

PHILIP S. GOLUB

EAST ASIA'S REEMERGENCE



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Philip S. Golub

polity

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PREFACE

The guiding theme of this book is that East Asia's re-emergence in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries as a semiautonomous core of the world economy constitutes one of the most significant world-systemic transformations since the Industrial Revolution and Eurocentric globalization in the nineteenth century. Thanks to a coherent developmental dynamic of remarkable intensity, duration, and spatial scope, the most populous region of the world is gradually regaining the position in the world economy that it enjoyed prior to the great East–West and North–South divergence, commensurate with its demographic weight. In the wake of Japan, which played a precursor role and served as a development model, countries that not so very long ago appeared caged in subordinate positions in the world capitalist economy, or, like the People's Republic of China (PRC), stood outside it, have been climbing the development ladder, becoming determining actors of the movement of East–West and North–South rebalancing that is one of the main features of our global present. Over the past four decades, East Asia's share of world Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in purchasing power parity (PPP), has thus risen from less than 10 percent to 30 percent, a ratio that should rise by 2030 to just over 40 percent. China, long a marginal actor in the world economy, has become the world's second-largest economy in current exchange rates (the largest in PPP), and the gravitational core of increasingly thick South–South linkages that are altering the vertical structure of North–South relations constructed during the age of Western empire and industry. The politics of re-emergence has lagged behind economics, but a gradual reordering of world politics is evidenced in the growing voice of the global South in international public organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and

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World Trade Organization (IMF, WTO) and clubs (G20), their activism in various issue areas of world politics, and institution-building efforts bypassing traditional centers of authority (IBSA, Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the New Development Bank, and the Asian International Infrastructure Bank). In short, a repatterning of international relations is underway that is closing the historical chapter opened by the rise and globalization of the West.

The amplitude of the rebalancing movement has become apparent only quite recently. Aside from a few authors, such as Janet Abu-Lughod, who perceptively foresaw a “return to the relative balance of multiple centers” (Abu-Lughod, 1991: 370–71) that characterized the world in the early-modern period, most observers in the 1980s and 1990s thought the possibility of North–South and East–West rebalancing remote. Surveying the world political economy in the mid-1980s, Stephen Krasner wrote: “Southern states are subject to external pressures that they cannot influence. . . . They are exposed to vacillations of an international system from which they cannot extricate themselves but over which they have limited control.” Noting the “important exceptions” of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore, as well as of China and India, special cases due to their size and isolation from the world economy, he nonetheless came to this general conclusion: “The gap between Northern and Southern capabilities is already so great that even if the countries of the South grew very quickly and those of the North stagnated (and unlikely pair of assumptions in any event), only a handful of developing countries would significantly close the power gap within the next one hundred years” (Krasner, 1985: 4). Notwithstanding growing evidence of a general albeit uneven movement of East Asian economic ascent (World Bank, 1993), there were still serious doubts in the 1990s over the breadth and significance of the phenomenon. In a well-known article in *Foreign Affairs*, Paul Krugman (1994) dismissed “Asia’s miracle” as a myth: “current projections of Asian supremacy extrapolated from recent trends may well look almost as silly as 1960s vintage forecasts of Soviet industrial supremacy did from the perspective of the Brezhnev years.” East Asian growth, in his view, was being driven by “perspiration rather than inspiration,” with few signs of productivity increases, technological upgrading, and other qualitative improvements. The Japanese financial crisis of the early 1990s, which ushered in a long period of economic stagnation, and the sharp regional financial crisis of the late 1990s, lent weight to the argument by calling into question the depth and sustainability of the East Asian model of state-led or state-governed economic

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development. By the end of the decade, at the high point of neoliberal intellectual hegemony (the Washington Consensus), the “miracle” was widely and blithely recast as a “mirage.”

Too closely bound to the moments in which they were formulated—a general problem of social scientific observation but one that is particularly salient in international analysis—sometimes reflecting Orientalist biases, these and like judgments missed the structural character of the East Asian developmental dynamic. Fundamental social changes unfold gradually, resulting from cumulative processes whose inner logic becomes perceptible, hence theorizable, only when they impose themselves as social facts. The Industrial Revolution “was a general and slow phenomenon, with distant and deep origins” (Braudel, 1985: 111–12) that was not discernible to Adam Smith and other contemporaries who were living through its initial phases. It was only toward the mid-nineteenth century, when Great Britain became the heart of a world-encompassing system of production, trade, and credit and the primary force behind the globalization of the West, that the properly revolutionary implications of industrialization became clear to observers such as Marx. In like manner, the United States’ emergence as the world’s leading industrial power in the latter part of the nineteenth century resulted from a long process of economic, demographic, and territorial expansion, the significance of which became fully evident only in the mid-twentieth century, when the United States superseded Europe at the center and apex of a renovated world capitalist system and a new international economic and political hierarchy. Though current global rebalancing is still in an early stage, and East Asia’s re-emergence remains far from complete, the evidence clearly points to a restructuring of the world economy comparable to these earlier instances of systemic change in terms of its transformative effects.

This book delves into the deep and distant sources of the transformation and interrogates its implications for understandings of globalization and capitalist development. Like the author’s earlier work on United States and Atlantic imperial history (Golub, 2010), it mobilizes a historical sociological approach to world politics that pays careful attention to historical structures and seeks explanation, or at least deeper understanding, of the present in the ontogenesis of social phenomena rather than the abstract theorizing that characterizes synchronic analysis (Hobson, 2010). It thus weaves together social theory and historical narrative to analyze the structural and contingent factors that gave rise, during distinct but interconnected moments of world history, to what might be called the East Asian

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economic revolution. Moving from present to past and past to present it successively examines the early modern European-Asian encounter, the imperial collisions of the nineteenth century, Pax Americana and the postwar constitution of authoritarian capitalist developmental states, and China's state-capitalist turn in the late twentieth century. The focus is on the ways in which imperialism, war, and revolution shaped modern nation- and state-building efforts—the international interactions that led to the rise of specific developmental state forms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries which, to varying degrees, proved able to harness transnational forces to national institutions and purposes, and to successfully alter national positions in the global economic hierarchy. Major emphasis is put on the regional character of the post-1945 capitalist dynamic: like the Industrial Revolution, which spread unevenly and at different rhythms in different parts of Europe but obeyed an overall developmental logic, East Asia's re-emergence should be seen as a general movement that spread sequentially if unevenly from its original Japanese epicenter to the rest of the region. The chapters of this book, whose structure is detailed in Chapter 1, unfold these arguments and points.

The conclusions drawn diverge from the set of ideas and assumptions regarding global integration and the nation-state that lie at the core of liberal globalization theory: the conjecture of an epochal change from modern to post-Westphalian or post-international politics (Rosenau, 1989), in which transnational flows would have obliterated territory, sovereignty would have been fundamentally reconfigured, and power tamed by global forces and transnational networks transcending and submerging the historic nation-state (Habermas, 2001; Held and McGrew, 2000; Castells, 1996). As I, as well as other authors (Rosenberg, 2005) have argued, real-world events over the past decade and a half have undermined the strong globalization hypothesis. The conclusions also contrast with those neo-Marxist interpretations that, from different theoretical starting points and different normative perspectives, have postulated the constitution of a postnational condition structured by global capital and characterized by the domination of a transnational capitalist class (Hardt and Negri, 2000; Robinson, 2004). This study points instead to new concentrations of national power and assertions of national purpose, reflecting the fluid and historically contingent character of state-market relations, and the variable impacts of transnational forces on different societies and states. If late-twentieth-century globalization has generated systemic pressures affecting all

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states, transnational flows produce differential effects according to the uneven distribution of state capacity and effective sovereignty. Some states have indeed been submerged and seen their development pathways conditioned by global forces and transnational networks outside their control. But the incorporation of the global South in the world capitalist economy has not produced uniform effects. In East Asia, in most cases, notably but not only China, internationalization has led to upward international mobility and, despite new world market dependencies, an increase of the relative international autonomy of the state (the way China has obliged global firms to defer to state preferences is discussed in some detail in Chapter 5).

It should be said that the book does not foresee the constitution of an Asian-centric or Sino-centric world system (Frank, 1998; Arrighi, 2007). In his grand fresco of historical capitalism, Braudel (1985, 1992) came to the conclusion that the world economy seemed to require a single center of gravity. Basing himself on the European record, he notes the way in which successive centers emerged as the “capitalist dynamic” unfolded, from the merchant city-states of the early Renaissance and the early modern period to the industrial capitalist nation-states of late modernity. Thus, in the case of Europe, the center would have shifted from Venice (1380) to Antwerp (1500), Antwerp to Genoa (1550–1560), and Genoa to Amsterdam (1590–1610) in the prenational era, and thence to Great Britain and the United States in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Each center, in his reading, finds itself possessing decisive comparative advantages for a time—the knowledge and technical know-how, the market and state institutions, the most profitable industries and long-distance trades, and often the military power that together give it the means to direct if not always to command the way a large part of the world works. For a time only, since these advantages gradually wane, and new more vigorous and brighter stars appear during “struggles, clashes . . . prolonged economic crises,” and the recurrent violent divvying up of the world. The movement of history, the mechanism of systemic change, is thus given by the rare, irregular, but decisive shifts from one center to another. The picture, on which world systems theorists drew to derive their own more deterministic reading of capitalist hegemonic cycles, is of successive systemic restructurings and expansions leading to capitalist formations of ever-greater power and ever-wider spatial scope. There are, however, no Newtonian laws of historic motion. The end of the long cycle of Western world economic predominance is not coterminous with absolute Western “decline”: global rebalancing is ushering in a plural world that will revolve

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around relatively equal and deeply interdependent centers of gravity. For observers concerned with the problem of international inequality, such as the author, this is normatively desirable a priori. But the transition constitutes a major challenge and is unlikely to be frictionless.

A note on the terminology used throughout the book: Along with the waning of colonial/imperial modernity, the categories that previously organized knowledge of world social space have become problematic. North, South, Third World, and so on, traditionally used to denote the sociospatial positioning of societies in the world political economy, no longer fit present realities. In terms of living standards, increasingly important population segments of the global South can no longer be considered part of the Third World. And there are significant population segments in the historic North that, in similar terms, can be considered part of the South (indeed, relative poverty in the most advanced Western industrialized countries is generally concentrated in minorities stemming from the global South). Insofar as they continue to structure actor self-understandings and point to the unfinished character of global rebalancing, these categories nonetheless remain useful. “East” and “West” are used in the book to denote historically constructed understandings, not fixed and essentialized cultural identities. The reader will, I expect, find her way around this problem.

This book owes a great deal to the work of authors whose specialized fields it trespasses into, to borrow Weber’s expression regarding comparative studies. I have drawn on a vast historical literature to found my arguments about globalization and the state. As the reader will surely notice, I owe a particular intellectual debt to Bruce Cumings’s work. Thanks are due to the colleagues and friends who in various ways encouraged this project: Raffaele Laudani, who gave me the opportunity some years ago to present a first sketch of the work at the Department of Historical Studies of the University of Bologna, as well as many others who generously offered their support, expertise, and critical comments: Richard Beardsworth, Noelle Burgi, James Cohen, Stephen Golub, Jean-Paul Maréchal, Susan Perry, and my research assistant Anna Wiersma, whose competence and critical eye made this a better book. I also would like to thank Pansak Vinyaratn for having invited me to explore East Asia in the 1990s, when the seeds for the book were first planted, leading to a long-term intellectual engagement. The editors of Polity Press must be warmly thanked for their encouragement and support during the long gestation of the book.

GLOBALIZATION, EAST ASIA, AND THE DYNAMICS OF CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT

The unequal division of the modern world into North and South and East and West has always been one of the core problems of social theory and one of the main lines of fracture of world politics. In the course of the long Industrial Revolution and Europe's synchronous movement of formal and informal imperial expansion in the nineteenth century, an increasingly interdependent but stratified world system came into being that was centered in the Atlantic and ordered by the West. If European overseas expansion and conquest began in the early modern period with the colonization of the Americas and the commercial penetration of Asia by the various East Indian companies, it was only in the late-modern period that imperialism took world-encompassing scope. Drawing on the energies of modern capitalism and made possible by technical evolutions (steamships, the telegraph, railways, and of course guns) that transformed the spatial and temporal conditions of transnational relations, Europe's late-modern "conquest of the universe" put an end to the "multi-secular era" in which various relatively equal and relatively autonomous *économies-mondes* (world economies) had coexisted and interacted in a plural and polycentric world without a dominant center of economic or political gravity (Braudel, 1992).

As imperial globalization unfolded over space and time, European guns and commodities battering down "all Chinese walls," the long-standing parity between East and West was supplanted by a new and durable hierarchical world order characterized by structural North-South and East-West asymmetries. Asia, for centuries the locus of advanced societies and sophisticated commercial cultures, became enmeshed in the webs of European empire and the Atlantic-centered world market. Great Britain, the first industrializer and most

expansive European colonizer, was the primary, though not the sole, agent of this tectonic shift. Britain, Hobsbawm writes, became the systemic center of a new international division of labor characterized by “a set of economies dependent on and complementary to the British, each exchanging the primary products for which its geographical situation fitted it for the manufactures of the world’s workshop” (Hobsbawm, 1990: 136). At the height of British economic predominance in the 1860s, when Britain accounted for 20 percent of world manufacturing, more than half of global coal, iron and cotton cloth production, and over a third of world steampower, observers noted that the “several quarters of the world,” from the Americas through the Mediterranean to the Far East and Australia, had become Britain’s “tributaries” (Jevons, 1865: 16.2). At the time, approximately 300 million people had been incorporated into European overseas empires—86 percent in British Crown colonies, and many millions more in the magnetic fields of the vast informal empire instituted by the “imperialism of free trade” (Gallagher and Robinson, 1953). By the end of the century, at the apogee of late-modern globalization and the nearly complete internationalization of economic life (Keynes, 1920), the population in the formal empires producing the sugar, tea, spice, cereals, cotton and other raw materials and commodities destined to the world market had reached 553 million, of which 393.8 million were under direct British rule (Bairoch, 1997, Vol. 2: 608–9). When semi-sovereign partially colonized states such as China and the nominally autonomous but economically subordinate societies of Latin America are included, nearly half the world population had been enmeshed in the regimes and controls of empire. Aside a few important exceptions, notably Meiji Japan, which managed to preserve its political autonomy and avoid economic entrapment through its own industrial revolution and the building of a modern state, and which went on to play a major role in interimperialist competition in Asia, the overall outcome of late-modern globalization was the great divergence (Pomeranz, 2000) between East and West and the division of the world into dominant cores and dependent peripheries.

Rather than spreading outside of Europe and leading to convergence, the Industrial Revolution generated asymmetric interdependence. Because of the patterns of specialization instituted by colonial regimes, industrialization and economic expansion in the northern Atlantic world conditioned other world regions, warping or arresting development in the newly constituted peripheries (Parthasarathi, 2001), whose living standards stagnated and whose share of world income declined sharply throughout the nineteenth century. According

to Paul Bairoch's thorough if necessarily approximate estimates, peripheral living standards, measured by average per capita output, were only marginally higher in 1900 than they had been in 1750, whereas they had more than tripled on average in the newly industrialized economies of Europe and the neo-European settler colonies. The disparity was even greater with the most industrialized countries, where average per capita output was four (Britain) to five (United States) times higher (Bairoch, 1997). The limited industrialization that did occur in colonial or semi-colonial areas in the late nineteenth century—for instance the construction of railroads and infrastructure to facilitate commodity transport to ports that shipped goods to Northern markets, or the creation of new textile manufacturing facilities in India—did not produce the cumulative results of self-sustaining growth, integration of national markets, and rising overall living standards observable in Europe. Rather, it elicited new patterns of spatial unevenness: the structure of international production and trade generated demographic inflation and unbalanced urbanization in coastal trading centers that became warehouses for the primary products and staples destined for the world market. If there were some pockets of quantitative development in India or Qing China, due to local entrepreneurship, capitalist modernity in colonial or semi-colonial Asia became coterminous with unevenness and durable international inequality. Europe's "machine revolution," Braudel aptly writes, was "not merely an instrument of development" but "a weapon of domination and destruction of competition" (Braudel, 1992: 535).

This outcome was not quite the one envisioned by Marx in his brilliant albeit Eurocentric depiction and analysis of late modern globalization and capitalist development. Writing from within the systemic transformation, he observed that the development and internationalization of "colossal productive forces" had "given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption" and generated "universal inter-dependence" in a world economy integrated through transnational flows (Marx and Engels, 1978). Thanks to the "rapid improvement of all instruments of production [and] the immensely facilitated means of communication," Europe was incorporating the rest of the world into its developmental movement, making "barbarian and semi-barbarian countries dependent on the civilized ones, nations of peasants on nations of bourgeois, the East on the West." Just as the emergence of capitalism in England flowed from a process of progressive historical change, he envisioned Europe's worldwide economic and spatial expansion as part of a necessary movement of the world

toward industrial and urban civilization, hence human liberation from natural constraints and the “idiocy of rural life.” By drawing Asia into the developmental logic of capitalism and enmeshing her in the “net of the world market,” European imperialism would hasten the transition from “oriental despotism” and the “village system” to industrial capitalism. Europe’s intrusion in India and China would destroy stagnant socioeconomic systems and revolutionize the “social state in Asia,” thereby “fulfilling mankind’s destiny” to be the “sovereign of nature” (Marx, 1963: 35-41).

Marx was well aware of the great violence of the incorporation process, devoting many eloquent pages to the “atrocious exploitation” of India and to “English ferocity in China.” He showed acute interest in contemporary national uprisings in China and India that, he believed, would help to spark revolution in Europe.¹ But he detached analytical and normative judgments in his theory of history and his analysis of capitalist development. Violence was foundational to the revolutionary rise and expansion of the world capitalist system: “The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production” (Marx, 1977: 751). As the Industrial Revolution matured, thanks to this first or “primitive” phase of capital accumulation, England became the midwife of modernity in Asia: “Whatever may have been the aims of England, she was the unconscious tool of history in bringing about the revolution . . . England has to fulfil a double mission in India: one destructive, the other regenerating—the annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundation of Western society in Asia” (1963: 37). Following the “natural laws of capitalist production,” industrialization would spread to the rest of the world. Precapitalist systems of social reproduction based on subsistence agriculture and household manufactures would be supplanted by modern capitalist development. In that sense, the more economically and technologically advanced countries “simply [presented] others with a picture of their future.”

For most of the non-European world, that future never fully materialized. The breakdown of the European world order after the Second World War due to the combined effects of anticolonial resistance and metropolitan exhaustion gave the postcolonial South de jure equality but not effective autonomy. With some major East Asian exceptions—Japan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), whose

modernization and state-building efforts are central concerns of this book—the structural disparities brought about in the late nineteenth century widened considerably. Notwithstanding the promise of self-determination, universal “well being,” “equal rights,” and “economic and social progress and development” contained in the United Nations Charter, average living standards in the postcolonial South were only marginally higher at the time of the Bandung Conference (1955) than they had been in the mid-eighteenth century. Nor did independence lead to an improvement of the relative economic position of most postcolonial Southern states. With three quarters of the world’s population, the global South’s share of world income (around 25 percent) was nearly three times lower than it had been in 1750 (Nayyar, 2013) and its share of world manufacturing output had fallen from over 70 to 6.5 percent. Relative decline was most pronounced in Asia (outside Japan), whose share of world manufacturing (craft and industrial) had fallen from more than 60 percent to less than 5 percent. Per-capita levels of industrialization reveal deep decline: per-capita industrial output in China in 1953 was half what it had been in 1750. In India it was 3.5 times lower. In contrast, per capita industrial production in Japan had been multiplied 5.7 times (Bairoch, 1982).

By the early 1970s the South’s relative position in the world economy had not significantly improved. While its share of world manufacturing output had increased to 9 percent in a much expanded world economy, it nonetheless remained inferior to 1900 levels. The most important gains were concentrated in a handful of industrializing states: in 1970 South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Brazil and Mexico accounted for nearly one third of industrial production, outside of China, in the South. In 1971, the United Nations (UNO) launched the Second Development Decade on a sombre note: “Countless millions of people in the developing world . . . are often still undernourished, undereducated, unemployed and wanting in the many other basic amenities of life. While a part of the world lives in great comfort and even affluence, most of the larger part suffers from abject poverty, and in fact the disparity is continuing to widen” (UN, 1970). Critical observers of international relations and international development specialists were thus well founded when they argued that the “obscene inequalities that disfigure the world” constituted the main theoretical and normative challenge for the social sciences and the fundamental problem of world politics (Seers, 1969). Ambitious efforts by a constellation of postcolonial leaders, international public servants (UNCTAD), theorists and activists in the early 1970s to

alter the post-1945 world economic order and institutionalize a global redistributive order (the New International Economic Order), founded on new binding multilateral regimes, failed (Golub, 2013).² Having little world market power and no voice in decisions taken by the most powerful Northern states, the position of many Southern world regions substantially deteriorated in the late 1970s and early 1980s. This was notably the case of Africa and Latin America, which were confronted with exogenously driven debt crises that ushered in economic stagnation and social regression.

In Latin America, parts of which had experienced significant economic gains in the first two decades of the postwar period due to import substitution industrialization (ISI), this led to the end of “peripheral Fordism” and the “asphyxiation of industrialization” (Lipietz, 1984). At the time, the few and rather small industrializing countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong) that accounted for the lion’s share of Southern manufactured exports did not appear systemically significant. Despite the beginnings of industrialization and strong growth in the 1970s and early 1980s, the developing capitalist countries of Southeast Asia were still peripheral actors in the world economy. China was contemporaneously swept up in the turbulence of the Cultural Revolution that dislocated the economy and nearly caused a general breakdown. In the early 1980s, the economy was just beginning to recover, thanks to the gradualist market reforms of the post-Mao leadership, and a capitalist transition, the tensions of which erupted into the open during the 1989 mass protests in Tiananmen Square in Beijing. Overall, downward mobility and/or crisis rather than convergence appeared the general trend for much, though not all, of the historic South. At the end of the 1970s the developmental impasse seemed so intractable and the disparities so great that Braudel pessimistically concluded that the South would somehow have to “break down the existing international order” (Braudel, 1992: 535) to gain upward economic mobility and achieve *de facto* rather than *de jure* equality.

A historical turn

Fundamental changes in the world economy over the past thirty years have overturned this assessment: due to the economic revolution that has unfolded in East Asia, the vertical world economic structure that came into being in the nineteenth century is being gradually altered from within. As publications of the United Nations Development

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Program (UNDP) and the World Bank (WB) have recently noted, we are experiencing a historic rebalancing that is leading to the dissolution of the hierarchies that became coterminous with Eurocentric modernity. “Throughout the course of history,” notes the Bank report,

paradigms of economic power have been drawn and redrawn according to the rise and fall of states with the greatest capabilities to drive global growth. . . . In the first half of the second millennium China and India were the world’s predominant growth poles. The Industrial Revolution brought West European economies to the forefront. In the post-World War II era, the United States was the predominant force in the global economy. . . . In more recent years the global economy has begun another major transition. . . . The rise of emerging economies will inevitably have major implications for the global economic and political hierarchy. (World Bank, 2011:1)

Announcing the 2013 *Human Development Report*, the UNDP likewise emphasized: “The World is witnessing an epochal global rebalancing. The rise of the South reverses the huge shift that saw Europe and North America eclipse the rest of the world, beginning with the industrial revolution, through the colonial era to two World Wars in the twentieth century. Now another tectonic shift has put developing countries on an upward curve” (UNDP, 2013). There is ample evidence supporting these claims. Over the past thirty years, the world GDP share of developing countries in purchasing power parity (PPP) has more than tripled, from approximately 15 percent in 1980 to 50 percent; their share of manufacturing value-added has risen from 8.8 to nearly 30 percent; and their share of world merchandise trade from 25 to 47 percent. New regional and trans-continental South–South economic linkages have concurrently come into being that are repatterning the geography of world trade and investment flows. South–South trade has expanded over the past two decades more rapidly than global trade and currently accounts for 25 percent of the total, 21 percent of world manufactures exports, and a quarter of exports of manufactures with medium and high technological intensity. Trade between developed countries fell during the same period from 46 to less than 30 percent (UNCTAD, 2012; UNDP, 2013).

Global rebalancing has been driven by East Asia, which has experienced a process of economic expansion and ascent whose amplitude, spatial scope, and duration have been remarkable by historic standards. Starting with Japan’s revival soon after the Second World War,