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HUMAN Security

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Reflections on Globalization
and Intervention

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Acknowledgements

The chapters in this book are revised and updated versions of essays that were originally published as book chapters or

Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CARE	Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CDD	Centre for Democracy and Development (Sierra Leone)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
GDP	gross domestic product
HCA	Helsinki Citizens' Assembly
HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDPs	internally displaced persons
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INTERFET	International Force for East Timor
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MEP	Member of the European Parliament

MIME-NET	Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Network
MSF	Medécins sans Frontières
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa
NGOs	non-governmental organizations
NLA	National Liberation Army (Macedonia)
NMSP-WOT	National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terror
OAS	Organization of American States
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDD	Presidential Decision Directive
PGMs	precision guided munitions
R&D	research and development
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
UAVs	unmanned aerial vehicles
UNAMIR	United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITAF	United Nations Unified Task Force
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

Introduction

War no longer exists. Confrontation, conflict and combat undoubtedly exist all round the world . . . and states still have armed forces which they use as symbols of power. None the less, war as cognitively known to most combatants, war as battle in a field between men and machinery, war as a massive deciding event in a dispute in international affairs: such war no longer exists.

Rupert Smith, *The Utility of Force*

The war in Iraq can be considered an illustration of why we need a new approach to security. President Bush and his former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld claimed that they were fighting a new type of war, based on the application of information and communications technology. Yet in fact the approach was rather traditional; it reproduced the methods that General Rupert Smith says we cognitively know as 'war', using conventional military forces to invade Iraq and subsequently to try to defeat the insurgents. What Rumsfeld called 'defense transformation' merely means incorporating new technologies into traditional structures and strategies.

The transformation in security goes well beyond technological change; it involves a transformation of the social relations of warfare and the character of the threats that we face. It is failure to understand this transformation of the social relations of warfare that explains why the Americans (and the British)

have been dragged ever deeper into a combination of insurgency and sectarian 'confrontation, conflict and combat' that has provided a magnet for global terrorism.

This book is a compilation of essays on this theme written during the first five years of the new century. It argues for a new approach to security based on a global conversation – a public debate among civil society groups and individuals as well as states and international institutions. The chapters are a logical follow-on to my work during the 1990s on the character of 'new wars' in places like the Balkans or Africa, or what Rupert Smith calls 'wars amongst the people'.[1] In this introduction, I sketch my thinking on new and old wars, the Cold War, and on global civil society because it provides a conceptual and historical background to the chapters in this book. Then I raise some brief methodological and normative considerations and, in the last section, I outline the essays.

Background

I began to use the term 'new wars' in the middle of the 1990s when I was co-chair of the Helsinki Citizens Assembly and visited local branches in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina or Nagorno Karabakh. I realized that these conflicts were very different from my preconceptions of war, which were largely based on what I had learned both in my research and from the media about the world wars of the twentieth century. I also realized that most people, including policy-makers in key positions, shared my preconceptions and that this prevented them adopting appropriate policies. I therefore chose the term 'new wars' to show that these conflicts are very different from the 'old wars' on which our preconceptions of war are based.

By 'old wars', I mean the wars that took place in Europe from the late eighteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century – it is this idealized version of this type of war that has come to represent what we cognitively understand as war. 'Old war' is war between states fought by armed forces in uniform, where the decisive encounter was battle. 'Old wars', as Charles Tilly has convincingly argued, were linked to the rise of the modern nation-state and were state-building.[2] '[W]ar made states, and vice versa,' says Tilly.[3] In wars, states were gradually

able to monopolize organized violence and to eliminate private armies, brigands, feudal levies, etc., and establish professional forces subservient to the state. Taxation and borrowing were increased, as was administrative efficiency and public services, and above all the concept of political community was forged. Imagined communities, based on the development of newspapers and novels in vernacular tongues through which people who spoke the same language came to see themselves as part of one community, were consolidated in war. Carl Schmitt talks about the concept of the political that underlies the modern state. For him, intrinsic to the concept of the political is the friend–enemy distinction, and this, he says, is linked to the 'real physical possibility of killing'.[4] The job of the state was to defend territory against others, and it was this job that gave the state its legitimacy. *Protecto ergo obligo* ('I protect therefore I am obeyed'), says Schmitt, 'is the *cogito ergo sum* of the state.'[5]

'Old wars' were fought according to certain rules, at least in theory, rules codified in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the Geneva and Hague Conventions – rules about minimizing civilian casualties, treating prisoners well and so on. Rules were critical to establishing the legitimacy of wars. There is a fine line between heroes and criminals, legitimate killing and murder.

What I call 'new wars' are just the opposite. These are wars that take place in the context of the disintegration of states (typically authoritarian states under the impact of globalization). They are fought by networks of state and non-state actors, often without uniforms, sometimes with distinctive signs, like crosses, or Ray-Ban sunglasses as in the case of the Croatian militia in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They are wars where battles are rare and where most violence is directed against civilians as a consequence of counter-insurgency tactics or ethnic cleansing. They are wars where taxation is falling and war finance consists of loot and pillage, illegal trading and other war-generated revenue. They are wars where the distinctions between combatant and non-combatant, legitimate violence and criminality are all breaking down. These are wars which exacerbate the disintegration of the state – declines in GDP, loss of tax revenue, loss of legitimacy, etc. Above all, they construct new sectarian identities (religious, ethnic or tribal)

that undermine the sense of a shared political community. Indeed, this could be considered the purpose of these wars. They recreate the sense of political community along new divisive lines through the manufacture of fear and hate. They establish new friend–enemy distinctions. Moreover, these sectarian political identities are often inextricably tied to criminalized networks that provide a basis for a global shadow economy.

Unlike 'old wars', which ended with victory or defeat, 'new wars' are very difficult to end. The various warring parties have a vested interest in continuing violence for both political and economic reasons. Moreover, they tend to spread through refugees and displaced persons, criminalized networks, and the sectarian ideologies they manufacture.

Of course, these wars are not entirely 'new'. They have much in common with wars in the premodern period in Europe, and with wars outside Europe throughout the period of 'old wars'. It is even possible to identify some elements of what I have called 'new wars' within 'old wars' – for example, in the effect of the First World War on the Ottoman Empire. I emphasize the distinction because it helps our understanding of what is happening today and what we need to do about it. In much contemporary literature, the 'new wars' are described as 'civil wars'. It is widely argued that interstate wars have declined and civil wars have increased. I have resisted this terminology both because the 'new wars' involve a blurring of internal and external, and because of the policy implications of the term. Was the war in Bosnia a Yugoslav civil war or an international war? Was the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in which several neighbouring states were involved interstate or civil? In policy terms, the use of the word 'civil war' implies non-intervention. The notion of international intervention to protect people from large-scale human rights violations is much more contested, despite the recent approval of the concept of 'responsibility to protect'. There is a case for international intervention to defend a state against aggression in the context of interstate wars. But does it matter whether human rights violations are conducted by outsiders and therefore count as 'aggression', or by insiders and termed 'repression'? In Bosnia, did it matter whether ethnic cleansing was carried out by Bosnian Serbs or Serbs from Serbia? Moreover, the use of the

term 'civil war' has meant that outside efforts, whether they count as intervention or not, have tended to focus on individual nation-states when in reality all 'new wars' spill over borders and have to be addressed in a regional context. A similar argument can be made about the term 'privatized war', which is used by some authors. It is true that new wars involve non-state armed groups, but usually with links to regular armies or the remnants of regular armies. The point is rather that, in the 'new wars', the distinction between public and private is also blurred.

'Old wars' reached their apex in the middle of the twentieth century. The application of science and technology to killing, and the increased mobilization capacities of states led to a destruction on an unimaginable scale. Some 35 million people were killed in the First World War and 70 million people in the Second World War. As many people were killed in a few weeks in Auschwitz as were killed in the tsunami, or in the entire war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Similar numbers were killed in a single night in the bombing of Tokyo, Dresden, Hamburg, Hiroshima or Nagasaki. Moreover, half of those killed in the Second World War were civilians. Out of the experience of those wars came the centralized totalitarian state and blocs of states – the high point of state-building. When George Orwell wrote *1984*, his nightmare vision of competing totalitarian blocs, he was thinking not just of the Soviet Union but of postwar Britain. *1984* was 1948 upside down. Above all, these total wars gave rise to a new concept of the political that extended beyond the state to blocs of nations, the idea of democracy against totalitarianism or of socialism against fascism. The Cold War can be conceptualized as a way of keeping this idea of 'old war', linked to an extended notion of political community, alive. 'Old war' ways of seeing the world run very deeply in the discourses of politicians. And this, it can be argued, prevents them from seeing the reality of 'new wars'.

During the Cold War, it used to be said that Europe or even the world, enjoyed 'peace'. Quite apart from the fact that there were real wars in Hungary and Czechoslovakia and in large parts of what was called the Third World, we lived in Europe as though we were at war with millions of men under arms, with frequent exercises, spy stories, hostile propaganda and so on. And we lived with much of the anxiety and fear associated

with war as well as with the organizations – the defence indus-
tries, the centralized state – and, of course, the friend–foe dis-
tinction that defined the world in two ideological camps and
provided a mechanism for discrediting opposition. That is why
I prefer to describe the Cold War as 'imaginary war'.[6]

Throughout the period, the Cold War was seen as a mighty
ideological clash, a 'Great Contest' as Deutscher put it, between
democracy and totalitarianism, or between capitalism and
socialism.[7] And I would argue that this idea, this 'global clash',
was a way of defining political community within each bloc.
The Cold War suited both sides. The Second World War had
solved the problems of the mass unemployment and destruc-
tive economic nationalism of the 1930s in the West, and of
inefficiency and lack of legitimacy in the East. The Cold War
reproduced those solutions. In a way, both right and left col-
luded in this idea. The right described the conflict as one
between freedom and totalitarianism. The left discredited
themselves by seeing the conflict as one between capitalism and
socialism.

None of this was a result of conscious decisions by their
elites. Rather it was the outcome of their own experiences in
the Second World War, the state structures that had been
established during the period. If you analyse, for example, the
evolution of the arms race during the Cold War, it is much
better explained on each side as though they were arming
against a phantom German enemy than against each other.
Thus the Americans continued to emphasize strategic bombing;
with the advent of missiles, nuclear weapons were seen as
a continuation of long-distance bombing and placed under
Strategic Air Command. The US anticipated a conventional
Blitzkrieg across the north German plains and they envisaged
themselves rushing to the aid of the Europeans, making use of
superior know-how. Russians, on the other hand, never did
strategic bombing – on the contrary, bombing was considered
a fascist tactic. They believed that there was no alternative to
conventional ground forces. Aircraft were seen as assisting
ground forces, 'hand maidens of artillery', as Stalin called them,
so when missiles were developed they were seen as artillery and
placed under the command of the artillery academy.

Nor was there symmetry between the two sides. Large
numbers of people in the West supported the Cold War and

felt they benefited from it. But the imposition of Stalinism was a tragedy for the peoples of central Europe and, it can be argued, the Soviet hold over central Europe was sustained by the Cold War.

Throughout the period, at least on the Western side, there was always a problem of 'credibility'. If war was purely imaginary, how long would enemies and friends continue to believe in American power? Astonishing numbers of nuclear weapons were accumulated during the 1950s and 1960s – enough to destroy the world many times over. Strategy, according to von Clausewitz, is the use of military force for political ends. But what, pondered strategists like Schelling, did strategy mean if the weapons were too dangerous to be used? What if insurgents in Latin America or South East Asia were not deterred? How could force be used in a limited way? Indeed the sophisticated differentiation of different types and roles of nuclear weapons (tactical, theatre and strategic) in a context where the use of any one weapon would be devastating was, to say the least, profoundly puzzling.

My answer to this puzzle was that strategy came to be about how force might be used in an imaginary war where everyone knew the rules. The arcane Western debates about, for example, mutual assured destruction versus flexible response, have to be explained in these terms. The complex esoteric argument for acquiring nuclear weapons put forward by Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration and one of the better-known nuclear strategists, and more recently one of the neocon team around President Bush, illustrates the imaginary nature of nuclear strategy: 'I've always worried less about what would happen in an actual nuclear exchange than the effect the nuclear balance has on our willingness to take risks in local situations,' said Perle. 'It is not that I am worried about the Soviets attacking the United States with nuclear weapons confident that they will win that nuclear war. It is that I worry about an American President feeling he cannot take action in a crisis because Soviet nuclear forces are such that, if escalation took place, they are better poised than we are to move up the escalation ladder.'[8] Star Wars, the Strategic Defense Initiative, or now National Missile Defense, was supposed to protect America in the imagination so that force could be usable again.

The Global War on Terror can be understood as an attempt to reproduce the narrative of the Cold War by a generation that was schooled in the mentality of permanent imaginary war – an argument I develop in chapter 2 of this book. They believed that the United States had 'won' the Cold War because the Soviet Union was no longer able to compete with the United States in the arms race. The 'old war' recipe was therefore trundled out again after 9/11; it was intrinsic to the psychological make-up of the men around President Bush. But unlike the Cold War, the Global War on Terror has led to two real wars. In Iraq, the United States is being dragged into a real global 'new war'. Because of shortages of troops, more private contractors are drawn into the war, so it is fought by a network of state and non-state actors. Because it is so difficult to distinguish insurgents from combatants, the main victims are civilians. Because the insurgents are mainly Sunni, the war has increasingly taken on a sectarian character, constructing sectarian identities in mixed urban settings. And the war is spreading to Iraq and Afghanistan's neighbours, and to East Africa as well.

Of course, there were real wars in the Cold War period, of which the most important were Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan. They were called 'limited' even though millions died – many more than in today's Iraq and Afghanistan – because they did not involve direct US–Soviet confrontation in Europe. But despite their 'limited' nature, both Vietnam and Afghanistan did call into question the credibility of large-scale conventional military force and began a questioning of the Cold War narrative. In the twenty years after Vietnam, a new discourse began to develop based on the coming together of the concepts of peace and human rights – the 'new peace', if you like, or better still, human security. In the period of 'old wars', peace referred to relations between states,[9] whereas law and rights referred to domestic affairs – something International Relations theorists call the 'Great Divide'.[10] The development of what has come to be called the 'human rights regime', as a result of both the development of human rights law, the Conventions and the Helsinki Agreement of 1975, and the proliferation of human rights activists concerned about human rights abuses, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe, was key in starting to overcome the 'Great Divide'. Peace movements, which had focused on opposition to war and the arms race, began to take

up human rights issues after the signing of the Helsinki Accords. I was involved in the dialogue between the West European peace movement and the opposition in Eastern Europe during the 1980s. It was through this dialogue that concepts like pan-European or global civil society or civic or human security were debated and elaborated. My version of the end of the Cold War is that the Cold War narrative, the idea of a permanent East–West dialogue, lost its hold on the imagination, especially but not only in the East.

By analysing 'new wars' in terms of social relations of warfare, we come up with a very different approach about how to deal with these types of conflict, and indeed, how to deal with terror in general. The global 'new war' that may develop as a consequence of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the way they are spreading can be viewed as a way of constructing a 'clash of civilizations', and it is already perhaps contributing to the growth of extreme Islamism. The risk of terror is too serious to be hijacked by fantasies of 'old war'. In much the same way, I would argue, the Cold War and nuclear weapons prevented us from adopting a serious strategy for undermining communism; this was only possible in a détente context. The Second World War really did mark the end of 'old wars'. Wars of this type are impossible; they are simply too destructive to be fought and have become unacceptable and, indeed, illegitimate. The eight-year war between Iraq and Iran was probably the exception that proved the rule. It was immensely destructive and led to military stalemate; and, at least on the Iraqi side, far from consolidating the state, it was the beginning of state disintegration, the slide into new war.

'New wars' deliberately violate all the conventions of 'old war', as well as the new body of human rights law that has been introduced since the Second World War. The key to dealing with 'new wars' is the reconstruction of political legitimacy around the ideas about human rights and global civil society that were reinvented in the last decades of the Cold War. If 'old wars' established a notion of political legitimacy in terms of the friend–enemy distinction, in 'new wars', the friend–enemy distinction destroys political legitimacy. So political legitimacy can only be reconstructed on the basis of cosmopolitan consent and within a framework of international law. It means supporting efforts of democratization in difficult

situations or using various international tools and law to support such processes. One of these tools is the use of military force, but an important theme of this book is the need to use military forces, together with civilian capabilities, in quite new ways that are more akin to law enforcement than to war-fighting.

The chapters in this book elaborate this approach. Carl Schmitt would argue that there can be no political community without enemies. And that where force is used in the name of humanity, the adversary is no longer an enemy but an outlaw, a disturber of the peace, so political community no longer exists. If he is right, the future is very grim; we can anticipate a pervasive global 'new war'. But if we believe political communities can be held together by reason rather than fear, then there is an alternative possibility, a transformation of statehood, in which states are no longer intrinsically linked to warfare and operate within a multilateral framework. And as for the argument about humanity, we could turn it on its head. If we dub the terrorists as enemies, we give them political status; indeed this may be what they are trying to achieve. Perhaps it is more appropriate to view them as outlaws, disturbers of the peace, and to use the methods of law enforcement rather than 'old war'.

Some Methodological and Normative Considerations

My starting point is the assumption that there is a real security gap in the world today. Millions of people in regions such as the Middle East or East and Central Africa or Central Asia where 'new wars' are taking place live in daily fear of violence. Moreover 'new wars' are increasingly intertwined with other global risks – the spread of disease, vulnerability to natural disasters, poverty and homelessness. Yet our security conceptions, drawn from the dominant experience of the Second World War, do not reduce that insecurity; rather they make it worse. The objective of most of the essays is to develop new proposals to address that security gap.

But this needs a new language. It is the way we currently perceive security, the 'old war' language we use, that prevents us from finding new solutions. Most of these essays analyse different positions, the arguments that are used to legitimize

policy. Social science is about telling stories. Some stories can be matched with evidence better than others. There cannot be a perfect fit because the story would be as slow to tell as life itself. It would be a mirror on life rather than an abstraction that pulls out certain aspects of life that help us guide our actions.

Stories can have enormous political ramifications. In democratic societies, contenders for power use their competing stories to mobilize political support. Relatively stable societies usually have a common narrative that holds them together, a 'disciplinary technology' to use Foucault's term,[11] although even in authoritarian societies it is possible to identify alternative versions. Moments of dramatic change are moments of experimentation when rival stories gain credibility and the implications of alternative stories are tried out. Stories become dominant if they can be reproduced, if the policies justified in terms of the story lead to outcomes that can be explained by the story. There is no inevitability about which story becomes dominant. In the Second World War, there were competing visions of postwar international arrangements. Roosevelt and the New Dealers imagined a new global order, based on collective security, free trade, and the right to self-determination. Churchill and Stalin envisaged a world divided into spheres of influence. Those who took part in the European resistance dreamed of a united Europe. That the Cold War story succeeded does not mean that the others could not also have been tried out had they been able to mobilize sufficient political support.

In these chapters, I have been experimenting with different ways of describing the competing stories of the current period. The 'old war' story I sometimes describe as 'geopolitical' or 'top-down' or even 'sovereignist'. The International Relations theorists call it the 'realist' position, even though it may no longer be realistic. The American narrative was never a classic 'old war' story, though there were some like Kissinger who tried to make it so. It was always tempered by a strand of idealism – the notion that the United States is the leader of a democratic crusade. And it is this revamped American story that is promulgated by the neocons and under attack in Iraq. The nationalists and the Islamists have other stories to tell – often drawn from the experience of communism and/or

of anti-colonial movements. But their stories fit the 'old war' narrative and can therefore reinforce the idea of the Global War on Terror.

In describing these competing stories, I am also trying to elaborate my own story, which has its origins in the dialogue between the peace and human rights groups in the last years of the Cold War. In these chapters, I also experiment with different terms. Terms like 'new wars', 'global civil society', 'cosmopolitanism' or 'human security' are all different ways in which I have tried to draw attention to the global context, the ways in which the difference between inside and outside have become blurred, and our growing concern about the fate of individual human beings and their communities, rather than states. The adjective 'new' attached to war is not so different from the adjective 'global' attached to civil society.[12] What is 'new' about 'new wars' has to do with globalization and this, in turn, is related to the changed role of the state. Indeed, I am not even sure that the word 'war' is appropriate because war does refer to political violence between social organized groups and, as I often stress, the 'new wars' are a mixture of war, human rights violations and organized crime. Likewise, global civil society is unbounded civil society; it is 'new' compared with the bounded civil societies found in North-West Europe and North America in an earlier period. In experimenting with terms, I am partly wrestling with their usage in relation to the real world and how well they fit our knowledge of what is happening in different regions, and whether they help us to ask new questions and acquire new knowledge. And I am partly concerned about their political resonance, how well they open up new ways of seeing the world that could lead to better policy.

Plan of the Book

The first chapter was originally written for the first edition of the *Global Civil Society* yearbook.[13] It described the emerging discourse and practice of humanitarianism in the aftermath of the Cold War. In particular, it aimed to show that civil society had been instrumental in shaping this discourse, introducing a new dimension into world politics. The chapter outlined the various positions on humanitarian intervention and argued that