the contemporary Muslim world. Some of these intellectuals belong to well-established religious classes in Muslim societies. They transmit a complex Islamic tradition in a highly dynamic age. Others have only recently risen to the fore. This is true, for example, with Ustaz Ashaari of Malaysia, whose grassroots organization has been banned by the government due to its challenge of the state's official religious discourse. (See Ahmad Fauzi Abdul Hamid's article on Ustaz Ashaari in this *Companion*.) The same can be said about the case of Fethullah Gülen of Turkey, living in exile in the United States since 2000, for his movement represents a great challenge to the authority of the Turkish state.<sup>6</sup> Gülen is a popular religious intellectual who has established and led the most powerful social and religious Islamic movement in contemporary Turkey, a movement that has been seen by some as posing a great danger to the Kemalist foundations of the Turkish Republic. Gülen was educated in the religious tradition current in East Turkey after the foundation of modern Turkey. His interpretation of the religious idiom has made him an attractive figure to a good number of religious intelligentsia in contemporary Turkey.

It is important to bear in mind that being an intellectual in the contemporary Muslim world is a difficult undertaking, indeed. The intellectuals, by and large, have been active in the anti-colonialist struggle and have had a vision about the construction of the nation-state after independence. However, a good number of contemporary Islamic intellectuals feel betrayed by the political elite of their countries. Some have actively tried to change the status quo, as in the case of religious leaders in Iran, while others, as in the case of the intellectuals of the Justice Party in Turkey, have opted to democratize their societies without attempting to change the Kemalist foundations of the state. A third type of Muslim intelligentsia and professional has opted to migrate to the West to seek their personal fortunes as an exit from their own dilemmas. The migration of intellectuals to Europe and North America has been a saga of the Third World since the dawn of imperialism. The rise of the United States to world prominence exacerbated the "brain drain" from the heart of the Muslim world. Therefore, it is erroneous to identify Muslim intellectual histories with just the intellectual forces present in the Muslim world. Many Muslim intellectuals in the West try every day to articulate a new identity that is in consonance with their social and political realities in the West.

The relationship of the intellectuals with the masses is very complex in contemporary Muslim societies. Religious intellectuals, by and large, have kept in touch with the masses. However, a good number of religious intellectuals have adopted the official side of the government line and represented the elite in their dealings with the masses. It is important to be guided, though not limited, by Antonio Gramsci's ideas on the meaning of intellectual and power, culture and politics, exile and creativity, civil society and religion. The distinction made by Gramsci between ecclesiastical and organic intellectuals might be helpful in dispelling some ambiguity about the role of the intellectual in contemporary Arab society. What prevents us from postulating that the most organic

intellectual in the Muslim world of late has been the ecclesiastical activist, he or she who speaks the language of the masses and identifies with their suffering and predicament?

On the whole, contemporary Islamic intellectual histories have dealt with the following questions and challenges. First is the issue of decolonization and political independence. Most Muslim countries have gained their independence from European colonialism only in the past several decades. Has political independence translated into a healthy process of modernization or economic development without any major objection from the Center? Second, in the decolonization process, all sorts of nationalist, secular and religious forces participated in order to rid their societies of European hegemony and exploitation. There was a measure of balance in the fight against the colonial structure. What happens to this balance after independence? How do some forces hijack political decisions after independence? Third, the Muslim world has experienced a tremendous demographic explosion since independence. What have been the ramifications of such an explosion on the infrastructure of modern Muslim societies and what happens to the population born after independence? Fourth, as a result of the lack of development in the countryside, the rural poor migrate to the cities or even overseas, as in the case of many people from North Africa. What is the fate of the new urban poor and the relationship between this phenomenon and religion or religious activism in contemporary Muslim societies? Fifth, there is the big question of the emerging political elite in Muslim societies after independence and the role of the military in politics and the shape of civil society. All of these are major questions that await answers. It is not farfetched to argue that liberal democracy is not a reality in most, if not all, Muslim countries. Why has this been the case? Is this due solely to internal factors? Furthermore, the political elite in the Muslim world has put religion, that is to say, Islam, to its use. It has not shown a tendency to free religion from the patronage of the state, and as a result, a good number of the religious intelligentsia have taken the side of the state against the poor. The religious intelligentsia has been effectively co-opted. Sixth, one must raise questions about the social origins of the ruling elite in contemporary Muslim countries. What class interests do they represent? What is their connection to world capitalism? Are they interested in democratizing their societies? Seventh, what happens to the Islamist movements after independence? The major ones were established during the colonial era and fought colonialism as vehemently as did the nationalist and secular forces. What is their fate in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa? Eighth, what is the role of intellectuals in the Muslim world after independence? This is a huge question with many possible answers. By and large, because of the prevailing political conditions in the Muslim world and the rule of either a military or tribal dictatorship, the intelligentsia has become disenchanted with the political structure and some resorted to silence or migration. The process of the "brain drain" is a direct result of actions on the part of the ruling elite in the contemporary Muslim world to accommodate their intelligentsia and secure a free environment for academic research and intellectual freedom, where the intelligentsia can thrive and help the intelligentsia of the *ancien regime* transcend their predicaments and problems. Ninth, oil is a major commodity in the modern world-system. This has created a unique situation in the Gulf states, where a number of underdeveloped countries with meager populations are pro-

tected by capitalist interests and are developed overnight in order to meet the demands of the capitalist market. Are the Gulf states modernized? In other words, are they part of the historical project of modernity? Do they lack modernism? Do they have modernization? Tenth is the question of Palestine. Is this the never-fading issue? What has been its impact on the Muslim world? Is it true that Western and American support of Israel and the lack of support for Palestinian rights have solidified the anti-American forces in the Muslim world? Or are these forces angry with America and the West because of what they endured under colonialism and neo-colonialism? Eleventh, one notices after independence the virtual lack of knowledge that Muslim countries have about each other. Educated people in Cairo, Istanbul, Karachi, and Jakarta know more about the West than they do about other Muslim countries. This phenomenon of the colonial past is still a problem today. How is it possible to develop inter-Islamic consciousness in an age of increasing specialization and in an age controlled by the Center? Furthermore, it is important to note that the educated people of the non-Arab Muslim world (i.e., Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia) know more about the Arab world than vice versa. Of course, much of this is due to the impact of Islam on these societies. This brings us to a whole host of questions about the lack of economic and political coordination in the Muslim world and its weak position *vis-à-vis* the world capitalist system. Twelfth is the status of religious sciences in the modern and contemporary Muslim world. There is no doubt that since its inception, the Islamic religious phenomenon contributed to the urbanization and modernization of the Muslim world. Islam is based on a sacred text, on literality. The Muslim world in the early modern period built a comprehensive system of madaris in order to impart Islamic teachings to the youth. In addition, Islamic civilization developed more or less an intact Islamic urban and literary cultural and religious system. However, all of this collapsed with the advent of colonialism in the Muslim world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

## The Nineteenth-Century Background of Contemporary Islamic Thought

In documenting the salient features of modern and contemporary Islamic intellectual histories, let us first focus our attention on the primary concerns of the Muslim intelligentsia at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Only in this way can we understand the problematics of contemporary Islamic thought. As a reaction to the penetration of Western capitalist modernity into all aspects of Muslim societies from the Arab world to Southeast Asia, a significant number of Muslim intellectuals began to write down the general outlines of a new intellectual project that is often referred to as "Islamic modernism." In the Arab world, Iran and the late Ottoman period<sup>7</sup> was represented by such luminaries as Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad 'Abduh, Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍa, Bediuzzaman Said Nursi (in his early phase), and a host of other religious scholars and thinkers who were intent on finding a rapprochement between their grand Islamic tradition and the scientific and philosophical achievements of capitalist modernity. In South Asia, the project of Islamic modernism was represented by such thinkers and activists as Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Amir Ali, Mawlana Abu al-Kalam Azad, and others.<sup>8</sup> In Southeast Asia, most

notably in Indonesia, the project of Islamic modernism was represented by the Muhammadiyah organization and its founder, Muhammad Dahlan.<sup>9</sup>

The major features of classical Islamic modernism were as follows: (i) the revival of rational elements in the Islamic tradition; (ii) finding Islamic solutions to the challenges of the West; (iii) embracing the philosophical and scientific features of modernity; (iv) constructing new academic and religious institutions to meet the challenges of modernity; (v) the revival of Kalam science; and (vi) the revival of Islamic languages and focus on foreign languages. Islamic modernism can be said to be composed of two major features at the beginning of the twentieth century: (i) on the one hand, it was deeply conscious of foreign occupation and its intellectual and educational design aimed at eradicating foreign control. This was the case with the Muhammadiyah; (ii) on the other hand, it saw the salvation of Muslims as being united with the foreign presence, as can be seen in the movement represented by Khan in India at the end of the nineteenth century. However, the logical outcome of both sides of Islamic modernism was to lay down the blueprint for an independent homeland for Muslims in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia.

Along with the rise of nationalism in different parts of the Muslim world in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Islamic modernism paved the way for the foundation of the nation-state in the modern Muslim world. In Indonesia, for example, Islamic modernism combined with nationalism and the rise of other Islamist parties to power led directly to the creation of modern Indonesia. The same combination of factors can be seen in the case of Pakistan.

Independence, national struggle, and the creation of modern institutions have been the landmark of contemporary Islamic thought. In the case of the Muslims of South Asia, the Partition of India and Pakistan has been a watershed in both contemporary Islamic intellectual and Indian intellectual histories. It is quite impossible to understand the huge issues besetting contemporary Islamic thought in South Asia without understanding this pivotal historical event and its intellectual, religious, social, political, and economic consequences and realities.

## The Meaning of Salafiyyah in Modern and Contemporary Islamic Thought

In general, the Salafiyyah refers to a diverse number of religious and intellectual forces in the modern and contemporary Muslim world that have taken their inspiration from the primary sources of Islam and that opt to live their contemporary lives in a way that is resonant with the ideals of the past and demands of the present. One can divide the Salafiyyah movement into three forms: pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial. The best example of the pre-colonial is the Wahabiyyah, which has had a marked impact on modern and contemporary Islamic thought since its inception at the end of the eighteenth century in Arabia. One may consider the Wahabiyyah a great revolutionary movement in its initial thrust, since it relied on a comprehensive ideology of radical social and political change. It intended to purify society of superstition and negative social practices. The second is the colonial Salafiyyah. In the Arab world, it is represented by such scholars as 'Abd al-Qādir al-Jazā'irī, Aḥmad al-Mahdī, al-Sanūsī, Ḥassan



al-'Aṭṭār, al-Saffār, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī, Muḥammad 'Abduh, and Rashīd Riḍa. The third is the post-colonial Salafiyyah represented by such religious scholars and activists as Mawlana Mawdūdī, 'Abd al-Qādir 'Awdah, Yūsuf al-Sibāī, 'Allāl al-Fāsī, Sayyid Quṭb, and Muḥammad Quṭb. One must not forget the several militant Salafi movements, such as the *jihād* and Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah in Egypt. Unlike the major Salafi trends, these movements seek to establish the Islamic polity through a military take-over of the state.

Many Salafi thinkers, especially from the Ahmad Khan school of thought in South Asia, sought accommodation with Westernization, as mentioned above. The Alighrah movement spearheaded by Khan in the nineteenth century produced generations of Muslim intellectuals in South Asia that sought accommodation between Islamic tradition and Western modernity. By and large, this movement was not critical of colonialism and Westernization. It is only in the twentieth century that some Salafi thinkers, especially those belonging to Islamic revivalist movements, began to contemplate the disastrous implications of capitalist culture and philosophy for Islamic metaphysics and ethics. Such revivalist thinkers as Khurshid Ahmad, Sayyid Quṭb, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Ḥussain Faḍlallah, and Rāshid Ghannoushi have been critical of Western colonialism and its implications for the Muslim world. Because of its aggressive nature, capitalist modernity forced Salafi thinkers to seriously consider capitalist modes of production and their impact on modern Muslim societies.

One can consider Islamism as a natural outgrowth of the nineteenth-century Salafiyyah, especially in its 'Abduh and Afghānī formulations. Islamism can be summarized both as an indigenous response to triumphant imperialism and the deep sense of political, religious, and intellectual malaise enveloping Arab society in the interwar period, especially after the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate in 1923. Being a response to the penetration of the modernity of imperialism in the different corners of the Arab world has always defined Islamist identity as intricately linked to that of the West. In a sense, this aggressive modernity has forced Islamism to be an avid observer of things Western, and has led it to present a comprehensive critique of the Western worldview and strategies in the Muslim world. This important dimension characterizes the thought of such people as Ḥassan Banna, Sayyid Quṭb, Muḥammad Faḍlallah, and many others. Although critical of imperialist modernity, both nineteenth-century Salafiyyah and interwar Salafiyyah adopted one key idea of Western modernity: the notion of reform and progress. However, one must draw an important distinction between the notion of progress as espoused by modernity and that as understood by the Islamic Salafiyyah. The Salafiyyah espousal of progress is not at all divorced from its appreciation of the centrality of the Islamic intellectual tradition and its modern intellectual positions.

In the Arab world, for example, and especially before 1967, the Salafiyyah was on the defensive while Arab nationalism was on the offensive. The 1967 defeat drastically changed this: it weakened and even paralyzed nationalism and forced it to revert to Islamic themes in its public pronouncements. In the words of the Egyptian thinker Ghali Shukri, the Salafiyyah "mushroomed" after the 1967 defeat. This happened in such countries as Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. A similar phenomenon took place in Iraq, especially after the second Gulf War.

After considering this historical sketch of the religious permutations of Salafiyyah, one must remember that the Salafiyyah movement in the Middle East was responding to a different set of circumstances than that in the Gulf states, especially the Wahabiyyah Salafiyyah in Saudi Arabia. In several Gulf states and most notably in Saudi Arabia, the Salafiyyah was intimately wed to the state to the extent that only an astute observer could distinguish the subtle difference between the state and the Wahabiyyah. The state claimed adherence to Islamic identity and the modernization of society. While the Salafiyyah in such countries as Syria and Egypt was on the defensive in the pre- and even post-1967 era, this was not the case in the Gulf states. The tribal Gulf state needed the Salafiyyah in order to boost its imported modernization programs in the 1960s and the 1980s and it needed it once again to attack Iraq in the second Gulf War. Furthermore, one may argue that the official Salafiyyah in most countries in the Gulf took the side of the state against Iraq after its occupation of Kuwait.

It is important to note that the Salafiyyah included a number of distinguished Shi'ite thinkers in the Arab world, most notably Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr of Iraq and Muḥammad Ḥussain Faḍlallah of Lebanon. These two thinkers, in particular, have had a major impact not just on Shi'ite youth but on Sunnite youth as well. In addition, one must not forget the major impact of the 1979 Iranian revolution on Arab consciousness in general and the Salafi outlook in particular.

The success of the Iranian revolution was seen as the concrete embodiment of genuine Islam in an Islamic society. A number of Salafi thinkers began to publicize the ideas of such figures as Ali Shari'ati and Imam Khomeini. Iran's contemporary intellectual history has been deeply influenced by the Khomeini revolution of 1979; the debates within Iran since that time are important. In treating the Salafi trend with its complex components in contemporary Arab thought, it is important to invoke the famous distinction drawn by Maxime Rodinson between "Official Islam" and "Popular Islam." To begin with, this is more than an academic sociological distinction about the nature of religion in contemporary Arab society. "Official Islam" represents the position of the state on religion and its various mechanisms, both subtle and concrete, to define a manageable relationship between the two. The constitution of almost every Arab state proclaims that Islam is the official religion of the country and that the *sharī'ah* is the main source of legislation. Besides raising questions about non-Muslims in Arab societies where the *sharī'ah* is the main source of legislation, this official position raises the fundamental question about the religious elite who enjoy the support of the state. This religious elite, dispersed as it is in different corners of the country, gains the official patronage of the state through the creation of a ministry for endowment and religious affairs, whose function becomes to keep those rebellious young preachers who may not heed the call of official reason in check.

## Liberalism, Nationalism, and Marxism in the Muslim World

Besides Salafiyyah in its bewildering varieties, liberalism has had a real presence in the Muslim world since the nineteenth century. It is beyond the scope of this *Companion* to deal with liberal, nationalist, and Marxist trends of thought in the Muslim world in any

comprehensive manner. However, the reader must bear in mind that these tendencies have coexisted with the Islamic trend of thought, have influenced and been influenced by it. It suffices to mention that liberalism in Western thought refers to a mode of thought that reflected the economic and cultural aspirations of the nascent bourgeoisie. In its different economic and political activities, liberalism prides itself on the notions of liberty and democracy. As a complex bourgeois movement, liberalism sought to achieve a number of things: philosophically, it sought to introduce a radical break between metaphysics and rationalism or between faith and reason. Liberalism no longer considered metaphysics to be the queen of sciences; an unfettered exercise of thought was considered the new criterion for progress. To be sure, the progress of science in the nineteenth century gave liberalism an edge over all religious philosophies. Economically, liberalism sought to achieve the unobstructed movement of goods. *Laissez-faire* capitalism was its natural expression in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Socially, liberalism was for constituting a new social and work ethic that was not defined by either religion or tradition, or where religious philosophies occupy a marginal position. Educationally, liberalism preaches a new type of liberal education that rejects the control of religious reason and institutions.

## Modernization and Religious Revivalism

Although we can date the beginning of contemporary Islamic thought to roughly the 1950s, its seeds were planted in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The Muslim world's response to the challenges of colonization was multifaceted; it sought to revive or reconstruct the religious, social, political, and economic institutions of the modern Muslim world. On the whole, *three different movements channeled this response: modernization, nationalism, and religious revivalism.*

The European challenge to the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century helped awaken the central authority from its slumber and encouraged it to launch an ambitious program of modernization called the Tanzimat, which began in the early part of the nineteenth century. The Empire responded by adopting Tanzimat, a wholesale modernization of Ottoman society from the top down. Ottoman political and military elite were aware of the necessity of taking drastic "modernization measures" if they wished to keep the Empire afloat. Most leading Ottoman bureaucrats and intelligentsia, including the religious intelligentsia, were firmly behind modernization. The *ulama* supported modernization in the hopes that "the welfare of the *ummah*" would be safeguarded.<sup>10</sup> Although the different nineteenth-century Ottoman sultans put their weight behind the Tanzimat, the process did not prevent the collapse of the Empire by the end of World War One. However, before the Empire folded, a new breed of secular Ottoman intelligentsia arose, and a small part of that intelligentsia saw the salvation of the state in adopting Westernization. They saw this as the only solution to the backwardness of the state. The discourse of this community of people centered on a new understanding of nationalism, secularism, and progress.

Therefore, in the case of Turkey, contemporary intellectual history begins with the construction of the ideological foundations of Kemalism in the 1920s. Atatürk was a

charismatic figure who desired the modernization of his country and people along European lines. One must situate the rise of different trends of thought in Turkey in the context of Kemalism and its impact on Islamic and leftist currents of thought. To a large extent, Islamic intellectual history in contemporary Turkey has been a response to the challenge of Kemalism to religious identity. One can discern four major trends of Islamic thought in contemporary Turkey: the first is the pacifist, represented by the thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi, a leading theologian of world renown who wrote the *Magnum Opus Risaleh Nur*, and who founded a community known as the Nur community.<sup>11</sup> The second is an educational Islamic movement represented by the theologian Fethullah Gülen, mentioned above. The third is the Islamic activist represented by the Refah party and the fourth is an activist moderate Islamic movement that works within the Kemalist system and that currently holds power in Turkey. (See Metin Heper's article in this *Companion*.) In addition to these representations of Islam, there is a host of Sufi brotherhoods that are still active in Turkey nowadays.

As mentioned above, nationalism represents the second tier of nineteenth-century Muslim response to the predicament of the Muslim world and Western challenges. Nationalism, in Anderson's celebrated phrase, "is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."<sup>12</sup> Nationalism is a limited imagining of the nation, much more limited, let us say, than Christendom or the Muslim *ummah*. Nationalism did not have to defend a stagnant past, although very often it resorted to inventing its own past in order to give a certain measure of authenticity to its actions. The nationalist movement in the Muslim world led the nation in a struggle against colonialism, which paved the way to creating several nation-states in the Muslim world. As a matter of course, nationalist leaders of the Muslim world did not use religious themes in their speeches or slogans. Such personalities as Ahmed Sukarno in Indonesia, Kemal Atatürk in Turkey, Muhammad 'Ali Jinnah in Pakistan, and Jamal 'Abd al-Nasser in Egypt represent this trend. Being highly charismatic, these founding figures fought for the political independence of their nations from the West while being at the same time envious of Western scientific and political achievements. Although they fought political domination by the West, they opted to model their societies according to the Western philosophy of life. It is interesting to examine the conditions in which Third World nationalisms arose. Much literature has appeared on the social or philosophical origins of European nationalism, but very little addresses the origins in the Muslim world. Overall, nationalism in the Muslim world fought very hard to liberate itself from imperialism in two important domains: the spiritual and the institutional. On the spiritual level, as Partha Chatterjee ably shows, nationalism seeks to ensure its sovereignty on the personality of the nation, its past, and cultural identity. On the institutional level, it seeks to establish its nationalist state by learning from Western science and institution building.<sup>13</sup>

The rise of nationalism in India is particularly interesting. Most of the Indian intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, regardless of their religious affiliation, were united on an ambitious nationalist program of ridding the country of British domination.<sup>14</sup> Any cursory reading of the career of the Indian Congress from the latter part of the nineteenth century until the 1947 Partition will undoubtedly reflect this preoccupation. However, under pressure from the British and because of certain religious and

economic conditions, some Indian Muslims began to contemplate a separate state from the Muslims of India, which became Pakistan after Partition.

However, one must examine the genesis of nationalism in India from the prism of intellectual history. Modern Islamic intellectual history in India begins roughly after the failure of the Indian Mutiny against the British in 1857, which signaled the breakdown of the Mughal Empire and the onset of a new age for both Muslims and Hindus in India. Between 1857 and the end of World War One, several religious and intellectual tendencies developed among the Muslims of India competing for the formulation and definition of Islamic identity there. The following major movements arose: (i) the Alighrah movement, which was represented by Sir Ahmad Khan and his colleagues, and which advocated political and cultural openness to the English and their methods of teaching; (ii) the al-Khilafat movement, which aimed at preserving the Ottoman Empire; and (iii) the Muslim League. The al-Khilafat movement was Pan-Islamic in orientation and anti-British. In addition to these organized religious and intellectual bodies in Muslim India, there were a host of traditional educational institutions such as the Dar al-Ulum, established in Deoband at the end of the nineteenth century. The Dar al-Ulum is still committed to its original vision of disseminating traditional Islamic education in South Asia and creating bridges between the traditional religious elite and the masses. One of its most brilliant representatives is Sayyed Abul Hasan 'Ali Nadwi (See Yoginder Sikand's article on Mawlana Nadwi in this *Companion*.)<sup>15</sup>

Since Partition, there has been some confusion about the true identity of Pakistan. Was Pakistan created for the Muslims of India or was it created as an Islamic state?<sup>16</sup> The careers of the founders of Pakistan and the movement behind the establishment of the country have reflected this uncertainty.<sup>17</sup> What is certain is that only a portion of Indian Muslims were interested in migrating to Pakistan after Partition, and initially, the Jamaat-e-Islami, founded by Abu al-'Ala al-Mawdūdī in 1941, stood against Partition on the grounds that the future Islamic state would be limited to Pakistan only.<sup>18</sup> The Pakistani movement was spearheaded by the Muslim "salaried class" of North India, a class that was "the product of the colonial transformation of Indian social structure in the nineteenth century and . . . comprised those who had received an education that would equip them for employment in the expanding colonial state apparatus as scribes and functionaries."<sup>19</sup> This class did not represent the interests of the majority of the Muslim peasants in rural India or those of the Muslims in south India. This explains why the majority of Muslims in the south and in the rural areas did not migrate to Pakistan after Partition. However, the creation of Pakistan did not solve the problems of Muslims in India. In 1971, Pakistan lost East Pakistan, and Bangladesh was established in the name of Bengali nationalism.

It is clear that the Partition left a deep mark on both Muslims and Hindus in South Asia. It signaled the failure of unitary Indian nationalism to establish one independent state after the termination of British colonial authority in India. However, both India and Pakistan opted to create a secular and not a religious system after independence. It is within this secular system in each country that one has to locate the debates around the big issues in each country, such as the creation of a religious state. This has been the more pertinent in the case of the Jamaat-e-Islami after the migration of its

founder to Pakistan in 1948. Mawdūdī never opted for Pakistan and he was one of the opponents of the Pakistan resolution in 1942. In other words, he did not see eye to eye with the Muslim League, which was fighting valiantly for the creation of a state for the Muslims of India. Mawdūdī did not initially opt for Pakistan since his Islamist vision of constructing an Islamic state all over India would have been greatly diminished. And diminished it was by the time that Mawdūdī and the top leadership of the Jamaat-e-Islami chose to migrate to Pakistan. (See Abdul Rashid Moten's article in this *Companion*.)

It is within the parameters of the nation-state of both India and Pakistan that one must discuss Islamic intellectual history and its evolution to the present. Whereas the bulk of Islamic intellectual history in Pakistan has revolved around the Islamicity of the state and the necessity of constructing an Islamic political and economic system to be compatible with modernity, the bulk of Islamic intellectual history in India has revolved around the preservation of the secular and democratic foundations of the modern Indian nation-state. Muslims as a minority in India, albeit a major minority of around 15 percent of the population, have by and large eschewed the Islamic pretensions of Pakistan, remained loyal to the indivisibility of India, and constructed their intellectual debates around the best ways and means to construct an Islamic identity in a secular environment. That is to say that even the most Islamist of movements in India, the remnant of the Jamaat-e-Islami, has been fighting to preserve the secular identity of the Indian state and against the Hinduization of the state. This is remarkable in view of the fact that the intellectual and political agenda of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan has been for the Islamization of the state.

Since the creation of Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami and other Islamist movements in the country have failed to establish an Islamist political system, which defines to a large extent the intellectual debates of Islamists in Pakistan. There is no doubt that the intellectual leaders of the Jamaat, such as the founder Mawdūdī, Khurshid Ahmad, and others, have remained faithful to the vision of creating an Islamist system in the country. Opposed to that has been the nationalist and secularist vision of the founders of Pakistan, which has been kept intact by the army in the country.

The third major response to the challenge of European colonization was Islamic revivalism. At the outset, it is crucial to differentiate among four major groups or classes of revivalism in the modern Muslim world: (i) pre-colonial; (ii) colonial; (iii) post-colonial; and (iv) post-nation-state. The Wahabiyyah of Saudi Arabia is a pre-colonial Islamic movement, which was created in reaction to internal Muslim decadence and sought to revive Islamic practices in light of a strict adherence to Islamic law and theology. To do so, the charismatic figure Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahab allied himself with the Saudi family, which led to the creation of the modern Saudi state.

Examples of the second form of colonial Islamic revivalism are the Muhammadiyyah and Nahdatu ul-Ulama organizations in Indonesia, both established in the first half of the twentieth century.<sup>20</sup> We can also add the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt and the Jamaat-e-Islami of India. These were mass-oriented social and religious movements committed to ambitious programs such as the reform of Islamic education or the control of political authority in preparation for implementing the *sharī'ah* in the larger Islamic society.

The onset of the nation-state in the Muslim world in the middle of the twentieth century and the supervision of the religious institution by the state, coupled with the failure of the nation-state on many fronts, resulted in the emergence of post-colonial forms of Islamic revivalism, which reflected extremist interpretations of religion and resorted to violence to achieve their objectives. The Egyptian *jihād* of the 1970s and 80s is a case in point.

The Taliban stands to be one of the major Islamist movements arising in response to the disintegration of the nation-state in Afghanistan. The Taliban emerged in response to the failure of the secular nation-state to build a new civil society and also to the failure of the urban Islamist movement in Afghanistan to arrest the further disintegration of the state, especially in the wake of the withdrawal of Soviet forces in the late 1980s.<sup>21</sup> The Taliban movement arose in the context of the severe chaos taking place in the country in the 1990s, especially after the "Americans had turned their backs on the ruins of Afghanistan."<sup>22</sup>

It is clear that the most significant post-nation-state Islamist movements, that is, the Egyptian *jihād*, the bin Laden movement, which must be examined against the wider context of Saudi Arabia in the 1970s and 80s, and the Taliban, appeared at major historical junctures in contemporary Islamic history, precisely when secularism and the nation-state became exhausted, and when new possibilities of establishing a novel Islamist order seemed to arise.

## The Question of Islam and Modernity

As various essays in this *Companion* show, modernity is the key to the main debates taking place in the Muslim world since the nineteenth century. Generally speaking, there are two ways to approach the question of "Islam and modernity." A host of Muslim theologians argue that Muslim tradition holds the answers to the many dilemmas that modernity has produced in the Muslim world. The most representative thinker of this trend, Seyyed Hossein Nasr, argues that "To conclude, a conscious and intellectual defense must be made of the Islamic tradition. Moreover, a thorough intellectual criticism must be made of the modern world and its shortcomings. Muslims cannot hope to follow the same path as the West without reaching the same impasse or an even a worse one, because of the rapidity of the tempo of change today. The Muslim intelligentsia must face all these changes mentioned here, and many others, with confidence in themselves. They must cease to live in the state of a psychological and cultural sense of inferiority."<sup>23</sup> Here, it is not clear what exactly Islamic tradition is and whether or not the contemporary Muslim intelligentsia is expected to bypass modernity or coexist with it. The former is most likely the position of the author. However, Nasr does not tell us *how* to bypass a modernity that has permeated the entire Muslim world in the past 200 years.

The second approach to dealing with "Islam and modernity" is to delve into the impact of modernity on actual Muslim countries, political, ideological, and social movements, states, power elite, and social formations in general. This is a more plausible approach than the former. In this approach, one must wrestle with a number of

significant questions and not just Muslim tradition, per se. Because of the triumph of modernity and the colonization of a significant portion of the Muslim world in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, it is quite impossible to speak of two separate paths of evolution, development, or change. The fate of the Muslim world has been entwined with that of the West for at least the past two centuries. (See Ziauddin Sardar's article in this *Companion*.)

The modern world-system and in principle, capitalism, has been the most potent result of modernity. Its impact on the world's economic and social structures has been without parallel. Therefore, the task of the Muslim intelligentsia must not be confined to developing Islamic paradigms or theories about Muslim tradition; neither should it be confined to the Islamization of knowledge. This is not feasible in the modern world where modernist capitalism has engendered profound changes in modern and contemporary Muslim societies, changes that cannot be understood by using "traditional Islamic paradigms or epistemes." In this case, I take issue with Ziauddin Sardar's contention that "The task before Muslim intelligentsia, then, is to develop, using the epistemology of Islam, alternative paradigms of knowledge for both natural and social sciences and to conceive and mold disciplines most relevant to the needs of contemporary Muslim societies. Only when distinctive Islamic paradigms and associated bodies of knowledge have evolved can Muslim scholars contemplate achieving synthesis on an appropriate footing with knowledge created by Western civilization."<sup>24</sup>

To put it bluntly, the Arab and the Muslim worlds cannot boast an Arab or Muslim civilization at present. The political and economic elite in the Arab or Muslim worlds, regardless of their culture, are true participants in the civilization of capitalism. True, there is an Arab or Muslim culture, but it is currently dominated by the larger capitalist civilization. We cannot compare a normative civilization (Islamic worldview) to a concrete and historically present civilization; that is, the global capitalist civilization. That is to say that it is impossible to fathom modern global identity outside the rubric of capitalism. We cannot view religious identity outside the domination of the capitalist system. Capitalists (proponents of a capitalist civilization) can be found all over the world, including the Muslim world, and class conflict still defines social relations. Furthermore, the Muslim world, unlike Europe, has failed to develop its capitalist system in the modern period and has thus become dependent on the world capitalist system, which has been pioneered by the West. The Muslim world has *culture*, but lacks its own distinctive *civilization*. Some articles in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* struggle with the concept of 'Islamic civilization' and reflect the ambivalence of some contemporary Muslim intellectuals about the revival of Islamic civilization under the current global conditions.

It is clear that capitalist civilization is dominant worldwide, although it has crystallized in various cultural and social forms depending on the country in which it flourishes. The capitalist system is strongest in North America, Europe, and Japan, with North America taking the leading role in world economic and scientific affairs. Here one must draw a distinction between globalization and Americanization, or between globalization and hegemony. Globalization is an objective socio-historical and economic process that began in the sixteenth century from the remnants of the feudal system. It has gone through major transformations ever since then. On the other hand,



Americanization or American hegemony is the product of the leading scientific and economic role the United States has played in the present world capitalist system. (See Mucahit Bilici's article in this *Companion*.) Britain was the dominant capitalist power in the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth. Therefore, globalization and American hegemony are not necessarily synonymous. At this point in time, however, the United States is the sole leading power, but it is unlikely that it will play this role forever.

Why is it important to come to grips with contemporary globalization? Since the nineteenth century, the Arab and Muslim worlds have been hard pressed to find solutions to their dependency on the capitalist West. Although the Muslim world has witnessed several political movements, most notably nationalism (which attempted to put an end to the structural and economic dependency of the Muslim world on the West), no viable solution has been found. The crisis of the social system in the Muslim world has resulted from the international division of labor under capitalism and the current hegemony of the United States. By and large, the political elite in the Muslim world either benefit from this division of labor or are unable to alter it to their advantage.

Has globalization been advantageous to the political elite in maintaining their authority? Has globalization weakened the contemporary state in the Muslim world? I think that globalization has often aided the political elite in the Muslim world in spreading their version of "false consciousness" by means of the mass media and given them the technological means to exercise full hegemony over society. Capitalism in the Muslim world, although concentrated in few hands, is deeply entrenched. It is part of the global capitalist system. As such, it competes with other capitalist groups or formations in the pursuit of unlimited wealth and power, when possible. Domestically, Arab capitalism assumes a relentless pursuit of power in order to protect its economic interests while constantly pursuing greater wealth. Instead of working for the progress of its society, capitalism in the Arab world seeks only the preservation of its hegemony and the expansion of its control. This expansion takes the form of a meager investment in religious institutions in order to exploit the religious feelings of the masses for its materialist ends.

One may say that modernity is an historical project with around 500 years of history. Since the inception of modernity, the world has gone through unparalleled major epistemological, industrial, scientific, economic, political, and military transformations that have affected every corner of the world. One can locate significant markers or paths in the historical march of modernity: the European discovery of the New World; the Protestant Reformation; the Industrial revolution; the Enlightenment and its idea of progress; secularism; colonialism; nationalism; the creation of the nation-states, etc.

The Enlightenment was the seed bed of modernity in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. David Harvey is correct when he says that, "Enlightenment thought embraced the idea of progress, and actively sought that break with history and tradition which modernity espouses. It was, above all, a secular movement that sought the mystification and desacralization of knowledge and social organization in order to liberate human beings from their chains."<sup>25</sup>

Most scholars of Islamic studies in the West follow, more or less, a Eurocentric approach by considering modernity to be a positive and somewhat monolithic process since its inception. Those in the field have been enamored of the philosophical formulations of such scholars as Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, Vattimo, and others, who do not for a moment consider the polarization created by modernity between one world and another, between one's civilization and another's backwardness. There has not yet been a critical appraisal of this phenomenon in the field of Islamic studies. Fazlur Rahman wrote the most significant book on Islam and modernity from an Islamic perspective.<sup>26</sup> To date, few scholars have followed in his footsteps. The field is still waiting for a major reflection on the problematic of modernity and Muslim responses to it or interaction with it. I hope that the various articles in *The Blackwell Companion to Contemporary Islamic Thought* will help us formulate the right questions about the state of modernity and religion in the contemporary Muslim world.

Finally, most of the trends discussed by the authors in this *Companion* discuss the public manifestations of Islam and some present what they consider to be an Islamic perspective on the current situation. It is quite important to understand the position of Islam in the contemporary nation-state in the Muslim world and in the larger context of the dominance of capitalism in contemporary Muslim societies. There is no doubt that both State and Islamism have exploited religion to advance and/or protect certain political and economic interests. One may argue that in many Muslim countries, the political elite have failed to offer a coherent nationalist program or ideology to rid their societies of economic dependence and political stagnation since independence. In some Muslim countries, authoritarianism seems to be the mode of political practice. Democracy has not been deeply anchored in contemporary Arab and Muslim societies. Because of widespread social, economic, and demographic changes taking place in the past five decades, religion has gained more public prominence than ever before. In the ensuing social and economic dislocation experienced by a significant number of people, religion has offered hope and solace.

## Notes

1. See my *Contemporary Arab Thought: Studies in Post-1967 Arab Intellectual History* (London: Pluto Press, 2004), especially chapters 1 and 2.
2. See P. Kinross, *Atatürk: The Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Phoenix Giant, 1995).
3. See O. Lovejoy, *Essays in the History of Ideas* (New York: George Braziller, 1955).
4. F. Gilbert, "Intellectual History: Its Aims and Methods," *Daedalus*, 100(1), 1971, 94.
5. Compare the current political elite in the Muslim world to what American sociologist C. Wright Mills had to say about the American elite in the 1950s: "By the middle of the twentieth century, the American elite have become an entirely different breed of men from those who could on any reasonable grounds be considered a cultural elite, or even for that matter cultivated men of responsibility. Knowledge and power are not truly united inside the ruling circles; and when men of knowledge do come to a point of contact with the circles of powerful men, they come not as peers but as hired men. The elite of power, wealth, and celebrity do not even have a passing acquaintance with the elite of culture, knowledge and

- sensibility; they are not in touch with them although the fringes of the two worlds sometimes overlap in the world of the celebrity." C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 351.
6. See Bayram Balci, *Missionaires de l'Islam en Asie centrale: Les ecoles turques de Fethullah Gülen* (Paris: Maisonneuve and Larose, 2003), and John Esposito and Hakan Yavuz (eds.), *Turkish Islam and Secular State: The Gülen Movement* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003).
  7. See M. Sait Ozervarli, "Kalam in the late 19th and 20th Centuries," *The Muslim World*, 89(1), 1999, 91–102.
  8. See Aziz Ahmad, *Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan, 1857–1964* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), and Mushirul Hasan, *Islam in the Subcontinent: Muslims in a Plural Society* (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002).
  9. See George Kahin, *Revolution and Nationalism in Modern Indonesia* (Cornell: Cornell University Press, 1952).
  10. "Leading ulema not only sanctioned and supported the innovations initiated by the Sultans and their military and civil advisors, both Ottoman and European. Some of them also played a major role in conceiving, suggesting, and planning reforms on European lines." Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II." In Albert Hourani, Philip Khoury and Mary Wilson (eds.), *The Modern Middle East: A Reader* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 30.
  11. See Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi' (ed.), *Islam at the Crossroads: On the Life and Thought of Bediuzzaman Said Nursi* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003).
  12. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (London: Verso, 1991), 6.
  13. Chatterjee argues that "anticolonial nationalism creates its own domain of sovereignty within the colonial society well before it begins its political battle with the imperial power. It does this by dividing the world of social institutions and practices into two domains – the material and the spiritual. The material is the domain of the 'outside,' of the economy and state-craft, of science and technology, a world where the West had proved its superiority and the East had succumbed. In this domain, then, Western superiority had to be acknowledged and its accomplishments carefully studied and replicated. The spiritual, on the other hand, is an 'inner' domain bearing the 'essential' marks of cultural identity. The greater one's success in imitating Western skills in the material domain, therefore, the greater the need to preserve the distinctness of one's spiritual culture. This formula is, I think, a fundamental feature of anticolonial nationalisms in Asia and Africa." Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories in the Partha Chatterjee Omnibus* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 6.
  14. Some leading Muslim thinkers, notably Sayyid Ahmad Khan, were pro-British. According to M.J. Akbar, "This disciple of the British [Ahmad Khan] became hero to the elite of a community which had lost its pride and confidence after a century of stagnation; whose leaders had degenerated from emperors to caricatures; whose poetry had collapsed from philosophy to self-deprecation or lament; whose vision was so debilitated that when asked to surrender self-respect in return for bread, it happily did so. For a pat on the back and a knighthood, Sayyid Ahmad Khan happily denounced the bravery of those numerous Muslims who fought the British in the wars of 1857. Inevitably, he could not resist becoming a bit of a caricature himself, wearing English clothes after his knighthood in 1888 and acquiring a knife and fork for his table. But he still did his writing still sitting on the floor." M.J. Akbar, *Nehru: The Making of India* (London: Viking, 1988), 16–17.
  15. "Deoband was a centre of conservative Islam where young men of religious turn of mind were trained in theology, Islamic history and other old-fashioned disciplines. Western

- learning was taboo, for it was one of the fundamental beliefs of the school that any truck with the infidel was tantamount to a compromise with heresy." A.K. Aziz, *The Making of Pakistan: A Study in Nationalism* (Lahore: Sang-E Meel Publications, 2002), 178.
16. This question is at the heart of many studies of modern Pakistan. See Akbar Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997); Tariq Ali, *Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State* (London: Penguin, 1983), and Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
  17. See Jean-Luc Racine, "Pakistan: Quel islam pour quelle nation?" *Le Monde Diplomatique*, December 2001, 12–13.
  18. Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since Independence* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 69.
  19. Hamza Alavi, "Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology," in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.), *State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1998), 68.
  20. On the Muhammadiyah, consult the major study by Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1909–1942* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1978); see also George Kahin, *Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1952) and Robert Hefner, *Civil Society: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
  21. See M. Hassan Kakar, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979–1982* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
  22. John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), 7.
  23. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, *Islam and the Plight of Modern Man* (London, 1975), 148.
  24. Ziauddin Sardar, *Islamic Futures: The Shape of Ideas to Come* (London: Mansell, 1985), 104.
  25. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), 12–13.
  26. Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).

## PART I

# Trends and Issues in Contemporary Islamic Thought

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## CHAPTER 1

# Contemporary Turkish Thought

Şahin Filiz and Tahir Uluç

The objective of this chapter is to critically evaluate contemporary Turkish thought from a historical and sociological perspective and shed new light on its evolution from the beginning of the Republic to the present time. The foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 was a watershed in modern Turkish history leading to the emergence of a new nation-state and a contemporary Turkish thought, which will be analyzed in this chapter.

This new Turkish nation-state inherited massive problems from the Ottoman Empire. From the beginning, this nation-state has grappled with two major issues. The first issue has been that of constructing a new Turkish identity different from that of the Ottoman state. The second issue has been that of importing and internalizing Western values *en masse*. These values have been expressed and manifested in such concepts as nationalism, secularization, and modernization of the country. In the view of the founders of the Republic, Turkey was not merely a piece of land, but also a nation in the modern sense. In other words, the construction of the new nation was seen as the “re-building of a non-existent past,” rather than a departure from the tradition of the East or Islam.

To appreciate the critical transformation of intellectual life in contemporary Turkey from that of the late Ottoman period to the contemporary period, a brief analysis of the intellectual developments in the late Ottoman period will be useful. One may delineate three major trends of thought at the time. These are: (i) a Pan-Islamic Ottoman trend of thought that stood for the modernization of the state; (ii) a nationalist trend of thought that emphasized the Turkish nation at the expense of the other nationalist/ethnic components of the Empire; and (iii) a Westernized trend of thought that took Westernization as the only model for the Ottoman state to follow. Very often, the difference between category (i) and (ii) gets blurred.

The third category, Westernized trend in Ottoman thought, was represented by such luminaries as Abdullah Cevdet, Celal Nuri, and Kılıçzade Hakkı, who attempted to build a Turkish version of the Enlightenment. However, these thinkers failed to construct solid philosophical foundations for any Turkish Enlightenment due to their narrow

interpretations of European Enlightenment. Nevertheless, a small but influential number of pre-World War One Ottoman thinkers were in agreement on the notion that Islamic tradition was no longer compatible with the conditions of modernity. Kemal Atatürk took the lead in the political realm to apply a strict separation between the religious and public spheres, thus greatly boosting the Westernized trend in Ottoman thought. Atatürk's main goal was to "modernize" Islam, so to say, as a means of creating a new identity for the Turkish nation.<sup>1</sup>

The foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 officially set in motion Kemalism as the ideology *par excellence* of the new Turkish nation. Islamic ideology had played a leading role in the Ottoman Empire but it failed to compete with the rising ideology of Kemalism in the 1920s and 1930s. "Religion was relying upon institutions that had political implications inconsistent with the basic principles of the new state; those institutions could no longer stand, even inharmoniously, side by side the secularized sector . . . A secular conception of national unity negated both the traditional and the 'modernist' view of a state associated with or based upon religion. This negation was symbolized by the abolition of the sultanate, soon followed by the abolition of the caliphate, and the establishment of a republican form of government based upon the sovereignty of the people constituting a nation."<sup>2</sup> The decade of the 1940s witnessed a significant impact on the life of Turkey due to certain external and internal factors. The external factors were the rise of fascism in Europe and the entry of the United States in World War Two on the side of the Allies, which enabled Kemalist Turkey to play the card of democracy and secularism. The internal factors can be seen with Kemalism trying to institutionalize its ideology by building schools and other institutions. One can locate the current predominant school of contemporary Turkish historiography and theoretical thought in this period.

During this time a number of influential intellectuals supported the notions of democracy and secularism and the number of academic and intellectual periodicals rose rapidly. Of interest in this regard have been such leading periodicals as *İnsan* (*Human Being*), *Yeni Adam* (*New Man*), and *Yurt ve Dünya* (*Home and the World*). Of the many Turkish intellectuals, such thinkers as Fuad Köprülü, Hilmi Ziya Ülken, and Niyazi Berkes, who was from Cyprus but was trained in Turkey, are noteworthy.

With the coming of Adnan Menderes to power in 1950, a radical shift in Turkish politics took place. Menderes encouraged a multi-party system and thus opened the way for new political and intellectual forces to emerge on the Turkish intellectual scene in the 1950s and 1960s. Further accelerating change was the speedy industrialization of the country after the foundation of the Republic, which produced new social classes that had been thitherto non-existent. This was to be seen especially with the new Turkish bourgeoisie that had social, political, and economic aspirations that were somewhat different from those of the bureaucrats who had ruled Turkey until then.

The rise of new social classes in Turkey coincided with the onset of the Cold War. In this new world situation, Turkey found itself in the Western camp taking an active role in the fight against communism and other radical ideologies. On the intellectual scene, the journal *Forum* played an active role in opposing communist ideology and in calling for a closer cooperation between Turkey and the West.

To a certain extent, the Cold War had a dramatic impact on Turkish intellectual life. Those intellectuals who identified themselves with the state and Kemalism supported