

# A COMPANION TO GREEK RHETORIC

*Edited by*

Ian Worthington



**A COMPANION  
TO GREEK  
RHETORIC**

# BLACKWELL COMPANIONS TO THE ANCIENT WORLD

This series provides sophisticated and authoritative overviews of periods of ancient history, genres of classical literature, and the most important themes in ancient culture. Each volume comprises between twenty-five and forty concise essays written by individual scholars within their area of specialization. The essays are written in a clear, provocative, and lively manner, designed for an international audience of scholars, students, and general readers.

## ANCIENT HISTORY

### **Published**

A Companion to the Roman Republic  
*Edited by Nathan Rosenstein and Robert Morstein-Marx*

A Companion to the Roman Empire  
*Edited by David S. Potter*

A Companion to the Classical Greek World  
*Edited by Konrad H. Kinzl*

A Companion to the Ancient Near East  
*Edited by Daniel C. Snell*

A Companion to the Hellenistic World  
*Edited by Andrew Erskine*

### **In preparation**

A Companion to Ancient History  
*Edited by Andrew Erskine*

A Companion to the Archaic Greek World  
*Edited by Kurt A. Raaflaub and Hans van Wees*

A Companion to Julius Caesar  
*Edited by Miriam Griffin*

A Companion to the Roman Army  
*Edited by Paul Erdkamp*

A Companion to Late Antiquity  
*Edited by Philip Rousseau*

A Companion to Byzantium  
*Edited by Elizabeth James*

## LITERATURE AND CULTURE

### **Published**

A Companion to Classical Tradition  
*Edited by Craig Kallendorf*

A Companion to Ancient Epic  
*Edited by John Miles Foley*

A Companion to Roman Rhetoric  
*Edited by William Dominik and Jon Hall*

A Companion to Greek Rhetoric  
*Edited by Ian Worthington*

A Companion to Greek Tragedy  
*Edited by Justina Gregory*

A Companion to Latin Literature  
*Edited by Stephen Harrison*

### **In preparation**

A Companion to Classical Receptions  
*Edited by Lorna Hardwick*

A Companion to Ancient Political Thought  
*Edited by Ryan K. Balot*

A Companion to Classical Studies  
*Edited by Kai Brodersen*

A Companion to Classical Mythology  
*Edited by Ken Dowden and Niall Livingstone*

A Companion to Greek and Roman Historiography  
*Edited by John Marincola*

A Companion to the Ancient Greek Language  
*Edited by Egbert Bakker*

A Companion to Greek Religion  
*Edited by Daniel Ogden*

A Companion to Hellenistic Literature  
*Edited by Martine Cuypers and James J. Clauss*

A Companion to Roman Religion  
*Edited by Jörg Rüpke*

A Companion to Ovid  
*Edited by Peter Knox*

A Companion to Catullus  
*Edited by Marilyn Skinner*

A Companion to Horace  
*Edited by N. Gregson Davis*

# A COMPANION TO GREEK RHETORIC

*Edited by*

Ian Worthington

© 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

BLACKWELL PUBLISHING  
350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148-5020, USA  
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK  
550 Swanston Street, Carlton, Victoria 3053, Australia

The right of Ian Worthington to be identified as the Author of the Editorial Material in this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by the UK Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988, without the prior permission of the publisher.

First published 2007 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd

1 2007

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data*

A companion to Greek rhetoric / edited by Ian Worthington.

p. cm. — (Blackwell companions to the ancient world. Literature and culture)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN-13: 978-1-4051-2551-2 (hardback : alk. paper)

ISBN-10: 1-4051-2551-9 (hardback : alk. paper)

1. Rhetoric, Ancient—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 2. Classical literature—History and criticism—Theory, etc.—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 3. Speeches, addresses, etc., Greek—History and criticism—Theory, etc.—Handbooks, manuals, etc. 4. Oratory, Ancient—Handbooks, manuals, etc. I. Worthington, Ian. II. Series.

PA3265.C66 2007

808'.0481—dc22

2006006922

A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library.

Set in 10/12pt Galliard  
by SPi Publisher Services, Pondicherry, India.  
Printed and bound in Singapore  
by Cos Printers Pte Ltd

The publisher's policy is to use permanent paper from mills that operate a sustainable forestry policy, and which has been manufactured from pulp processed using acid-free and elementary chlorine-free practices. Furthermore, the publisher ensures that the text paper and cover board used have met acceptable environmental accreditation standards.

For further information on  
Blackwell Publishing, visit our website:  
[www.blackwellpublishing.com](http://www.blackwellpublishing.com)

# Contents

Notes on Contributors	viii
Preface: For Readers – and Reviewers	x
Notes	xii
Abbreviations	xiii
Speeches of the Attic Orators	xiv
<b>Part I    Setting the Scene</b>	<b>1</b>
1    Rhetorical Questions <i>Edward Schiappa and Jim Hamm</i>	3
2    Modern Interpretations of Classical Greek Rhetoric <i>Takis Poulakos</i>	16
<b>Part II    Rhetoric: A Brief History</b>	<b>25</b>
3    Background and Origins: Oratory and Rhetoric before the Sophists <i>Michael Gagarin</i>	27
4    Gorgias the Sophist and Early Rhetoric <i>Jeroen A.E. Bons</i>	37
5    Alcidamas <i>Michael Edwards</i>	47
6    Isocrates <i>Terry L. Papillon</i>	58

7	Plato's Rhetoric <i>Harvey Yunis</i>	75
8	The <i>Rhetoric to Alexander</i> <i>P. Chiron</i>	90
9	Aristotle's <i>Art of Rhetoric</i> <i>W.W. Fortenbaugh</i>	107
10	Hellenistic Rhetoric in Theory and Practice <i>John Vanderspoel</i>	124
11	The New World Order: Greek Rhetoric in Rome <i>Joy Connolly</i>	139
12	Rhetoric in Byzantium <i>Elizabeth Jeffreys</i>	166
<b>Part III</b>	<b>Rhetoric and Speeches</b>	<b>185</b>
13	The Parts of the Speech <i>Michael de Brauw</i>	187
14	Forensic Oratory <i>Craig Cooper</i>	203
15	Symbouleutic Oratory <i>Stephen Usher</i>	220
16	Epideictic Oratory <i>Christopher Carey</i>	236
<b>Part IV</b>	<b>Rhetoric: Political, Social and Intellectual Contexts</b>	<b>253</b>
17	Rhetoric and Politics in Classical Greece: Rise of the <i>Rhētores</i> <i>Ian Worthington</i>	255
18	Rhetoric and Persuasion in the Hellenistic World: Speaking up for the <i>Polis</i> <i>Andrew Erskine</i>	272
19	Rhetoric and the Law <i>James P. Sickinger</i>	286
20	Rhetoric and Education <i>Teresa Morgan</i>	303
21	Rhetoric and Religion <i>Ken Dowden</i>	320



22	Rhetoric and Language <i>A. López Eire</i>	336
23	Rhetoric and Logic <i>James Allen</i>	350
24	Rhetoric and Knowledge <i>Tobias Reinhardt</i>	365
25	Rhetoric and Ethics from the Sophists to Aristotle <i>Jane M. Day</i>	378
26	Rhetoric, Manliness and Contest <i>Joseph Roisman</i>	393
27	Rhetoric and Emotion <i>David Konstan</i>	411
<b>Part V</b>	<b>Rhetoric and Literature</b>	<b>427</b>
28	Right Rhetoric in Homer <i>Hanna M. Roisman</i>	429
29	Hesiod's Rhetorical Art <i>Jenny Strauss Clay</i>	447
30	Acts of Persuasion in Hellenistic Epic: Honey-Sweet Words in Apollonius <i>Anatole Mori</i>	458
31	Rhetoric and Tragedy: Weapons of Mass Persuasion <i>Marianne McDonald</i>	473
32	Attic Comedy and the Development of Theoretical Rhetoric <i>Thomas K. Hubbard</i>	490
33	Rhetoric and Lyric Poetry <i>William H. Race</i>	509
34	Rhetoric and the Novel: Sex, Lies and Sophistic <i>Ruth Webb</i>	526
35	Rhetoric and Historiography <i>Matthew Fox and Niall Livingstone</i>	542
	Bibliography	562
	Index	594

# Notes on Contributors

---

**James Allen**, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, USA

**Jeroen A.E. Bons**, Fellow of University College, Utrecht, Professor of the History of Rhetoric, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

**Michael de Brauw**, Andrew W. Mellon Fellow in Classics, Department of Classics, Northwestern University, USA

**Christopher Carey**, Professor of Greek, Department of Greek and Latin, University College, London, England

**Pierre Chiron**, Professeur de langue et littérature grecques à l'UFR de Lettres et Sciences humaines de l'Université Paris XII-Val de Marne, Directeur de l'EA 3953 (Philosophie et Littérature: textes, traditions, idées), France

**Jenny Strauss Clay**, Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, University of Virginia, USA

**Joy Connolly**, Assistant Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, New York University, USA

**Craig Cooper**, Associate Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, University of Winnipeg, Canada

**Jane M. Day**, Fellow and Tutor in Philosophy, Lady Margaret Hall, University Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford, England

**Ken Dowden**, Professor of Classics and Director of the Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, University of Birmingham, England

**Michael Edwards**, Professor of Classics in the School of English and Drama, Queen Mary, University of London, England

**Antonio López Eire**, Chair of Greek Philology, Department of Classical Philology and Indoeuropean Linguistics, University of Salamanca, Spain

**Andrew Erskine**, Reader in the School of History and Classics, University of Edinburgh, Scotland

**William W. Fortenbaugh**, Professor of Classics Emeritus, Department of Classics, Rutgers University, USA

**Matthew Fox**, Senior Lecturer in Classics, Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, University of Birmingham, England

**Michael Gagarin**, James R. Dougherty, Jr. Centennial Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, University of Texas-Austin, USA

**Jim Hamm** Graduate Student in the Department of Classics, University of Minnesota, USA

**Thomas K. Hubbard**, Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, University of Texas-Austin, USA

**Elizabeth Jeffreys**, Fellow of Exeter College and Bywater and Sotheby Professor of Byzantine and Modern Greek Language and Literature, University of Oxford, England

**David Konstan**, John Rowe Workman Distinguished Professor of Classics and the Humanistic Tradition, and Professor of Comparative Literature, Department of Classics, Brown University, USA

**Niall Livingstone**, Lecturer in Classics, Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity, University of Birmingham, England

**Marianne McDonald**, Professor of Classics and Theatre, Department of Theatre, University of California-San Diego, USA

**Teresa Morgan**, Turpin Fellow and Tutor in Ancient History, Oriel College, University of Oxford, England

**Anatole Mori**, Assistant Professor of Classics, Department of Classical Studies, University of Missouri-Columbia, USA

**Terry L. Papillon**, Associate Professor of Classics, Department of Foreign Languages and Literatures, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, USA

**Takis Poulakos**, Associate Professor of Rhetoric, Department of Rhetoric, University of Iowa, USA

**William H. Race**, Paddison Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, USA

**Tobias Reinhardt**, Fellow and Tutor in Latin and Greek, Somerville College, and University Lecturer in Classical Languages and Literature, University of Oxford, England

**Hanna M. Roisman**, Bartlett Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, Colby College, USA

**Joseph Roisman**, Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, Colby College, USA

**Edward Schiappa**, Professor of Communication Studies and Paul W. Frenzel Chair of Liberal Arts, Communication Studies Department, University of Minnesota, USA

**James P. Sickinger**, Associate Professor of Classics, Department of Classics, Florida State University, USA

**Stephen Usher**, Formerly Senior Lecturer in Classics at Royal Holloway College, University of London, England

**John Vanderspoel**, Professor of Late Antiquity, Department of Greek and Roman Studies, University of Calgary, Canada

**Ruth Webb**, Honorary Research Fellow in the School of History, Classics and Archaeology, Birkbeck College, University of London, England and Professeur associé, Département de Grec, Université de Paris X, Nanterre, France

**Ian Worthington**, Frederick A. Middlebush Professor of History, Department of History, University of Missouri-Columbia, USA

**Harvey Yunis**, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and Classics, Department of Classics, Rice University, USA

# Preface: For Readers – and Reviewers

---

The aim of the *Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World* series, according to its blurb, is to ‘provide an international audience of students, scholars, and general readers with sophisticated, one-volume companions to classical and near eastern civilizations, classical literature, and ancient history’. The chapters in each volume are to be written primarily for those approaching the topic for the first time (be they undergraduates, graduates, or members of the public) and for scholars operating in adjacent fields of study, but at the same time those working in the particular field should also find them stimulating. Writing for these different types of reader at the same time is difficult, and so I should say at the outset that the chapters in this Companion are ultimately written for its primary audience, but I hope specialists in the field will find them beneficial. Each chapter provides an overview of the main issues of its topic, at times raises new questions or adopts a fresh approach to its subject matter, and has a bibliographical essay that acts as a guide to further reading. All quotations from ancient sources are translated into English. An introductory chapter (1) discusses the idea of rhetoric, the status of rhetoric studies (present and future), and summarises the various chapters of this volume.

There has been much work undertaken on rhetoric in recent years, as will be obvious from the discussions in the following chapters and references in their notes. More than that, translations of ancient works dealing with rhetoric, speeches by orators, and so forth, are appearing with welcome regularity these days, thus making these works available to a wider reading audience. One recent venture that should be singled out is the University of Texas Press’ Oratory of Classical Greece series. Under the general editorship of Michael Gagarin, the series will consist of translations of all of the speeches and major fragments of the Attic orators, and several volumes have already been published.

We seem to be living in an era of Companions and ‘Introductions to’ as even a cursory glance at the number of publishers producing such books, often on the same subject, shows, and one can question why there is a need for this one. Put simply, the

aim of this book is to be the most comprehensive treatment of Greek rhetoric within one set of covers. It is a mixture of narrative and thematic analysis that traces the history of rhetoric from Homer to Byzantium and through a variety of approaches considers rhetoric in a number of historical, social, political, intellectual, and literary contexts. Included are the usual ‘staple’ chapters such as rhetoric and politics, rhetoric and law, rhetoric and philosophy, rhetoric and various literary genres, along with topics that are deserving of more attention, such as rhetoric and emotion, rhetoric and logic, rhetoric and ethics, rhetoric and knowledge, rhetoric and religion. All contribute to give us different insights into how the Greeks saw and used rhetoric, and how it was as fundamentally at the heart of their society as law, politics and religion – and by extension, how it influenced, and became part of, many of the things that we take for granted today. This book also partners Blackwell’s *Companion to Roman Rhetoric*, edited by W.J. Dominik and J. Hall (Oxford: 2007), which, on the Roman side, covers a broad range of topics and involves a variety of modern approaches.

An editor’s job is not an easy one given the quickness of reviewers to criticise Companions if their chapters are uneven in content and style or if the book lacks coherency because contributors did not discuss their work with each other. The editor usually bears the brunt of criticism, and in many cases rightly so. Since I have no desire to be lambasted in reviews any more than I usually am, I asked the contributors to write for the book’s primary audience while appealing to specialists, not to argue some narrow angle or to grind a particular axe, and where possible to ask new questions. I also asked them to communicate with those whose chapters overlapped with, or had some bearing on, their own, rather than writing in a vacuum (many did so, either in email exchanges or by exchanging drafts). Thus, the chapters are written in as uniform a manner as one can get with three dozen different people, for the most part take the work of others into account, and are approximately the same length (with the exception of Chapter 11 on Rome: see its first note for explanation). I hope that the book will appeal to even critical reviewers.

I have a number of people to thank. I was delighted when Al Bertrand at Blackwell invited me to edit this Companion, and my thanks go to him, as they do to Sophie Gibson and Angela Cohen at Blackwell for their support. I am very grateful to Annette Abel, whose keen eye at the copy-editing stage saved this book from many errors and inconsistencies. I am indebted to the contributors to this book, not only for agreeing to write on their topics in the first place (and doing such a first-class job) but also for putting up with a demanding editor who tried to be diplomatic and more than a few times failed. Years from now, some of us may look back on this project and laugh. My long-suffering family has also my heartfelt thanks for continuing to put up with me, despite knowing that as one project ends another begins.

Ian Worthington  
Department of History  
University of Missouri-Columbia  
January 2006

# Notes

References in the text and notes to a scholar's name followed by a chapter number (e.g., M. Gagarin, Chapter 3) refer of course to the contributor and his/her chapter in this book.

All dates are BC except where indicated and in Professor Elizabeth Jeffreys' chapter on Byzantium (12).

In deference to the fact that the majority of contributors live in North America and England, I have allowed both English and American spellings.

I have also allowed contributors to cite works such as Aristotle's *Rhetoric* in one of two (sometimes both) ways and to transliterate Greek words using a 'y' or 'u' (e.g., *hubris*, *hybris*) depending on their inclination. Greek names are anglicised, but some terms and technical words are transliterated, and these will be obvious when they appear.

# Abbreviations

Names of journals are abbreviated as in *L'Année Philologique* (less well-known or common ones to classicists are given in full), although consistent with English practice the 'h' is dropped (thus, *CP* not *CPh*).

Titles of ancient works are given in full except in the case of speeches by the Attic orators (see p. xiv) and in the following two frequently cited works:

*Rhet.*                      *Rhetoric* (of Aristotle)  
*Rhet. Alex.*              *Rhetoric to Alexander* (attributed to Anaximenes)

Frequently cited ancient authors are abbreviated as follows:

Aes.	Aeschines
Andoc.	Andocides
Ant.	Antiphon
<i>AP</i>	<i>Athēnaiōn Politeia</i> (attributed to Aristotle)
Arist.	Aristotle
Aristoph.	Aristophanes
Cic.	Cicero
Dem.	Demosthenes
[Dem.]	Pseudo-Demosthenes
Din.	Dinarchus
Diod.	Diodorus
Diog. Laert.	Diogenes Laertius
Dion. Hal.	Dionysius of Halicarnassus
Hyp.	Hyperides
Is.	Isaeus
Isoc.	Isocrates
Lyc.	Lycurgus
Lys.	Lysias
Pl.	Plato
Plut.	Plutarch
[Plut.]	Pseudo-Plutarch
Quint.	Quintilian
Thuc.	Thucydides

# Speeches of the Attic Orators

---

References to speeches by all Attic orators are by their number only. The following is a list of the numbers and titles of the speeches cited in this book for ease of reference (speeches believed to be spurious but which have survived under the name of a particular orator are listed under that name and cited as such in the chapters).

## Aeschines

- 1 *Against Timarchus*
- 2 *On the False Embassy*
- 3 *Against Ctesiphon*

## Andocides

- 1 *On the Mysteries*
- 2 *On His Return*
- 3 *On the Peace with Sparta*

## Antiphon

- 1 *Against the Stepmother*
- 3 *Second Tetralogy*
- 4 *Third Tetralogy*
- 5 *On the Murder of Herodes*
- 6 *On the Chorus Boy*

## Demosthenes

- 1 *Olynthiac 1*

- 2 *Olynthiac 2*
- 3 *Olynthiac 3*
- 4 *Philippic 1*
- 5 *On the Peace*
- 6 *Philippic 2*
- 8 *On the Chersonese*
- 9 *Philippic 3*
- 10 *Philippic 4*
- 13 *On Organisation*
- 14 *On the Navy-boards*
- 15 *For the Liberty of the Rhodians*
- 16 *For the People of Megalopolis*
- 18 *On the Crown*
- 19 *On the False Embassy*
- 20 *Against Leptines*
- 21 *Against Meidias*
- 22 *Against Androtion*
- 23 *Against Aristocrates*
- 24 *Against Timocrates*
- 25 *Against Aristogeiton 1*
- 27 *Against Aphobus 1*
- 29 *Against Aphobus for Phanus*
- 30 *Against Onetor 1*



- 32 *Against Zenothemis*
- 33 *Against Apaturius*
- 34 *Against Phormion*
- 35 *Against Lacritus*
- 36 *For Phormion*
- 37 *Against Pantaenetus*
- 38 *Against Nausimachus and Xenopeithes*
- 39 *Against Boeotus 1*
- 40 *Against Boeotus 2*
- 41 *Against Spudias*
- 42 *Against Phaenippus*
- 43 *Against Macartatus*
- 44 *Against Leochares*
- 45 *Against Stephanus 1*
- 46 *Against Stephanus 2*
- 47 *Against Evergus*
- 48 *Against Olympiodorus*
- 49 *Against Timotheus*
- 50 *Against Polycles*
- 51 *On the Trierarchic Crown*
- 52 *Against Callippus*
- 53 *Against Nicostratus*
- 54 *Against Conon*
- 55 *Against Callicles*
- 56 *Against Dionysodorus*
- 57 *Against Eubulides*
- 58 *Against Theocrines*
- 59 *Against Neaera*
- 60 *Funeral Speech*
- 61 *Erotic Essay*

**Dinarchus**

- 1 *Against Demosthenes*

**Hyperides**

- 1 *In Defence of Lycophrion*
- 3 *Against Athenogenes*
- 4 *In Defence of Euxenippus*
- 6 *Funeral Speech*

**Isaeus**

- 1 *On the Estate of Cleonymus*
- 2 *On the Estate of Menecles*

- 3 *On the Estate of Pyrrhus*
- 5 *On the Estate of Dicaeogenes*
- 7 *On the Estate of Apollodorus*
- 8 *On the Estate of Ciron*
- 9 *On the Estate of Astyphilus*
- 10 *On the Estate of Aristarchus*
- 11 *On the Estate of Hagnias*
- 12 *On the Estate of Euphiletus*

**Isocrates**

- 2 *To Nicocles*
- 3 *Nicocles*
- 4 *Panegyricus*
- 5 *To Philip*
- 6 *Archidamus*
- 7 *Areopagiticus*
- 8 *On the Peace*
- 9 *Evagoras*
- 10 *Helen*
- 11 *Busiris*
- 12 *Panathenaicus*
- 13 *Against the Sophists*
- 14 *Plataicus*
- 15 *Antidosis*
- 16 *Concerning the Team of Horses*
- 17 *Trapeziticus*
- 18 *Against Callimachus*
- 19 *Aegineticus*
- 21 *Against Euthymus*

**Lycurgus**

- 1 *Against Leocrates*

**Lysias**

- 1 *On the Murder of Eratosthenes*
- 2 *Funeral Speech*
- 3 *Against Simon*
- 4 *On a Premeditated Wounding*
- 6 *Against Andocides*
- 7 *Concerning the Sēkos*
- 10 *Against Theomnestus 1*
- 11 *Against Theomnestus 2*
- 12 *Against Eratosthenes*
- 13 *Against Agoratus*

- |    |                                                      |    |                                                                 |
|----|------------------------------------------------------|----|-----------------------------------------------------------------|
| 14 | <i>Against Alcibiades 1</i>                          | 24 | <i>For the Disabled Man</i>                                     |
| 15 | <i>Against Alcibiades 2</i>                          | 25 | <i>Defence Against a Charge of<br/>Subverting the Democracy</i> |
| 16 | <i>For Mantitheus</i>                                | 27 | <i>Against Epicrates</i>                                        |
| 17 | <i>On the Property of Eraton</i>                     | 28 | <i>Against Ergocles</i>                                         |
| 18 | <i>On the Property of Nicias'<br/>Brother</i>        | 29 | <i>Against Philocrates</i>                                      |
| 19 | <i>On the Property of Aristophanes</i>               | 30 | <i>Against Nicomachus</i>                                       |
| 20 | <i>For Polystratus</i>                               | 31 | <i>Against Philon</i>                                           |
| 21 | <i>Defence against a Charge of Taking<br/>Bribes</i> | 32 | <i>Against Diogeiton</i>                                        |
| 22 | <i>Against the Corn Dealers</i>                      | 33 | <i>Olympic Speech</i>                                           |
| 23 | <i>Against Panoleon</i>                              | 34 | <i>Against the Subversion of the<br/>Ancestral Constitution</i> |

PART I

# Setting the Scene



## CHAPTER ONE

# Rhetorical Questions

---

*Edward Schiappa and Jim Hamm*

### 1 Why Study Greek Rhetoric?

We pose such a question for readers of this *Companion* to consider because *what* one studies and *how* one goes about the study of Greek rhetoric ultimately are decisions fueled by the values, interests, and purposes one brings to the table. The extant texts of classical Greece are mute until read, but how they are read and the purposes to which such readings are put are contingent matters. The point worth stressing at the very outset is that all accounts of classical Greek rhetoric are necessarily *partial*; that is, no single account can exhaust the limitless interpretive possibilities of the relevant texts, and all accounts are guided by the scholar's sense of what is important and noteworthy about the texts. Because what is 'rhetorically salient' about Greek texts varies from scholar to scholar, discipline to discipline, time period to time period, the interpretive possibilities are limited only by human imagination.<sup>1</sup>

Scholarship on Greek rhetoric may be usefully described as motivated by two basic purposes: historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation.<sup>2</sup> Described most simply, historical reconstruction engages classical texts to describe the intellectual, aesthetic, economic, or political work that such texts performed in their own time or what such texts might have meant to those living in the classical era. Contemporary appropriation is typically motivated by a desire to draw inspiration from classical texts to meet current theoretical, political, or pedagogical needs. For example, a historical reconstruction may try to describe what '*enthymēmē*' meant to fourth century audiences while a contemporary appropriation might ask: 'How ought we teach the *enthymēmē* today?' A historian may ask: 'What intellectual and political work did Gorgias' *Encomium to Helen* do in the late fifth and early fourth centuries?' while a contemporary theorist may draw from Gorgias' texts reinforcement for contemporary anti-foundationalist approaches to epistemology.<sup>3</sup> One way to distinguish between the two activities is to note that anachronism is considered a

mistake for historians but not for those who wish to reinterpret classical texts to inform a contemporary theory or pedagogy.

Such a distinction does not imply, of course, that historians do their work in a vacuum. As Chapter 2 of this *Companion*, written by T. Poulakos, nicely documents, historians are guided by current needs, values, and interests that arguably complicate the distinction between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation. To acknowledge that historians are influenced by current theories and interests does not imply, however, that the distinction between historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation collapses. Indeed, as the subsequent chapters of the *Companion* illustrate, historical reconstruction is alive and well. Fidelity to the methods of classical philology, a preference for argument by example, and sensitivity to the features that make Greek texts/authors distinctive and *different* from us still help to distinguish the purposes and methods of the historian from those who are more interested in argument by analogy and who are attracted to features that make Greek texts/authors *similar* to us. Of course, *both* sorts of intellectual projects are valuable, but keeping in mind the different purposes of historical reconstruction and contemporary appropriation may help readers navigate and assess the amazingly diverse interpretations generated by scholars in classics, philosophy, history, literary studies, communication studies, and English.

## 2 What is Rhetoric?

Interestingly enough, only a few contributors to the *Companion* explicitly define ‘rhetoric’. Indeed, implicit in the chapters that follow one can discern the word ‘rhetoric’ or ‘rhetorical’ being used to denote a wide range of phenomena, including oratory, parts of speech, prose genres, figurative language, performance, pedagogical practices, discourse, the strategic use of language, persuasion, and various *theories* of discourse, language, or persuasion. Indeed, as Poulakos notes in Chapter 2, rhetoric designates ‘many ways of being and performing in the world’ (p. 20). The result is that just about anything and everything could be studied as rhetoric or as rhetorical. Is this a problem?

It has sometimes been argued that failing to limit the denotative range of the word ‘rhetoric’ threatens to render the term so global and universal as to make ‘rhetoric’ meaningless; *si omnia, nulla*. Notably, there are a goodly number of other disciplinary terms that are just as broad in scope, including anthropology, sociology, psychology, and politics. Arguably, once one takes the position that a term such as rhetoric or psychology represents a socially-constructed category or *perspective* rather than a ‘thing’, then just about any discipline can study anything under the sign of ‘the rhetoric of X’, ‘the politics of X’, ‘the sociology of X’, and so forth.

To answer the question of whether such a broad scope is a problem, consider an analogy with the terms ‘physics’ and ‘physical’. One of the most important moments in Western intellectual history is when a group we now call presocratic philosophers broke from the tradition of understanding and describing the world in purely religious terms and started to describe the world as *physis*, nature. Their explanations were monistic: Everything has a ‘physical’ basis that can be understood. Not everyone chose to follow such a route, of course, just as not every scholar in academia today claims to study

rhetoric. The scope of these physicists' claims were global and universal. Now, 2,600 years later, most of the sciences are still informed by the general notion that almost everything can be described as 'physical'. Where is the problem? Similarly it is not self-evident that there is a problem with the fact that almost any phenomena today could be described in rhetorical terms. The fact that we could do so does not mean we necessarily will bother to do so, just as the fact that anything could be described using the language of physics does not automatically mean we will bother.

Arguably, the popularity of the 'rhetorical turn' is fueled by the fact that a rhetorical perspective emphasizes two attributes of human beings as a species that are unquestionably important: Humans must communicate to survive and such communication always takes place under contingent circumstances. The birth of the systematic study of using language to influence others in classical Greece recognized these attributes explicitly. The emergence of New Rhetorics in the twentieth century was predicated on two similar theses, one linguistic and one epistemological, that were in direct opposition to the rise of positivism earlier in the century: The linguistic thesis, which stresses the partial and persuasive function of all language-use, can be described by the following syllogism:

All persuasive actions are rhetorical.  
 All symbol/language-use is persuasive, therefore:  
 All symbol/language-use is rhetorical.

The epistemological rationale is fueled by the argument that the philosophical criteria used traditionally to separate 'higher' ways of knowing, such as Science (as *epistēmē*) from Rhetoric (as *doxa*), have been critiqued persuasively. Since the 'certain' or 'absolute' side of binaries such as certain/contingent, absolute/probable are unavailable, we are left to dwell in the historicized land of contingency and probability, which means that all cultural knowledge is the product of rhetorical activity.

Whether one gets to what some have called 'Big Rhetoric' via the linguistic rationale or the epistemological rationale, the point is that such routes lead to the conclusion that the human condition is coterminous to the rhetorical condition. Thus, it is not surprising that scholars have described such a wide variety of phenomena with the terms rhetoric and rhetorical.

Nonetheless, it is understandable that some readers will be unsatisfied with the notion that rhetoric denotes 'many ways of being and performing in the world' and will want to know what the word means in a particular scholar's chapter or sentence. Indeed, since some chapters are concerned with the very origins of 'rhetoric', greater clarity is needed. The Greek word *rhētorikē* is formed by adding *-ikē* (meaning art or skill) to *rhētōr*—a term that was used most typically to refer to politicians who put forth motions in the courts or Assembly. Most scholars agree that the earliest surviving use of the term *rhētorikē* is in Plato's *Gorgias*, dating from the early fourth century, and its absence in important texts of the period concerning education and public speaking is striking.<sup>4</sup> Obviously the practice of persuasive speech-making dates back to our earliest records of Greek history; indeed, speech-making is an important activity in Homer's epics. Thus, the practice of 'rhetoric' in the sense of 'persuasive speech' is as old as history. Perhaps a clearer designator would be the word 'oratory', though in Greek this term (*rhētoresia*) appears surprisingly late and is used infrequently in the classical period.

Though the practice of persuasive speech-making was taught prior to Plato, the scope and purpose of such instruction remains a matter of scholarly dispute. The education offered by the older sophists is often summed up with the word ‘rhetoric’, but it does not appear that any of them actually used the word and M. Gagarin has argued that persuasion was not the focus of their educational training.<sup>5</sup> Precisely when ‘rhetoric’ emerged as a recognized, discrete, and identifiable educational activity need not be resolved at the moment. But emerge it did, and over the centuries the term has been used to denote a variety of practices and functions of discourse.

The main point is for readers to recognize that we now can identify at least five ways of using the word ‘rhetoric’ that are informed by classical or contemporary scholarship: 1) rhetoric as an instance of speech-making (or oratory); 2) rhetoric as persuasive technique; 3) rhetoric as a tactical function of language use (rhetoricity); 4) rhetoric as an educational agenda or program that inculcates the art or skill of the rhetor; and 5) rhetoric as a theory about human communication. The scope of rhetorical scholarship is broadened considerably if we note that in addition to texts that *explicitly* identify themselves with the rhetorical tradition we may add those that we believe *implicitly* participate in that tradition. Then, once we turn ‘rhetoric’ into the adjectival form ‘rhetorical’ and think of it not as a thing but as a perspective or point of view, these various explicit and implicit senses of rhetoric could describe just about anything. For that reason, the scope of the *Companion* is large and touches on many aspects of Greek culture. However, the reader might have to pause from time to time to consider precisely *which* sense of rhetoric a particular author may have in mind in any given passage.

### 3 What are Rhetoric Scholars Investigating?

Given the range of phenomena that could be studied under the sign of ‘rhetoric’, readers may have an interest in what active rhetoric scholars have been investigating. In one sense, of course, the *Companion* represents a comprehensive answer to just such a question. The tremendous range of authors, genres, texts, and issues discussed in the *Companion* is a good reflection of the enormous scholarly effort that has been put into the study of Greek rhetoric over the past century. The bibliographical essays in the *Companion* provide an excellent resource for students and scholars interested in surveying the rich secondary literature available. Recent scholarship in Greek rhetoric appears in three forms. First, as the *Companion* illustrates, there has been substantial interest in recent years in producing comprehensive syntheses of what we know about rhetoric, including Greek rhetoric. *The Encyclopedia of Rhetoric*, edited by T.O. Sloane for Oxford University Press (2001), has a strong emphasis on classical rhetoric, as does the multi-volume *Historisches Wörterbuch der Rhetorik* project, published in Tübingen by M. Neimeyer. Second, each year a number of books are published by scholars in classics, philosophy, communication studies, and English, that focus on Greek rhetoric in whole or in part.

Third, a number of scholarly journals publish articles about Greek rhetoric. Because such journals are typically published by discipline-specific academic organizations, it is possible to gain a sense of how disciplines engage Greek rhetoric differently. To that end, we surveyed the contents of eighteen academic periodicals published between



2000 and 2005: *Rhetorica*, *Rhetoric Review*, *Philosophy and Rhetoric*, *Rhetoric Society Quarterly*, *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, *American Journal of Philology*, *Classical Quarterly*, *Classical Antiquity*, *Classical and Modern Literature*, *Classical Journal*, *Classical Philology*, *Greece and Rome*, *Greek Roman and Byzantine Studies*, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, *Hermes*, *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, and *Yale Classical Studies*. The results were somewhat surprising. Articles appearing in classics venues that were explicitly concerned with Greek rhetoric were sparse in this time period (fewer than ten). The oratory of Demosthenes and Aeschines was the subject of three and none directly engaged the rhetorical texts of Plato, Aristotle, or Isocrates. Since we searched for articles in which the word ‘rhetoric’ appeared in the title, it is possible that many more works address relevant issues but under a different rubric, and it should be noted that a great deal of work on Greek rhetoric by classicists is published in book form.

By contrast, we found nearly sixty articles on Greek rhetoric in journals produced primarily by scholars in English and communication studies. Nearly half were devoted in whole or in part to Aristotle and the *Rhetoric*. Three of the seventeen books published between 2000 and 2005 explicitly relevant to classical Greek rhetoric also have Aristotle, either in whole or in part, as their subject. A prominent theme in these discussions is the need to devote closer attention to the editorial and transmission history of the text in order to separate the interpolated chaff from the genuine Aristotelian wheat. Work also has been directed toward clarifying and explaining particular concepts employed in the *Rhetoric*, such as the *enthymēmē*, how passive or active Aristotle viewed audiences of rhetoric, *ēthos* and style (*lexis*) in the *Rhetoric*, the *paradeigma* and its relationship to the notion of induction, and Aristotle’s literate classifications of *endoxa* and *pistis*. There has also been an attempt to interpret Aristotle and his discussion of rhetoric more broadly, particularly by using his other works as a point of reference. Thus, scholars have examined the relationship between Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* and his logical works, arguing that his theory of persuasion is in part derived from his theory of proofs. Other scholars recently have shown interest in Aristotle’s *De Anima* as a way of understanding what Aristotle writes about memory and perception. As may be apparent from this summary, the vast majority of this scholarship is framed as historical reconstruction.

In our survey of recent journals, Plato and Isocrates were the next most widely cited authors; Plato’s texts engaged in twelve articles, and Isocrates in nine. Some of these articles revisit the longstanding controversies over Plato’s relationship to and use of rhetoric. Though generalizations are risky, our sense is that scholars in English departments are the mostly like to revisit Plato’s texts from the standpoint of contemporary appropriation and sometimes are quite candid about having no fear of anachronism. The point is to open up the dialogues of Plato to new readings that speak to contemporary concerns, and such values as creativity, theoretical relevance, and pedagogical usefulness trump the norms of traditional philology. Some scholars are quite candid in their desire to combine traditional historical reconstruction with contemporary appropriation in the belief that ancient texts and practices are viewed as shedding light on modern pedagogical or political problems.

Scholars of Greek rhetoric who work on Isocrates appear to be either establishing or resuscitating his reputation as a serious thinker. He is often defined in terms of what other, more-celebrated thinkers are or are not; for example, Isocrates’ conception of

learning is defined in part by not being Platonic or Aristotelian. Several articles contend that Isocrates' ideas of rhetoric are intimately tied to his theories of politics in a way that Aristotle's allegedly are not. Though the issues involved in recent work on Isocrates are too complex to do justice to here, it is clear that his texts have become a fecund source for scholars interested in fourth-century Greek culture, politics, and education, made all the more interesting since he describes his educational program as *philosophia* rather than as *rhētorikē*.

There is a recognizable body of recent work devoted to the issue of what constitutes the proper limits of the discipline of rhetoric, or how rhetoric has been 'disciplined'. Some scholars seek to blunt the oppositional forces that have played their part in separating philosophy and rhetoric from each other, and in particular argue that various disciplinary and historiographical habits and ideologies have proved to be obstacles in reading an author such as Plato rhetorically, for instance, or Gorgias philosophically. Recent book-length scholarship on the sophists is particularly relevant to such concerns.<sup>6</sup>

The preceding paragraphs are not intended to provide a systematic and thorough guide to recent scholarship in Greek rhetoric, but rather to offer a brief snapshot of what issues appear to be engaging scholars as the twenty-first century begins. It should be clear from even this limited discussion that Greek rhetorical studies is a healthy field of endeavor involving work that engages a wide variety of texts and concerns. Whether the claims advanced are as narrow as who the author of a particular classical text was, or as broad as what lessons we should learn from the Greeks about contemporary cultural and political matters, it is apparent that Greek rhetoric will continue to command the attention of scholars in multiple disciplines.

## 4 What is the Future of Greek Rhetoric Studies?

To prognosticate about the interests of future scholarship is difficult, of course, but we thought readers might be interested in what scholars of Greek rhetoric believe to be the important questions that *ought* to be pursued in future research. To that end, we surveyed over fifty scholars with a self-declared interest in Greek rhetoric from several academic disciplines. Before embarking on our survey, we hypothesized that classicists and historians would be more interested in historical reconstruction and scholars in other disciplines would tend toward issues of contemporary appropriation. While generally supported by our responses, there were numerous exceptions that make it clear that the interests and purposes guiding scholars are not discipline-specific. Accordingly, our summary of the responses we received is organized thematically rather than by discipline.

Predictably, a number of the important questions identified by scholars are explicitly historical. For example, though such questions have been explored for many years, the authorship, compilation, and transmission of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* continue to challenge scholars. The educational and historical role of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* (see Chapter 8 of the *Companion*) remains a puzzle to be solved. There are texts in the *Rhetores Graeci* collections, compiled by C. Walz, L. Spengel and H. Rabe, which have yet to be translated into modern languages and have not been fully mined for their historical value.<sup>7</sup>

Several scholars noted that Greek rhetoric scholars have not paid sufficient attention to the role of women in Greek culture. They ask: By what criteria may it be said that women taught or practiced rhetoric in the classical period? What role did women have in the education process informally? How closely do the rhetorical portrayals of women in Greek literature match other historical evidence? How do we interpret the evidence about women provided by Greek rhetoric and literature?

A number of historical questions offered by our respondents concerned the performance of rhetorical practices. For example: What is the relationship between writings devoted to rhetorical theory and actual rhetorical practices? What do we know about the verbal and nonverbal aspects of rhetorical delivery in the classical era? What was the role of the immediate audience for spoken rhetoric? Were the masses really wowed by Gorgias? Did public speeches truly persuade audiences or were there ‘inartistic’ factors, such as familial, tribal, or political relationships, that better account for decisions made in courts and the Assembly?

The majority of scholarship has focused on rhetorical theories and practices in or near Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, but there are centuries of later Greek rhetorical theory, pedagogy, and practice that remain under-explored. ‘Greek rhetoric’ need not be defined in such a limited fashion. Comparative work, not only between Greek and Latin but also between Greek rhetoric and conceptualizations of persuasive discourse in other cultures, has increased significantly in the last three decades but our respondents suggest that much more work remains to be done. Such work not only engages in cross-cultural comparisons, such as between Asian and Greek rhetoric, but also traces the influence of Greek contact with other cultures (Egyptian and Aramaic, for example).

Some respondents expressed speculative interest in *origins*. For example: How did the ancient Greeks discover the rhetoricity of language, and what does the rhetoricity of language consist of? Another respondent asked: What would classical rhetoric look like if we rejected Plato’s division of *logos* into the art of the mind (*philosophia*) and the art of speech (*rhētorikē*)? What would have happened had the word ‘rhetoric’ never been coined?

Issues of methodology continue to challenge scholars. Though scholars obviously produce readings and interpretations of Greek texts explicitly and implicitly concerned with rhetorical theory, pedagogy, and practice, how such interpretations are produced and performed, why there are so many conflicting (even contradictory) readings of the ‘same’ text, and how we are to adjudicate competing interpretations, remain open questions.

Also predictably, many scholars are interested in the relevance of Greek rhetoric for contemporary theoretical, pedagogical, and political concerns. First and foremost, scholars are deeply concerned with the relationships between rhetoric and civic education in Greece and what those relationships might tell us about the present. As one respondent put it: What is the relationship between eloquence and citizenship, where ‘eloquence’ would signify fluency in critique and ‘citizenship’ would signify an active participation in public culture? Another respondent asked: What do *rhētōrs* such as Isocrates and Demosthenes offer as resources, inspirational or cautionary, for theorists and teachers interested in a broader view of public deliberation? Yet another respondent suggested that in Athens rhetorical education was primarily a ‘private good’, and wondered if we cast Athenian rhetorical theory in a way that reveals our own desire for a discipline that encourages civic participation.

In general, a number of scholars expressed interest in continuing exploration of how we interpret and integrate Greek rhetoric within our own thinking and teaching of classical and modern rhetoric. More specific questions were raised in terms of whether Greek rhetorical studies can offer insights into how to understand, develop, or theorize writing instruction and the phenomena of visual rhetorics. Not all such questions were based on the optimistic assumption that contemporary practices can be enhanced through the study of Greek rhetoric. One respondent asked: Why teach a model of persuasion and argument based on classical principles when what passes as effective argumentation in public discourse consistently subverts and mocks these principles? Another respondent left the question open: To what extent can classical texts provide exemplars or theory that can aid us in our efforts to transform the critical rhetorical vocabularies and attitudes that we attempt to foster in our students into a propensity for enriching, disrupting, and engaging contemporary democratic public culture?

It should be evident from this sampling of responses to our survey that the future of Greek rhetorical studies will be exciting and provocative. Regardless of one's values, interests, and intellectual purposes (or, put differently, regardless of one's tastes), there are ample important questions that will occupy those willing to engage them.

## **5 What is this *Blackwell Companion to Greek Rhetoric* about?**

The aim of this book is to provide readers with a comprehensive introduction to the many ways in which rhetoric was conceptualized, practiced, and functioned in Greek culture. Quite deliberately, some chapters are necessarily introductory and are accessible to readers with little prior knowledge of Greek rhetoric, while others advance claims that will be of interest primarily to specialists. The reader will get a clear sense, we suspect, of those matters that historians consider mostly settled and matters that are still contested. Each chapter ends with a brief bibliographical essay that provides an orientation to key literature pertinent to the chapter's subject. The volume can be read straight through or can be mined selectively to suit the reader's individual needs and interests.

Part I includes this introductory chapter as well as Chapter 2, a useful overview by T. Poulakos of the competing interpretive approaches to Greek rhetoric, with a particular emphasis on the classical era. Poulakos provides a sophisticated charting of different modes of interpretation and their theoretical and ideological commitments that makes sense of an otherwise bewilderingly diverse body of literature.

Part II presents an excellent introductory overview to the history of Greek rhetoric – rhetoric understood here primarily in terms of traditional Greek oratory and the beginnings of Greek rhetorical theory. In Chapter 3, M. Gagarin begins his account of the origins of Greek rhetoric by insisting that we first try to understand what we mean when we use the word 'rhetoric'. A review of early Greek literature suggests that while importance is placed upon 'speaking well' as a corollary of effective political action, there is no evidence to suggest that anything like a systematic analysis of public speaking occurred until the fifth century at the earliest. J.A.E. Bons assesses the contribution of Gorgias to speech theory in Chapter 4. According to Bons, Gorgias

was developing in his *Helen* and *Palamedes* an awareness of the principles that will form the basis of what will come to be known as epideictic and forensic oratory. In a more philosophical strain, Bons points to Gorgias' thoughts on deception (*apatē*); specifically, how the function of speech to deceive, best exemplified in the fiction of the theatre, is relevant to *all* speech acts. Gorgias' possible student Alcidimas is the subject of M. Edwards' Chapter 5. A survey of Alcidimas' principal works, *On Sophists* and *Odysseus*, leads Edwards to conclude that the former is likely a prospectus for his teaching methods, while the latter is an example of an epideictic couched in the form of a forensic speech. Edwards also addresses the style of Alcidimas and what evidence this may or may not provide for current interpretive controversies involving his works.

In Chapter 6, T.L. Papillon divides Isocrates' extant body of work into three major categories: educational, political, and epistolary. He emphasizes how Isocrates weds educational and political ideas, and how his interest in contemporary political affairs became extraordinarily influential in late antiquity and beyond. In Chapter 7, H. Yunis shows that a close inspection of the several Platonic dialogues upsets the traditional view of Plato as an inveterate opponent of rhetoric. While the *Gorgias* argues that the 'rhetor's art' results in political flattery and not instruction, dialogues such as the *Phaedrus* and *Republic* attempt to establish the legitimacy, both in theory and practice, of an art of persuasion tied to philosophical education. P. Chiron, in Chapter 8, discusses the influence of classical Athenian sophists and philosophers on the *Rhetoric to Alexander*. While much of the substance of the *Rhetoric to Alexander* was crafted with the practicing fourth-century orator in mind, the philosophical aspects of the treatise, particularly its echoing of Plato and certain similarities to Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, assure its importance for those interested in the intersection of rhetoric, sophistic, and philosophy. In Chapter 9, W.W. Fortenbaugh illustrates the 'concise, yet comprehensive' idea of rhetoric found in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. By focusing on key aspects of Aristotle's rhetorical doctrine, such as the importance of rational argument, the arrangement of material within an oration, and a speaker's delivery and style, Fortenbaugh reveals Aristotle's individuated approach to deliberative, judicial, and epideictic rhetoric.

In Chapter 10, 'Hellenistic Rhetoric in Theory and Practice', J. Vanderspoel explains how the conquests of Alexander and his eastern Mediterranean successors led to an educational revolution. It was here, Vanderspoel suggests, that the study and practice of Greek rhetoric in the Hellenistic world came of age. As schools proliferated to accommodate the increasing demand among local elites for a Greek education, the numbers of those trained in the technical aspects of Greek rhetoric also rose. Vanderspoel shows how rhetorical scholarship proceeded apace in this period, its study and practice becoming ever more technical. In Chapter 11 on Greek rhetoric in Rome, J. Connolly argues that it was the political character of Greek rhetoric that captivated Roman culture. She illustrates that the evolution of the Roman state from Republic to Empire developed certain internal social and political pressures, creating a challenge for which rhetoric is offered as a means to ensure stable government. Rounding out Part II, E. Jeffreys in Chapter 12 examines the influence of the ancient Greek intellectual heritage on the Byzantine world. She centers much of her discussion on the application of various genres, such as *ekphrasis*, the *epithalamios logos*, and the *epitaphios logos*, to oral (such as speeches given in the imperial court) and literary (such as hagiography) contexts.

In Part III, the focus is on Greek oratory. Contributors take a closer look at the major components of formal oratory as well as Aristotle's highly influential, three-fold functional division of oratory. In Chapter 13, M. de Brauw describes the four traditional parts of Greek and Roman speech with the goal of determining whether fifth- and fourth-century oratorical practice vindicates the views set out in theoretical treatises such as the *Rhetoric to Alexander* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. He suggests that while practice does on occasion confirm theory, in a majority of instances Attic oratory in fact strays from the traditional four-part arrangement. In Chapter 14, C. Cooper defends the practice of forensic oratory against Plato and Aristotle, who perceive it as an activity inferior to deliberative oratory. Cooper claims that the focus of most late fifth- and early fourth-century works written on oratory, whether theoretical discussion about speech structure or model speeches, was directed toward forensic oratory. This claim is illustrated with a discussion of Lysias' famous defense of Euphiletus, whereby it is argued that Athenians of the classical period were quite justified in devoting much of their intellectual energy towards cultivating this particular oratorical practice. S. Usher addresses the topic of deliberative or symbouleutic oratory in Chapter 15. He discerns two phases of symbouleutic oratory in the classical period. The first takes place in the fifth century, when historians such as Thucydides describe speakers engaged in a deliberative context primarily to explain the reasoning behind their own (i.e., the speakers') decisions. The second, newer phase can be seen best in the person of Demosthenes who, it is argued, solicited sympathy and aroused patriotism in the Athenian *Boulē* to justify personal political initiatives. In Chapter 16, C. Carey discusses the various manifestations of speech-making traditionally categorized as epideictic, that is, speeches meant for 'display' (*epideiktikos logos*). Carey points out that far from being mere showpieces, epideictic speeches were often generated in highly competitive environments; for example, as 'self-advertising' for students of rhetoric, or for profit if they were demonstrations of a teacher's method of argumentation. The funeral oration (*epitaphios logos*) and speeches of praise and blame are further examples of epideictic speech cultivated in the classical period to such a high level that they would become standard genres for imitation throughout the rest of antiquity.

Part IV is an ambitious overview of the role of rhetoric in key political, social, and intellectual contexts. In Chapter 17, Ian Worthington provides a succinct narrative of what he calls the 'rise of the *rhētores*' to argue that the rise of a class of identifiable and highly influential orators was due to changes in Athenian democracy, but notes that political and even physical constraints of public speaking situations arguably diminished the quality of discourse and decision-making. A. Erskine, in Chapter 18, notes that our study of Greek rhetoric too often begins and ends with the classical era and contends that rhetoric grew to become an essential element of Greek education and continued to be an important force in politics throughout the Hellenistic era, notably in diplomatic exchanges in settings where the *polis* still retained an important political identity. Chapter 19, by J.P. Sickinger, describes how Athenian law was but one of many potential resources drawn upon by rhetors in forensic settings to advance their case and describes the passages from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and the *Rhetoric to Alexander* that provide advice to *rhētores* on how to deal with the law in their speeches. The chapter provides a summary of the tactics utilized in a number of preserved forensic texts and is particularly useful in reminding us how different Greek legal



rhetoric was from contemporary legal discourse. In Chapter 20, T. Morgan traces the history of place of rhetoric in Greek education. She provides what Schiappa has described (and critiqued) elsewhere as the standard account of early Greek rhetorical education, but such a narrative is valuable, particularly for students, since no complete counter narrative has yet been generated.<sup>8</sup> Furthermore, Morgan's narrative extends through the time of Quintilian.

Up to this point in Part IV, the term *rhetoric* is used by *Companion* chapter authors primarily to denote traditional oratory. In Chapter 21, K. Dowden describes public prayer as a fictional speech of persuasion to expand the scope of rhetoric to include religious ritual. His chapter demonstrates the applicability of the vocabulary of rhetorical criticism to Greek religious verbal and nonverbal religious practices. A. López Eire, in Chapter 22, mines the texts of a variety of early Greek thinkers to argue that 'rhetoricity' is an unavoidable characteristic of all language. Challenging the view that language is basically referential and representational, Eire defines rhetoricity as the quality or capacity of language that persuades listeners primarily with psychological and aesthetic strategies. In so doing, he provides a classical precursor to the twentieth century argument that all language use has an inescapable rhetorical function. In Chapter 23, J. Allen is less interested in rhetoric *per se* than he is in charting the origins of the discipline of Logic. His account illustrates that what we consider the study of logic has its origins in the practice of dialectic and becomes the formal analysis of propositional form in Aristotle and subsequent philosophers.

T. Reinhardt, in Chapter 24, provides an introduction to an important issue that came to occupy many rhetorical theorists in the late twentieth century; namely, what can be called rhetorical epistemology. To what extent is rhetoric, understood here as the art of the *rhētōr*, based on, or capable of producing, knowledge? Reinhardt provides a narrative of the debate over such issues that appear in the texts of the classical era that will be particularly of value to those unfamiliar with the classical antecedents to twentieth century texts devoted to such matters. J.M. Day in Chapter 25 offers an introductory overview to the relationship between rhetoric and ethics from the older sophists to Plato. Day makes the important point that oratory provides key historical evidence about the ethical norms and values advanced in the discourse of elites in Greek society. Moreover, such discourse can itself become the subject of critical ethical appraisal by other elites.

In Chapter 26, J. Roisman illustrates the ways in which Greek rhetorical theory and practice were gendered in a manner he describes as agonistic masculinity. Noting the close association between Greek military warfare (which was almost continuous throughout the classical era) and the war of words between speakers, Roisman shows how the discourse and performance of orators reflects, reinforces, and performs dominant Greek norms of masculine identity. D. Konstan, in Chapter 27, rounds out Part IV with an erudite discussion of rhetoric and emotion. His focus is on two kinds of evidence: The accounts of emotion in technical treatises devoted to rhetoric (with an appropriately strong emphasis on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*) and an analysis of emotional appeals found in the texts of Attic orators. Noting that multiple disciplines still analyze the role of emotion in human cognition and behaviour, Konstan rightly points out that the classical antecedents to such studies are rightly located in the arena of rhetoric, where the importance of emotion first became the object of systematic analysis.

Part V contains a series of studies of rhetoric and Greek literature. ‘Rhetoric’ is used in these chapters to denote a particular *function* of literature (the rhetoricity of literature), a subject of discussion within such literature, a set of specific strategic techniques employed by authors to gain a desired effect, and in some cases, even to describe an implicit theory of discourse and persuasion that can be abduced from literary texts. In Chapter 28, H.M. Roisman observes that, given the centrality of speech-making in Homer’s *Iliad*, the text can be interpreted as a meditation on persuasion. Roisman provides a close reading of the opposing speeches by Theristes and Odysseus over whether the troops should leave the battle for home or stay on and fight until Troy is defeated. From her reading, Roisman constructs an interesting implicit Homeric theory of right rhetoric that is described primarily in Aristotelian terms. Similarly, in Chapter 29, J. Strauss Clay reconstructs an account of the power and efficacy of speech based on her interpretation of the poems of Hesiod. Like Roisman in the previous chapter, she draws from Aristotle’s vocabulary to explicate rhetorical concepts from Hesiod’s poems. The result is an account that demonstrates Hesiod’s use of rhetoric (in the sense of strategic devices) as well as reconstructs what could be called an implicit theory of rhetoric (understood broadly as persuasive discourse). A. Mori, in Chapter 30, does not attempt to reconstruct a coherent theory of rhetoric in Apollonius’ epic *Argonautica*, but instead provides a close reading to illustrate how important communicative practices are to the story and character development, in particular Jason’s demonstration of persuasive skill and various characters’ truthful and deceptive language use. Mori identifies interesting points of contrast with similar themes in Homer that suggest such texts can be mined to track changes over time in cultural assumptions and practices concerning persuasion and the use of force.

M. McDonald, in Chapter 31, provides a thorough account of the deployment of rhetoric in the tragedy of Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and fourth-century tragedians. ‘Rhetoric’ is used by McDonald to describe a range of phenomena including rhetorical techniques of language use, speech-making, and oratorical training. Even if one disagrees with McDonald’s acceptance of the standard account of the emergence of rhetoric as a discipline in the fifth century, her cataloguing of rhetorical materials in Greek tragedy amply demonstrates how one characteristic of the Greek Enlightenment was growing reflexivity about the process of persuasion as manifested in all language arts. Aristophanes’ comedy is the focus of Chapter 32 by T.K. Hubbard. Aristophanes’ plays amply document speakers employing self-conscious linguistic strategies to persuade others, which Hubbard appropriately labels as ‘rhetoric’. Setting aside his disagreement with scholars he describes as ‘sceptics’ about the status of rhetorical theory and pedagogy in the fifth century, Hubbard provides compelling evidence that Aristophanes was an insightful observer and skilled critic of educational practices of the late fifth century that included argumentation, persuasion, and oratory.<sup>9</sup>

W.H. Race, in Chapter 33, accomplishes two useful goals. First, he provides an interesting history of the evolution of scholarship on the rhetorical aspects of the lyric poetry of Pindar. Second, through close analysis of a diverse sampling of verse, Race presses home the contention that poetry often uses rhetorical arguments; put another way, lyric poetry advances claims supported by forms of inference that would later be described and codified in treatises on rhetoric. In Chapter 34, R. Webb examines prose fiction in post-classical Greek literature to explicate the cultural significance of speeches and narratives within the world depicted by early novels. Such novels



appeared at roughly the same time as the Second Sophistic, a fact that Webb believes has led some literary critics to judge the rhetorical passages of the novels harshly. Webb analyzes a series of interesting examples to argue that the practical techniques of rhetoric are crucial to the success of the novels in general, and in particular provide the novelist with a ‘code’ with which to develop specific characters through the discourse those characters speak.

Last but far from least, M. Fox and N. Livingstone, in Chapter 35, point out the distinctly rhetorical tasks of Greek ‘historians’ by noting that they had to re-create important speeches as well as provide compelling narratives (narrative being an important component in forensic rhetoric). The authors analyze a variety of writers – from Homer to Isocrates to Lucian – to track the variations among historical writers’ attitudes towards, and use of, rhetoric in order to gain insight into how Greeks thought about their past and about the best way of writing about it. In more contemporary parlance we might say that a Greek author’s historiographical commitments necessarily entail at least an implicit rhetorical theory.

The last chapter is an appropriate one to conclude this *Companion*, for we have come full circle, given that all the authors of these texts have written as *rhētores*, necessarily committed to a host of theoretical beliefs about rhetoric and historiographical commitments.

## Notes

- 1 On the concept of rhetorical salience, see E. Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*<sup>2</sup> (Columbia, SC: 2003), pp. 206–12.
- 2 Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*, pp. 64–69.
- 3 Contrast the accounts of Gorgias that can be found in E. Schiappa, *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999) with S. Consigny, *Gorgias: Sophist and Artist* (Columbia, SC: 2001).
- 4 For a discussion of the origins of the word *rhētorikē*, see Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos*, pp. 39–58 and Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, pp. 14–29.
- 5 M. Gagarin, ‘Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?’, *Rhetorica* 19 (2001), pp. 275–291. See also Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* and M. Gagarin, *Antiphon The Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists* (Austin: 2002).
- 6 See, for example, Consigny, *Gorgias. Sophist and Artist*, Gagarin, *Antiphon the Athenian*, B. McComiskey, *Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 2002), Schiappa, *Protagoras and Logos* and *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*.
- 7 G.A. Kennedy, ‘Some Recent Controversies in the Study of Later Greek Rhetoric,’ *AJP* 124 (2003), pp. 295–301.
- 8 For a critique of the standard account, see Schiappa, *Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, Part 1.
- 9 Hubbard treats the ‘sceptical’ positions of T. Cole (*The Origins of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* [Baltimore: 1991]) and E. Schiappa as identical, despite Schiappa’s explicit disagreement with Cole’s conflation of rhetorical theory and practice (*Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory*, p. 22). We have it on good authority that Schiappa agrees with almost everything Hubbard advances in this chapter, but would still insist that Hubbard overestimates the status of a technical vocabulary of rhetorical theory in the fifth century and underestimates the intellectual consequences of the development of that vocabulary in the fourth. But this disagreement will have to be settled at another time and place.

## CHAPTER TWO

# Modern Interpretations of Classical Greek Rhetoric

---

*Takis Poulakos*

As with other areas of study, approaches to classical Greek rhetoric have typically followed larger interpretive trends, along with numerous smaller strands, traversing our times. Of these, two broadly-ranging trends guiding interpretation of classical rhetoric in our moment stand out most prominently: ideological critique and human agency. For the most part, the two approaches are closely intertwined and, indeed for many scholars, each is taken to be one leg of the same dialectic – the former exploring the various social, economic, and cultural forces shaping rhetorical texts and practices, the latter exploring possible ways in which rhetorical texts and practices themselves turn against the very forces that have shaped them. Naturally, there are exceptions, as some scholars have placed the emphasis on one of the two approaches without concerning themselves with the other.

Indeed, during the heyday of ideological critique, classical Greek rhetoric was approached as a site for exploring and discerning the operations of mystification that the ruling class needed in order to sustain its social and cultural norms and to legitimate its economic interests. Rhetorical treatises along with the education they promoted, previously celebrated for their competitive spirit and their potentially egalitarian effects, came to be interrogated for their collusion with aristocracy and their complicity with elitism; see M.I. Finley, *The Use and Abuse of History* (New York: 1975). Public speeches – long exalted as testaments of individual power, signs of open competition for excellence, and reliable indicators of a healthy public sphere – became fertile ground for an analysis and a critique of the subtle ways in which social structures of inequality and the powers sustaining them could be masked, maintained, and perpetuated (cf. N. Loraux, *The Invention of Athens: The Funeral Oration in the Classical City* [Cambridge, MA: 1986]). The interpretive strategies of ideological critique were especially endorsed by scholars who, holding on to Plato's distinction between the apparent and the real, understood rhetoric as deliberate manipulation of truth. Presuming to possess the necessary know-how in order to distinguish the objectively true from the ideologically constructed, these scholars posited themselves as knowing

subjects, able to occupy an ideologically-free space, and approached rhetorical texts as ideological representations whose mystificatory character had to be exposed and whose falsehood needed to be brought to light. The most influential work exemplifying this approach to classical rhetoric is Loraux's *The Invention of Athens*, a study in which fourth-century orators are presented as aristocracy's mouthpieces and 'specialists of half-truths' (p. 138), deliberately seeking to create a false image of Athens and to 'give Athenians an aristocratic image of themselves' (pp. 150–151).

In time, it became evident that ideological critique had run its course. For the premises of ideological critique, urging judgments about the past on the basis of our valuations in the present, led scholars to reach the same conclusion time and again: that the values promoted by classical Greek rhetoric paled by comparison to our own values and that, as a vehicle for aristocratic, sexist, elitist, and racist valuations, classical Greek rhetoric had nothing of substance to offer to our own preoccupations at present. Following the same fate that the entire Greek culture suffered in the hands of an ideological critique that fervently challenged the long-standing tradition of ancient Greece as the origin of civilization, democracy, and liberal education, classical rhetoric and its ancient-long links with democratic practices in the public sphere were also ardently undermined. In effect, the notion that the tradition of rhetoric was a meaningful part of our intellectual tradition and, as such, held some important relevance to our present concerns, was vehemently dismissed.

The excessive contestations of ideological critique, and especially the failure to come to terms with our intellectual tradition in any way other than suggest its complete obliteration, prompted scholars to recast the premises of ideological critique as so many givens on the basis of which the relevance of classical rhetoric to our contemporary concerns could be pursued. Rather than conducting inquiries that ended at the point of exposing non-egalitarian valuations in the Greek culture, scholars approached these same valuations as formations of structures against which possible workings of human agency could be discerned and rendered visible. While taking for granted rhetoric's collusion with non-egalitarian valuations, inquiries into human agency turned the spotlight onto terrains in which rhetoric could be shown to contest, challenge, or render questionable the very valuations that informed its uses and practices. In *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People* (Princeton: 1989), J. Ober, for instance, found – in the same aristocratic valuations that Loraux had taken to fashion entirely the rhetoric of fourth-century orators – a space from within which the orators' criticisms of the Athenian *dēmos* and the Athenian democracy could in fact be understood as so many gestures that wittingly or unwittingly contributed to the strengthening of democracy. Ober's thesis, that by allowing its critics free speech the *dēmos* found ways to display its power and solidarity, and that by engaging in free speech the critics of the *dēmos* performed democratic practices in spite of themselves, points to critics of democracy in fourth-century Greece as occupying a subject position whose discursive effects are not reducible to the single function of serving the interests of aristocracy. Such a space – also explored by J.P. Euben in his *Athenian Political Thought and the Reconstruction of American Democracy* (Ithaca: 1994) – issues a number of challenges against assumptions made by ideological critique, namely, that political rhetoric must be addressed from a stable perspective, and that discourses on rhetorical education and their relation to civic norms can only ensue from a single angle.

The first challenge was taken up by H. Yunis in *Taming Democracy: Models of Political Rhetoric in Classical Athens* (Ithaca: 1996), who examines the discourse of political deliberation in Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes. Yunis recasts the familiar attacks against rhetoric for flattering and pandering to mass audiences as cultural givens alongside which a deeper vision of political deliberation thrives which, tying together a historian, a philosopher, and an orator, aims not only to mediate political conflicts and unify the various factions of the city but also to educate the citizenry into the kind of political deliberation that promises to turn the *polis* into a community.

The second challenge was taken up by a number of scholars seeking to rethink classical rhetorical education in relation to modern civic and pedagogical practices characterizing our democratic commitments today. Without attempting to make orators and rhetoricians appear less dismal on issues of gender, class, and race than they were shown to be, the following works comprise so many efforts to discern in classical rhetoric and rhetorical education openings and possibilities that would enable us to fashion areas of compatibility with and relevance to our own civic and educational activities. These include S. Jarratt's *Rereading the Sophists* (Carbondale, Ill: 1991), C. Glenn's *Rhetoric Retold* (Carbondale, Ill: 1997), J. Atwill's *Rhetoric Reclaimed* (Ithaca: 1998), J. Kastely's *Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition* (New Haven: 1997), V. Vitanza's *Writing Histories of Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 1994), and my *Rethinking the History of Rhetoric* (Boulder, CO: 1993). Some of these efforts were carried out by means of rhetoric's function to persuade: its philosophical alliance with principles of relativity, its communicative proclivity to reach multiple (and therefore diverse) audiences, and its aesthetic propensity to move auditors toward alternative directions if possible. Others were carried out by means of the constitutive function of rhetoric: its productive capacity to create social bonds and unify audiences through identification.

While the studies above found new ways to reconnect classical rhetoric with our times and to extend in multiple directions the range of its relevance to our contemporary concerns, they nevertheless failed to disassociate themselves from the set of assumptions that plagued the logic of ideological critique: that rhetorical texts and practices in classical Greece are to be appropriated for present purposes and current stakes. Like their ideological counterparts, studies in human agency treated rhetoric as a symptom of something else. Even as both approaches illuminated profoundly classical rhetoric's connections to our present viewpoints, they did not also elucidate ways in which rhetoric could differ from ideological discourses or discourses of empowerment. Nor did they reveal any additional ways in which rhetoric could manifest itself other than as a symptom of power structures or as a source of investing individuals with human agency. In short, both approaches shed less light on classical rhetoric than on the scholarly agendas circulating in and being endorsed by the academy today.

The scholarly appropriation of classical rhetoric for present purposes raised an issue for several scholars as to the responsibility interpreters had to explore classical rhetoric in itself rather than to appropriate it for contemporary concerns. The issue became especially heated in the case of the sophists whose fragmentary texts and incomplete character of their rhetoric could hardly offer any material resistance to the degree of interpretive freedom scholars could exert. At stake were such works as B. McComiskey's

*Gorgias and the New Sophistic Rhetoric* (Carbondale, Ill: 2002), Jarratt's *Rereading the Sophists*, and J. Neel's *Plato, Derrida, and Writing* (Carbondale, Ill: 1988), which were seen as having created too great a disjuncture between, on the one hand, understanding sophistic rhetoric on its own terms and, on the other hand, appropriating sophistic rhetoric for contemporary concerns. The ensuing debate, mostly captured in S. Consigny's *Gorgias, Sophist and Artist* (Columbia, SC: 2001), V. Vitanza's *Negation, Subjectivity and the History of Rhetoric* (Albany, NY: 1997), E. Schiappa's 'Neo-Sophistic Rhetorical Criticism or the Historical Reconstruction of Sophistic Doctrines?' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 23 (1990), pp. 92–217, and J. Poulakos' 'Interpreting Sophistic Rhetoric: A Response to Schiappa,' *Philosophy and Rhetoric* 23 (1990), pp. 218–228, raised methodological issues about processes of reconstructing fragmentary texts and of recovering their function within past contexts. But other than advancing the tacit agreement that sophistic rhetoric ought to be examined in its own cultural milieu, the debate did very little to advance an understanding of classical rhetoric on its own terms. Perhaps not surprisingly, the debate focused instead on ways of understanding contemporary approaches and of coming to terms with the types of assumptions interpreters deployed in their reading of the sophists. In Consigny's *Gorgias, Sophist and Artist*, the debate has been arranged into methodologically compatible groupings of scholars whose perspectives on the sophists are organized under such labels as objectivist, subjectivist, rhapsodic, empiricist, and anti-foundationalist. Consigny's own approach to sophistic discourse, an expressed blending of a pragmatist and conventionalist or communitarian strategies, attests to a widely accepted notion in the academy today – that the key to reading past works and practices on their own terms lies in the interpreter's selection of the 'right' theoretical lens or combination of lenses among the repertoire of current theories available at present.

One way some scholars sought to understand classical rhetoric in its original setting was to consider its disciplinary status in classical Greece. T. Cole's *The Origin of Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Baltimore: 1991) and E. Schiappa's *The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece* (New Haven: 1999) approached classical rhetoric by stressing the boundaries Plato and Aristotle had placed around it as they attempted to distinguish it from other areas of study. According to Cole, who regards rhetoric as a fourth-century phenomenon, it was Plato and Aristotle who first recognized rhetoric and gave it the kind of self-conscious awareness it needed in order to develop as an art. The two 'had to invent rhetoric' because the 'assumption of an essentially transparent medium that neither impedes nor facilitates the transmission of information, emotions, and ideas' was suddenly contested by 'a body of prose texts which might be read or delivered verbatim and still suggest the excitement, atmosphere, and commitment of a spontaneous oral performance or debate' (p. 29). Schiappa similarly argues that rhetoric became a discipline when Plato coined the word *rhetorikē* in order to differentiate rhetorical practices from philosophy and to define the latter through a negative description of the former.

By associating classical rhetoric with the disciplinary identity it was granted by Plato and Aristotle, Cole and Schiappa privilege the kind of rational self-consciousness and literacy characteristic of fourth-century disciplines at the expense of rhetoric's association with orality and myth characteristic of rhetorical practices in previous centuries. Partly shaped by needs created by contemporary disciplinary formations, Cole's and Schiappa's project was also prepared by several lines of inquiry that, situating

rhetoric's beginnings in an oral, poetic, and mythic culture, traced the development of rhetoric along the transition from poetry to prose, myth to reason, and orality to literacy. These lines of inquiry include Eric Havelock's *The Muse Learns to Write* (New Haven: 1986), J. de Romilly's *Magic and Rhetoric in Ancient Greece* (Cambridge, MA: 1975), M. Detienne's *The Masters of Truth in Ancient Greece* (New York: 1996) and A. Lentz's *Orality and Literacy in Hellenic Greece* (Carbondale, Ill: 1989). By assuming a development model, according to which rhetoric was initially a sub-genre of poetry, be it poetic eloquence or protorhetoric, on its way to a more fully developed phase, the logic characterizing these studies paved the way for Cole and Schiappa to argue that rhetoric could only be considered fully developed at the point when it was first self-consciously recognized as a discipline.

While the disciplinary status of rhetoric illuminates aspects of the cultural context within which rhetoric first came to be thought as a unique area of study, it also poses severe limits on the kinds of investigations that can be conducted about rhetoric's relation to the Greek culture. What cultural practices fostered rhetoric and shaped it, how rhetoric provided different responses to different historical developments, or what rhetorical practices shaped intellectual currents and social activities in Greece are questions that require both an open-ended understanding of rhetoric and an unrestricted view of the range of meaningful contacts made between rhetorical and cultural practices. These are also questions that interdisciplinary approaches to classical rhetoric raise. Works like J. Walker's *Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity* (Oxford: 2000), Yunis' *Taming Democracy*, Ian Worthington's edited *Persuasion: Greek Rhetoric in Action* (London: 1994), E. Haskins' *Logos and Power in Isocrates and Aristotle* (Columbia, SC: 2004), and T. Poulakos' and D. Depew's edited *Isocrates and Civic Education* (Austin: 2004) explore classical rhetoric in its various rapprochements with other disciplines in order to discern cultural saliency and identify that which emerges as significant for the Greek culture in particular moments. Approaching rhetoric as a form of signification that draws its energy from and simultaneously gives meaning to cultural practices, authors of the works and collections above refuse to circumscribe rhetoric around the logic of a discipline. In raising questions about rhetoric's relation to culture, in other words, these scholars do not frame questions in accordance to a disciplinary understanding of rhetoric: they do not say, 'now, let's reframe the question posed in a manner that would eliminate its philosophical components, purge its poetic features, remove its historical dimensions, so that the question could only be addressed by a genuinely disciplinary understanding of rhetoric'. By allowing the questions themselves to determine the scope and the terrain of the inquiry, the works above identify rhetoric with so many ways of being and performing in the world.

## A Case Study of an Interdisciplinary Approach to Classical Rhetoric

Isocrates' decision to label his rhetorical education as education in philosophy presents us with an interesting case to explore classical rhetoric in his day (on Isocrates, see further, T.L. Papillon, Chapter 6). It is interesting because the label *philosophia* defies our disciplinary assumptions. Indeed, from a disciplinary viewpoint, his choice of the term *philosophia* can only be understood either as a misnomer or, as several



scholars have already pointed out, a public relations ploy on his part, a way for him to distance his rhetorical education from the disreputable sophists and to associate himself with the more respected intellectual activity of philosophy. Yet, if we suspend our disciplinary understanding of rhetoric and philosophy, it may be possible to provide some other explanation that will in turn also shed light back on alternative ways of understanding rhetoric's relation to the Greek culture.

To begin with, let us keep in mind that the kind of question Isocrates addresses is not rhetorical but pedagogical and, from all indications, a question that many intellectuals in his day were also raising with an utmost sense of urgency: can education in any way help bring the city out of its near-crisis situation? Isocrates' general claim, that he can teach people how to discover the right course of action for the city in any given situation, shows that the pedagogy he was practicing had been designed to provide a response to the intellectual concerns of his day. His specific claim, that he can help students improve their judgments and, as he puts it, enable an orator 'by his powers of conjecture (*doxa*) arrive generally at the best course of action' (15.271) or reach 'a judgment (*doxa*) which is accurate in meeting occasions as they arise and rarely misses the expedient course of action' (12.30), shows that he framed the question in political and philosophical terms. For *doxa* (opinion, belief, judgment, conjecture) invited both sets of problems. Politically, *doxa* determines the fate of the community, and human lives often hang on a single opinion that dominates deliberation in the Assembly and binds Athenians to a particular course of action. Isocrates' contemporaries knew too well that the rise and fall of the Athenian empire had been a story of good and poor judgments made by orators/politicians.

Philosophically, *doxa* posed the vexing problem of standards. On what basis could one *doxa* be said to be better than another? What certainty could we have that even the best judgment reached was anything more than a lucky guess? Plato had already addressed in the *Meno* the problem of arriving at the correct solution for the city as a problem of *doxa*. Even though the good statesman in the *Meno* wants to make the right decision for his people every time, he is inevitably caught up in a situation where, with mere opinion as his guide, he sometimes hits and sometimes misses the mark. Plato's proposed solution, that one must reach a level of knowledge (*epistēmē*) that would provide a standard for judging false and correct opinions alike, was expressed as follows: 'He who has knowledge will always hit on the right way, whereas he who has right opinion will sometimes do so, but sometimes not' (97c). It was a solution Isocrates could easily dismiss by redirecting the issue back to the political realm: unless someone has the ability to predict the future, he reasoned, there can be no certainty about the outcome of political decisions. This reasoning gave Isocrates the authority to expose Plato's philosophy as being out of touch with Athenian politics – 'no system of knowledge can possibly cover these occasions, since in all cases they elude our science' (15.184) – and plenty of opportunities to remind his audience that, in the political realm, *doxa* is all there is: 'In dealing with matters about which they take counsel, [people] ought not to think that they have exact knowledge of what the result will be, but to be minded towards these contingencies as men who indeed exercise their best judgment (*doxa*) but are not sure what the future may hold in store' (8.8).

The question Isocrates raised about *doxa*, then, led to a philosophical problem that philosophy, as practiced at the time, was not equipped to resolve. The importance of the question he raised, self-evident to his contemporaries, provided him with an angle

from which to critique the existing practices of philosophy: 'I hold that what some people call philosophy is not entitled to that name' (15.270). But if Isocrates criticized the discipline of philosophy for not being able to resolve the problem of *doxa* in the context of political deliberation, he also criticized the discipline of rhetoric for not even addressing *doxa* as a problem. For the field of rhetoric had thus far placed all its energy on eloquence and persuasion, *eu legein*. The plethora of sophistic teachings on rhetoric made it fairly easy for someone to learn how to defend his *doxa* or undermine his opponent's *doxa* eloquently and persuasively. However much improved in the areas of pleasing discourses and techniques with persuasion, the discipline of rhetoric had thus far nothing to say about the process of formulating sound judgments.

Isocrates addressed the lacuna he had identified in the disciplines of philosophy and rhetoric, as they were practiced at the time, by resorting to history. Athenian history, with its plentiful examples of sound decision making and good judgments in political deliberation, offered countless opportunities to witness *doxa* in its best possible renderings. Isocrates points to Solon, Cleisthenes, and Pericles as men in the distant past who had repeatedly reached sound decisions, had spoken eloquently and persuasively, and had advocated courses of action that conferred the greatest benefits on their fellow Athenians. These men, he remarks, were 'the best statesmen ever to have come before the rostrum', 'the most reputable orators among the ancients', and 'the cause of most blessings for the city' (15.231).

Isocrates' move to history enabled him to offer a pragmatic solution to the problem of *doxa*. If we have no criteria for distinguishing one *doxa* from another, we can at least look to the past and identify examples of wise people having made sound decisions. Furthermore, we can study these examples at present. Under his guidance, he remarks, a student will select from the past 'those examples which are the most illustrious and the most edifying; and, habituating himself to contemplate and appraise such examples, he will feel their influence not only in the preparation of a given discourse but in all the actions of his life' (15.277). By invoking the great statesmen of the past, Solon, Cleisthenes, and Pericles, who were still celebrated in his day for their practical wisdom in strengthening the city as well as for their persuasive eloquence, Isocrates succeeded in creating a space where rhetoric and philosophy could first be reconfigured and then be blended together into an indissolubly single practice. It is the space of *sophia*, an old cultural activity, still being understood by his contemporaries as practical wisdom in action.

Isocrates ends his inquiry into *doxa* by bringing philosophy to the service of *sophia*, contemplation to action. The distinction between the two, as the following passage demonstrates, is the difference between wise decisions made in the past and the preparation necessary to develop the ability to make sound decisions in the present (15.270–271):

I hold those men to be wise (*sophous*) who are able by the power of conjecture to arrive generally at the best course, and philosophers those occupying themselves with the studies from which they gain most quickly that kind of insight (*phronēsis*).

Wise people are men of action, blessed with practical wisdom and the power to make correct conjectures or, translated more literally, to arrive at successful opinions, as much as that is humanly possible. Philosophers are those who study the decisions of